Citizen attitudes of political distrust: examining distrust through technical, ethical and interest-based evaluations by Bertsou, Eri
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citizen Attitudes of Political Distrust: 
Examining Distrust through Technical, Ethical and Interest-Based 
Evaluations 
 
 
Eri Bertsou 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of 
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
London, December 2015 
 
	   2	  
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I 
have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work 
carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided 
that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior 
written consent. 
 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any 
third party. 
 
 
I declare my thesis consist of 82,752 words.
	   3	  
ACKNOWLDEGMENTS	  
 
The completion of this PhD would not have been possible without the support and guidance 
of many individuals in the past four years. Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my 
supervisor Michael Bruter for his expert guidance and continuous support over the past years. 
My fascination with the world of research and return to academia, as well as the realization of 
this research project, would have never taken place without his encouragement and 
inspirational influence.  
 
I would also like to thank the Onassis Public Benefit Foundation for their generous financial 
support of my doctoral studies through their scholarship for Hellenes (F ZI 041-1). I am also 
grateful to the family of Baroness Birk and the Government Department at the London 
School of Economics for the scholarship in support of doctoral students. My research 
experience as a PhD student was also greatly enriched through my work at ECREP 
conducting research in Electoral Psychology, with Michael Bruter, Sarah Harrison and 
Sophie Lecheler. I thank them for the opportunities they provided and all their useful 
instructions over the past years.  
 
I am also grateful to Sofie Marien for her comments on chapters of this thesis and Marc 
Hooghe for numerous insightful discussions and exchanges on the issue of political trust and 
distrust. I would also like to thank my old friend and colleague Spyros Kosmidis for his 
mentoring and advice, both on my research and broader academic development. I am 
especially grateful to many professors and colleagues at the LSE, whose comments and 
feedback in research workshops and conferences helped me develop my research and refine 
this thesis.  
 
My doctoral journey would certainly not be the same without the stimulating discussions, 
plentiful exchanges of ideas and cherished friendship of fellow researchers at the LSE’s 
Government Department. My thanks go to Giulia Pastorella, Ellie Knott, Nicola Mastrorocco, 
Jack Blumenau, Laura Bromley and Kara Akkoyunlu for the many intellectually stimulating 
debates and great deal of laughter they have offered over the past years. I would also like to 
thank Gisela Calderon, Anahi Wiedenbrug, Marta Wojciechowska, Randi Soljhell, Paola 
Romero, Jose Olivas Osuna, Kenneth Bunker, Stefan Bawchowitz, Ignazio De Ferrari, Feline 
Freier and Johannes Wolf. Their friendship, collegial support and pool of knowledge has 
greatly contributed to my time at the LSE.  
 
Most importantly, I am enormously grateful to Alessandro and my family, my mother Gina, 
my father Nikos and my brother Tasos. They have taken the meaning of the words ‘love’ and 
‘support’ to a whole new level over the past years and above all, this thesis is dedicated to 
them. I would like to thank my mother for her unwavering belief in me, which made it 
possible for me to believe in myself; my father for always challenging me to be the best I can 
be and to persevere; and my brother for his positive influence and life-long support. Finally, I 
am thankful to Alessandro for his endless encouragement, daily care and occasionally 
required crisis management. His unreserved support and inspiring influence have been a 
treasured part of my doctoral journey and beyond.  
	   4	  
ABSTRACT  
 
Citizen orientations towards their political leaders, institutions and political systems sits at the 
heart of political science and political behaviour, yet despite the potential challenges 
distrusting citizenries pose for the operation and stability of democratic systems, there has 
been no consensus on what political distrust really is, what it means for the citizens that 
express it, what its implications are for political systems and how to best capture it across 
established democracies. The dissonance between empirical observations of citizen 
distrusting attitudes and the analytical concepts used to study political orientations, which 
have mainly focused on trust, make this the right time to ask “What is political distrust?” and 
to investigate how this attitude area can help social scientists better understand current 
phenomena of political behaviour across democratic systems. This thesis postulates that we 
cannot conclusively interpret the significance of plummeting trust indicators nor apprehend 
their consequences for democratic politics without a clear understanding of citizens’ political 
distrust, defined in its own right and separated from competing notions, such as cynicism or 
the lack of trust.  
The thesis follows a mixed methodological approach to the study of political distrust from the 
perspective of citizens. It develops a conceptual model for distrusting political attitudes based 
on theoretical work and novel empirical evidence from three European democracies – Italy, 
the UK and Greece. Our model conceptualises political distrust as a dynamic, relational and 
evaluative attitude that follows technical, ethical and interest-based assessments to judge the 
untrustworthiness of political agents. Further, the thesis puts this conceptual model to the test, 
creating a novel survey indicator and providing new quantitative evidence regarding the 
structure and operation of political distrust. It finds support for our conceptualisation of 
distrusting attitudes as retrospective and prospective evaluative judgments and highlights the 
prominence of perceptions of unethical political conduct in shaping political distrust. Using a 
multiple-item indicator tapping into evaluations of national parliament and a citizen’s 
preferred political party we explore the dimensionality and hierarchy of each evaluation and 
unravel a double operation of distrusting attitudes, both as specific assessments of political 
agents along these three dimensions and as a cognitive evaluative shortcut acting in a cyclical 
reinforcing manner. We also investigate how the newly identified aspects of political distrust 
relate to citizens’ behavioural intentions for participating in politics and find differences in 
the motivating and demotivating influence of distrusting attitudes targeted at different parts 
of the political system.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 The puzzle of political distrust and motivation for the thesis  
1.2 A problem of definition: Theoretical framework and review of current research 
1.3 Summary of case selection and methodology 
1.4 Main findings and contribution of the thesis 
1.5 Chapter summaries 
 
1.1 The puzzle of political distrust and motivation for the thesis  
 
The concept of political trust has received considerable attention in the academic literature. 
Scholars have theorised about and empirically researched the benefits of citizens’ trust in 
politicians, political institutions and governments since the 1960s. Theoretical accounts on 
the importance of political trust in democracies reach as far back as texts from classical 
Greece and the treatises of John Locke.1  Political trust has been identified as a key 
component of diffuse support for democratic systems and is considered necessary for their 
survival (Easton, 1965; 1975; Norris, 2011; Braithwaite and Levi, 1998). Given its 
significance, political scientists have been using mass surveys and frequent polling to closely 
monitor citizen attitudes towards government, political institutions and the political system in 
general, first in the US and Britain, and subsequently across other European democracies. 
Yet, what we observe in most established democracies with more and more regularity are 
citizen attitudes towards politicians and institutions that can be best characterised as attitudes 
of distrust, not trust. One can easily notice such widespread negative orientations to politics 
across mass media, social media and critical commentaries of current affairs.2 It is not only 
the recent financial meltdown that has triggered waves of protests across the US and Europe, 
nor the Euro-zone crisis that has strained citizens’ support for their political systems in 
peripheral European countries. A wide range of phenomena, such as the London riots of 2011 
or the rise in extreme-right voting and success of anti-systemic fringe parties throughout 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Locke, “Second Treatise on Government” (1982) and the ‘‘Anonymous Iamblichi’’ (Gagarin and 
2 Some recent examples include the London riots of 2011 (Monde Diplomatique, 2012; Independent, 2012), the 
French and British student protests over policy and young people’s hostile to political processes (The 
Conversation, 2014), the Indignados and other political movements in Spain interpreted as the manifestation of 
distrust in political elites (Good, 2014) and the ‘We won’t pay’ anti-austerity movement (Guardian, 2011). 
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European countries, have been interpreted as manifestations of political distrust (Jennings 
and Stoker, 2015; Hartleb, 2015). 
 
Survey trends also paint a rather negative picture. In the latest Eurobarometer survey 
conducted in May 2015, over 62% of all Europeans claim not to trust their national 
parliament and national government.3 There are significant cross-country differences of 
course, but even among Scandinavian countries, around 30% of citizens claim not to trust 
their representative political institutions. A recent OECD report tracing the state of political 
trust among its 34 members also shows on average 60% of citizens distrust their political 
systems.4 Similarly, in the US, 75% of Americans claim that they ‘never’ or ‘only some of 
the time’ trust their government to do what is right. Such negative responses have been the 
norm rather than the exception in the US since the 1970s, and negative trends have ensued in 
other established democracies.5 Public and academic debate has focused largely on the 
interpretation of these trends and their implications for the health of democratic systems, 
bypassing the question of what political distrust really is and what it entails for citizens that 
express it.   
 
Some scholars highlighted the prevalence of negative attitudes towards politics and people 
involved in government prior to the 1970s, even in nations considered to exhibit civic culture 
virtues (Hart, 1978; Norris 1999). A recent British study dedicated to negative citizen 
orientations replicated a question polled in 1944 and 1972, asking citizens whether they 
believed British politicians were out for themselves, their party or the good of the country 
(Jennings and Stoker, 2015). In 1944 only one in three respondents believed their politicians 
were doing what is best for the country, while 70 years later this ratio has shrunk to one in 
ten. The worsening image of politicians is evident, yet at the same time this early poll shows 
that two out of three people asked in 1944 still believed their politicians were either out for 
themselves or for their party, hardly a sturdy basis for a positive orientation towards those 
who legislate and govern.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Eurobarometer 83 available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm. 
4 OECD Restoring Trust in Government Forum, available at http://www.oecd.org/general/focus/focus-restoring-
trust-in-government.htm. 
5 More than 50% of Americans have registered distrust towards their government since the 1970s, with only a 
brief period following the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US when distrust fell below 50%. For this reason a large 
amount of scholarly work on political trust, its erosion and the implications for the health of democratic polities 
appeared in the US in the beginning of the 1970s. For more information on single question trends see Gallop 
(http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx) and the NES database (http://www.electionstudies.or 
g/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm). 
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The purpose of this thesis is not to address the debate on the timing or extent of the rise in 
political distrust. Rather, it highlights a puzzle that results from the dissonance between 
empirical observations of citizen attitudes of distrust and the analytical concepts used to study 
attitudes towards politics, which have focused on trust. The fact that citizens express 
primarily negative affective and cognitive orientations towards the people that govern them, 
their political institutions and processes has been well documented and studied by a series of 
prominent scholars in the field (Norris, 2011; Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Nye, 1997; Crozier et 
al., 1975; Almond and Verba, 1980). This new pattern of political orientations has been 
assigned various labels, such as ‘dissatisfied democrats’ (Klingemann, 2014) ‘critical 
citizens’ (Norris, 1999; 2011) or ‘emancipated citizens’ (Welzel, 2007; 2013), emphasising 
critical attitudes combined with strong democratic values. Nevertheless, this field of research 
is still missing a clear conceptualisation of political distrust and systematic study of such 
attitudes as expressed by citizens in democratic contexts. We believe that the challenges 
posed by plummeting indicators of political trust and confidence cannot be fully understood 
nor accurately interpreted when ‘political distrust’ has not been conceptually defined in a 
clear way, distinguished from competing notions and studied in its own right. 
 
The recent surge in theoretical and empirical work that attempts to conceptualise and 
understand negative citizen orientations, such as ‘anti-politics’ (Jennings and Stoker, 2015) or 
‘counter-democracy’ (Rosanvallon, 2011), further showcases the need for a change of focus 
and for clearly delineated concepts in the study of citizen attitudes towards politics. In this 
context, the present thesis argues that given the prominence of distrusting attitudes in the 
realm of politics and the fundamental threat political distrust may pose to democratic 
governance and stability, this is the right time to ask: “What is political distrust?” In this 
sense, we claim that we do not really know how citizens think about or express their distrust 
in politics, how they judge the untrustworthiness of political agents and whether different 
political objects are evaluated along similar lines. Finally, we ask whether different 
evaluations of untrustworthiness can illuminate the function of distrust, its association to 
other key political attitudes and its consequences for political behaviour.  
  
An additional piece of the puzzle for the study of political distrust stems from the above 
mentioned survey indicators and polls, which have been providing a wealth of empirical 
evidence on citizen attitudes across countries spanning decades. These measures have been 
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used as indicators of ‘trust in government’ or ‘political trust’ and lower values have been 
assumed to reflect distrusting attitudes. However, this approach has raised question marks 
and has given rise to diverse criticisms on both sides of the Atlantic. When a citizen claims 
she only trusts the government to do what is right “some of the time”, is it a true indication 
that she distrusts her government and the system of governance? Or when citizens report that 
they “tend not to trust” their national parliament, should this be interpreted as an expression 
of distrust towards parliament? Indeed, scholars such as Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker 
have highlighted that “we have yet to question whether all of this research is really about 
trust” (200: 483), referring in particular to the American National Election Study questions 
used as the ‘trust in government’ indicator; others have questioned whether such measures 
can provide an indication of distrusting citizen attitudes (Cook and Gronke, 2005; Miller, 
1974a, 1974b; Larry, 2002; Stokes, 1962). Similar limitations have plagued indicators that 
aim to capture trust and distrust ‘by intuition’, that is, by asking survey respondents how 
much they trust various political institutions, essentially leaving trust and distrust open to the 
interpretation of each individual citizen. These approaches are suitable for monitoring trends 
and comparing levels of ‘trust’ across time, but unfortunately, they tell us very little about 
citizens’ rationale for distrust and the kinds of evaluations they follow when judging political 
agents to be untrustworthy (Fisher et al., 2010; Mishler and Rose, 1997).  
 
These debates have yet to be conclusively resolved, yet the widespread utilisation of such 
indicators in political research (this thesis is no exception, having already used such data for 
motivating reasons) and empirical studies of effects and determinants of political distrust has 
left a perceptible gap in the field. This gap concerns the nature of the concept of political 
distrust, its meaning and the underlying evaluations entailed in a distrusting judgment. For all 
the empirical analyses carried out, there is still no comprehensive conceptual account of 
citizens’ political distrust that scholars agree upon. On the contrary, the notion of political 
distrust has been conflated with other concepts, such as ‘cynicism’ or ‘lack of trust’, resulting 
in a contested term. We believe this is the right time to take a step back, rethink the 
conceptual status of political distrust, examine the nature of distrusting attitudes and 
contribute to the existing literature. To this end, the present study focuses on political distrust 
and aims to address some of the fundamental questions about this type of citizen orientations.  
 
Finally, the third piece of the puzzle this thesis has identified in the study of distrust stems 
from the ambivalent scholarly stance towards the relationship between political distrust and 
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political trust, and especially distrust and the lack of trust. This ambivalence relates to the two 
points mentioned above about the limitations in interpreting and understanding the 
phenomenon of distrusting attitudes in modern democracies without a clear conceptualisation 
of political distrust. The relationship between trust, the lack of trust and distrust is not a 
minute etymological detail. It is important both conceptually and empirically. Equating the 
lack of trust with distrust is equivalent to equating ‘something’ with the ‘absence of 
something else’ and assumes trust and distrust are symmetrical notions. In less abstract terms, 
this research affirms that political distrust denotes citizens’ negative expectations relating to 
interactions with political agents. Negative expectations are by definition ‘something’, which 
can and should be explored in more depth, and hence cannot be assumed to signify the ‘lack 
of something’. If we take attitudes of trust to encapsulate positive expectations citizens 
formulate in response to political agents, then the lack of trust is the absence of such positive 
expectations. And similarly, lack of distrust should denote the absence of negative 
expectations. In some cases, political scientists have attempted to distinguish between the 
three states conceptually and empirically by examining the possibility of skeptical citizens, 
unconvinced citizens or citizens that both trust and distrust political agents, yet these 
distinctions did not give rise to studies dedicated to the exploration of distrusting attitudes 
(Cook and Gronke, 2005; Levi and Stoker, 2000; Braithwaite and Levi, 1998). 
 
Recent advances in evolutionary biology, neurobiology and psychology investigating the 
roles of trust and distrust in human behaviour further support this argument and provide 
motivation for the need to examine these concepts separately. Studies in neurobiology have 
shown that trust and distrust are associated with completely different neurotransmitters in the 
human brain, operating through different mechanisms and motivating different behaviours 
(Zak et al., 2005; Fehr, 2009).6 From this alternative scientific perspective of human 
behaviour we learn that the experience and implications of distrust are particular to that state 
and cannot be understood simply as the lack of trust. Furthermore, work carried out as part of 
this thesis on distrusting attitudes in the realm of politics brought to light the particular 
psychological and emotive state citizens manifest when they distrust political actors and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to a series of replicated experimental studies with human subjects, the experience of trust and 
reciprocation of trusting attitudes triggers oxytocin in the human brain, a hormone that boosts pleasant feelings, 
the release of dopamine and tips humans towards cooperation, affiliation, attachment and willingness to bear 
risk. Distrust is associated with a higher level of cortisol, the activation of the amygdala part of the brain 
through fear and release of stress hormones. Male participants also experience an increase of 
dihydrotestosterone (DHT), a bioactive metabolite of testosterone that increases the desire for physical 
confrontation. For more information about neurobiology research on trust and distrust see Kosfeld et al., (2005).    
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institutions. Expressions of extreme distrust entail the anticipation of harmful outcomes from 
interactions with political agents, triggering feelings of anger, fear and insecurity and an 
attempt to shield one’s self from vulnerability by not engaging in any form of citizen-state 
interactions. We argue that such reactions are particular to distrusting attitudes, that they are 
significant for better understanding citizens’ political behaviour and should not be overlooked 
by political attitude research.  
  
Structuring theoretical and empirical work solely around the concept of political trust has 
resulted in much scholarly confusion and a dissonant tool to study actual citizen attitudes 
towards political systems, which are based on negative affective and cognitive orientations. 
Scientific understanding of citizen actions such as abstention, anti-systemic party voting, 
protest, support or opposition to government policies or support for political alternatives to 
representative democracy can benefit from a clear conceptual account of political distrust. 
We therefore summarise the arguments motivating the present thesis as follows: increasingly, 
observations of citizen attitudes in Western democracies point to negative orientations and 
distrust towards politicians, institutions and political processes. The most widely used 
theoretical and empirical tools available to study these trends are not appropriate: they are not 
tailored to investigate the concept of distrust and cannot tell us what citizens are thinking 
about when they express political distrust. We believe political distrust is an attitude that 
entails specific evaluations and further, that these evaluative dimensions can provide 
important insights into the operation of distrust and its role for democratic citizenries. 
 
This thesis tackles an ambitious and multi-faceted research question: ‘What is political 
distrust?’ Specifically, it aims to address the nature of political distrust by exploring the 
meaning citizens attach to such attitudes and the way they express distrust towards their 
political system. Defining distrust as an attitude, this thesis proceeds to investigate its 
underlying evaluative dimensions, its internal structure and operation in terms of related 
notions and measures of political behaviour and how citizens make sense of their decisions to 
distrust politicians or political institutions. After providing a conceptual model of political 
distrust grounded in theoretical arguments and citizen-centred empirical evidence, the thesis 
also seeks to capture distrusting attitudes using a novel survey measure. This additional 
empirical evidence allows us to investigate the dimensionality of distrust and determine how 
its different components are associated with other attitudinal and behavioural variables of 
interest.  
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1.2 A problem of definition: Theoretical framework and review of current research 
 
Many scholars have highlighted the theoretical importance of political and institutional trust 
for the effective governance and legitimacy of democratic regimes (Gambeta et al., 1988; 
Miller, 1974a; Hetherington, 1998; Gibson and Caldeira, 1995; Inglehart, 1999; Warren, 
1999). Empirical studies have linked trust with law compliance and support for governmental 
policies, while distrust has been associated with anti-systemic party voting, electoral 
abstention, protest and political disaffection (Hetherington, 2005; Schul et al., 1998; Bélanger 
and Nadeau, 2005; Peterson and Wrighton, 1998; Rosanvallon, 2008). Scholarly interest in 
political trust and distrust reaches back to Easton’s influential distinction between specific and 
diffuse support, which identified political trust as a component of diffuse democratic support 
(Easton 1965, 1975). According to the Eastonian model, diffuse support is necessary for 
institutional legitimacy; it is what arms citizens with a ‘reservoir of good-will’ towards the 
political regime that can sustain it throughout times of poorer performance. Similarly, in their 
study of civic culture, Almond and Verba (1963, 1980) consider an allegiant or positively 
oriented citizenry towards political agents to be an integral part of civic culture that is 
conducive to effective and stable democratic governance.  
 
Nevertheless, the political trust literature has been ambiguous in its approach to political 
distrust. According to work on system support and political culture, distrust of political 
institutions is inimical to democracy, as it inhibits voluntary compliance with legislation and 
cooperation between citizens and political agents. Yet there have also been scholarly efforts to 
give political distrust the role of guardian of democracy. Some scholars have developed an 
understanding of ‘liberal distrust’ as necessary for the healthy functioning of political 
institutions, following a tradition from Locke to Madison, which calls citizens to be 
suspicious and vigilant towards people in a position of power and institutions, since they 
could be used to serve interests other than those of the community (Hardin, 2004; Pettit, 1997; 
Skinner, 1995). However, for the purposes of current research in political distrust we argue 
that this ‘liberal distrust’ does not correspond to the phenomenon of political distrust observed 
in established democracies, which already have in place such monitoring institutions, controls 
of government actions and working constitutions the liberal democratic theory suggests. The 
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idea of ‘liberal distrust’ is motivated by the need for vigilance, but at the same time demands 
the existence and flourishing of trust in a political community in order to achieve collective 
goods and effective governance (Lenard, 2008). We therefore believe that citizen attitudes of 
distrust towards their politicians and institutions can be a cause for concern in democratic 
communities, following the theoretical framework of studies in system support.  
 
Still, political distrust has often been conflated with political cynicism and alienation 
(Abramson, 1983). Miller wrote that political distrust or cynicism “refers to the degree of 
negative affect toward the government and is a statement of the belief that the government is 
not functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations” (1974a: 952). 
His definition was criticised for not distinguishing between the disapproval of specific 
incumbent authorities and a diffuse attitude of dwindling support for democratic governance, 
giving rise to lengthy subsequent debates (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974b; Norris, 1999; Cook 
and Gronke, 2005). It also led a group of scholars to focus on the target of citizens’ negative 
orientations and question whether the increase in levels of political distrust stems from an 
increase in citizens’ democratic expectations (Klingemann, 2014). Higher democratic 
aspirations and the rise of a critical citizenry should benefit democracies, and despite the fact 
that this leads citizens to report lower levels of trust and lower satisfaction with the way 
democracy functions in their country, these scholars argue that there is no systemic trend that 
shows eroding support for democracy as a regime (Norris, 1999, 2011; Nye et al., 1997). 
Nevertheless, these debates have resurfaced and the role of political distrust in democratic 
societies is far from having been put to rest. The role of citizen aspirations and the changes in 
the environment of political information further complicate the study of political distrust, but 
we argue that decreasing trends of political trust cannot inform us further about what is 
happening at the citizen level, the evaluations entailed in citizen judgments, their implications 
and whether they indeed reflect political ‘distrust’. In their review of research on political 
trust and trustworthiness, Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker (2000) urged researchers to re-
evaluate their concepts and measures, yet despite the prominent place of political distrust 
attitudes in current research, there has not yet been a systematic examination of what citizens 
mean when they ‘distrust their political institutions’ (Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2014; 
Catterberg and Moreno, 2005; Hakhverdian and Mayne, 2012). 
 
The theoretical framework for approaching political distrust as an individual level attitude has 
again been informed by the study of trust. Hardin (1993, 2004) formulated a rational-strategic 
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approach to trust and expanded this to encompass distrust as a tripartite relation: A (dis)trusts 
B to do X. This conceptual understanding of trust and distrust as ‘encapsulated interest’ 
maintains that individual trusters rationally calculate the possibility of their own interest being 
encapsulated in the interest of the trusted. That is, I will trust or distrust you if I have reason to 
believe that “you have an interest to attend to my interests because, typically, you want our 
relationship to continue” (Hardin, 2004: 5). This strategic approach has influenced the way 
scholars have thought about citizen attitudes of political trust, reflecting a calculation of the 
possibility political agents will act in a benefiting manner (Gambetta, 1988; Hetherington, 
2005; Fisher et al., 2010). Despite the heavy burden of knowledge and information 
requirement this approach places on citizens and the inability to distinguish between reasons 
for withholding trust or extending distrust, subsequent studies have attempted to identify what 
citizens could perceive as their own ‘interest’. They have often focused on performance-based 
measures of government, especially as economic output, but also other policy domains such 
as control of crime, international affairs and security.  
 
However, a large body of work on political trust and distrust goes beyond the strategic 
calculation entailed in citizens’ evaluations. Scholars point to the ability of trust to solve 
problems of collective action, which goes against the standard understanding of narrow self-
interest (Levi, 1997; Tyler, 1998). In this approach, trust is considered to make a normative 
claim based on shared moral values, good intentions and ethical reciprocity, whereas distrust 
is found to inhibit the formation of such shared norms (Blackburn, 1998; Fenton, 2000; 
Uslaner, 2002). The idea of trust as a ‘moralistic worldview’ has also been developed in 
individual-level research that focuses on the psychological traits or personal characteristics 
that encourage people to trust both horizontally (inter-personal) and vertically (political and 
institutional). This approach emphasises the way in which early socialisation and first 
experiences help to create a circle of trust, whereby placing trust in other people has been 
reciprocated resulting in positive outcomes that further enhance a view of the world as a safe 
and benign place. In a circle of distrust, on the other hand, trusting relations are unable to 
flourish, or are met with disappointment and betrayal, forging a view of the world as a 
malevolent and dangerous environment. The body of literature focusing on interpersonal 
relationships and the development of social capital in political communities does not provide 
a convincing theoretical or empirical link to examine political distrust and the arrow of 
causality can easily be understood to run either way (Hardin, 2004; Cook et al., 2005; 
Fukuyama, 2014). Discussions about the role of social capital and interpersonal relations are 
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outside the scope of this thesis, as it is specifically aimed at unravelling citizen attitudes of 
distrust towards political agents, yet we do consider some of the conceptual and empirical 
insights from this literature in our effort to understand citizen judgments and to definite the 
concept of political distrust.  
 
From the aforementioned approaches we recognise the important role that experiences can 
play in fostering attitudes of trust and distrust, as well as the necessity that political distrust 
must entail aspects additional to the calculation of performance evaluation or encapsulated 
interest. Furthermore, we also highlight the need for a conceptual approach to political distrust 
that separates it from the lack of trust. We know that distrusting judgments entail a certain 
degree of vulnerability and risk in relation to a political agent (Scheidegger and Staerklé, 
2011; Marková and Gillespie, 2008), and although they might be a normatively appropriate 
response in cases of untrustworthy political agents, they set in motion an elaborate cognitive 
and behavioural response mechanism that researchers are still investigating (Marien and 
Hooghe, 2013; Schul et al., 2008; Tyler, 2006). Recent advances in social psychology and 
neurobiology have brought to light links between distrusting or trusting states with emotive 
and cognitive responses that motivate human behaviour (Zak et al., 2005; Merolla et al., 2013; 
Yamagishi et al., 1998; Fehr, 2009; Lu, 2014). What Margaret Levi called “lack of trust, in 
the sense of standing back and failing to trust until given sufficient evidence or reasons for 
trusting” (1998: 96) has a different meaning and behavioural implications than distrust.  
 
As a final note, the empirical study of political distrust has been further complicated due to 
the separate paths taken by macro and micro-level research. Judgments of distrust have often 
been approached by analysing the trustworthy qualities of the political targets, macro-level 
characteristics of the political regime, such as government and economic performance, 
institutional characteristics and political culture theories (Nye et al., 1997; Hooghe, 2011, 
Newton, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 1997). At this point it is important to note that although 
‘untrustworthiness’ and ‘distrust’ are conceptually distinct, empirical research shows most 
citizens refer to ‘untrustworthy politics’ when giving their account of political distrust. 
Untrustworthiness and trustworthiness are attributes of the political object being evaluated – 
not of citizens – yet individuals decide to distrust based on their perception of 
untrustworthiness. Studies that focus on the variation of distrust levels across national borders 
and across time are informative and theoretically significant for precisely such purposes: 
understanding the variations we observe at the national level, identifying national experiences 
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or institutional characteristics that contribute to perceptions of political untrustworthiness and 
testing macro-level theories about its determinants. However, these studies are unable to 
investigate the individual-basis for political distrust.  Distrust is an attitude of negative 
orientation towards one’s political system, which is formed and expressed by each individual 
citizen. If we are to address the question of what political distrust really is, what it means and 
how it functions for citizens, we need to redirect our focus from the macro-level 
characteristics of institutional (un)trustworthiness towards individual perceptions and 
evaluations.  
 
 
1.3 Summary of case selection and methodology 
 
The research design of the thesis follows a mixed methodological approach in order to 
address the substantive questions that relate to the meaning and functioning of political 
distrust attitudes for citizens. A sequential mixed methods design allows the incorporation of 
findings from exploratory research into the conceptualisation of political distrust and 
subsequent data collection and quantitative analysis of distrusting attitudes. Relying solely on 
quantitative survey data for this study would not have allowed the researcher to investigate 
the meaning and conceptual status of political distrust. Existing survey indicators are 
responsible for a large part of the current confusion and gaps in the social scientific 
understanding of this attitude area. In this case, the appropriate methodological approach is 
empirical qualitative research tailored to address questions of meaning and able to access 
people’s evaluative frameworks. Recognising the strengths of this research approach is as 
important as acknowledging its limitations in addressing the subsequent goals of the thesis: to 
examine the structure and functioning of distrusting attitudes. The overarching research 
question of the thesis renders qualitative and quantitative evidence necessary, and the chosen 
sequential mixed methods research design provides stronger support for the conceptual model 
of political distrust proposed in the thesis. 
 
The first part of the research strategy consists of an exploratory study of political distrust 
attitudes through popular narrative interviews. The collection and thematic analysis of 
empirical qualitative evidence provides a fitting approach to access the meaning citizens 
attach to distrusting attitudes, the language used to express distrust and the evaluations they 
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use to explain their distrust to a third party. It allows the researcher to identify common 
themes and patterns in the underlying evaluative dimensions employed by citizens, while at 
the same time remaining open to the possibility of discovering new aspects of this attitude 
area that have been overlooked or run against assumptions made in the relevant literature. 
Findings from this part of the research are used, in conjunction with theoretical knowledge 
about citizens’ political attitudes, to formulate a conceptual model for citizen attitudes of 
political distrust. Our conceptual model marks a contribution to the field of research and 
captures the dynamic, reciprocal and evaluative aspects of political distrust, specifically 
citizen assessments of technical, moral and incongruent political conduct. 
 
The purpose of case selection for this part of the research concerns: (a) countries where 
interviews were conducted; and (b) participants that were interviewed. Three countries were 
selected in order to obtain empirical evidence not solely confined to one individual political 
culture and national context that could lead to a conceptualisation of distrusting attitudes, 
which could potentially travel across national borders (albeit with the caveat that the initial 
focus was placed on established European democracies). Our aim was, firstly, to conduct 
research in countries where attitudes of political distrust are commonplace. Given our goal of 
conceptualising political distrust, being able to find expressions of distrust in the population 
was a necessary requirement. Secondly, it was important for the empirical data to be gathered 
from national contexts experiencing different political developments, with diverse historical 
trajectories and institutional set ups, but belonging to the relatively homogenous group of 
established democracies. This helps boost the generalisability of findings beyond the three 
national contexts of the thesis while maintaining the relevance of our analysis to citizen 
attitudes of political distrust in the context of established democracies. Greece, Italy and the 
UK were chosen as suitable countries to conduct narrative interviews and a diversified 
participant group was recruited in each nation, based on citizens’ geographical residence, age 
and socioeconomic status (N=48). We provide more information regarding the national 
contexts where research was conducted, as well as the recruitment process and details of 
interview participants in Chapter 3.  
 
Findings from the analysis of narrative interviews inform our conceptual model of political 
distrust that is advanced throughout the thesis. This model also provides the basis for the 
operationalisation and measurement of political distrust attitudes through a novel indicator, 
included in a dedicated online survey in the UK (N=785). We use this original survey data to 
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explore the internal structure of distrusting attitudes as they are captured by the new multiple 
items, and to supplement or revise the conceptual model of political distrust through 
quantitative data analysis. We further examine how the different aspects of distrusting 
attitudes interact with other individual-level attitudes, such as political cynicism, efficacy or 
knowledge in an effort to unravel some of the existing conundrums regarding the association 
of political attitudes. Similarly, we take advantage of the subcomponents of distrusting 
attitudes captured through the multiple item indicator and re-examine the effect of distrust on 
citizens’ behavioural intentions. The link between distrust and political participation has also 
been contested in theoretical and empirical studies, and our aim is to contribute to these 
debates with novel evidence more detailed analysis.  
 
This part of the study provides the opportunity to carry out statistical analysis that further 
adds to our understanding of the underlying structures and functions of political distrust 
attitudes and brings new evidence based on an empirically grounded conceptual model of 
citizens’ distrust. For the purposes of the study we opted for an online survey design that 
allows the inclusion of a more diverse sample of respondents than the widely used college or 
university student samples in similar studies of political attitudes. We carried out this part of 
the research in the UK (using a specialised online survey provider) as one of the original 
national contexts studied in the earlier part of the research. Although the quantitative data are 
derived from a single national context, we believe they provide a meaningful contribution to 
the analysis of political distrust and further studies can easily reproduce our research and 
expand on it on various directions.  
 
1.4 Main findings and contribution of the thesis 
 
The current thesis tackles the puzzle of political distrust by addressing the nature and 
functioning of distrusting attitudes. It affirms that distrust should be separated from trust in 
the study of political attitudes and contributes to the current scholarly work with a study that 
defines and examines political distrust in its own right. Further, it follows a micro-level 
perspective, focusing on the meaning and operation of distrusting attitudes for individual 
citizens. Macro-level studies that examine the role of institutional and other systemic 
characteristics for political distrust can provide informative cross-national comparisons and 
test theories regarding institutional effects. Nevertheless, they are not able to address the 
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question of what really constitutes political distrust and how it varies between individuals. 
Ultimately, political distrust is an attitude, and as such it is inevitably attached to the 
individual that formulates it in response to some aspect of her world (Krech and Crutchfield, 
1948). We therefore offer an individual-level study that emphasises the role of personal 
evaluations and perceptions of the political system that shape distrusting attitudes. We argue 
that unlocking the underlying evaluations on which distrust is based is the best way to answer 
the key questions surrounding the ontological status of political distrust. These two 
approaches, individual-level and distrust-focused, inform the research design of the thesis, 
resulting in the collection of original empirical evidence of citizens’ distrusting political 
attitudes. This methodological approach constitutes a further novelty in the study of political 
distrust, which for the most part has rested on either conceptual work or the analysis of 
existing survey data. The research design is of course necessitated by the key questions this 
thesis set out to address. Empirical qualitative evidence is collected to tackle the puzzle of 
meaning in expressions of political distrust and to examine the evaluative processes entailed 
in distrusting attitudes. The analysis of quantitative data based on this conceptual model of 
political distrust reveals the internal structure of such attitudes and the way this structure 
relates to intentions of political participation. 
 
The first contribution of the thesis is a conceptual model of political distrust attitudes derived 
from the analysis of popular interview narratives in three European democracies. Our 
research showed that the underlying meaning of political distrust as expectation of negative 
outcomes and the evaluative dimensions entailed in distrusting attitudes followed the same 
patterns across the three national contexts studied. Based on this evidence we formulate a 
model of political distrust that can be used as a map for further study. This model 
conceptualises political distrust as a relational and dynamic attitude. Relational, in the sense 
that it is developed between the citizen and her political system, and is hence based on 
evaluations and perceptions derived from interactions with political agents. We argue that 
these evaluations entailed in distrusting attitudes run along three main lines: evaluations of 
technical incompetence and inability to fulfil political roles; evaluations of political conduct 
that is morally wrong, unjust or produces unfair outcomes; and evaluations of diverging 
interests between the citizen and political agents, that is the perception that the best-interest 
of the citizen is not in line with the interests pursued by the political system. These three 
underlying aspects of political distrust can vary in their role and significance among different 
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individuals, different occasions and in judging different parts of the political system. Yet we 
find they are omnipresent in some combination in expressions of distrusting attitudes.  
 
We also conceptualise distrust as dynamic, meaning that it entails a retrospective and 
prospective temporal dimension. Evaluations of untrustworthy political conduct are based on 
perceptions of past events, interactions and information related to the citizen’s political life, 
as well as on calculations regarding future outcomes and expectations. This dynamic aspect 
allows citizens to consider new evidence and information when formulating perceptions and 
expectations of political untrustworthiness given any change in circumstances. In this way 
attitudes of distrust are built over the citizen’s political life experience, but are also 
responsive to political performance and political changes. Past evaluations of political 
untrustworthiness undoubtedly influence future expectations, yet we argue that the two time 
projections tap into slightly different aspects of distrusting attitudes. Retrospective 
evaluations are grounded more strongly in current and past perceptions of political conduct, 
whereas prospective evaluations entail a bigger role for citizens’ belief in the political system 
and the political agents.  
 
Further, we find that political distrust functions in a cyclical, self-fulfilling manner through a 
psychological state and behavioural intentions that reinforce distrust. Established attitudes of 
distrust denote expectations of negative outcomes from interactions with political actors, and 
therefore citizens seek to protect themselves by ceasing cooperation and removing 
themselves from the citizen-state relationship. If a citizen perceives politicians and political 
institutions to be untrustworthy, distrust appears as the only rational approach to protect 
oneself. In turn, distrusting citizens can become themselves untrustworthy citizens, 
attempting to evade the state, establishing alternative networks for cooperation, resisting 
government action or policy implementation and ceasing to participate in a way that enhances 
democratic politics. The state of distrust is associated with a psychological state of insecurity 
and alertness due to the risk entailed in operating under an untrustworthy political system. 
We find that when addressed at specific political actors distrust is accompanied by emotive 
responses of anger, disappointment and disgust. These emotive responses are important 
aspects of distrust because emotions are increasingly recognised as action motivators. For 
example, anger towards a political party or political institution you perceive to be 
untrustworthy can have a mobilising effect for protesting or supporting political alternatives. 
At the same time, distrust that builds up and affects the entire political system is associated 
	   24	  
with a state of anxiety, fear and even despair, which are equally important emotive states for 
political behaviour.  
 
Although political distrust stems from evaluations of political agents, it builds up and spills 
over from one part of the political system to another. The precise point where spill-over 
occurs is difficult to identify, as it appears to be different for each individual. For example, 
for some citizens in the UK, the parliamentary expenses scandal reinforced their view of the 
political class as ‘out-of-touch’ and ‘out-for-themselves’ without a willingness to address the 
real problems of the country, and this was projected onto the entire political system. For 
others these evaluations were confined to the specific individual politicians who misbehaved, 
were caught and disciplined and the operation of the controlling mechanisms ring-fenced the 
trustworthiness of the system. Similarly, for some citizens their perception of a manipulation 
offensive surrounding the Iraq war was strong enough to stain the normative standing of all 
British politicians, while for others it was confined to Tony Blair and the New Labour 
administration. We therefore also find evidence of political distrust acting as a cognitive 
heuristic mechanism and spilling over to colour subsequent evaluations of political agents 
and different parts of the political system.  
 
The second contribution of this thesis is a novel operationalisation of political distrust based 
on the conceptual model developed, which provides a measurement tool and original survey 
data on distrusting attitudes. The multiple item indicator of political distrust includes items 
that touch on the three evaluative dimensions for each time projection mentioned above, 
targeting two parts of the political system: the institution of national parliament, as an 
institutional actor that symbolises representative democracy, that encompasses all legislative 
processes, all elected political parties and the national political class and that produces 
democratic outputs. Negative evaluations of this institution provide a good indicator for 
attitudes towards the political system, although we discuss possible variations in the way 
citizens interpret the role of national parliament. We also include evaluations of another 
political agent that provides a more demanding test for distrusting attitudes in our measure. 
Half of the new items tap into evaluations of the political party citizens are closest to, support 
or prefer compared to all other political groups. Conceptually, asking citizens whether they 
perceive their preferred political party to be untrustworthy traces the lowest possible edge of 
political distrust, as the party one prefers represents the part of their political system they 
would distrust the least. Our finding that many citizens’ evaluations continue to be negative 
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across all items makes a stronger case for the predominance of politically distrusting 
attitudes. It could be possible – although less likely – for some citizens to hold more negative 
evaluations of their preferred political party, and by consequence all political parties in the 
system, than of the institutions and processes of the political system. We do not find any 
evidence for this pattern of evaluations in our sample and would argue that distrust in 
political parties, and particularly in a citizen’s preferred party, can only be a bad omen for 
attitudes towards the democratic system, which is built on the premise of representation and 
elections. If political distrust is not extended to political institutions, it is arguably a matter of 
time before citizens’ reservoir of good-will runs out and they begin to perceive political 
processes as equally untrustworthy.  
 
This new indicator contributes to the empirical analysis of distrusting attitudes with original 
survey data from the UK and offers the opportunity to explore the conceptual model of 
distrust from an additional angle. We investigate the internal structure of the evaluative 
dimensions, map how respondents approach different evaluative items and assess the 
contribution of this approach for examining how distrust can influence political behaviour. 
We find, as expected, that evaluations of national parliament are on average more negative 
than the political party citizens consider closest to them. Evaluations of the two agents are not 
ordered in the same way for all respondents, which would have indicated that negative 
judgments of one’s preferred party capture more distrust in the political system. These 
findings already suggest the two political objects may tap into different aspects of distrusting 
attitudes, may be influenced by external stimuli in different ways and may play different roles 
in motivating political behaviour. Further, this difference is not only due to perceptions of 
diverging interests, but equally of evaluations that have to do with competence and normative 
commitments. The theoretical approach to distrust as a calculation of encapsulated interest 
has guided much of the conceptual work in the field, but what we find throughout our 
analyses is the prominent role of prospective normative evaluations in decisions of distrust. 
The interview evidence highlights the importance of citizen perceptions of fairness, fair play 
and ethical norms for distrust in all political agents, while the survey analysis suggests 
perceptions of unethical political conduct are prominent components and better placed to 
capture strong attitudes of political distrust. We hope that further research with data from 
additional national contexts could provide comparisons for the identified structure and 
associations we find between the evaluative items.  
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Using the multiple items indicator we can disentangle the notion of political distrust little by 
little and map its structure and operations. We find that all of the identified evaluative 
dimensions are part of a single underlying concept of distrust and can be considered as 
indispensable components of distrusting attitudes. We also find that citizens resort to 
retrospective assessments of untrustworthiness as much as they formulate prospective 
expectations for political conduct, although beliefs about future conduct are consistently less 
negative than those of the past. This difference may reflect genuine political changes, such as 
replacement of politicians, newly introduced processes or reforms. However, we argue that 
the due to the timing of our data collection and the consistency in these disparities, which 
hold for all types of evaluations and political targets and for all subgroups in our study, 
including the most cynical individuals, can be better understood in terms of a basic 
psychological tendency and prospective assessments tapping more strongly into the level of 
one’s faith about future political conduct and institutional performance. Maintaining some 
degree of hope and the belief in a more favourable future – or at least no worse than past 
indicators would suggest – also emerges across some narratives of political distrust.  
 
This would constitute an encouraging interpretation of our results for the possibility of 
remedying distrusting relations, at least within the UK national context. If citizens are still 
ready to formulate expectations of political conduct that are less negative than past 
evaluations would suggest and despite instances of being let down, it means that politicians 
and institutional structures can combat distrust by promoting political conduct that is in line 
with communal norms of fairness and competent governance. Diverging interests, or the 
perception that the best-interest of the citizen will not be disregarded by politicians, is also an 
integral part of distrusting attitudes, though not central in motivating intentions of abstaining 
or voting for an extreme party in elections, or even moving away from the country. It is easier 
for citizens to register negative evaluations of national parliament based on diverging 
interests, but such perceptions alone are not detrimental to the citizen-state relation, through 
the encouragement of disruptive types of political behaviour. On the contrary, it can even 
motivate active participation in politics, voicing citizen concerns and engaging in the political 
process. However, negative interest-based evaluations of one’s preferred party have the 
potential to damage the link between the citizen and democratic representative processes and 
to weaken one’s resolve to participate in a constructive manner. 
 
	   27	  
An additional key finding of this thesis concerns roles different aspects of distrusting 
attitudes can play in citizens’ reaction to politics. Above, we commented briefly on the 
particular emotional responses and psychological states associated with political distrust, as 
well as the advances of research in political psychology that highlight the effect emotional-
psychological states have on citizen’s behaviour. We further find that negative evaluations of 
the political party one considers closest to them act in a demotivating fashion and lead 
citizens to think less about actively participating in politics through existing avenues and 
political groups. Such attitudes also help us better understand the decision to abstain in an 
election. Both retrospective and prospective negative evaluations of the political party 
citizens consider closest to their preferences should make it harder for them to lend their 
support to that party on election day; this increases the incentives for abstention and in this 
instance past evidence of untrustworthy political conduct is more informative for citizens’ 
intention to abstain. At the same time, radical or extreme-party voting, which has attracted 
considerable attention due to prominent and considerable electoral gains across European 
democracies, is also linked to political distrust. 
 
The conventional wisdom posits that increased distrust will either lead citizens to abstention 
or to the support of radical and anti-systemic parties. We add two points to this discussion. 
Firstly, that some evaluative dimensions of distrusting attitudes are more central than others 
in motivating such considerations. Secondly, that distrust in one’s preferred political party is 
a better predictor for considerations to abstain, whereas distrust of national parliament 
provides a stronger basis for the motivation to vote for an extreme or radical party. This 
finding is in line with what the academic community knows about radical parties; they 
seldom make up a large part of parliament and usually present themselves through anti-
systemic and populist language that distances them from the political establishment. On the 
most extreme end of behavioural intentions we have identified the wish to sever completely 
the relationship between the citizen and the untrustworthy political system. Moving away 
from the country provides an opportunity for citizens to no longer be affected by their 
political system, but we find that such considerations are motivated by distrusting attitudes 
that go beyond one’s preferred party and are directed towards the wider political system, in 
particular negative institutional evaluations regarding past and future competent and ethical 
conduct.      
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These findings pertain to some of the behavioural intentions that we begin to identify in the 
first stage of our research into distrusting attitudes and investigate further in the latter part of 
our analysis. They offer initial evidence that in some cases distrust, and not trust, is more 
informative as a political attitude to understand citizens’ behavioural intentions, such as in 
the case of electoral abstention and active political participation. Furthermore, distrust 
targeted at different parts of the political system (partisan or institutional actors) can have 
different motivating influences. Evidence suggests that the former proves motivating for 
active political engagement through political organisations, interest groups and activism, 
while the latter appears to be motivating for types of behaviour that disrupt democratic 
political processes. Considering these differences can help us make further contributions to 
the debates on the role of political distrust for participation and democratic political 
behaviour.  
 
Finally, the thesis contributes to the academic study of political distrust by addressing the 
issue of dimensionality, both conceptually and empirically. We believe that a considerable 
part of the scholarly debates surrounding political distrust and conflicting research findings 
have emerged as a result of a double function of attitudes of political distrust. We argue that 
political distrust can and should be understood as a unified concept. We find consistent 
evidence that all evaluative dimensions tap into the same latent trait of political distrust, 
despite certain differences in the responses registered along retrospective or interest-based 
evaluations. All citizens tend to assess the untrustworthiness of political targets across 
evaluative dimensions and time-projections in a consistent manner. There is no evidence of 
any respondent group that systematically provides very negative evaluations along certain 
lines and very positive evaluations along others. Evaluations of different political agents, 
usually along different evaluative dimensions, move in tandem.  
 
At the same time, we find that attitudes of distrust are formed in response to specific events, 
information or experiences and can be addressed at specific political agents in response to 
assessments regarding their capabilities, values and interests. More importantly, citizens are 
able to hold different attitudes towards different parts of the political system according to 
their perceptions of untrustworthiness. We conclude that both the similarities and the 
differences in the way each citizen evaluates political agents to arrive to a distrusting political 
attitude are highly informative for our understanding of citizen orientations. When 
considering the differences and the specific evaluations attached to different parts of the 
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political system, we can investigate in more detail the aspects of distrust that are associated 
with behavioural intentions and related political attitudes and further, we can identify the 
reasons why citizens may update their perceptions of untrustworthiness. When considering 
the similarities, we can observe that distrust of different political objects are still part of an 
overarching political attitude and can rarely be developed in isolation. This overarching 
attitude of political distrust can act as a cognitive shortcut and guide perceptions of any 
potential political agent. Empirical evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, points to this 
double function of citizens’ political distrust.  
 
 
1.5 Chapter summaries 
 
The final section of this introductory chapter presents an overview of the upcoming chapters. 
It briefly outlines the main question each chapter sets out to address, the way it fits within 
this thesis and the key points and contribution it brings in answering the overarching research 
question of what is political distrust.  
 
Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework for the study of political distrust. It begins with 
a review of the relevant conceptual work and the available definitions in the literature, which 
have been mainly developed around trust, and adapts them to the study of distrusting 
attitudes. The existing scholarly discussion of political distrust is intertwined with that of 
political trust, but through this review of the most important theoretical perspectives our aim 
remains to explain political distrust and disentangle it from competing notions, such as lack 
of trust, efficacy, support, alienation, disaffection, and cynicism. We evaluate the theoretical 
significance of distrusting attitudes towards government and the state, via the articulation of 
civic culture prerequisites and the basis of political legitimacy through citizen support. On 
this theoretical basis, we conclude that citizen distrust can pose a threat to democratic 
governance and erode diffuse support for the regime. The chapter also reviews the theoretical 
arguments and existing research into the effects of distrusting attitudes on citizens’ allegiant 
and participant orientation towards the political system, which have often resulted in 
conflicting hypotheses and findings. We believe the focus of this thesis on distrust can help 
us rethink and also resolve some of the confusion. Reviewing the existing analytical 
approaches to the study of distrust from various disciplines, the chapter concludes with a 
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conceptual model of political distrust, which marks this research project’s first contribution to 
our understanding of this attitude area. This conceptualisation is also grounded in the findings 
of empirical qualitative work carried out as part of the thesis. The analysis is presented in 
more detail and discussed thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
 
The conceptual model describes political distrust as a process whereby citizens assess the 
prospective behaviour of political agents, as well as evaluations of past behaviour, to 
formulate expectations of negative outcomes from interaction with that agent. Although the 
particular actions and political attributes that form the basis of untrustworthiness between 
different institutional agents, the government, political figures, such as the prime minister, 
and political parties may differ, they invariably follow the same three evaluative dimensions: 
a technical dimension, where citizens assess incompetence in ability, outcomes or processes; 
a moral dimension, where citizens evaluate the ethics, fairness or injustices perceived in the 
actions and intentions of political agents; and an interest-based dimension, where citizens 
evaluate the interests political agents are set to fulfil as diverging from their own. These three 
evaluative dimensions, alone or – more often than not – in combination, lead citizens to 
formulate judgments of political distrust and set in motion a series of emotive and cognitive 
responses, which in turn influence citizens’ future actions and decisions. This conceptual 
model establishes political distrust as a relational attitude which is therefore grounded in 
evaluations of a political entity and does not stand in isolation. At the same time, such 
evaluations abound in the political lives of citizens and are habitually synthesised in an 
overall attitude based on the estimated trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of the political 
system as a whole. We affirm that citizens are able to make individual evaluations and that 
the two functions are not incompatible. It is precisely this double function of political distrust 
that renders it such a potent attitude for political behaviour and democratic support and 
simultaneously allows it to be updated or reversed in response to institutional changes and 
new experiences. The detailed conceptualisation of political distrust also enables us to 
disentangle the notion from competing concepts and develop a line of inquiry tailored 
specifically to distrust.  
 
Chapter 3 presents in detail the overarching research methodology and methodological 
choices made at each step of the project. It explains the choice of a mixed methods research 
approach as the most appropriate methodology for the study of political distrust attitudes, as a 
contested concept and highlights the strengths of this relatively recent, but increasingly 
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popular research method. The qualitative research component serves the purpose of re-
examining political distrust judgments inductively, putting citizens and their expressions and 
perceptions at the centre of the research endeavour. It is a necessary step for a project that 
seeks to investigate the meaning of distrust judgments and to unearth the way such judgments 
operate for citizens, before it can proceed to propose a conceptual model that claims to 
capture the meaning, function and ontological status of political distrust. Qualitative 
empirical work was conducted in more than one European country to allow for multiple 
political culture inputs and increase potential generalisability of findings outside a single 
national context. The choice of countries where research was conducted was motivated 
primarily by the aforementioned research question, i.e. the availability of distrusting citizen 
attitudes and the flexibility of citizens to express such views freely. Forty-eight popular 
narrative interviews were conducted in three European established democracies (the UK, 
Italy and Greece). Narrative content was transcribed and translated, undertaking a seven-step 
thematic analysis to derive common threads of meanings and lines of evaluations in citizens’ 
expressions of political distrust. The analysis of qualitative evidence informs the conceptual 
model of political distrust presented in Chapter 2 and guided succeeding choices on the 
operationalisation of political distrust through survey measures.  
 
Given the central role of political distrust attitudes for citizens’ political behaviour and 
support for democracy, scholarly interest is not only theoretical and conceptual, but expands 
to the identification and measurement of these attitudes in large-scale quantitative surveys. 
The second part of the methodology chapter maps the process of operationalisation and 
measurement of political distrust attitudes through a multi-item survey indicator. The new 
measure was employed in an online survey of English respondents and provided quantitative 
evidence to further investigate the structure and function of distrusting attitudes. This 
quantitative part of the thesis makes a second contribution to the study of distrust by 
proposing a new survey measure and exploring the dimensionality and structure of distrust. 
The statistical analysis carried out adds further strength to the proposed conceptual model of 
political distrust, examining construct validity and addressing the final question of this 
research project, which concerns the relationship between political distrust, related political 
attitudes and citizens’ political behaviour. 
 
After explaining the overarching methodological approach and the particular research choices 
made in this study of political distrust, the subsequent three chapters comprise the empirical 
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core of the thesis, presenting and analysing the findings from the narrative interviews carried 
out and survey data collected. Chapter 4 provides a detailed exploration of citizen 
expressions of political distrust as these emerge through narrative accounts from Greece, Italy 
and the UK. It identifies the main themes citizens resort to when evaluating their political 
systems and uncovers the meaning they ascribe to distrusting attitudes across national 
contexts. The findings from popular narratives give rise to the conceptual model for the study 
of political distrust described in Chapter 2, defined as expectations of harmful outcomes from 
interactions with political agents, based on retrospective and prospective evaluations. 
Expressions of distrust entail three evaluative dimensions based on technical incompetence, 
ethics or unfairness, and perceived incongruent interests. The evaluative aspect of distrusting 
judgments appears to operate similarly for different study participants and the various parts of 
the political systems being evaluated. Other key issues that emerge from the study of 
expressions of distrust are presented and discussed in detail with the aid of interview extracts. 
Firstly, although distrust is identified as relational (established between the citizen and a state 
agent), dynamic and cyclical (sensitive to past experiences and influencing one’s approach to 
future interactions), it can also spill-over from specific evaluations to systemic attitudes and 
vice-versa. We argue that this double function of attitudes of political distrust sits at the core 
of its significance for democratic citizenship, as well as its difficulty to be captured 
empirically through survey measures. This chapter attempts to address this issue, firstly, by 
articulating the two processes in a clear way, and secondly, by discussing the particular 
expressions, emotive and cognitive responses accompanying citizen distrusting judgments, to 
gain a better understanding of the two functions. It concludes with a discussion of the most 
important political actors citizens use to relate to their political system and as key targets for 
political distrust. In this discussion we identify the national parliament as a key institutional 
player that represents a symbolic aspect of representative democracy and consider the 
variation in citizen interpretations of, and the political party citizens feel closest to, as a 
partisan player integral to one’s feeling of representation and point of contact with 
politicians, policies, elections and political outcomes.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces the first quantitative analysis and findings based on the new indicator of 
political distrust. The purpose of this chapter is to present an initial description of the data 
and interpret the significance of our findings for the conceptual model of distrust. 
Specifically, it examines the status of the three evaluative dimensions; technical, ethical and 
interest-based in the two time projections and investigates similarities and differences in 
	   33	  
respondents’ assessments of the two political objects. In this chapter we explore the way in 
which the different evaluations of untrustworthiness associate with each other, the underlying 
response structures that are formed and the ways in which respondents are grouped together 
based on their response patterns. We also investigate the reliability, dimensionality and 
validity of the new political distrust indicator. 
 
We find that the three dimensions of technical, ethical and interest-based evaluations 
identified through earlier qualitative work capture aspects of political distrust attitudes on a 
single dimension. Retrospective and prospective assessments of untrustworthy political 
conduct are also important aspects of distrusting attitudes, and we observe that across our 
sample of respondents prospective evaluations are consistently less negative than 
retrospective ones, possibly pointing to a positive prospective bias. We also find that 
evaluations of untrustworthiness are lower for respondents’ preferred political parties than for 
the national parliament. This is considered more a validation of our research design than a 
surprising finding of political distrust attitudes. The survey items touching on one’s 
assessments of their preferred political party capture the lower boundary of political distrust. 
Respondents differentiate between evaluative assessments of their preferred parties and 
questions asking about national parliament along all evaluative dimensions. We also find that 
for assessments of national parliament extreme negative responses are more frequent than 
extreme positive responses, especially regarding considerations of incongruent-interests, 
which is the easiest item for respondents to register negative evaluations. We believe this 
further highlights the relevance of examining negative political attitudes and investigating the 
underlying evaluations of untrustworthy political conduct.  
 
Overall, we find that the twelve items used in the measurement of political distrust can form a 
reliable scale and load on a single latent concept. The data suggest that despite differences in 
the assessment of the two political targets, evaluations still tap into a latent attitude of 
political distrust. We argue that this reflects a double function of distrusting attitudes: one 
following a cognitive and affective process where citizens assess the trustworthiness of 
political agents along the three evaluative dimensions identified, and another following a 
cognitive shortcut where distrusting attitudes influence perceptions and assessments of 
political agents, making them all relate to each other. We conclude with a test of construct 
validity for the new political distrust scales using associated political variables and 
demographic characteristics.  
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Chapter 6 is the final empirical chapter of the thesis and focuses on the insights our measure 
of political distrust provides to the relation of distrust with other political attitudes, citizen 
characteristics and political behaviour. It investigates the association of the new measure of 
political distrust attitudes with external variables identified in the literature and in conceptual 
work to be related to distrust. We have included in our survey measures of political cynicism, 
political efficacy, strength of identification with the UK, political knowledge, ideological 
orientation and demographic characteristics, as well as other measures of democratic support: 
satisfaction with democracy and a traditionally phrased institutional trust item for national 
parliament. The latter offers an additional comparison for the political distrust scale, as well 
as for the two separate indices of distrust in national parliament and in one’s preferred 
political party. We find that for certain related variables such as political efficacy and 
political knowledge the new measure of distrust is better able to capture the link between the 
two and to highlight the nuanced relationship identified by theoretical investigations. Using 
the two indices of political distrust in national parliament and preferred party we show that 
the relationship between these variables is not uniform for all types of distrusting attitudes.  
 
We also look at the effect of political distrust on future intentions of political behaviour. We 
are particularly interested in types of political behaviour that we identified during exploratory 
work and key actions for democratic processes. In our survey, we include items that refer to 
active political participation (attending a peaceful demonstration, joining a political party and 
joining an NGO or other group) and behaviour that is considered unwanted and disruptive for 
democratic processes, such as abstaining and blank voting, voting for an extremist party, 
attending violent demonstrations or leaving the country. These measures refer to respondents’ 
reflections of such actions, that is, whether they would consider such behaviour in the future 
and not realised behaviour, yet we do find significant associations of distrust with such 
intentions. We not only investigate the contentious association between distrust and political 
participation intentions, but also disentangle some of the confusion by highlighting the 
motivating and demotivating effects of different components of distrusting attitudes. We find 
that overall distrust increases intentions for disruptive political action and decreases 
intentions for active participation in politics, yet these effects are driven primarily by 
attitudes targeted at different parts of the political system. Distrust of national parliament has 
a motivating influence on non-constructive types of political behaviour, such as abstaining or 
voting for an extreme political party, while distrust of one’s preferred party has a 
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demotivating effect on active political participation, such as joining a peaceful demonstration. 
Finally, we also find evidence, in line with previous analyses of the new measure of distrust, 
to support that certain components of distrusting attitudes are more important than others in 
motivating behavioural intentions. Perceptions of untrustworthiness for national parliament 
that are based on diverging interests are not enough to motivate actions such as abstaining or 
leaving the country. On the contrary, distrust based on moral evaluations, especially 
retrospective ones, is influential. We discuss the implications of this analysis for our model of 
political distrust and the contribution it makes to our understanding of distrusting attitudes in 
general.  
 
Chapter 7 offers a conclusion to the thesis and the opportunity to revisit and discuss some of 
the key insights achieved. It considers the wider implications of our findings for the existing 
literature in citizen attitudes of political distrust and discusses the limitations of the thesis as 
well as possible avenues for further research into citizen attitudes towards their political 
systems. We revisit the conceptual model of political distrust and one of the initial puzzles in 
the study of distrusting attitudes: the relationship between political trust and distrust. We 
argue that the two notions can be thought of as sitting at opposite ends of a single attitudinal 
continuum, yet reaffirm the two concepts are not necessarily symmetrical and that the 
absence of one does not assume the presence of the other. We urge for further social science 
research that can identify the limits of negative, positive and neutral political attitudes of 
distrust, trust and lack of trust and conclude the thesis by considering the contribution of the 
conceptual model and measurement indicator of political distrust for the state of research in 
political attitudes. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Conceptual Model for the 
Study of Political Distrust 
 
2.1 What is so special about political distrust? 
2.2 State of current research 
2.3 Analytical approaches to the study of distrust 
2.4 The conceptual model of political distrust based on technical, ethical and interest-based 
evaluations 
2.5 Dimensions and spill-overs of political distrust 
2.6 Towards conceptual clarity: Political distrust and related concepts 	  	  
The study of political distrust presents multiple puzzles to the willing political science 
researcher. There is a lack of consensus on the theoretical status of the concept, its meaning 
and its relation to trust. Empirical and often conceptual discussions have been overshadowed 
by the notion of trust, and a primary aim of this thesis is to conceptualise and investigate 
political distrust in its own right. At the same time, many of the aforementioned problems 
also plague the study of political trust resulting in a lot of confusion in the way theories about 
the causes and consequences of political distrust are formulated and tested. This thesis does 
not claim to conclusively address all of these issues. Instead, it focuses on providing a clear 
concept of political distrust based on empirical exploratory work and a survey measure of 
distrusting attitudes, which can advance our understanding of citizen attitudes and citizen 
behaviour. In this way it hopes to act as a solid step towards addressing some of the many 
puzzles political scientists face when studying citizen political orientations.  
 
This chapter begins with a reiteration of the puzzle of political distrust judgments and the 
research question guiding this thesis. It then situates the current research project among the 
existing literature, which spans conceptual and empirical work covering an impressive array 
of issues relating to distrust. It looks back to the theoretical relevance of political distrust in 
studies of democratic support and political behaviour and affirms the important role attitudes 
of political distrust play in modern democracies. We review and revise the most appropriate 
analytical approaches to the study of distrusting attitudes and then proceed with the 
conceptual model that aims to capture the specific evaluative processes entailed in attitudes 
of distrust, as well as their dynamic and cyclical nature. Its aim is to merge the specificity of 
distrusting judgments with the systemic nature of diffuse distrust, both of which are integral 
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parts of political distrust and a common cause of confusion in the operationalisation and 
interpretation of empirical evidence. Finally, we present key concepts in the study of political 
behaviour that have been associated with attitudes of political distrust and are also used in 
subsequent parts of this study exploring the structure and operation of distrusting attitudes.  
 
2.1 What is so special about political distrust? 
 
Despite the recent increase in scholarly work and public discussions on citizens’ distrust of 
their governments, politicians and political systems, the academic literature is still ambivalent 
towards the concept of political distrust. Most existing theoretical work has focused on the 
definition and function of trust, which is considered to promote cooperation, facilitate social 
and economic exchanges, enable rule compliance and, therefore, to contribute towards stable 
democratic processes, economic growth and human development (Fukuyama, 1995; Hardin, 
2002; Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Blind, 2006; Schul et al., 2008). As a result, the theoretical 
and conceptual framework of political trust has overshadowed most of the discussion around 
distrust, as well as the quantitative measurement and empirical study of the causes and 
implications of distrust. Yet, political distrust was the object of much scholarly investigation 
carried out in the 1970s and 1980s, as political scientists became alarmed by the mounting 
evidence of alienated citizens and attempted to understand the phenomenon of disaffection 
and its implications for the stability of democratic values and political systems (Hart, 1978; 
Parry, 1976; Sigelman and Feldman, 1983; Craig, 1980; Gamson, 1968).  
 
From this work we have a variety of definitions for citizens’ political distrust, all of which 
concur with a description of distrusting attitudes as a negative orientation towards the 
political system, its agents and outputs. Miller (1974a) emphasised the importance of political 
outputs and explained political distrust as “a statement of the belief that the government is not 
functioning and producing outputs in accord with individual expectations” (952). Sigelman 
and Feldman (1983) focused on citizens’ personal interests and defined political distrust as 
“the belief that government is not being run in one’s interest” (119). Perhaps the most 
comprehensive definition, even for today’s discussion regarding citizens’ distrust, is Vivien 
Hart’s:  
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“[T]hat which I call political distrust is, in a democracy, an unfavourable 
evaluation of the processes of their polity based upon the perception by citizens 
of a discrepancy between the actual operation of the political system and the 
democratic norms publicly accepted as its standards.” (1978: 2)  
 
In this approach, emphasis is placed on the discrepancy between political operations and 
democratic norms, suggesting that political distrust is a result of a wanting political system 
that is not functioning in accordance with publicly acceptable standards. All of the above 
definitions may promote different aspects of political distrust, yet they form a consensus over 
two key characteristics of distrusting attitudes: firstly, that distrust is based upon citizens’ 
perceptions of their political system or their beliefs about how the system is being run. 
Secondly, these perceptions are specifically related to the political system, its processes, 
agents and outputs. Political distrust is, therefore, primarily a political judgment based on 
citizens’ perceptions of untrustworthy political agents. Beyond the fact that attitudes of 
distrust refer to citizens’ perceptions of their political life, there is a polyphony on what 
precisely is being evaluated (the government, politicians, the political system in its entirety), 
on what actions (outputs, processes and operation) and along what lines (individual 
expectations, best-interest or democratic standards).  
 
These are only some of the sources of confusion that have followed the study of political 
distrust (and often trust), causing heated debates among political scientists and policy 
practitioners alike. Already in 1978, in her book Distrust and Democracy, Vivien Hart noted 
“there is no disagreement that substantial numbers of people in both Britain and America 
now disparage politics. The disagreement is over the significance of this fact – over what 
political distrust means for those who express it and over what it means, and whether it 
means the same, for each of these polities.” (1978: 2). To this day, academic discussions 
continue to debate how to interpret such observable phenomena in democratic communities 
(Stoker, 2011; Hay, 2009; Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011; Norris, 2011; Levi and Stoker, 2000). 
Unfortunately, they have attempted to do so without a clear understanding of what political 
distrust is and what it means for the citizens that express it. 
 
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the study of political distrust by tackling this gap 
regarding the meaning and nature of distrusting political attitudes. Before presenting the 
theoretical framework for this study and the conceptual model it advances, it is first necessary 
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to explain why political distrust warrants such a thorough investigation and scientific 
scrutiny. The scope of this project is delimited to the reconceptualisation of political distrust 
and the investigation of the structure and operation of distrusting attitudes. This is its primary 
focus and it argues that a study of political distrust aimed at investigating the meaning such 
attitudes have for the citizens that express them and at offering a clear conceptual model of 
its underlying evaluations and functions is a necessary step before we can interpret survey 
trends and comprehend changes taking place in democratic societies. To that end we also 
provide a novel measure of distrust based on the conceptual model developed through this 
thesis, and add further evidence as to its properties, functioning and contribution regarding 
the influence of distrusting attitudes to citizens’ political behaviour. Nevertheless, for the 
reader that remains unconvinced about the importance of citizen attitudes of distrust, the 
section below briefly addresses the question, “Why is understanding attitudes of political 
distrust important in the first place?” 
 
One reason lies in the central place trust and distrust have been given at the very core of 
government according to Western political thought. Following John Locke’s Second Treatise 
of Government, a government is formed as “a body of men entrusted with supreme legislative 
power which is a delegation from the community” (§141 quoted in Parry, 1976: 130, 
emphasis in the original). Even from the earliest of political times in Ancient Greece, trust 
was considered necessary for the healthy functioning of a society and identified as a source of 
stability and cooperation that would benefit all citizens (Hardin, 1998; Baier, 1986). As 
briefly mentioned in the preceding chapter, even in republican theories that place an 
emphasis on citizens being watchful of their government and political institutions, the role of 
vigilance is to allow trust in the political system to flourish (Lenard, 2008).  
 
Easton’s (1965) seminal work on the study of political systems identified political support as 
a necessary input in order to counterbalance the stress imposed by citizen demands and 
ensure the stability of the system. He further introduced the influential distinction between 
specific and diffuse citizen support; the former referring to support that is generated by 
system outputs and the latter referring to beliefs about the benefits of the regime and 
associated with the legitimacy of the system. Political trust has commonly been considered 
part of the input of diffuse support in a political system. It allows the system to function even 
when specific support, that is, support for policy programmes, decisions or incumbents, is 
lacking. According to this framework, changes in the input of support would affect the way 
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the political system can operate, hence the level of trust that citizens extend to their political 
authorities and political regime is crucial for the healthy and continuous functioning of the 
democratic system (Easton, 1965; Marien, 2011b; Norris, 1999). Yet Easton’s systems 
analysis does not explicitly consider citizen distrust; an imbalance in the system occurs only 
when citizens no longer express diffuse and specific support for the political regime.  
 
Positive cognitive and affective orientations towards the political system were also given a 
leading role in the systematic analysis of political culture. Gabriel Almond and Sidney 
Verba’s (1963) framework for the civic culture identified an allegiant and participant citizen 
culture to contribute to stable and successful democratic systems. According to this 
framework citizens must not only be participants who are cognitively and affectively 
connected to the political system; they must also have a positive or allegiant orientation. A 
neutral citizenry is described as apathetic, whereas a negatively oriented citizenry contributes 
to an alienated political culture. Although political distrust is not named as a key 
characteristic in this framework, to the extent that distrusting citizen attitudes connote a 
negative political orientation, they can be considered to contribute to an alienated citizen 
culture (Inglehart, 1997; Dalton, 2000; Newton, 2001). Whereas allegiant orientations 
towards the political regime can steer a democratic system through trying periods, negative 
orientations pose a challenge to the development of a civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963; 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Putnam, 1993). 
 
With the registered decrease in political trust trends after the 1970s, the decline in electoral 
turnout and the spread of political protest and other forms of activism, political scientists 
have focused more and more on the concept of alienation and political disaffection. In 
Gamson’s theory of political mobilisation and active citizenship, political trust and distrust 
were treated as key organising concepts (Gamson, 1968). Gamson argued that political 
distrust does not necessarily contribute to political alienation, but it rather depends on a 
citizen’s level of political efficacy, which is the belief that the citizen can understand and 
meaningfully impact political processes (Sigelman and Feldman, 1983; Paige, 1971). 
Political distrust combined with high political efficacy, the theory goes, must motivate active 
participation and contribute to a mobilised citizenry. It is the combination of perceived 
shortcomings of the political system and the belief that citizens can make a difference that 
can best explain mobilisation. However, when combined with feelings of inefficacy, political 
distrust leads to alienation and political disaffection and is a bad omen for the health of the 
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political system. Despite the intuitive merits of this theory it consistently produced 
unsupporting or very weak evidence when tested empirically, pointing to a more complicated 
interaction between individual political attitudes and the political system (Hawkins et al., 
1971; Sigelman and Feldman, 1983). 
 
Therefore, political distrust has become a relevant political attitude demanding further 
investigation, due to its links to theories of system support, civic political culture and political 
behaviour. The existing literature has revisited some of these theoretical frameworks and has 
also investigated in depth the role of citizens’ trusting and distrusting political attitudes in 
important aspects of political behaviour, such as political participation, electoral choice, law 
compliance and community participation (Hetherington, 2005; Uslaner, 2002; Rothstein and 
Stolle, 2008). We present these advances in the following section.  
 
 
2.2 State of current research 
 
Due to the aforementioned theoretical approaches to the study of democratic systems, levels 
of political trust were closely monitored through national surveys; once the first signs of trust 
erosion appeared (in the US in the early 1970s and Western and Northern Europe shortly 
after), they instigated widespread academic and public debates regarding the health and 
future of these democracies. Since then, the scholarly research on political distrust can be 
placed in three broad categories. One concerns the resurgent debate on whether citizen 
distrust is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for democratic politics, which has been based mainly on theoretical 
and conceptual reasoning (Hart, 1978; Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Warren, 1999). The idea 
that distrust may be the rational or ‘correct’ attitude towards state actors or a system that does 
not function in a way that is in line with citizen expectations has made some scholars 
reluctant to assign normative associations to the phenomena of political trust and distrust. 
Misplaced distrust, in the sense of distrusting a political agent that has trustworthy qualities, 
is damaging due to the lost cooperation and benefits that could have been achieved for the 
citizen and the society as a whole. But given that misplaced trust to an untrustworthy political 
agent should be equally detrimental, distrust extended rightly so to an untrustworthy system 
can protect the citizen from the harm and betrayal of potential interactions (Levi, 1997; 
Hardin, 2002). 
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However, the present thesis argues that once distrust comes to characterise citizen-state 
relations, it can impede the positive input required by the system to deal with citizen 
demands, thereby inhibiting – at least for as long as the system and its agents are perceived 
untrustworthy – all the positive outcomes associated with effective governance, cooperation 
and the ability to solve problems of collective action. Citizens may be right to be distrustful 
of an untrustworthy politician, a malfunctioning political institution or political process, but 
this could only be beneficial for democratic governance overall if untrustworthiness can be 
contained: if the specific actor can be replaced by a trustworthy one or the institution can be 
reformed so as to uphold democratic norms. This is often a challenging endeavour, as 
research into corrupt incumbents and the persistence of political distrust has shown 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anduiza et al., 2013).  
 
Another collection of empirical work has focused on aggregate levels of political trust and 
distrust. Its key question is whether distrust is indeed increasing in democratic communities 
and crucially, whether it is eroding diffuse system support (Norris, 1999; Klingemann, 2015). 
Being predominantly empirical, most of this research has relied on survey data and existing 
measures of political trust, initially from the US and subsequently adding evidence from 
other democracies. The fierce debate that ensued the increasing trends of distrust shifted 
attention to the operationalisation and measurement of key variables, trying to determine 
what precisely these indicators were capturing (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Miller, 1974a, 1974b; 
Citrin, 1974). 
 
Despite the persistence of the same measure indicators, there have been attempts to revisit 
and revise the aforementioned theoretical frameworks, in order to incorporate the challenges 
posed by the increasing frequency of critical and negative citizen orientations towards 
politics in established democracies (Dalton and Welzel, 2014; Norris, 1999, 2011; Inglehart 
and Welzel, 2005). One approach has been to separate the targets of political distrust 
following the Eastonian typology, from a more varied and frequently updated level of 
specific support for incumbents and policy outputs, to a more stable set of value and affective 
orientations towards the processes and principles of the regime. It was proposed that as long 
as citizens in established democracies remain committed to democratic regime principles and 
processes, distrusting attitudes towards specific authorities would not erode diffuse system 
support (Norris, 1999). Survey-based evidence from democracies around the world indicate 
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that the majority of citizens fall under this category of ‘distrusting’, ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘critical’ 
democrats (Dalton and Shin, 2014; Klingemann, 1999; Kumlin, 2011). However, the 
implications of this phenomenon and the analyses that have been carried out are still tentative 
(Norris, 2011). It is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret the phenomenon of citizen 
political distrust without a clear understanding of what such distrusting attitudes entail and 
when scholars are relying on survey-based indicators that were not created to capture distrust 
in the first place.   
 
Finally, a third strand of research has focused on the causes of political trust and distrust, as 
well as their implications for democratic governance (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011; 
Hetherington, 2005; Hetherington and Husser, 2012; McLarren, 2012). As mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, a number of studies have looked at aggregate trust levels from a 
comparative perspective and explored macro-level variants, broadly categorised as 
institutional performance or cultural-historical factors, both of which have been found to 
influence levels of trust registered in a political community (Mishler and Rose, 1997; 
McAllister, 1999). Studies that focused on micro-level determinants delved deeper into the 
role of individual perceptions of government performance in a series of policy areas, such as 
the economy, crime and security, as well as of individual evaluations of procedural fairness, 
impartiality and democratic standards (Mishler and Rose, 2001; Chanley et al., 2000; 
Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). These studies also identified the role of individual characteristics 
and general attitudes towards one’s life. The effects of education, political interest and 
knowledge, in particular, have been highlighted as contributing to more positive orientations 
towards political institutions and general levels of satisfaction, although the rise in education 
levels and simultaneous decline in mass survey trends of trust suggest the empirical link 
between the two is more nuanced.  
 
The impact of political distrust on other attitudes and types of political behaviour has been 
the focus of a large body of work exploring the association between levels of political trust 
and voting behaviour, different modes of political participation and mobilisation, as well as 
support for policy programmes or law compliance. Hetherington and his colleagues have 
shown that levels of political trust affect perceptions of incumbents, policy preferences and 
support for policies of a redistributive nature (Hetherington 1998, 2005; Hetherington and 
Husser, 2012). Research across Europe and the US has also found evidence that levels of 
political trust affect compliance with the law and tax avoidance (Scholz and Lubell, 1998; 
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Hooghe et al., 2011).  
 
Investigation of political distrust’s effect on political participation has been equally prevalent, 
albeit less conclusive. As mentioned before, according to Gamson’s mistrustful-efficacious 
hypothesis, distrusting citizens should be more motivated to engage in political action in 
order to voice their grievances and alter those processes, incumbents or parts of the political 
system they perceive to be untrustworthy. On the other hand, one could expect distrusting 
citizens to participate less in politics, at least in terms of voting and other acts of conventional 
participation, given their negative views of the political system and its agents and the fact that 
empirical findings show trust and efficacy to be strongly and positively associated on the 
individual basis (Finifter, 1970; Levi and Stoker, 2000). Most empirical studies support this 
latter claim, showing that distrusting citizens are more likely to abstain in an election or vote 
for fringe parties/third-party alternatives, where these are available (Hooghe et al., 2011; 
Dassonneville et al., 2015; Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005; Citrin and Luks, 1998). Nevertheless, 
these questions remain as the types of political participation available to citizens expand and 
change, the distinction between institutional and non-institutional forms of political 
participation blurs, and additional types of activism and disruptive participation gain 
attention. 
 
Finally, within the causes and effects literature, another body of work has focused on the 
association between different forms of trust and distrust in societies, especially the link 
between political trust and social trust or social capital. Although the causal claim and 
direction of causality between political and social trust have been heavily contested, more 
and more scholars argue that distrust towards the political authorities inhibits trust formation 
and cooperation among citizens in modern day complex societies (Fukuyama, 1995, 2014; 
Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Offe, 1999). Empirical research based on survey data supports 
the view that political institutions that are perceived to be effective and fair help to facilitate 
general trust among citizens (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994).  
 
Scholarly research into the causes and consequences of political distrust has utilised almost 
exclusively existing survey measures of political trust. We believe this creates the first 
impediment to understanding political distrust and interpreting the meaning of these survey 
results for citizens and their democratic communities. Although this body of work has 
provided important insights into the potentially powerful role attitudes of distrust can play in 
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citizens’ behaviour, emphasising further the need for an in-depth examination of political 
distrust, such survey data alone can never tell us what citizens are thinking when they claim 
to distrust their political system, nor reveal the underlying structure of such distrusting 
attitudes. The operationalisation of political trust and distrust and the survey indicators used 
in empirical research have received considerable criticism; to some extent they can be said to 
add more confusion rather than conceptual clarity to the study of these attitudes (Marien, 
2011a; Levi and Stoker, 2000). Recognising this confusion, as well as the prevalence of 
negative and critical citizen orientations towards politics, an emerging body of work is 
beginning to focus on the meaning and role of distrusting attitudes (Hardin, 2004; Ullmann-
Margalit, 2004; Lenard, 2008; Schul et al., 2008; Van de Walle and Six, 2013; Rosanvallon, 
2008).  
 
This thesis aims to contribute to this body of research, with a study focused on citizen 
attitudes of distrust towards their political system. We believe that having a better 
understanding of what constitutes distrusting attitudes and how these attitudes function 
provides a contribution to the on-going debates outlined above. The thesis takes a step back 
to re-evaluate the concept of political distrust, considers the most appropriate theoretical 
approaches and builds a conceptual model grounded on individual-level empirical research, 
but it also aims to provide a survey measure of distrust and investigate how it relates to 
citizen attributes and behaviour. In this sense, it still speaks to the larger question regarding 
citizen attitudes towards politics and the potential implications of political distrust for 
democratic communities. In the remaining sections of this chapter we review the main 
analytical approaches to the study of distrust, inside and outside the realm of politics, and 
present the conceptual model of citizen attitudes of political distrust derived from qualitative 
research.  
 
 
2.3 Analytical approaches to the study of distrust  
 
We begin by considering the ontological nature of ‘distrust’ and the analytical approaches to 
this attitude area. As mentioned previously in this chapter, distrust entails a negative 
orientation towards the political system and its subcomponents, but there are many different 
analytical approaches that emphasise various aspects of distrusting attitudes and their 
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operation. Trust and distrust have been given a prominent position in facilitating or impeding 
desirable outcomes outside the realm of politics. Most fields that study human cooperation 
from business and economics (Knack and Zak, 2003; Korczynski, 2000; Gambetta, 1988), 
work environments (Kramer and Tyler, 1995; Kramer, 1999; Lewicki et al., 1998), social and 
interpersonal relationships (Uslaner, 2011; Delhey et al., 2011) to international negotiations 
among nation states (Kydd, 2005; Horne, 2004; Larson, 1997) have written extensively about 
the role of trust and distrust. In this section we bring together analytical approaches from 
different fields and present the most relevant aspects that we believe can be informative for 
understanding relations of distrust. Since a large part of the existing approaches have focused 
on the concept of trust, our aim is also to evaluate whether these can be extended and applied 
to the analysis of distrusting attitudes in an insightful manner. 
 
We already know that trust and distrust are cognitive and affective notions that become 
particularly relevant in conditions of risk or uncertainty (Levi, 1997; Fenton, 2000). 
Gambetta has described trust and distrust as “a particular level of the subjective probability 
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be 
able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action” (1988: 217, emphasis 
in the original). Distrust is therefore the result of a probability calculation regarding actions 
that will be harmful to the truster, to some degree. Importantly, it is an attitude that is relevant 
in motivating subsequent decisions and actions.  
 
There are still multiple views on what the calculations that shape this subjective probability 
entail. This is where we find different analytical approaches to distrust. The strategic 
approach focuses on a rational analysis of the agent’s motivation for acting in a manner that 
reflects, or ‘encapsulates’, one’s interests. Russel Hardin (2002, 2004) formulated this 
account of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’ and extended it to include the decision to distrust.7 
This decision depends on a cognitive exercise of determining, based on the information 
available to you, whether an agent’s capacities and intentions would lead them to behave in a 
way that goes against your best interest. Given this requirement, the strategic approach 
demands that the relationship of distrust is specific to the domain and task at hand. For 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The extension of the ‘encapsulated interest’ approach from trust to distrust is not without its problems, as it 
fails to account for the difference between agents who do not have a motivation to encapsulate one’s interest in 
their actions and agents who have a motivation to go against that said interest. As discussed in the later sections 
of this chapter, both can result in distrust, but there are important differences between levels of distrust.  
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example, you may distrust a shopkeeper who overcharged you for the goods purchased and 
may very well refrain from visiting his shop in the future. But you would not say you distrust 
him to be a good and faithful husband, as this is an entirely different matter on which you 
have insufficient relevant information.  
 
Of course, individuals rarely have sufficient information about every aspect of social life, and 
already, one might think that what leads an agent to cheat or betray trust in one instance 
might lead them to do so in another as well. The tripartite formulation of distrust (A distrusts 
B to do X) is useful as it is analytically straightforward, but at the same time, it is highly 
limiting in explaining actual human behaviour given the complexity of social relations and 
the informational burden it places on the individual. Furthermore, the purely rational 
approach fails to account for situations where, (a) trust is extended even when it goes against 
the standard understanding of self-interest, and (b) distrust is established without sufficient 
information about the capabilities and intentions of agents. When theorising about attitudes of 
distrust (and trust) it is important to remember that they are social constructs employed in a 
world with a high degree of social complexity, where encounters and decision-making are 
often recurrent and do not operate in isolation as a ‘one-off’. The example used above 
mentioned an experience of trust-betrayal (the initial trust involved engaging in a transaction) 
as the source of information, although we could have used an external third party supplying 
information, which would require an evaluation of the trustworthiness of that information and 
simply increase the amount of complexity. 
 
To alleviate the demands of this strategic approach, some scholars proposed an alternative 
approach to trust and distrust that depends on one’s view of ethical reciprocity. This is the 
idea that shared normative values will impose certain types of behaviour among agents 
(Braithwaite and Levi, 1998; Ostrom and Walker, 2003; Letki, 2006). In a similar manner, 
some scholars have preferred to view trust and distrust as an attribute of the individual and 
the extent in which she holds an overarching moralistic worldview (Uslaner, 2002, 2008; 
Mansbridge, 1999). This approach shifts the focus entirely on the psychological traits and 
characteristics of the individual that trusts or distrusts. Generalised trust is based on the belief 
that the world is a good and fair place, where people like this individual are treated in a 
positive manner and any trust extended is rewarded and reciprocated. On the contrary, 
distrust reflects a belief that the world is a dangerous place, where people like this individual 
are treated poorly, extending trust is unwise and hence the best approach is to refrain from 
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putting oneself in a vulnerable position. These views are considered to be formed during 
early developmental and socialisation stages and are strongly associated with life 
experiences, as well as major events in a community.  
 
Some evidence supports a ‘winner’s hypothesis’ of trust (Zmerli and Newton, 2011), 
meaning that those who are at the top of the society in terms of health, education, income and 
life satisfaction tend to have a more positive outlook in life and trust their compatriots, other 
social groups, institutions and political authorities. However, we believe this approach is 
overly restricting. The theory of general trusters and distrusters is limiting for the study of 
citizen-state relations and for other social interactions, as it does not allow for variation 
across cases of interactions depending on the trustworthy or untrustworthy characteristics of 
the agent being evaluated. Shifting the focus back to the relationship between the individual 
citizen and the political community provides a more promising approach to understanding 
attitudes of trust and distrust. Nevertheless, the idea that distrust entails a belief regarding 
shared norms of reciprocity can supplement the rational-strategic approach and provide a 
basis for the self-fulfilling nature of trust and distrust. It is not only the case that ‘the use of 
trust increases trust further’, but also that the establishment of distrust also increases distrust 
further, setting in motion a virtuous or vicious circle (Levi, 1997). The violation or absence 
of such norms of reciprocity render distrust self-validating, either by preventing agents from 
engaging in interactions that can invalidate distrust or by leading to widespread and accepted 
practices that foster untrustworthy behaviour and further distrust (Blackburn, 1998; 
Gambetta, 1988). 
 
The two approaches outlined above can work in a complementary rather than an antagonistic 
manner to explain distrusting attitudes. We believe that distrust can be both rational, that is, 
the result of strategic calculation within the confines of one’s knowledge and perceptions, but 
that it also depends on the existence of shared normative values between the person that 
decides whether to distrust and the agent being evaluated, which transcend the standard 
understanding of ‘encapsulated interest’ and are not solely specific to the information and 
task at hand. We also draw insights from an alternative approach to relations of distrust based 
on the work of social identity theorists and the principles of in-group and out-group 
formation. Although much of this work has gone unnoticed by the literature on trust, studies 
carried out by social identity theorists and evolutionary game theorists find that as humans 
we are predisposed to trust our own kind and people who are ‘similar to us’, rather than out-
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groups (Brewer, 1999; Turner et al., 1994; Turner, 1975; Tajfel, 1978). 8  The existence of in-
group and out-group bias shows that “members of an in-group tend to perceive other in-group 
members in generally favourable terms, particularly as being trustworthy, honest and 
cooperative” (Messick and Brewer, 1983: 27-28, emphasis in the original). Respectively, 
members of out-groups are approached with suspicion and hostility, and are more likely to be 
viewed as untrustworthy and un-cooperative.  
 
This approach highlights the social and repetitive aspect of human interactions and relations 
of distrust. As social creatures, human beings do not operate in isolation, but need to create 
social bonds and define their social selves through relationships. In this sense, trust and 
distrust are relational constructs that depend on the delineation of in-groups and out-groups 
and the strength or homogeneity of groups. In-group favouritism for small groups, some 
scholars argue, is directly related to the perception of an insecure environment and distrust of 
out-groups (Brewer, 1999; Kramer, 2004). In a political context, individuals that identify 
with a group systematically excluded from advocating its interests and holding positions of 
authority distrust the state and its agents, while the populist or radical political discourses 
attempt to delineate the political class as a separate group at odds with the rest of the political 
community. This theoretical approach to trust and distrust also appeals to the notion of 
positive and negative norms of reciprocity and helps explain the mechanism behind people’s 
tendency to develop ‘special relationships’. Life within a social context obliges people to take 
some risks and to cooperate in certain domains; we all need to eat, have shelter, work and at 
times seek assistance or services from others. When the pressure to act is inescapable, people 
may resort to what Gambetta describes as “a deceptive rearrangement of beliefs” (1988: 220). 
“Thus there are those”, he explains, “who distrust entire categories of people, except the 
member of that category with whom they have a special relationship” (1988: 220). The 
general attitudes can be distrusting, but the formation of a special bond or close relationship 
allows some forms of cooperation to take place.  
 
A combination of these approaches to the study of distrust can emphasise the role of rational 
calculation and reasoning, the importance of shared norms of reciprocity and the relational or 
affective identification process, all of which shape perceptions of untrustworthiness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Some exceptions are Tyler (1998), who considers the role of social identification with the authorities as a 
source of trust and Hooghe and Marks (2005), who find that communal identities are important in shaping views 
of political objects, especially in multi-level governance. See also Brewer (1999) and Scheidegger and Staerklé 
(2011) for more information. 
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Throughout these different perspectives distrust is seen as an attitude that affects one’s stance 
towards the agent or group of agents being evaluated and shapes intentions of how to deal 
with the risks associated with social interaction. Distrust denotes a state of alertness, the 
presence of fear and risk of vulnerability, which would lead to non-cooperation and an 
attempt to shield oneself from harmful outcomes (Schul et al., 2008; Yamagishi et al., 1998; 
Gambetta, 1988). This connection between attitudes of distrust and subsequent action 
provides the basis for another important characteristic of distrust: the development of distrust 
as an attitude heuristic. Attitude heuristics operate as cognitive shortcuts in the human mind 
that use stored evaluations and overall assessments as a guiding indicator for action 
(Pratkanis, 1989; Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1989). Previous research has found that attitude 
heuristics are developed and employed to help individuals cope with problems of complexity, 
uncertainty and the lack of sufficient information that plague many aspects of social and 
political life. Within a society, the heuristic strategies available to citizens in order to tackle 
problems of uncertainty in collective-action can be derived at the societal level from culture-
specific historical developments or from individual cognitive processes and learning cycles 
(Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Schoon and Cheng, 2011; Cosmedes and Tobby, 1994; Putnam, 
1993).  
 
Earlier research has identified a ‘duty heuristic’ and ‘trust heuristic’, which explain how 
positive experiences associated with the benefit of participating in a collective enhance trust 
and trustworthiness and promote future cooperation in the form of rule compliance and non 
free-riding (Scholz and Pinney, 1995; Hetherington, 2005; Scholz and Lubell, 1998). We 
believe that a similar heuristic mechanism can be at play when it comes to attitudes of 
distrust, as they too can act as a summary measure of the risks and potential harm derived 
from interactions with a given agent or collective and guide future behaviour. 
 
In this section we have presented key analytical understandings of distrust from a range of 
scientific fields and a diverse body of work. According to the strategic account of 
‘encapsulated interest’, distrust must be targeted and domain specific and it depends on an 
assessment of the motivation and capabilities of the agent and domain in question. The 
notions of ‘general’ or ‘moralistic trust’ render trust and distrust two distinct moral 
worldviews that are not targeted to a specific agent, but depend on the traits of the individual 
citizen. However, as humans are fundamentally social beings that need – and even want – to 
cooperate, establish relations and survive in a society, the concept of distrust as an attitude 
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targeted towards an out-group or as an attitude heuristic, can help explain instances where 
cooperation fails even in the absence of specific information and evidence. Furthermore, all 
of these approaches highlight the self-reinforcing nature of distrust. Any calculation that 
involves information and knowledge about past indications of untrustworthiness and group 
perceptions also help shape prospective expectations. Relations of distrust propagate 
themselves by providing ever stronger perceptions of untrustworthiness and not allowing 
interactions that could disprove such perceptions to take place. 
 
As mentioned above, relations of trust and distrust are omnipresent in the lives of citizens, 
groups and collectives. Can the analytical approaches presented here help us to examine in-
depth citizen attitudes of distrust towards political agents, institutions and the political system 
in general? In other words, can we speak of ‘political distrust’, and if so what is the most 
appropriate analytical framework to study such attitudes? A similar question has preoccupied 
scholars of political trust – some consider ‘political trust’ to be a misnomer, substituting the 
term with that of confidence or support (Hardin, 2002; Lenard, 2008; Ullmann-Margalit, 
2004). This thesis has argued from the outset that attitudes of distrust are particularly apt for 
describing citizen-state relations. Firstly, it is the language that citizens and commentators 
alike use to describe current phenomena and express negative orientations towards political 
actors, processes and institutions. In addition to the common use of the term, looking at the 
way many citizens interact with political authorities, political agents and institutions invites 
us to analyse these relationships using a concept that can account for the observable 
complexity and combination of cognitive and affective hostile orientations. The aim of the 
thesis is precisely to develop an analytically robust and empirically sound conceptual model 
of political distrust that can resolve some of these disputes. 
 
 
2.4 The conceptual model of political distrust based on technical, ethical and 
interest-based evaluations 
 
Below, we present the conceptual model for the study of distrusting political attitudes. The 
model is informed by inductive research, the findings of which are presented in detail in 
Chapter 4, as well as by the analytical approaches to distrusting attitudes discussed in the 
preceding section. Qualitative empirical research focusing on citizens’ accounts of political 
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distrust, their sentiments, expressions and explanations of distrusting attitudes, provide new 
evidence to address the key question guiding this thesis. Political distrust in this thesis is 
primarily defined as an attitude held by a citizen in relation to her political system. The 
meaning of political distrust as expressed by citizens and described above is an expectation of 
harm and other negative outcomes resulting from the operations of political agents. It denotes 
a hostile attitude and entails the intention of refraining from interacting with political actors 
and breaking any form of relationship with political agents.  
 
As an attitude expressed by an individual citizen, political distrust is unavoidably affected by 
personality traits and individual characteristics in a multitude of ways. Personality and other 
socialisation experiences shape perceptual screens, influencing the ways in which people 
process information and perceive the world around them (Zaller, 1992). Since political 
distrust is based on perceptions of untrustworthiness, it is crucial to acknowledge such 
influences that may derive primarily from individual citizens and not their relation to political 
agents, even if these are not the main focus of our analysis. A body of work has investigated 
the personality traits and individual characteristics associated with political trust, and as 
discussed in the earlier section some scholars have formulated a theory of general trusters and 
distrusters on this basis (Zmerli and Newton, 2011; Uslaner, 2002). Based on the theoretical 
premise that ‘winners’ in a society are in a better position to formulate positive views of the 
community and political institutions and to gain from norms of reciprocity, empirical 
research has found that higher levels of education, income and socioeconomic status, life 
satisfaction and personal health are negatively associated with expressions of political distrust 
(Putnam, 2000; Newton and Norris, 2000). This thesis does not consider a theory of general 
distrusters to be the appropriate analytical approach to the study of political distrust, but 
acknowledges that the link between citizen characteristics and perceptions of political 
untrustworthiness are important to consider in any comprehensive account of political 
distrust.  
 
Focusing on political distrust itself, we have conceptualised it as a relational attitude that 
reflects perceptions of untrustworthiness specific to the political system in its entirety or its 
components. In line with the definition by Gambetta presented earlier, we argue that attitudes 
of political distrust develop in a context where the decision to distrust affects the citizen’s 
subsequent actions. This is not merely a derivative or effect of distrusting attitudes, but an 
essential part of political distrust as experienced by citizens. Exploring this attitude area using 
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an exploratory research approach revealed particular emotive and behavioural intention 
responses as part of citizens’ expressions of political distrust. These are discussed further in 
subsequent chapters and included in the conceptual model of this thesis.  
 
Political distrust entails the belief that political agents act in an untrustworthy manner and 
therefore requires information about political agents, processes and outcomes. Information 
becomes available through a citizen’s cognitive and affective reservoir, which includes past 
experiences, stimuli and new information regarding the actions and other qualities of political 
agents. Distrust itself is expressed in two time projections: retrospective and prospective. 
Retrospective attitudes reflect past negative evaluations of political agents, whereas 
prospective distrusting attitudes refer to a belief about future untrustworthy conduct. In this 
sense, political distrust is not only a relational, but also a dynamic attitude. This is an 
important characteristic given that, as mentioned before, political distrust forces us to 
consider an attitude that is not formulated in an isolated environment and does not operate 
within the confines of a single exchange. The political lives of citizens begin even before 
they transition to voters and continue to be enriched year after year with new information, 
experiences and events that shape their orientation towards politics. Beliefs about the future 
conduct of political actors are influenced to a large extent by existing and past evaluations, 
but the two are not identical. Prospective assessments involve a bigger role for the faith or 
lack of faith citizens have in the political system, whereas retrospective evaluations are 
grounded more firmly in evidence (even if subjective). Further, exploratory empirical 
evidence showed that expressions of political distrust frequently follow retrospective 
evaluations of untrustworthiness, especially in cases where initial trust has been betrayed. 
Prospective assessments of untrustworthiness tap into the forward-looking nature of social 
experience and are more in line with the framework of strategic distrust. Crucially, these two 
time projections provide a dynamic aspect to attitudes of political distrust. 
 
So far, we have not addressed perhaps the most important aspect of political distrust and have 
resorted to describing distrusting attitudes in a rather tautological manner: political distrust is 
an attitude that reflects the belief that the political system and its agents are untrustworthy. 
Conceptually, distrust and untrustworthiness are two distinct notions, the latter referring to 
qualities of the political system and its agents and the former referring to the relational 
dynamic attitude we have set out to study. The above description of political distrust may be 
empirically valid, and indeed, macro-level studies into the determinants of political distrust 
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would equate the two. In the existing literature, government honesty, transparency, efficiency 
and responsiveness have been placed high on the list of qualities that would constitute a 
trustworthy government (Miller and Listhaug, 1990). Nevertheless, the study of political 
distrust attitudes requires a definition of citizen perceptions, specifically citizen perceptions 
of political untrustworthiness. We identify three types of evaluations or dimensions that 
perceptions of untrustworthiness may follow.  
 
Firstly, both retrospective and prospective perceptions of untrustworthiness can be 
understood as judgments of technical incompetence. Similar to the emphasis placed on the 
capacities of an agent to fulfil or betray trust in the strategic analytical approach, political 
distrust reflects evaluations of incompetent political agents and failed processes. Citizens 
perceive politics and positions of political power as posts that demand particular types of 
knowledge, competencies and skills in order for institutions, processes and indeed the 
democratic polity to function successfully. Political distrust does not reflect an apathetic 
stance towards politics or the belief that it is not relevant for citizens’ lives. On the contrary it 
denotes a recognition that governments and state actors (in their different levels and 
mandates) matter and that given their roles in regulation, the economy, security, healthcare 
and education, to name but a few of the domains under political influence, technical 
incompetence and failure to perform according to the needs of the polity constitute an 
untrustworthy political system. Citizen distrust of a political group or institution reflects the 
belief that these agents are incapable of fulfilling the role requirements and that the 
institutions fail to produce the required outputs.  
 
As an example, we can think of the national legislature that needs to create a sustainable state 
pension system that is balanced, financially sound and takes into account external factors, 
such as inflation, investment rates, and population demographics to ensure that contributions 
made today will result in a living pension in 20, 30 or even 50 years’ time. Distrust of the 
people in charge of designing, implementing and maintaining this programme involves a 
perception of incompetence. Even without detailed knowledge of the requirements of a 
pension system, the experience of a halved pension or a pension that never arrives signals 
evidence of managerial, political and economic failure. There are many examples of this 
evaluative dimension of political distrust that emerge from the exploratory research we 
carried out. Distrust can be targeted at public services for being antiquated and unhelpful, at 
politicians and political parties that do not show the necessary skill to govern effectively or at 
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the entire political system based on a perception of failure and the inability of most of its 
parts to fulfil their role in policy, implementation and output. In this sense, retrospective and 
prospective evaluations of political untrustworthiness are often perceptions of technical and 
functional incompetence.  
 
This evaluative dimension of political distrust is sensitive to government performance and its 
political track record, but rests primarily on individual experiences and beliefs about the 
shortcomings of political agents. Yet, it is not the sole way citizens evaluate political 
untrustworthiness. Expressions of political distrust can carry an additional element, one that 
is intrinsically normative. Attitudes of distrust are expressions of the belief that there is 
something fundamentally wrong, unfair and unethical about the processes, intentions and/or 
outcomes produced by the political system. Political roles and government functions, being 
public functions, involve certain communal norms of ‘right’ behaviour and citizens’ 
perceptions of untrustworthiness make a profound moral claim. Political distrust entails a 
negative evaluation of technical competence, but also a negative ethical evaluation of the 
political system. However, this evaluative dimension is not equivalent to the notion of 
‘moralistic’ trust, that is, an individual’s worldview regarding the trustworthiness of others, 
including political agents. It is still a dynamic and relational assessment of the political 
system and its agents that is extended retrospectively and prospectively highlighting the 
violation of shared normative values. It describes political actions, processes or outcomes that 
are in direct contrast to moral norms considered objective and commonly agreed upon by the 
political community. This important ethical aspect of distrusting attitudes transcends the 
preference framework of any one individual and provides an additional bond of each citizen 
to their political community.  
 
It might not be surprising that in citizens’ evaluations of their political system and its agents, 
moral norms play an important role. Earlier scholarly discussions of what constitutes a 
trustworthy government and ‘good type’ of politician identified qualities that have strong 
ethical dimensions: honesty, fairness, integrity and impartiality (Mansbridge, 2003). Without 
a doubt, it will be hard to find any citizen, or political scientist for that matter, who would 
argue that these are not desirable qualities in democratic governance. What has not been 
clearly identified so far is that attitudes of political distrust make a claim that condemns the 
violation of such ethical norms. Descriptions of political conduct that is perceived to be 
wrong, decisions that are unjust, processes and outcomes that are judged to be unfair, come 
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part and parcel with citizens’ explanations of what constitutes political untrustworthiness. 
And although each citizen’s evaluative and cognitive framework may give rise to a different 
outcome judgment regarding political agents, distrusting attitudes often lay claim to the 
violation of ‘universal’ ethical norms. Assessments of deception, bias, inequity, prejudice and 
manipulation all follow this dimension. Further, we could also consider that the normative 
framework of different political cultures or the same culture in different time-points may 
vary. Yet, the expressions of political distrust by citizens will continue to refer to political 
conduct that is in breach of ethical rules and accepted notions of fairness. Repeated instances 
of political dishonesty, such as being lied to or deceived, political processes that are 
systematically biased in favour of those in powerful positions or outcomes that impact the 
weaker members of a society are some examples of political untrustworthiness perceived 
through this evaluative dimension.   
 
Corruption, bribery and cronyism are also examples of political conduct that carry strong 
ethical judgments and have been associated with high levels of political distrust. Pervasive 
corruption may have a serious impact on the effectiveness of a system and damages its 
capacity to function successfully, as it enhances the impression of incompetent and 
inadequate officials. Yet, it is the unfairness and unethical aspect of such practices which 
citizens refer to initially. The two perceptions of political untrustworthiness, technical failures 
and unethical conduct, are not mutually exclusive. They often follow similar directions and 
are intertwined. But it is also possible for citizens to arrive at distinct evaluations of the 
untrustworthiness of political agents or specific institutions. For example, we can think of a 
citizen who perceives their prime minister or other political leader to be competent and 
skilful, but who is at the same time perceived to be lacking in honesty and ethical qualities.  
 
The third and final dimension we identify can similarly be intertwined with perceptions of 
technical and ethical untrustworthiness. This evaluative dimension is based on perceptions of 
incongruent interests between the citizen and the political system and its agents. 
Considerations of interests have been central to the analytical approach to trust as 
‘encapsulated interest’, however transferring this notion to attitudes of political distrust is 
challenging. It is this aspect of political distrust where its relational nature comes most into 
play. This judgment is not a reflection of the functional qualities of political agents and the 
political system. Rather, it is the perception that the intentions, processes and outcomes of 
political agents contravene the citizen’s personal interests and preferences. Citizens that 
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express political distrust often refer to incongruent interest between themselves and the 
political system or some of its agents. This aspect of distrusting attitudes becomes prominent 
in divided communities, partisan politics and divisive social issues.  
 
Citizens often perceive politics as a competitive arena where resources, values, and issue 
prioritisation are allocated based on a contest of interests and ideologies. Citizens may 
develop their own understanding of their best-interest, either on individual terms that 
encompass themselves and their family or even the social group they identify with in a 
pluralistic society. Expressing political distrust in this sense entails the belief that the interests 
of political agents are judged to be incongruent with those of the citizen. Retrospective and 
prospective assessments of diverging interests are part of political distrust attitudes, although 
again the outcome of these assessments and the process of identifying all actors’ interests can 
vary from citizen to citizen. Social groups and political parties aid the process of aggregating 
individual interest and delineate in-groups and out-groups. These can be based on 
geographical terms, religious or class differences, or at the individual level on personal 
beliefs, ideology, professional and social standing. In existing studies of citizen trust in 
government, a consistent finding is that partisans express more distrust towards a government 
not run by their party. It is highly likely that they perceive that government as incompetent 
and pursuing policies that violate ethical norms, but their perception of untrustworthiness is 
primarily based on the belief that these political agents behave in a manner that harms their 
personal best interest. Other examples may include low skilled workers expressing distrust 
towards a system or administration that promotes economic migration or a health worker who 
distrusts a party that advocates less state support and cuts in the health sector.  
 
Instances of political distrust based on diverging interests are expressed in more specific 
terms. Being able to identify the interests of political agents or the political system is not an 
easy task. Group identification provides some help in this regard and can inform perceptions 
of congruent and incongruent interests between citizens and political agents. However, it is 
important to note that this evaluative dimension of political distrust is not only relevant to 
parts of the political system, partisans, minorities, or specific agents. It can become a 
prominent aspect of distrusting attitudes when the political regime as a whole is perceived to 
pursue interests that are diverging from those of the citizenry. As mentioned earlier, populism 
thrives on a rhetoric that places political elites and the system on a contrasting path to the 
popular will and the citizens’ best-interest. Similarly, a political class that is perceived as 
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disconnected and oblivious to the needs of the citizenry, or a system that fails to promote the 
voices and interests of large parts of the citizens, all consist of evaluations of political 
untrustworthiness.  
 
The conceptual model of political distrust we formulate and advance throughout this thesis 
follows these aforementioned insights. We understand political distrust to involve 
retrospective and prospective assessments of the political system and to follow three types of 
evaluations based on perceptions of technical incompetence and procedural failure, 
perceptions of political conduct and outputs that violate ethical norms and perceptions of 
diverging interests between the citizen and political agents. The relationship between these 
three evaluative dimensions is more difficult to determine, as it may differ among individuals 
and the political agent being assessed or even the timing of the evaluation. This thesis aims to 
explore these relations further in subsequent chapters that analyse quantitative evidence. 
Here, we argue that these three evaluations of untrustworthy political conduct are not distinct 
types of political distrust. Ontologically, they represent aspects of distrusting attitudes 
motivated by different judgments, which may overlap, may be fused together and could be 
difficult to discern even for the citizen expressing them. Nevertheless, we believe that 
recognising that citizens use one or more of these underlying evaluations when deciding to 
distrust political agents marks a contribution to our understanding of political distrust and 
opens the way for further investigations into the structure and operation of citizen attitudes. 
Figure 2.1 below offers a graphical representation of the conceptual model of political 
distrust. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual model of political distrust  
 
 
 
In addition to the three dimensions of evaluation and time projections entailed in attitudes of 
political distrust, we also consider that such attitudes are relevant to situations of risk and 
uncertainty and to the appropriate action that needs to be taken in relation to political agents. 
We argue that this is a fundamental conceptual part of political distrust and find empirical 
evidence for the particular response states (emotive and cognitive) embedded in expressions 
of distrust. Although behaviour in the context of this thesis is limited to citizen reports of 
behavioural intentions, we believe that these responses are part of what make attitudes of 
distrust a powerful concept in the study of political behaviour and merit further investigation. 
 
Attitudes of distrust targeted at political agents indicate hostility, anger and disappointment 
and activate a search for ways to terminate interactions with those agents, bypassing them or 
replacing them with other agents. Attitudes of distrust towards the entire political system 
become more problematic, as citizens’ search for ways to break up citizen-state interactions 
is nearly impossible, save for the decision to leave the country or become an outlaw. Citizen 
hostility and anger are not enough to mend the risk represented by interactions with an 
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untrustworthy political system. When insecurity, fear and even despair prevail, they may 
motivate different actions.  
 
Finally, a conceptual model of political distrust would be incomplete without accounting for 
its cyclical and reciprocal nature. Reciprocity has been affirmed as a key characteristic of 
social and political trust relations. We have already argued that distrust exhibits similar 
cyclical and self-reinforcing characteristics that have the power to activate a vicious circle, 
acting both as its cause and effect. Given the multitude of ways in which political agents and 
processes impact the lives of citizens, distrust in particular creates incentives for citizens to 
become themselves untrustworthy. The existence of distrusting political attitudes impedes 
cooperation and interactions that could mitigate distrust, helping to develop more 
untrustworthy institutions and political processes that cannot operate effectively and cannot 
reach out to citizens to mend perceptions of untrustworthiness. Untrustworthy political agents 
feed distrusting citizen attitudes and distrusting attitudes feed political untrustworthiness, 
establishing relations of negative reciprocity. 
 
2.5 Dimensions and spill-overs of distrust 
 
The conceptual model of political distrust presented above was developed following 
conceptual work and the findings of exploratory empirical research aimed at investigating 
distrusting attitudes from the citizens’ perspective. It identifies the meaning and underlying 
evaluations entailed in citizen attitudes of political distrust, as well as other conceptual 
characteristics, such as the dynamic and cyclical nature of distrust. So far, we have spoken of 
political distrust as an attitude held by a citizen in response to his political system, its parts or 
its agents. We consider that attitudes of distrust follow this model irrespective of whether 
they are targeted at specific institutions, governments, political groups or the political system 
as whole. The expectation of negative outcomes are based on assessments of technical 
failure, unethical conduct and incongruent interests influences the consideration of new 
evidence or stimuli and particular response mechanisms; this holds for all expressions of 
distrust.  
 
The Eastonian model and subsequent theoretical research have emphasised the difference 
between distrust of specific incumbents and distrust of the political regime; however, the 
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distinction is not as clear or hierarchical when looking at citizen attitudes and empirics 
(Easton, 1975). Perceptions of untrustworthiness spill-over from one political object to 
another, from incumbents, to processes or institutions and vice versa, influencing evaluations 
of the political system at large. Receiving unfair treatment from one public service is likely to 
contribute to evaluations of other public services, even if you do not have information or 
first-hand experience of the qualities of system components. Assessments of political 
untrustworthiness can spill over from parts to the whole and from the whole to its parts. The 
separation of citizen orientations towards specific and diffuse political levels is a useful 
analytical distinction; however, attitudes of political distrust can be targeted either at specific 
parts of the political system, at the system as a whole, or both, and are much more 
intertwined than a strictly hierarchical framework would suggest. Distrust targeted at 
particular political agents, groups or institutions may motivate different emotive and 
behavioural responses than distrust in the political system, but the two are not fundamentally 
different attitudes. They follow the conceptual model outlined above, albeit with some 
evaluative dimensions being more prominent than others and some variation in the response 
mechanisms they trigger.  
 
The discussion regarding the targets of political trust and distrust has caused considerable 
debates in the academic literature, yet we believe that the challenge in understanding citizen 
attitudes of political distrust do not so much lie in a failure to adequately identify the political 
target or the task for which they are distrusted (although doing so may put some of these 
debates to rest, see Miller, 1974a, 1974b; Citrin, 1974; Cook and Gronke, 2005; Langer, 
2002). Rather, it stems from two complementary functions of political distrust: the perception 
of political untrustworthiness as outlined in the previous section and the heuristic mechanism 
that serves as a cognitive shortcut for evaluations of all political agents along various 
dimensions.  
 
As discussed earlier, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that political distrust acts as 
a cognitive heuristic for assessing parts of the political system and guiding citizen decision-
making in complex situations where information is costly and unwieldy (Hooghe and Marien, 
2011; Hetherington and Rudolph, 2015).  At the same time, as an evaluative attitude, political 
distrust is grounded in the processing of available information, evidence and experiences, and 
hence is open to change during one’s political life to reflect such perceptions. This 
conceptualisation of distrusting attitudes provides a dynamic model of distrust, whereby all 
	   63	  
the information and underlying reasoning is available to citizens to explain their attitudes and 
decision-making. Yet given that citizens are to a great extent ‘cognitive missers’, that is, they 
are disinclined or unable to gather sufficient knowledge regarding every political agent, 
attitudes of distrust also act as a heuristic mechanism (Hooghe, 2011).  
 
It is important to acknowledge both of these functions of political distrust in the development 
of a conceptual model. Our exploratory research indicates that attitudes may function in both 
ways. Citizens can evaluate different aspects of untrustworthy and trustworthy qualities and 
different parts of their political system in ways that show they consider and prioritise 
different information, but evaluations are also affected by overall beliefs about the qualities 
of the political system. All of these aspects are at play and all of them provide insights into 
the way in which political distrust operates. Following the operationalisation and collection 
of quantitative evidence based on this model of political distrust, we seek to explore the 
internal structure and function of distrusting attitudes in greater depth through additional data 
and analyses.  
 
 
2.6 Towards conceptual clarity: Political distrust and related concepts 	  
Finally, this section is devoted to clarifying the relationship between political distrust and 
related notions. Conceptual and empirical studies of political distrust have been plagued by a 
profusion of related concepts. Already, within the key theoretical approaches in political 
science, political distrust is discussed in terms of trust, but also of alienation, disaffection and 
political support. It is clear that the significance of distrusting attitudes in the realm of politics 
lies in their association with these phenomena and the types of political behaviour they 
motivate. Nevertheless, to date there has been no effort to distinguish political distrust from 
other competing notions and provide a conceptualisation of distrusting attitudes that can 
clarify those associations.  
 
This problem of having a plethora of competing concepts (as well as operationalisations and 
indicators) is something that every researcher in the field of citizen attitudes towards politics 
has to face (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Craig, 1993; Nye et al., 1997; Mishler and Rose, 1997). 
Following the presentation of the conceptual model in the previous sections, the next task is 
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to disentangle political distrust from other notions and clarify the way in which it is 
associated with other key attitudes. Part of the confusion in the study of political distrust has 
its source in this wealth of concepts, which has led political scientists to often talk (and write) 
past each other. In the final section of this chapter, we clarify the conceptual differences 
between attitudes of political distrust and trust, the notion of political cynicism and discuss 
key concepts that are associated with distrusting attitudes and used in subsequent analyses of 
empirical data.  
 
This study began by challenging the assumption that trust and distrust are mirroring concepts 
in a single continuum and that the lack of one equals the presence of the other. The 
conceptual model presented in this chapter is focused on distrusting political attitudes and 
was informed from theoretical and empirical work. During this work we find that people 
often think and reason about trust and distrust together in politics, yet that there are 
differences in the role of retrospective judgments, the moral aspect of distrust, as well as the 
distinctive emotive responses that accompany distrusting judgments. These aspects and the 
fact that distrusting attitudes capture negative orientations towards political agents and the 
political system, distinguish distrust from trust and the neutral or ambivalent position that 
reflects neither positive nor negative orientations, that is lack of trust. Therefore, we argue 
that conceptually the three notions form part of a continuum, where trust occupies the 
positive pole, distrust the negative pole and there is a clear neutral area in between the two, as 
long as we separate them and recognize that distrust and trust are not symmetrical notions. 
Measuring this continuum empirically and identifying the cut-off points presents additional 
challenges to which we return and discuss in more detail in the concluding chapter of the 
thesis.   
 
Focusing on citizens’ negative political orientations, earlier definitions of political distrust 
conflated distrusting political attitudes with the notion of political cynicism (Miller, 1974a; 
Abramson, 1983; Abramson and Finifter, 1981). Political cynicism reflects a negative 
attitude that is rooted in deeply-held beliefs of the ‘inherent evilness’ of politicians and the 
entire political system (Schyns et al., 2004). However, political distrust depends on the 
assessment of political agents according to some evaluative criteria. Cynicism is a personal 
stance towards the political system irrespective of the agent, group or process that it is 
directed to. In this way, it is better understood as a characteristic of the citizen and not a 
function of the trustworthy or untrustworthy qualities of the political system (Dekker, 2006).  
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Without a doubt, political distrust and cynicism are positively associated and even causally 
connected, although the arrow of causality can be theorised to run in either direction. 
Repeated interactions with the political system that leave citizens betrayed or worse off can 
build up and contribute to a cynical view of the entire democratic system (Capella and 
Jameson, 1997). Similarly, early socialisation and experiences that have little to do with 
political exchanges may also foster a cynical worldview at the individual level, which is then 
extended to one’s political life and could motivate distrusting attitudes. Nevertheless, the two 
concepts are distinct. If we are to maintain the notion of political distrust as a relational and 
evaluative attitude that depends on the behaviour and attributes of the political agents being 
evaluated, it needs to be distinguished from the notion of political cynicism.  
 
The politically distrusting are not necessarily cynical or alienated citizens, even if the cynical 
and alienated often express attitudes of political distrust. Considering the conceptual model of 
distrust advanced in this thesis, we expect that cynical attitudes will be associated with all 
evaluative dimensions of political untrustworthiness, especially perceptions of moral 
misconduct and incongruent interests between the citizen and the political system. A cynical 
view of politics should also be associated equally with retrospective and prospective 
expressions of political untrustworthiness, as there is no reason to hope or believe that the 
future might hold any ‘wiggling room’ for political changes.  
 
Recent anti-establishment sentiments, political disatisfaction and discourse that captures 
citizens’ belief in the ‘evilness’ of the political system has also become the focus of the 
scholarly study of populist attitudes (Akkerman et al; 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012). With 
populist rhetoric and political actors on the rise across European established democracies and 
beyond, it is useful to point to some conceptual similarities and differences with this 
burgeoning field of studies. A popular anti-elitist sentiment is often echoed in the moral 
negative evaluations of distrusting judgments and may have a similar basis to the populist’s 
proclamation of a malevolent political elite that deceives and takes advantage of the people. 
Nevertheless, populist attitudes also rest on a Manichean view of politics and the belief in a 
‘good’ people with a homogenous will (Castano-Silva et al. 2016) that is not equal to the 
interest-based based dimension of distrust, which recognises personal and group interests in a 
pluralist society. Undoubtedly, populist discourse often capitalises on existing sentiments of 
political distrust in order to further its ideological worldview (which can be of the political 
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right or left) and finds fruitful grounds in the case of dissatisfaction stemming from 
incongruent interests between a citizen and the political establishment in its entirety. Citizens 
more prone to populist sentiments and are expected to be distrustful of the existing political 
elite and institutions, but they are also more likely to reject the view of a pluralistic society 
and the need for protection of minorities and to ascribe to the idea of a strong leader that 
promotes the ‘will of the people’ (Werner et al., 2016). In this sense, populism may depart 
from distrust when citizens express grievances towards the current system but do not hold 
such views about the political community. 
 
Political efficacy is a related concept that has also been brought under scholarly scrutiny. 
Although seldom conflated with distrust conceptually, its definition and operationalisation in 
relation to political distrust have caused confusion. The early definitions of political efficacy 
describe it as the feeling that an individual’s political action does have, or can have, an 
impact upon the political process (Craig et al., 1990). Due to its theoretical links to citizen 
participation and mobilisation, a series of empirical studies focused on efficacious and 
inefficacious attitudes and went on to identify two dimensions of political efficacy. The term 
‘internal political efficacy’ was used to refer to one’s confidence in their ability to 
understand, participate and influence political processes, and included survey questions that 
inquired after citizens’ perceptions of their own place and competence in politics (Robinson 
et al., 1991). The term ‘external political efficacy’ was used to refer to one’s beliefs regarding 
the responsiveness of political institutions and authorities to potential citizen action. The 
latter notion of external efficacy was mainly identified through survey items that tapped into 
evaluations of the political system and significantly overlapped with survey measures of 
political trust (Citrin and Muste, 1999; Schyns et al., 2008). According to our 
conceptualisation of distrust, these evaluations of the responsiveness of the political system 
are included in assessments of incongruent interests or unethical conduct and contribute to 
distrust. In order to avoid a tautology between political distrust and external political 
inefficacy, which would both rest on perceptions of the system’s responsiveness, the most 
helpful way of thinking about political efficacy is as feelings of internal efficacy.  
 
Gamson’s mistrustful-efficacious hypothesis for active participation focused on those citizens 
that are aggrieved by political processes, and therefore have cause for participating in 
politics, but who also believe their actions can have an impact. The association between 
political distrust and efficacy however is more nuanced. In most empirical studies those who 
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are politically efficacious also tend not to register negative attitudes towards the political 
system (Sigelman and Feldman, 1983).  It is difficult to disentangle the extent to which 
political distrust influences feelings of efficacy and feelings of efficacy influence attitudes of 
distrust. Though causal arguments fall outside the scope of this thesis, our interest in the 
association between political efficacy and distrust remains, as both concepts are important in 
the study of political behaviour, especially types of behaviour that have to do with political 
participation. We could expect that feelings of inefficacy would be associated more strongly 
with political distrust based on ethical and interest assessments, given that a citizen that feels 
unable to understand or influence political processes is also likely to believe these processes 
are not in line with his best interests and that the political system is not operating as it ought 
to. 
 
Thinking about feelings of political efficacy opens the door to a number of individual level 
traits and characteristics such as education, political interest and political knowledge, which 
can also influence political distrust (or even be influenced by distrusting attitudes). For 
political knowledge in particular, we can theorise both a negative and a positive association 
with attitudes of political distrust. We have already referred to the ‘winner’s hypothesis’, 
which suggests that increased levels of information and knowledge, which ordinarily come 
hand in hand with higher levels of education and socioeconomic status, are negatively 
associated with political distrust (Zmerli and Newton, 2011; Uslaner, 2011; Scheidegger and 
Staerklé, 2011). In other words, those people with lower status in a society, who are worse 
off and find themselves on the losing side of political competition, are more likely to distrust 
political agents and the system as a whole. However the opposite association between 
information or knowledge and political distrust could also be at play, given that high levels of 
knowledge regarding the competencies, track-record and processes of a political system 
increase the likelihood of identifying aspects that render political agents untrustworthy. 
Similarly, the theory on the rise of critical citizens or the cognitive mobilisation thesis would 
suggest that increased access to information and higher levels of political knowledge are 
precisely the reason why citizens are adopting a more critical assessment of political 
performance, therefore leading to more sceptical attitudes (Norris, 1999; Dalton and 
Wattenberg, 2000). It is also important to recognise that attitudes of political distrust may 
also influence levels of political knowledge as much as the opposite way around, given that 
political knowledge is something that is continuously sought (or avoided) throughout one’s 
lifetime.   
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It has already been mentioned that citizen attitudes of political distrust are particularly 
important in the study of political science due to their link to political behaviour. Distrust 
may motivate non-compliance and protest against untrustworthy institutions and processes in 
order to stimulate corrective action, but it may also lead to non-compliance with legitimate 
policies, opposition to political processes that legitimise the system and support for 
alternative regime types (Braithwaite and Levi, 1998). Earlier research into political 
disaffection and discontent has focused on institutional and non-institutional modes of 
political participation, suggesting that increased distrust may motivate citizens to engage in 
unconventional types of participation, such as signing petitions and demonstrating, while it 
decreases their involvement in institutional processes, such as elections and party campaigns. 
Given the changing nature of political action and nature of distrusting attitudes, we believe 
investigating political action that contributes to political processes and action that is primarily 
disruptive is more relevant for this study. 
 
A big part of the research investigating the link between political distrust and citizen 
behaviour has focused on the specific action of electoral participation and electoral choice. 
Most studies support the theory that trusting citizens are more likely to participate in politics 
through voting, while distrusting citizens are more likely not to participate, cast blank votes, 
or in the case of multiparty elections, vote for non-systemic, extremist or smaller parties 
(Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2014; Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2011; Miller 
and Listhaug, 1990). The emphasis on electoral participation is warranted given the fact that 
abstention or non-participation in the electoral process erodes the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the democratic system and might lead to political instability over time. We are 
particularly interested in the association between political distrust and the intention to abstain 
from elections or cast a blank vote, as much as deciding to support an extremist or radical 
party. All three acts of electoral behaviour can be considered disruptive for the democratic 
process of voting and we expect that perceptions of untrustworthiness based on ethical and 
interest-based assessments will contribute to this type of behaviour. A belief that the system 
violates shared norms of fairness must add to citizens’ disenchantment with the political 
process and their unwillingness to participate. Similarly, key political agents that pursue 
interests that run contrary to a citizen’s best-interest may turn someone away from the 
electoral process or towards radical political parties.  
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Finally, we are also interested in action that could be considered constructive for political 
processes, since both theoretical expectations and empirical evidence suggest that distrusting 
citizens are in fact more likely to participate in non-institutionalised political actions, such as 
signing petitions or attending demonstrations (Marien and Hooghe, 2013; Kaase, 1999; 
Marien et al., 2010). We want to explore which aspects of distrusting judgments promote 
active citizenship, such as demonstrating peacefully and joining political organisations, either 
non-governmental, pressure groups or existing political parties. It might be the case for 
example that distrust based on distinct assessments or formulated in retrospective or 
prospective projections motivates political action in different ways.  
 
Before presenting the findings of the empirical research carried out for this thesis, the 
following chapter explains in detail the research design and methodological choices made at 
each step of the research project. The research question addressed by the thesis necessitates 
an alternative approach to the study of political distrust, as it cannot rely on the available 
survey data or existing indicators. Survey data alone cannot provide an insight into what 
citizens are thinking or what they are evaluating when they express political distrust. At the 
same time quantitative data are extremely useful and offer a multitude of opportunities to 
analyse and investigate the structure and associations of distrusting attitudes. The empirical 
chapters of the thesis explore the nature of political distrust attitudes and advance the 
conceptual model presented above 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology 
 
3.1 Overarching research design: Mixed methodological approach 
3.2 Case selection, language and national context 
3.3 Qualitative research: Exploring the meaning of political distrust 
3.4 Quantitative research: Operationalisation, measurement and the analysis of survey data  
3.5 Summary of methodologies and conclusion 
 
 
This chapter presents the research design guiding this thesis and explains why a mixed 
methods approach is necessary to address its core research question. It employs a sequential 
mixed methods design, whereby the first part of the research consists in the collection and 
analysis of qualitative empirical evidence and informs the second part, consisting of 
quantitative data analysis derived from a new measure of political distrust attitudes. Popular 
narrative interviews provide empirical evidence to address the question of meaning and the 
conceptual status of political distrust for citizens. Interview data offer a wealth of information 
on how citizens think about, express and explain their distrust in politics. This information is 
analysed and used to build the conceptual model of distrusting political attitudes presented in 
the preceding chapter. Empirical research conducted in three national contexts – rather than a 
single one – allows us to consider the variation that exists among individuals and among 
national contexts. More importantly, we can identify common themes and patterns of 
operation that reflect human behaviour, and could potentially be generalised beyond the 
contexts studied here. Italy, the UK and Greece provide fertile ground for the study of 
distrusting attitudes towards politics, and despite their different historical trajectories and 
political cultures, expressions of distrust studied in all three contexts are found to follow 
similar patterns.  
 
In the second stage of the research design, qualitative empirical analysis feeds into the 
conceptual model of distrust and the exercise of operationalising and measuring this 
attitudinal concept. The latter part of this chapter presents all the methodological choices 
made in the process of deriving a measure for political distrust and important information 
regarding the survey that provides this study with original quantitative data. Survey data, 
derived from an online respondent sample in the UK, allows us to investigate the internal 
structure of distrusting attitudes using multivariate statistical analysis, and to further explore 
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associations between other political attitudes, individual characteristics or behavioural 
intentions and political distrust. These analyses further advance our conceptual understanding 
of distrust and contribute a new measure and original data to study the operation, not only of 
political distrust, but of each evaluative part of distrusting attitudes.  
 
 
3.1 Overarching research design: Mixed methodological approach 
 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, part of the trouble with political distrust research is 
related to the conceptualisation and methodological operationalisation of the concepts of trust 
and distrust. In this chapter we present our research design and methodological choices in 
order to address the research questions guiding this thesis; “What is political distrust?” 
Specifically, we seek to investigate what citizens mean when claiming to distrust politics and 
political actors based on empirical evidence, and to map how distrusting judgments take form 
in the minds of citizens. Further, we present a theoretically and empirically informed model 
explicating the operation of political distrust judgments. Finally, we want to determine 
whether we can capture political distrust in a quantitative survey following this 
operationalisation and make further contributions regarding the structure and operation of 
political distrust to the scholarly debate.  
 
The academic study of citizens’ political distrust has received increased attention in 
theoretical studies, yet empirical projects have almost entirely focused on existing survey 
measures of political trust. To our knowledge, there has been no measure dedicated to the 
study of political distrust from the outset following an operationalisation and measurement 
process, which presents a potential first point of conflict in understanding and interpreting 
political distrust. Most existing empirical studies into the nature, causes and effects of 
political distrust rely on survey data following the standardised operationalisation of trust 
found in national and transnational surveys. In European based surveys and other large-scale 
comparative survey research (Eurobarometer surveys, European Social Survey, World and 
European Values Survey, European Election Studies and many national election studies in 
European countries), multiple items ask respondents how much trust or confidence they have 
in different political institutions, but leave the definition and interpretation of trust to each 
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individual respondent; in the United States, four items touching on different dimensions of 
trust have been used in American National Election Studies (ANES) since the 1960s.9  
 
Nevertheless, using such indicators could never help us determine what citizens are thinking 
of when expressing distrust and what distrusting their political systems really means for 
them. In addition, none of the existing measurement efforts was aimed at capturing attitudes 
of distrust. They focused on measuring trust ‘by intuition’, or in the North American case it 
was even doubtful what these items were created to measure in the first place. Nevertheless, 
both have the evident benefit that comes with any well-established and continuously used 
survey indicator. Researchers have inexpensive access to reliable data of representative 
samples that are necessary to monitor trends and allow for time and country comparisons. 
Many scholars have lamented the fact that once measures are used repeatedly in national and 
multinational surveys they provide a benchmark for comparisons, and therefore any 
alteration, even if it serves to improve an otherwise bad indicator, is very hard to achieve, 
since it would mean ‘losing’ information from previous years. The criticisms of both 
measures vary and have occupied the political trust literature on both sides of the Atlantic. In 
their 2000 review of the field, Levi and Stoker concluded: “In one sense then, we have yet to 
question whether all of this research is really about trust or trustworthiness at all” (Levi and 
Stoker, 2000: 483). The NES measure of political trust attempts to tap into the different 
aspects of trusting judgments, yet it has been criticised for failing to distinguish between 
diffuse and specific support, leading to the often quoted Citrin-Miller debate regarding 
incumbent versus systemic evaluations (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974a, 1974b). In the European 
tradition, the most widely used measure of political trust does distinguish between different 
institutional players, politicians and the national government, but leaves two questions 
unanswered: “What is it that we are truly measuring?” and “Are we measuring the same 
notion in each national context?” (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Fisher et al., 2010; Hooghe, 2011). 
Adding to this puzzle the interchangeable use measures of institutional confidence, it seems 
that despite lengthy analyses of political distrust trends and investigation into their causes, we 
do not really know what it means for a citizen to distrust her government, politicians, political 
institutions or the entire political system. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See Appendix A for the exact phrasing of the most widely used political trust survey indicators.  
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Therefore, the current state of research in political distrust and the questions guiding the 
present research project require a methodological approach that incorporates qualitative and 
quantitative study. Although mixed methodology has been on the rise in the last decade there 
is limited employment of this powerful research approach to be found in the study of political 
behaviour, whether due to the historical distinction of epistemological paradigms or practical 
considerations for publishing (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 
2003).10 Nevertheless, it is clear that contested concepts such as distrust and trust can benefit 
from in-depth qualitative insights as well as quantitative study (Bruter, 2005). The beginning 
of mixed methods research in the social sciences dates back to the 1980s and 1990s, when 
groups of researchers from sociology, education, and management evaluation created 
independent works describing this methodological approach. Its motivation has remained the 
assertion that “the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in combination, provides a 
better understanding of research problems than either approach alone” (Creswell and Clark, 
2007: 5).  
 
Using a more descriptive view of mixed methods research entails an orientation that consists 
of “multiple ways of seeing and hearing, and of multiple ways of making sense of the social 
world” (Greene, 2007: 20). We find this especially apt for the study of social-psychological 
constructs. The methodological literature on attitude measurement also stresses the 
importance of early exploratory work that will allow researchers to understand the latent 
construct they will attempt to measure quantitatively, although this exploratory work could 
consist of solely reviewing the literature, not necessarily conducting extensive qualitative 
work (DeVellis, 2012; Vogt et al., 2004; Oppenheim, 1992; Oskamp and Schultz, 2005). The 
present research project is not simply a scale-development exercise. It is an in-depth study of 
political distrust as an attitude area and it seeks to address questions of meaning, judgment 
formation and operationalisation in order to build a conceptual model of distrust and provide 
empirical evidence to support it. The nature of the research question demands a mixed 
methods approach, as it cannot be adequately understood or fruitfully addressed using only 
qualitative or quantitative research. Studying political distrust using quantitative studies 
without a clear idea of what existing measures are capturing, or in fact, what they ought to 
capture would – at the very least – be ineffective. Empirical qualitative research allows us to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a comprehensive overview on the development and controversies in mixed methods research, see 
Creswell (2013: 269-284). 	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access meaning and better understand the function of distrust judgments (Rossman and 
Rallis, 1998). It can inform the conceptual model and operationalisation of political distrust, 
yet it is limiting in the types of inferences one can make about the associations and structures 
of distrusting attitudes. Since attitudes of political distrust are theoretically significant for 
diffuse support and the democratic quality of a political system, they are attitudes political 
scientists are interested in measuring at large, in order to analyse their internal structure using 
multivariate statistical tools and their associations with other political attitudes and 
behaviours, as well as to monitor across societies and across time. With its inevitably limited 
and specific sample under study, this thesis can only argue for the generalizability of its 
findings to a certain extent. A survey measure of political distrust based on the conceptual 
model above can provide data that will enhance our understanding of the operations of 
political distrust. In the context of the present thesis we analyse quantitative evidence from a 
single country, it still allows us to investigate the properties of distrusting attitudes through 
statistical analyses and draw conclusions on the basis of a UK sample. 
 
At this point it is necessary to note that the use of the terms ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ in 
this section refers to the methods of data collection and analysis of empirical evidence. 
Despite some criticism of these terms due to the epistemological paradigms they have been 
attached to, in the case of political behaviour research both methods are acceptable, or even 
necessary for addressing fundamental questions about psychological constructs (Giddings 
and Grant, 2006). In the epistemological paradigm debate, mixed methods research offers a 
third alternative of pragmatism,11 arguing that the quantitative and qualitative approaches are 
compatible and in some cases should be used in conjunction (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; 
Howe, 1988). 
 
This research project follows a sequential mixed methods design, presented in Figure 3.1 
below. Sequential mixed designs focus on the incorporation of findings and results into a 
conceptual framework and subsequent research phases aimed at providing answers to the 
research question (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell, 2013). The following sections of 
this chapter will explain in more detail the specifics of each research phase, beginning with 
popular narrative interviews conducted in three European countries and the qualitative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Pragmatism, as understood by Greene (2007) and others, leads to social inquiry focused on problem-solving 
and action that is committed to facilitating progress in a scientific field. For a lengthier discussion on the 
paradigm of mixed methods research see Greene (2007), Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) and Howe (1988). 	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analysis of empirical evidence used to develop the conceptual model of political distrust 
judgments. The second section uses these insights achieved through qualitative research to 
inform the conceptualisation and operationalisation of political distrust and to construct 
variables to be employed in quantitative research. Finally, the measure of political distrust is 
used in a UK survey, and multivariate statistical analysis of the survey data is used to further 
explore the function of political distrust judgments as represented by our model, investigate 
additional properties of distrust attitudes and assess the contribution of the measure to survey 
research.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Methodological integration of the project following a sequential mixed 
methods design 
 
 
 
Although the sequential mixed strategy involves a “first phase of qualitative data collection 
and analysis, followed by a second phase of quantitative data and analysis that builds on the 
results of the first qualitative phase” (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007: 211), in reality, as the 
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multiple arrows in Figure 3.1 show, insights from the qualitative and quantitative phases of 
research help illuminate each other and the overarching conceptualisation of political distrust. 
The combination of qualitative and quantitative research can boost the credibility of findings 
and aid in explaining surprising results after all data have been collected, allowing for 
triangulation of findings (Bryman, 2012; Johnson et al., 2007). 
 
 
3.2 Case selection, language and national contexts 
 
Social science research often rests on a restricted number or areas of observations. 
Nevertheless, a transparent selection process of cases and participants guided by the research 
aim of the project can provide the basis for a fruitful social scientific inquiry (King et al., 
1994; Creswell, 2009). The objective of this study is to understand political distrust 
judgments, to offer a conceptual model for their operation and to create an indicator that 
captures citizen attitudes of political distrust based on this model for further analysis. 
Therefore, the selection of countries for the first step of the research project is motivated by 
the pervasiveness and range of distrusting citizen attitudes to be found in the realm of 
politics. Earlier research in political culture has identified distrusting citizen attitudes towards 
the political class as a salient topic in Britain despite its long-standing democratic institutions 
and the older observations of cultural deference towards politicians has been replaced by 
hostility  (Hart, 1978; Almond and Verba, 1980; Hay, 2007; Stoker, 2011). In Greece, 
distrust of politicians and political institutions is fast increasing since the great recession 
spilled over and exposed the country’s poor public financial situation in 2010. Democratic 
institutions have often struggled to establish efficient and transparent processes to serve 
citizens, yet in the democratic era following 1974 political parties managed to provide a link 
between citizens and politics and enjoyed an unprecedented surge of citizen confidence in 
their governance role, which has now been reversed (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014; Armingeon 
and Guthmann, 2014; Featherstone, 2005). Similarly, Italian citizens have often grappled 
with an oversized political system, in which it is extremely difficult to enact change. People 
around the country and especially in the south tend to report very negative evaluations of 
their political institutions and politicians, and often resort to interpersonal or other 
cooperative networks to make up for the lack of security and efficiency in getting things done 
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Gambetta, 1988; Putnam, 1993; Schyns and Koop, 2010). The 
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two graphs below trace Eurobarometer trends for ‘trust in national parliament’ and ‘trust in 
national government’ in the three countries relative to the EU average, showing lack of trust 
is consistently high.12 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Percentage of citizens that 'tend not to trust' their national government 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Percentage of citizens that 'tend not to trust' their national parliament 
 
Note: EU Average includes all member states after European enlargement. Source: Eurobarometers 48-81. 
 
A number of other countries in Europe could have provided fertile ground for the study of 
political distrust, such as the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, existing research of political attitudes in these national contexts has shown that 
the communist experience and subsequent transition has shaped the way citizens relate and 
evaluate the state as well as their community in a fundamental way (Mishler and Rose, 1997, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 Although the three national political contexts have been studied separately and comparatively through 
historical case studies, representative survey data on citizens’ political trust became available through 
Eurobarometer surveys only in 1997.	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2001). Britain, Italy and Greece represent nations from a relatively homogenous group of 
Western European established democracies, which present variation in their historic 
trajectories, political culture and institutional culture characteristics.13 Furthermore, relying 
on three different national contexts for the qualitative phase of this research project, instead 
of a single case, provides extensive information on the meaning and operation of political 
distrust to support the conceptual model and operationalisation of distrusting judgments. The 
selection of Britain, Italy and Greece is an appropriate strategy for the first phase of the 
research, leading to the second step of quantitative data on a new measure of political distrust 
with a UK sample. Although this is not an ideal reduction in the geographical breadth of the 
research, it was an inevitable limitation that comes alongside the scope and resources of 
doctoral work. The UK is still a national context where citizen attitudes of political distrust 
remain in the spotlight, providing a first test for the conceptual model of political distrust and 
the new survey indicator created.  
 
 
3.2 Political context, language and culture 	  
Before moving on to present the specifics of each methodological strategy, the next 
paragraphs offer a brief observational account of the contextual, linguistic and cultural 
differences encountered in the study of political distrust, which will help less familiar readers 
situate the findings presented in the following chapters. In Italy, the early 1990s saw the 
overturning of the party system and the entire political status quo since the end of the Second 
World War through the ‘clean hands’ scandal, which exposed widespread and deep-seated 
corruption among the political class, close ties with the Mafia and abuse of power.14 This 
gave rise to a two bloc party system, where a centre-left bloc led by the ‘Partito Democratico’ 
(PD) competed and exchanged power with a centre-right bloc led by ‘Forza Italia’ (followed 
by ‘Popolo della Liberta’, PdL). The centre-right and much of Italian politics of the past two 
decades has been dominated by the figure of Silvio Berlusconi, a media owner and 
businessman who established a firm grip on the country’s political scene despite recurrent 
scandals and allegations of political corruption. Following the wave of financial turmoil that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See Appendix B for more information on the three countries. 14 For more information on the ‘clean hands’ scandal see Gundle and Parker (1995) and Della Porta and 
Vannucci (1999). 
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shook peripheral European countries, a technocratic government led by Mario Monti was put 
in place in late 2011 to implement reforms and austerity measures that would rehabilitate 
public finances. At the time of fieldwork, the majority of Italians had turned their back on the 
technocratic experience, resentful of increased taxation and austerity measures. The 
inconclusive elections of February 2013 saw an entirely new anti-systemic political party 
‘M5S’, led by a television comedian Beppe Grillo, capture the frustration of millions of 
Italians across the country with the state of the political system and receive 25.5% of the 
vote. The on-going coalition talks in the summer of 2013, between the centre-left (PD) and 
centre-right blocks (PdL), which became the only possibility for government formation, and 
the political bargaining over the nomination of a prime minister further frustrate those 
citizens who had been hit hard by the economic crisis and were looking for an end to 
uncertainty and for quick reforms. In addition, in the summer of 2013, Silvio Berlusconi was 
on trial pending economic charges for tax-fraud (not personal scandal). The trial’s 
development and verdict was at the forefront of every public discussion across the country, 
adding to citizens’ exposure to political corruption. 
 
Greece has followed a different political trajectory in its modern history. Following a seven 
year military junta from 1967-1974, in the democratic metapoliteusi era both main political 
parties, the socialist ‘Pasok’ and the conservative ‘New Democracy’, attempted to put Greece 
on the road to modernisation and integration with Europe. Although early EU and Eurozone 
memberships were achieved, the political class failed to create independent services and it 
institutionalised clientelistic practices in every aspect of the public domain. The relatively 
young democratic institutions have proven to be impervious to systemic reform, even in the 
period of economic growth and prosperity following the introduction of the common 
currency. In the 2000s Greek citizens seemed to be catching up with the rest of Western 
Europe in levels of satisfaction with their democracy and indeed trust in their political 
institutions and government.15 However, the recent financial crisis exposed Greece as the 
weakest economic link in the European chain and from 2010 the country has entered into 
multiple programmes of financial assistance from the European Commission, ECB and IMF, 
which included the imposition of harsh austerity measures and conditions of structural 
reform. These political developments, along with plummeting socio-economic indicators, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For a longer discussion on the institutional successes and failures of the metapoliteusi era see Featherstone 
(1990, 2005) and Pappas (2013). 
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caused extensive changes to the political party system. Following a provisional coalition 
government with a technocrat prime minister between 2011-2012, the former centre-left 
socialist party Pasok, which had governed for more than 20 years since 1974, almost 
disappeared from the electoral map. A formerly marginal small radical left-wing party 
‘SYRIZA’, pursuing a populist anti-austerity agenda, found support and emerged as the main 
opposition party to a coalition government following elections in 2012 (heading a governing 
coalition since January 2015). On the far-right side of the political party spectrum, the fringe 
extreme-right party ‘Golden Dawn’, with neo-Nazi and nationalistic rhetoric, increased its 
popular appeal and consolidated itself in Parliament with 7%-8% of the national vote. At the 
time of fieldwork in the summer-autumn of 2013, Greek citizens had already been exposed to 
three years of plummeting socio-economic indicators and harsh austerity measures imposed 
by their national government and the Troika of international institutions (European 
Commission, ECB, IMF). The economy was a central preoccupation for citizens across the 
country, but equally central was the political upheaval that broke ties between citizens and 
the political parties they had supported and relied on for four decades. In this respect, 
considerations of blame and responsibility for the state of the country were popular in public 
discourse. The extreme-right ‘Golden Dawn’ party also featured in media and public 
discussions, although fieldwork took place prior to the legal detainment and prosecution of 
Golden Dawn MPs.16 
 
At first glance, the political experiences of citizens in England have been markedly different 
than the two Southern European countries. Britain has been considered a case where the long 
history of democratic institutions and citizen deference form a solid basis for a thriving civic 
culture. Yet, scholars have highlighted the existence of critical citizenship and political 
distrust in parts of Britain as far back as the 1880s (Hart, 1978). Despite stable politics, 
citizens in England have been widely critical of their political elites and institutions, and 
increasingly disaffected and disengaged from political processes, leading many scholars to 
sound the alarm over the state of democratic politics in the country.17 The perceived 
detachment of political elites from the rest of the population and the revelations of political 
abuse of power, from the parliamentary expenses scandal in 2010 to the inquiry into the Iraq 
war, have contributed to a public discourse of mistrust, although this had not led to rapid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For more information on Golden Dawn and the rise of extremist and populist rhetoric in Greece following the 
financial crisis see Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou and Exadaktylos (2014). 
17 For a longer discussion on the current state of citizen attitudes towards the political system see Stoker (2011) 
and Hay (2009).	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change in the political or party systems in the way seen in Italy and Greece. Some scholars 
argue that the last two general elections in the UK showed signs of change. Despite the first-
past-the-post majoritarian electoral system, following the 2010 elections the Conservative 
Party had to form a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats, who won 23% of the 
vote (57 out of 650 seats) and challenged the definition of the UK as a two-party system. At 
the time of fieldwork in late 2013, the performance of the coalition government was a salient 
political subject, but mainly because of the disappointment in the Liberal Democratic Party 
not to fulfill their electoral promises. Challenges to the party system also came from strong 
nationalist sentiments in Scotland, where despite the rejection of independence in the 2015 
independence referendum, the Scottish National Party swept Scotland’s constituencies at the 
general election later that year and came out with 56 seats in Westminster. Pressure was also 
mounted by rising anti-European and anti-immigration sentiments, articulated by the right-
wing UK Independence Party (UKIP). Still, public discussions at the time of fieldwork were 
centred expectedly on economic issues, such as taxation and benefits and the salient topic of 
immigration from within and outside the European Union. The ongoing political turmoil in 
Syria and potential military involvement discussed in parliament and in the media throughout 
2013 also resurfaced sentiments and reactions from the last UK military involvement in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
 
The historical and current political context certainly influences public discourse on political 
matters, but so does language. In a subtler, yet impactful way, language shapes discussions 
and expressions of political attitudes, as well as the way in which people formulate thoughts 
and create meaning. The following paragraph offers only a brief account of the linguistic 
heritage the notions under investigation carry in the three national contexts studied. This is 
part of a larger and much richer discussion in semantics, yet for the purposes of this study 
exploring citizen aptitudes of political distrust, such information may help the reader better 
appreciate the expressions of distrust presented and analysed in the following chapters.  
 
In the English language the words mistrust and distrust provide an etymological equivalent 
for the concept we wish to capture; that is, the negative spectrum of political attitudes of 
trust, and not simply the lack thereof. The two words may not be used as readily as the 
affirmative of trust in everyday language, yet context often helps determine whether the 
emphasis is placed on the negative expectations of the speaker, or on a lack of conviction in 
determining trustworthiness. On the other hand, the Greek and Italian languages present a 
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different story for the use of ‘trust’ and ‘distrust’. Firstly, the two terms are etymologically 
connected to and derived from the words ‘belief’ or ‘faith’. Δυσπιστία, the Greek noun for 
distrust, is formed from the combination of the negating prefix ‘δυσ-’and ‘πίστη’, meaning 
‘faith’ or ‘belief’. Trust is formed by the pronoun “εν-” and ‘πίστη’ (faith) to make 
“εµπιστοσύνη”, meaning to place your faith in something or someone. Yet this translation of 
trust and distrust only works for nouns. When using a verb to denote the act of trusting, 
‘εµπιστεύοµαι’ (I trust), there is no counterpart verb that denotes distrust, only its negation, 
‘δεν εµπιστεύοµαι’ (I do not trust). Similarly, distrust in the Italian language is derived from 
the negating prefix ‘s-’ and ‘fiducia’, meaning ‘faith’. La sfiducia is a commonly used noun 
for distrust, yet it does not transform to a verb. People will use the term ‘avere fiducia’ (to 
have trust) or its negation “non avere fiducia” (to not have trust) to express their decision to 
approach political agents with trust or distrust.  
 
Two important points follow from these linguistic particularities. Firstly, political distrust is 
linked to the concept of faith, at least in terms of its etymological roots. Although there are no 
remnant traces of religious connotations, faith and belief are by definition powerful concepts 
that are not only dependent on rational calculation. They are called upon to bridge uncertainty 
and mitigate risk about the future in the same way that modern scholarship conceptualises 
trust and distrust. Losing one’s faith and establishing a predisposition of disbelief in politics 
represent a serious rupture in citizen-state relations that is difficult to mend. Regaining faith 
entails the same challenges as regaining trust. Therefore, despite the inevitable national 
linguistic characteristics among the three contexts, it is reasonable to expect there will not be 
an unbridgeable chasm in the use and meaning of the terms trust and distrust. Secondly, 
although in both non-English languages the term distrust can translate as a noun, there is no 
equivalent translation for the verb that denotes the act of distrusting. However, we believe 
that this does not pose a challenge to the study of distrusting attitudes, since the focus of this 
investigation is the study of latent psychological attitudes and not linguistic expressions of 
distrust.  
 
 
3.3 Qualitative research: Exploring the meaning of citizens’ political distrust  
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As a social scientific field, political science is inherently interested in meaning. Using an 
often quoted example in the interpretative tradition by Gilbert Ryle, King et al. (1994) 
comment on the fundamental difference in the meaning of a twitch and a wink – despite the 
identical appearance of the two actions – to highlight the implications our understanding of 
such meanings have on social interaction. They explain that “[i]f what we interpret as winks 
were actually involuntary twitches, our attempts to derive causal inferences about eyelid 
contraction on the basis of a theory of voluntary social interaction would be routinely 
unsuccessful: we would not be able to generalise and we would know it” (1994: 40). Their 
point is directly applicable to studies of political behaviour and emphasises the fact that 
without access to ‘meaning’ any attempt to derive theories around the observable 
implications of citizen actions would be stifled. Research interest in citizen attitudes of 
political distrust stems from its theorised consequences on participation, cooperation, 
compliance and democratic governance in general. Understanding what political distrust 
means for citizens and how it functions is a necessary step before investigating observable 
implications that form the big questions in political behaviour. 
 
In the case of contested social concepts such as ideology, identity, support, and indeed 
distrust, political science research can benefit from inductive study, which can provide a 
better understanding of the subjects’ worldview and attitudes, necessary for subsequent 
elucidation of large-scale survey results (Oppenheim, 1992; Oskamp and Schultz, 2005). For 
these reasons, we have chosen to conduct popular interviews in the three European states 
mentioned in the previous section (Creswell, 2009). Departing from quantitative analysis of 
survey data and focusing on citizens’ perceptions, experiences and the way in which they 
make sense of their political lives, this thesis also hopes to make a methodological 
contribution to the study of political distrust. 
 
Structured or semi-structured interviews are common methodological tools in qualitative 
research, but were not appropriate for this project, as the interviewer would be imposing on 
the information gathered through the selection of language, the wording, the type of topics, 
the timing and ordering of each question (Hollway and Jefferson, 2008). These impositions 
are not in line with the research objective at this phase of the study, which is to identify the 
meaning ascribed to political distrust and inductively explore the aspects entailed in 
distrusting judgments, phrased in citizens’ own words and based on examples from their 
political lives. Discussion or focus groups with a small number of participants could have 
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been appropriate for these purposes. However, due to the potentially sensitive evaluative 
nature of distrusting attitudes and the known influences of partisanship, personal interests and 
group identification in decisions of political trust and distrust, such discussions could lead to 
arguments or uncomfortable situations. Therefore, we decided that individual popular 
narrative interviews were the most appropriate and effective methodological choice to gain 
access to participants’ thoughts on political distrust.  
 
Narrative interviews offer a promising methodological choice. As Roland Barthes notes, 
narrative is a universal competence that is “present in every age, in every place, in every 
society” (1993: 251). Systematised as a research tool that aims to reconstruct events from the 
interviewee’s perspective, narrative interviews do not simply offer the recounting of events as 
a list, but comprehensively connect them in time and meaning (Bauer, 1996; Jovchelovitch 
and Bauer, 2000). Further, narrative interviews are rich in indexical and non-indexical 
statements, the former being based on personal experiences and the latter reflecting the 
interviewee’s evaluative system, something that is particularly relevant for judgments of 
political distrust (Bruner, 2000). Narrative accounts can offer important insights into the 
thought processes involved in political distrust, showing what types of information citizens 
use, how they evaluate them, the way they interpret events and choose to explain them to a 
third party (Bryman, 2012). Further, the participant is at the centre of the story and assumes 
responsibility for presenting her views, experiences and feelings without interference from 
the researcher. Though these may not always appear coherent, the encouragement and lack of 
interruptions by the interviewee and the long length of narrative interviews offers participants 
the space to retrace their thoughts and connect them in a meaningful way.  This interviewing 
method allows citizens to use their own language when expressing distrusting attitudes, to 
offer personal interpretations of untrustworthy behaviour and account for their significance. 
 
Despite the fact that there does not exist – and according to Barthes, there has never existed – 
“a people without narrative” (1966: 14) a potential criticism of the narrative method stems 
from the relation citizens’ narratives have to true events and factual reality. This is a valid 
point that speaks to a wider question within the study of political distrust using a micro-level 
research perspective: to what extent do citizen perceptions correspond to reality? The 
preceding chapter briefly summarised the conceptual difference between political 
untrustworthiness and distrust, and described different strands of scholarly research that have 
developed studying the qualities of political institutions or the attitudes of citizens in response 
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to their political system. This research project focuses on citizens and the concept of political 
distrust. It follows, therefore, that this attitude is formulated on the basis of citizens’ 
perceptions of political actors, through their evaluations, preexisting knowledge and possibly 
influenced by other personal characteristics and predispositions. Whether these perceptions 
correspond to factual evidence of untrustworthy conduct on behalf of political actors is a 
significant, but altogether different question, regarding the untrustworthiness of political 
systems. For the study of citizen political attitudes it is necessary to consider people’s view of 
their political world, how they choose to approach and navigate it. More importantly, we 
argue that even though citizen perceptions are subjective, they are real; they shape attitudes 
that can motivate very real behavioural intentions. All the biases in recalling, interpreting and 
judging political agents are part of the fabric of political distrust. If citizens’ perceptions are 
the best way to access this attitude area, then narrative interviews offer a well-equipped 
methodological tool for this purpose.    
 
Participant recruitment and interviewing 	  
The remaining part of this section presents the methodological design for the collection and 
analysis of qualitative data. Large parts of qualitative research often come under criticism for 
failing to produce a clear account of how the analysis was conducted, or omitting it 
altogether, making it hard to support the scientific value and reproducibility of research (Lee 
and Fielding, 1996). In an effort to address these issues from the outset and enhance the 
transparency of this project, we present below a detailed account of the research design, 
recruitment of participants, interviewing protocol, and steps for the analysis of data. 
 
Sixteen interviewees were recruited in each country, adding up to 48 narrative interviews. 
Given the limited number of participants, our goal was to create a diverse and balanced 
participant group in terms of key demographic characteristics known from earlier research to 
affect distrust. A detailed list of the entire sample and country groups is available in 
Appendix C. Overall, participants formed a mixed gender group (50% female), belonging to 
a variety of age groups (average age 41.8 years) and socioeconomic status (following the 
ESEC classification). Geography is also an important factor in the distribution of political 
distrust attitudes in each country and other political characteristics in many communities 
(Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Cook and Gronke, 2005); therefore, in order to increase the 
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diversity of our sample, interviewees were recruited from three different geographical areas 
within each country. In all three countries we aimed to include interviewees from a big city, a 
smaller city and a rural area. In Italy these were chosen from the north, the centre and south 
of the country, in England from the capital, the west and the north and in Greece from the 
capital, the north and the Aegean.18 
 
Participants were recruited for this study in two ways. The majority of participants were 
approached ahead of the interview through referral networks of local people who did not 
participate in the study, but were asked to nominate other citizens who might be willing to 
participate. Some participants were invited to participate in an interview selected randomly 
from social settings, always with the aim of recruiting as diverse a sample as possible in all 
three national contexts.19 A written interview invitation was distributed to all participants 
outlining the nature of the interview process prior to the start of recording. For the purposes 
of our study it was important to not refer explicitly to the issue of political distrust, as this 
could predispose participants and introduce acquiescence and response bias in their accounts. 
After introducing the researcher and the purpose of the study it was also specified that 
participants did not have to mention their political affiliations or party preference, as the 
purpose of the study was to better understand how [British/Greek/Italian] citizens think about 
politics, politicians and institutions in their country. Following this introduction and 
disclosure of the academic purposes and anonymity of the research findings, participants 
appeared more confident and eager to share their views, and to even speak about ideological 
and party preferences. A full copy of the invitation as well as the introduction to each 
interview can be seen in Appendix D. 
 
Interviews were conducted with the help of a handful of thematic headings to trigger thoughts 
and ideas on political evaluations and distrust. Each interview commenced with the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The exact locations where fieldwork took place are the following: Italy: Milan (Northern Italy), Florence area 
(Central Italy), Puglia area (Southern Italy). England: London (capital city), Hertfordshire (East England) and 
Norwich (North England). Greece: Athens (capital city), Thessaloniki (Northern Greece), Aegina (Aegean 
island). 
19 Two thirds of participants were contacted in advance and recruited via this ‘second-referral’ method, and a 
third of participants was recruited randomly in social settings (cafés, piazzas, restaurants). While every effort 
was made to have a diverse and balanced interviewee pool in terms of demographic characteristics, it is possible 
that people self-select to participate in the study on the basis of their, existing distrusting outlook, their interest 
in politics or even time-availability. For this reason, the purpose of the study was not mentioned explicitly and 
‘distrust’ was not mentioned in any of the correspondence with participants or introductory information. Also, 
participants who initially claimed not to have much to say or to be uninterested in politics were specifically 
encouraged to participate in the study and efforts were made to meet with busier participants in convenient 
locations (close to their place of work, during a 1hour lunch-break or after work). 
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prompter asking participants “What are your thoughts about politics in 
England/Greece/Italy?” According to Jovchelovitch and Bauer’s (2000) systemisation of the 
narrative interview, the researcher managed to pose as an ‘outsider’ in all three national 
contexts with limited information about political developments and past events, and had 
minimal input throughout the interview, using only follow-up and encouraging intercessions. 
Interviews averaged 58 minutes in length (the shortest interview lasted 41 minutes and the 
longest 79 minutes), providing approximately 2,770 minutes of interview content. The length 
of interviews and general approach to the subject of politics varied widely across participants, 
depending on their willingness and ability to express their views on politics uninterrupted for 
extended periods of time. A potential limitation of the narrative interview methodology is 
that certain types of people and cultural contexts are better suited to taking advantage of the 
unstructured and open nature of the interview. Narrative interviews seemed to work well in 
all three countries, but we did observe variation in the length and content of narrative 
accounts among people with different levels of political interest and political knowledge, as 
well as the eagerness of citizens to share their views between Greek, Southern Italian, 
Northern Italian and English participants. 
 
Seven-step thematic analysis 	  
Thematic analysis offers a highly robust set of tools for the systematisation and study of 
qualitative data (Attride-Stirling, 2001; Boyatzis, 1998). It begins with “careful reading and 
re-reading of the data”, in order to identify common themes that can be synthesised in 
common patterns describing the concept under study (Rice and Ezzy, 1999: 258). The 
method of analysis chosen for this part of the study follows seven steps after the data 
collection phase. It arrives at a synthesis and inductive interpretation of the patterns observed 
in citizen accounts that inform our conceptual model of political distrust. These steps 
represent an eclectic collection of the most appropriate phases of qualitative analysis for 
political attitudes, in line with Creswell (2009), Rossman and Rallis (1998), Tesch (1990) and 
Attride-Stirling (2001). 
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Table 3.1: Seven steps of qualitative analysis 
Step 1 Transcription of narrative interviews 
Step 2 First stage of analysis: reading of the data, identifying common themes that 
emerge from expressions of political distrust 
Step 3 Translation of narrative content 
Step 4 Second stage of analysis: Summarising the data and streamlining recurrent 
examples, issues or themes that emerge 
Step 5 Third stage of analysis: Categorisation of condensed information on the basis 
of higher-order themes that encapsulate key aspects of political distrust 
judgments. These are: observations, expectations, retrospective 
events/examples, evaluative dimension technical, moral, interest-based, 
emotional response, behavioural intention response. 
Step 6 Fourth stage of analysis: Connecting data, describe, explore and summarise 
the connections between evaluations, observations and responses and the 
interactions of themes identified. 
Step 7 Final stage of analysis: Interpreting the patterns identified and mapping a 
conceptual model of political distrust. 
 
 
All interviews were transcribed in the original language and then translated by the researcher. 
Content was analysed in a step-wise procedure of text reduction and categorised in line with 
Bauer (1996) and Schatzman and Strauss (1973). Thematic analysis of narrative content 
provided manageable amounts of information and allowed for the identification of common 
observations, patterns and thought processes in expressions of political distrust across 
different participants and national contexts. Condensed interview material was then 
categorised according to: general observations, negative expectations, retrospective events or 
past examples of distrust, technical, moral and interest-based evaluative dimensions, 
emotional response and behavioural intention responses. We depart from the use of the term 
‘codes’ and ‘coders’, preferring to explain the method of analysis as thematic, with a data 
reduction stage, identification of specific themes in the expressions of political distrust and 
higher-order themes that capture overarching aspects of distrusting judgment, followed by a 
categorisation of interview content. Our purpose is to uncover the meaning citizens ascribe to 
distrusting judgments and to understand how they explain their decision to distrust (to trust or 
to remain neutral) in an inductive way. For this reason, we are looking to connect and 
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interpret the various aspects present in citizen narratives of distrust as part of a coherent 
attitudinal mechanism (Schatzman and Strauss, 1973; Agar, 1980). We were therefore 
looking for issues expected to emerge from existing studies of political distrust but also 
aspects that were surprising, unusual and perhaps not anticipated in the earlier stages of the 
research (Creswell, 2009). 
 
As an example, the emotive responses that accompanied expressions of distrust were an 
unexpected aspect which emerged from the narrative accounts, leading the researcher to go 
back and expand the search in existing literature of social psychology to further investigate 
this aspect of distrust judgments. The process of deriving a conceptual model for political 
distrust included such interactions between the analysis of qualitative data and theory. The 
remaining categories were identified as a result of both a theoretically informed 
understanding of political distrust judgments and information emerging from the interview 
data. An extract of analysed interview data is presented in Appendix E. The thematic analysis 
of narrative interviews, in combination with the presented theoretical framework for the study 
of political distrust, led to the reconceptualisation of distrust judgments and formed the basis 
for a new operationalisation and measurement.  
 
 
3.4 Quantitative research: Operationalisation, measurement and the analysis of survey 
data 
 
Part of the puzzle in attitudes of political distrust lies in the previously unexplored meaning 
citizens attach to distrusting evaluations. Another part of it lies in the information we can 
extract from quantitative evidence and the interpretation we give to survey indicators of 
political distrust. This thesis attempts to tackle both these puzzles, therefore, after shedding 
light on citizens’ expressions of distrust, we proceed to propose a novel operationalisation 
and measurement indicator. This indicator of political distrust was included in an online 
survey for the UK, yielding quantitative evidence that will add to our understanding of 
distrusting judgements. The remaining sections of this chapter present the methodological 
choices in the operationalisation and measurement of political distrust, as well as the 
statistical methods employed in the later parts of the thesis to analyse quantitative data.  
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Operationalisation 	  
We have conceptualised political distrust as a negative attitude held by the citizen towards 
parts or the entirety of their political system. Social and political psychology posits that 
attitudes are tri-componential, with a cognitive, affective and action-tendency component 
(Oppenheim, 2012; Oskamp and Schultz, 2005). Although scientists do not necessarily agree 
whether these three parts should be seen as separate concepts or not, the focus has been 
placed mainly on the evaluative (cognitive and affective) dimension of attitudes. Eagly and 
Chaiken define an attitude as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a 
particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (1993: 1). Most social scientists agree 
that political attitudes are social constructs that can be inferred, but not observed directly 
(Oppenheim, 1992). To proceed with an operationalisation of political distrust it is necessary 
to understand distrust as such a construct, that is, a latent entity. It is a latent, rather than 
manifest or observable variable, such as for example a person’s age or whether they 
participated in the last general election, which would be easier to operationalise and of 
course, measure. Therefore, we collect evidence based on a series of questions, the manifest 
items, and assume that the presence or absence of a latent variable is the cause behind the 
score a respondent gives to each item. Since we cannot observe the true level of the latent 
variable (the strength and magnitude of political distrust), we cannot determine the 
relationship between the item and the latent variable scores. What we can do, however, is 
study the relationship among a series of manifest items we believe are caused by the same 
latent variable to assess the validity of our measure  (DeVellis, 2012). Table 3.2 presents each 
step from the conceptual model of political distrust to its operationalisation and measurement.
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Qualitative analysis of citizen interviews helped to identify the relational, evaluative and 
time-dynamic nature of political distrust judgments. The relational nature of political distrust 
attitudes translates to the need to specify a political agent whose untrustworthiness 
respondents are asked to evaluate. There are many political players, institutions, groups and 
political figures that citizens evaluate and decide whether to distrust. Due to space limitations 
in survey questionnaires and time-duration concerns for the survey, we decided to specify 
two political objects that emerge as important targets of citizen evaluations from the literature 
and the narrative interviews. National parliament captures institutional evaluations directed at 
the central legislative institution of representative democracy. Given that it is comprised of 
elected officials from all political parties it is a considerably less partisan political actor than 
the national government, where trust is strongly associated with individual partisan 
identification and evaluations of the current incumbents. A single measure of trust in national 
parliament is often used in European empirical research as an indicator of citizens’ political 
trust, since it symbolises the institution and processes of democratic legislation and includes 
the political class across the party system.  
 
In section 4.4 “The ‘political’ in political distrust” we found that evaluations of political 
institutions, such as the National Parliament, incorporate evaluations of the politicians that 
populate them, as well as institutional processes and outcomes. The analysis of narrative 
interviews, presented in more detail in the following chapter, indicates that participants 
interpret national parliament in these ways, at least in the emphasis they place on the 
evaluation of parliamentarians, of institutional processes or outputs. Further more, given that 
politicians and the political class tends to receive the lowest trust scores and the most 
unfavourable evaluations among all other parts of the political system and public service 
posts (along with political parties), we believe asking respondents about politicians directly 
would result in overly negative evaluations and bias our measurement (Jennings and Stoker, 
2015). It is clear that the national parliament is a highly visible political institution in all three 
contexts studied and an integral part of the democratic political system that citizens live in. 
Therefore, it is a political agent citizens are likely to evaluate, where distrusting relations are 
particularly important for their implication on future citizen attitudes and behaviour. We 
select the national parliament as both an appropriate and central agent for studying citizen 
distrust. 
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The second political target we consider is a citizen’s preferred political party. With this 
operationalisation we depart from the standard practice in European research that asks 
respondents their level of trust in all political parties, and in US research that focuses on 
evaluations of all politicians or the government. Our purpose is to allow respondents to select 
their preferred subcomponent of their political system, in order to provide a stronger test for 
distrusting attitudes and map its lower boundary. Further, the role political parties play in the 
way citizens relate to and evaluate their political system has been highlighted by theoretical 
and empirical research on political distrust, formulating theories regarding the diverging 
interests and ideological positioning between citizens and parties. Considerations about 
representation emerge clearly through qualitative empirical evidence. Participants emphasise 
their democratic expectation of finding a political group whose interests, ideological 
positions and general outlook of society they share. More importantly, if such a political 
group does not exist, or if the political group one has chosen behaves in an untrustworthy 
manner, it influences citizens’ overall approach politics. Further, using citizens’ preferred 
political party as a political target to capture and investigate attitudes of political distrust 
allows us to capture evaluations towards a political object that transcends partisan feelings. 
 
Having identified the evaluative nature of political distrust attitudes we operationalise distrust 
following three evaluative dimensions. The conceptual model of distrust put forward in this 
thesis postulates three evaluative dimensions as part of citizens’ decision to distrust: 
evaluations of incompetence on technical matters, evaluations of unethical conduct and 
evaluations of diverging interests on divisive situations. Manifest variables will touch on the 
technical, moral and interest-based dimensions of untrustworthiness in order to establish their 
ontological status and how they relate to each other. The dynamic temporal dimension of 
political distrust suggests that distrusting attitudes entail a retrospective evaluation of past 
evidence, as well as a prospective formulation of expectation regarding the conduct of 
political agents. We therefore specify variables that directly touch on the retrospective 
assessments and prospective expectations for the behaviour of respondents’ political parties 
and the national parliament along technical, moral and interest-based lines.  
 
Finally, we conceptualised political distrust as cyclical – not only because of the reciprocity it 
demands and its self-reinforcing nature, but also because it spills over from specific political 
agents to a general attitude towards the political system, and from a general attitude towards 
the political system to specific agents being considered as untrustworthy. People can 
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formulate and hold attitudes towards an abstract issue, as much as they can hold attitudes 
towards a concrete object from their social environment (Maio et al., 2006). This is 
particularly true in the case of political distrust. In the preceding chapter it was noted that a 
substantial part of the confusion surrounding theories of political distrust and empirical 
findings stems from the dual function of political distrust as a specific evaluation grounded in 
an assessment of the technical, ethical and interest-based record of a political agent, as well 
as a general orientation towards the political system as whole. The two functions co-exist and 
influence each other, making it harder for political researchers to separate them conceptually 
and, of course, empirically. This project faces the same challenge. Yet having explored in-
depth judgments of political distrust and following an operationalisation that includes 
evaluations of two political agents from different levels of the political system, along various 
dimensions of assessment, we should be in a more advantageous position to further 
investigate this dual function through quantitative data.  
 
Measurement 	  
The final part of Table 3.2 shows the items used to measure political distrust in our survey. 
There are 12 Likert items phrased as attitude statements asking respondents to denote their 
level of agreement or disagreement. Based on measurement research, attitude statements used 
to measure latent traits need to remain short, to avoid colloquialisms, double negatives and 
proverbs, and not be too extreme, so as to allow respondents to make full use of the 
agreement or disagreement gradation in response options available (Oppenheim, 1992). To 
capture attitudes of political distrust the manifest items also need to be specific enough to 
guide respondents’ thoughts to an evaluative dimension and time projection for the political 
target identified, and at the same time generic enough to work across space and time, to allow 
respondents to recall events and formulate expectations based on their own experiences and 
perceptions of politics.  
 
It is important to note that there are potentially unlimited ways to construct attitude 
statements that capture political distrust, even following the said operationalisation. However, 
we are interested in creating an indicator of political distrust that can potentially travel across 
national contexts and across time to allow for comparative and longitudinal study. 
Exploratory qualitative research offered an array of specific examples of political distrust that 
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could be transformed into attitude statements, yet the contextual-specific nature of these 
examples would make it difficult to translate to other time periods and societies. Examples 
such as the expenses scandal or the inquiry into the Iraq war may be very impactful for 
current evaluations of political agents in the UK, but not outside the UK and potentially 
neither for British citizens in the years to come. Furthermore, such specific examples leave 
unspecified the political agent that potential untrustworthy conduct will be attributed to, 
which as will be shown, varies between citizens. Therefore, the manifest items were phrased 
in a way to tap into particular evaluative contexts of technical ability, ethical behaviour and 
ideologically divisive decisions, and address specific political agents that we consider 
important in overall attitudes of political distrust. We decided to phrase all items in positive 
language to avoid awkwardly phrased statements that may overestimating negative 
evaluations towards the two political objects due to acquiescence bias. 1 Although a mixture 
of positively and negatively phrased items are often used for attitude measurement, our items 
are expected to tap on into different evaluative dimensions which we want to explore further, 
which would be difficult if we introduced such variation in the phrasing. The items are still 
designed to tap on political distrust as negative low responses would tap on unfavourable 
evaluations of political targets along the lines that were identified in the qualitative part of the 
research.   
 
Each item measures respondents’ agreement or disagreement to the attitude statement 
presented in Table 3.2 using a seven-point scale. The use of seven-point scales for attitude 
measurement offers an appropriate number of response categories, wide enough to gather 
ample information on the strength and distribution of respondent attitudes, yet concise 
enough to avoid a central tendency bias (Miller, 1956; Uslaner, 2013; Alwin and Krosnick, 
1991; Schwartz, 2003; Petrzelka et al., 2013). The items can be added in a simple 
arithmetical average to create an overall scale of political distrust. Scale creation will be 
discussed in more detail in the following sections and will be the object of analysis in 
Chapter 5. But before moving on, it is important to note the choice of measurement level for 
political distrust. Political attitudes are habitually measured in survey research via multi-item 
indicators added up in a Likert scale. Although these items record answers in scales from four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The positively phrased items we are making it harder for respondents to register distrusting attitudes overall. 
Acquiescence bias refers to the tendency of respondents to agree with the statement provided, no matter its 
phrasing, hence negative statements about political institutions would tend to record higher political distrust. 
Similarly, the specific phrasing of the statements help differentiate between political that is ‘right’ in a technical, 
ethical or selfish way, something that is missing from current survey instruments causing difficulty in 
interpreting citizen evaluations towards government and politics.  
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up to ten ‘agree-disagree’ response categories, it is common practice to treat attitude scales as 
continuous variables (Jamieson, 2004; Norman, 2010). The investigation of attitudes of 
political distrust faces the same problem. Political distrust is a continuum, since one can 
distrust a political agent to varying degrees, but at the same time it is substantively separate 
from neutral and positive evaluations of trustworthiness. In our analysis we follow the scaling 
methodology research and treat the variable of political distrust as a continuous indicator, but 
at the same time investigate different structures that arise from the aforementioned 
differences. 
 
For a classical linear scale model, scaling methodology emphasises the following four 
requirements: linearity and unidimensionality, adequate reliability, adequate validity and 
reproducibility (Oskamp and Schultz, 2005; DeVellis, 2012; Oppenheim, 1970). We use the 
items presented above to construct a scale for political distrust according to our conceptual 
model, but since this is an exploratory project we will also investigate the associations 
between each item and whether they can be considered as parallel instruments through the 
survey data. We explore the internal structure of the data to examine dimensionality, linearity 
and other attributes of the new indicator of political distrust, especially the association 
between the evaluative dimensions and the association between distrust in different political 
targets. Statistical analysis in this part of the thesis adds new evidence to the conceptual 
model of political distrust we have formulated and contributes to our understanding of the 
operation of distrust measurement. 
 
The new items were included in an online survey conducted by a research institute which 
specialises in online survey research and maintains a panel of UK respondents.2 The total 
sample was 785 respondents, representing a varied sample of the UK population, with an 
average age of 47.6 years and 50.4% women. Online samples have yet to reach the 
representativeness and breadth of national surveys, but they offer far better opportunities to 
study political attitudes than university student samples, which differ from the general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The study originally included an experimental part that falls outside the scope of the thesis. The retrospective 
and prospective survey items were placed in different parts of the questionnaire to avoid identical evaluations. 
The latter were placed in the second part of the questionnaire following an unrelated stimulus of newspaper 
content, but were not affected by the manipulation. More information on the survet as well as the analysis of 
responses based on different combinations of experimental groups are available in Appendix F.  
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population in many more respects, especially age, education and geographical location 
(Robinson et al., 1991; Sears, 1986).3  
 
We carried out a series of multivariate statistical analyses using survey data on the 12 new 
items to explore the underlying structures and answer the key questions regarding the internal 
structure of distrusting attitudes guiding this part of the research. First, we looked at the 
descriptive statistics of the items data and analysed the similarities and differences between 
the manifest items. Quantitative data can help us expand the conceptual model by 
determining the associations between the evaluative dimensions, time projections and 
political targets and by examining the validity and reliability of the new indicator through 
statistical analysis.  
 
The primary concern for scale measurement theory is dimensionality: whether the items used 
to measure a latent trait do indeed measure the same and single construct. Reliability analysis 
uses an internal consistency method to determine whether all the items measure the same 
underlying continuum. The motivation behind latent trait measurement is that since we 
cannot observe and directly measure the attitude of interest, in this case political distrust, we 
use items that tap into this latent attitude. If all items tap into political distrust they are not 
only highly associated with distrust, but also with each other. Reliability analysis uses this 
rationale to calculate the strength of associations between all items and indicate whether they 
form a reliable scale of political distrust attitudes (DeVellis, 2012). Chronbach’s alpha 
coefficient is used as an internal consistency and scalability estimate (Chronbach, 1951; 
Nunnally, 1978). 
 
Reliability analysis using Chronbach’s alpha coefficient has been criticised as a test for scale 
uni-dimensionality (Green et al., 1977). A stronger statistical test to investigate the 
dimensional validity of the underlying scale is the use of exploratory factor analysis. 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) uses the same rationale of latent attitude measurement and 
allows items to load on as many underlying factors as there are in the data. It is the most 
widely used analysis technique to explore whether attitude complexes are homogenous or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A breakdown of demographic characteristics of the sample is presented in Appendix G and a copy of the entire 
survey questionnaire is attached as Appendix J. In terms of demographic characteristics, levels of education are 
theoretically and empirically related to attitudes of political distrust (winners hypothesis) and the lack of a 
representativeness in terms of educational level in our sample could explain why we routinely find no 
association between our measure of distrust and respondents’ education. Nevertheless, a slightly higher level of 
education in our respondents compared to the population would only tend to underestimate distrusting attitudes. 
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entail different independent dimensions. EFA is a useful tool to investigate the 
dimensionality of distrusting attitudes based on different retrospective and prospective 
evaluations and to determine whether distrust towards different parts of the political system 
are different or form part of a homogenous attitude, merely tapping into different parts of the 
same latent concept of political distrust. In such cases the two dimensions would belong to 
the same rather than to two different indicators of distrust towards specific political agents 
(DeVellis, 2012). Useful criteria, such as the amount of information captured by each 
underlying factor in the data (Eigenvalue), can help determine the number of factors worth 
considering in a meaningful conceptualisation (Kaiser, 1960). Information on item factor 
loadings and communality can also help us identify which items are performing better and 
which poorer at capturing the latent factor (DeVellis, 2012; Bartholomew et al., 2008; 
Bartholomew et al., 2011). Furthermore, for our purposes of exploring the dimensionality of 
political distrust, factor analysis allows the calculation and graphical representation of a two-
factor model and the rotation of factors in two-dimensional space, which aids in the 
interpretation of underlying dimensions.  
 
We also use Mokken scale analysis on the basis of consistent differences among the manifest 
items, as an additional investigation into the dimensional validity of the political distrust 
scale, and to investigate whether hierarchies exist within our data. Likert scales and classical 
test theory (factor analysis and reliability analysis) assume that all items are parallel 
instruments of the latent construct, yet a hierarchical data structure means certain items differ 
in their distributions. A Mokken scale conforms with all the fundamental assumptions of Item 
Response theory4 (unidimensionality, monotonicity, and local independence), and offers the 
opportunity to identify hierarchies within the data, meaning that it takes into account that 
certain items are easier to agree with than others. Mokken analysis allows us to investigate 
this (in a more flexible manner than the Rasch scale) and to determine whether the scale 
follows a Monotone Homogeneity model, where the order of item ‘easiness’ differs among 
respondents, or a Double Monotonicity model, where items are ordered in the same manner 
by all respondents. In the conceptual model of political distrust proposed in this thesis, we 
have identified three evaluative dimensions and two time projections embedded in distrust 
judgments, which can be targeted towards parts of the political system or a specific political 
actor. Using Mokken scale analysis we can not only verify the status of the different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For more information on Item Response Theory see Sijtsma and Molenaar (2002) and on the development and 
applications of Mokken Scale analysis see Mokken (1971, 1997) and Van der Ark (2007). 
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evaluative dimensions as parts of distrusting attitudes, but also determine whether there is a 
hierarchy along different dimensions or a hierarchy in distrusting the national parliament and 
one’s preferred political party.    
 
We supplement the analysis of the new items of political distrust using a respondent-centred 
approach. Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical method that identifies substantively 
meaningful groups of people based on their response patterns to the measured items. It 
investigates the latent structures not based on the items, like factor analysis, but based on the 
way in which respondents decide to combine their answers to all the items in distinct 
patterns. Furthermore, LCA pays attention to the categorical nature of the measurement 
items. It calculates the probability of selecting particular response categories for each 
identified group, allowing us to see how respondents approach the different items and which 
responses are paired. This statistical analysis provides an additional test for the dimensions 
identified through factor analysis, but more importantly, highlights groups of respondents 
based on their overall evaluations through the manifest items. These groups supplement our 
understanding of citizens’ political distrust and give rise to subsequent validity exercises.  
 
Attitude research requires a measurement scale to be not only reliable, linear and uni-
dimensional, but also a valid measure of the underlying attitudinal construct. In fact, none of 
the above exercises would be very informative if the latent attitude being measured was 
something other than political distrust. Apart from face validity that is argued conceptually, 
we also investigate construct validity.  Since latent attitudes are unobservable, construct 
validity can be determined through establishing a network of relationships between the new 
indicator and other variables of interest or a well-validated measure of distrust administered 
in the survey (concurrent validity). Theoretical assumptions of associations between political 
distrust and other variables and characteristics of respondents, stemming from theoretical 
work and previous research, can serve as a test for the validity of the new indicator of 
political distrust. If the new measure behaves in a way that is expected given these 
assumptions, this provides good evidence to support construct validity.  
 
Of course, the association of political distrust with other variables, especially other political 
attitudes and behaviour, is what renders distrust such an important and interesting attitude 
area. In Chapter 6, we examine associations between the new distrust indicator, as well as the 
distrust in parliament and preferred party indices, with other external variables of interest, 
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such as political knowledge, efficacy, political cynicism and behavioural intentions in the 
political arena. Our aim is to explore whether different citizen characteristics are associated 
more strongly or in a different direction with the various subcomponents of distrusting 
attitudes. We take advantage of the multi-item indicator of political distrust and examine 
associations per political target, time projection and evaluative dimension, both through 
bivariate correlations and partial associations. Of particular interest is the effect of political 
distrust upon political behaviour. In the context of this thesis, it is important to note two 
points. Firstly, although we have very good theoretical and empirical reasons to argue for the 
effect of political distrust upon behaviour, we are not in a position to employ methods for 
causal inference to determine direct causal effects. We are only investigating the association 
between our measure of distrust, its subcomponents, and survey questions inquiring about 
respondents’ behaviour. Secondly, the survey measures focus on respondents’ behavioural 
intentions, not realised actions. In this sense, we do not claim to provide evidence as to the 
particular behavioural consequences of distrust, but examine the association between 
different evaluative dimensions of distrusting attitudes and the likelihood respondents would 
consider various types of political behaviour. 
 
The types of political behaviour we enquire after are also informed by our exploratory 
research and theoretical expectations, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. We are 
particularly interested in aspects of electoral behaviour that are damaging for democratic 
politics, such as electoral abstention, blank voting and support for a radical or extreme 
political party. These types of political action are grouped together with two extreme 
behavioural intentions, attending a violent demonstration and leaving the country, following 
exploratory factor analysis. Together these five behavioural intention items form an index 
representing disruptive types of political participation. The second index we consider refers 
to measures of active political participation that includes attending a peaceful demonstration, 
joining a political party and joining a pressure group or NGO. The final part of the 
quantitative analysis employs all the insights gathered through previous analyses to 
investigate these associations and provide suggestions for further study in the area of political 
distrust. Again we look at measures of bivariate associations as well as partial associations, 
controlling for key demographics and political ideology. The measure of political ideology on 
a left-right spectrum is important to control for when considering political participation and 
electoral behaviour, as ideology has an independent influence on citizen behaviour in the 
political arena.  
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The conceptualisation and operationalisation of political distrust culminated in a novel 
measurement tool, which uses multiple items to tap into different evaluative aspects of 
distrust and different political targets. In the creation of this indicator we follow best-
measurement practices to avoid measurement error and create a valid and reliable index. This 
allows us to investigate the internal structure of the distrust attitude area, but also to 
disaggregate the overall scales and examine associations between external variables of 
interest and individual items, evaluative dimensions or political targets. The statistical 
analysis employed throughout the quantitative empirical chapters of the thesis suggests that 
evaluations of distrust of national parliament and distrust of one’s preferred party can be used 
as two separate indicators for attitudes towards these two political targets, as well as 
combined in a single indicator of overall political distrust. 
 
 
3.5 Summary of methodologies and conclusion 
 
The holistic nature of this research project demands a mixed methodological approach to the 
study of political distrust. To address the question of meaning and the way in which citizens 
express attitudes of political distrust, we conducted popular narrative interviews with citizens 
in three European democracies. Narrative interviews from Greece, Italy and the UK were 
thematically analysed to construct a conceptual model of political distrust. Gathering 
qualitative evidence from three European democracies helps to boost the validity and 
generalisability of our findings. The aim has been to explore distrust as a psychological 
attitude area and not solely in the three national contexts where data was gathered. The 
exercise of peeling off multiple layers of context-specific information and events to 
determine common threads, evaluations and meanings attached to political distrust 
expressions across all respondents has given rise to a conceptual model, which could be 
applied outside the three contexts studied as part of this thesis.  
 
There are a number of potential caveats in the research design employed, apart from the 
limited cases informing the qualitative part of this research project. The first has to do with 
the subjectivity of the researcher, which may pose the risk of unintentionally shaping or 
interpreting interview evidence in light of pre-existing biases or theoretical positions. To help 
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counter this risk, the researcher must exercise self-discipline, not interfere with the interview 
process or begin the analysis before all evidence is collected, and proceed with an analysis 
that considers negative and discrepant information that may run against some of the themes 
and patterns identified. This is especially true for an exploratory research design that aims at 
identifying meaning and unifying patterns. Actively considering evidence that does not fall 
within the framework established, such as the varying level of importance placed upon the 
different evaluative dimensions by different individuals in their decision to distrust, or the 
fact that for some participants political distrust does not make sense as a term to explain 
attitudes towards politics, strengthens the analysis and interpretation of findings by 
highlighting the inevitable complexities inherent in political attitudes. Finally, the logic of 
triangulation with different sources of data and existing literature provides a further sources 
of validation.  
 
Secondly, one question regarding the study of political distrust attitudes rarely addressed in 
empirical research concerns researchers’ ability to reach out to citizens who have serious 
reasons to be distrustful, such as the unemployed, systematically disadvantaged and those 
living at risk of poverty. This is a potential problem of qualitative as much as quantitative 
research, which can be improved by more inclusive sampling and targeted groups. In this 
particular study, we attempted to include as diverse a sample as possible in the interview 
stage, including socioeconomic background and employment history, but were not able to 
reach out to people without a method of communication such as a landline or access to email. 
Even within the participant group, despite the fact that the narrative interview worked well as 
a methodological tool across all three national contexts, there were still observable 
differences in the duration, coherence and depth of narratives along the lines of education and 
political interest. Nevertheless, these narratives were very informative and an integral part of 
the analysis, as they gave a more direct line to citizens’ thought processes and attitudes than 
more elaborate and eloquent narratives that tended to shift the focus of the interview away 
from personal evaluations and towards an attempt to provide objective observations of 
political reality.  
 
Finally, the research steps followed for the operationalisation and measurement of distrusting 
attitudes included multiple decisions regarding the evaluative dimensions, political targets 
and phrasing of survey items. Given the sequential research design employed, the 
justification for some of these choices will become clearer in the following chapter, which 
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presents the analysis and findings from the interview stage of the project. In the present 
chapter, we have presented the overall methodological framework followed in order to 
address the motivating research question, “What is political distrust?”, to present a 
conceptual model of distrusting attitudes that reveals the meaning and evaluative processes 
entailed in the decision to distrust, and to provide further evidence on the internal structure of 
such attitudes based on the aforementioned model.   
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Chapter 4: What Do Citizens Mean and Think When Claiming to 
Distrust Political Institutions and Politicians? 
 
4.1 Themes of political distrust in popular narrative interviews 
4.2 Meaning of political distrust 
4.3 Three evaluative dimensions of distrust: Technical, ethical and incongruent interests 
4.4 The ‘political’ in political distrust 
4.5 Emotive responses and behavioural intentions 
4.6 Political distrust from the citizens’ perspective and conclusions 
 
 
So, how do citizens think about political distrust? In this chapter we provide an answer to this 
question by exploring the meaning attitudes of political distrust take for the citizens that 
express them. Throughout this thesis it has been argued that distrust is relational and 
evaluative, meaning it is an attitude held by a citizen in relation to specific political agents or 
the entire political system, based on individual perceptions. These perceptions concern 
technical failures, the unfairness of intentions and outcomes, as well as the level of divergent 
or congruent interests between the citizen and politics. We have also argued that distrusting 
attitudes are dynamic and can change depending on the perceived trustworthiness of the agent 
being evaluated, but that they are also comprehensive orientations that can act as a heuristic 
mechanism for future attitudes and even behavioural intentions. This is particularly true for 
behaviour that has to do with citizens’ own intentions of fulfilling the role of good citizens, 
which results in this vicious circle of distrust in politics. These are some of the conceptual 
characteristics we have attributed to political distrust in this thesis and they have been 
primarily derived through the analysis of narrative interviews of Italian, English and Greek 
citizens. All the relevant information regarding fieldwork research, the participants and the 
methods of analysis of narrative content are available in the preceding chapter. In this 
chapter, our aim is to present the findings of our thematic analysis and address two 
fundamental questions: ‘What do citizens mean when expressing political distrust?’ and 
‘Does this meaning remain constant among different citizens, contexts and political agents 
being evaluated?’ We therefore discuss the key themes that emerge from citizens’ narratives 
and the evaluations underlying judgments of distrust. We further consider how such 
judgments vary when evaluating different political agents. 
 
The discussion is supplemented by interview extracts, which are used to demonstrate the type 
of discourse citizens employ, the specific events and information they recount and the 
underlying judgments entailed in distrusting attitudes. The purpose of the quotes is both 
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illustrative and representative, although the latter term needs to be used with caution in small 
N qualitative research, and especially this kind of exploratory study, which seeks to 
investigate relations between evaluations and expressions of distrust rather than generalising 
findings. The extracts are representative in so far as they indicate expressions and capture 
evaluations that were articulated in a similar manner by participants other than the person 
being quoted. Once a number of narratives was analysed, it became clear that certain themes 
and judgments were recurring across different participants and contexts, increasing our 
confidence in this part of the research. From its outset, this analytical exercise did not begin 
with rigid notions about the nature of political distrust nor set expectations about the type of 
behaviours or reactions of distrusting citizens. The advantage of the study’s research design 
is that during the analysis of interview data it was possible to identify less visible and 
unanticipated aspects of political distrust, such as the particular emotional manifestations and 
psychological state associated with expressions of extreme distrust in the system, as well as 
differences between distrust addressed towards specific political actors or differences in the 
evaluative dimensions each individual may prioritise. These aspects of distrusting attitudes 
contribute to scholarly understanding of political distrust and highlight many of the 
complexities entailed in this field of study that could be addressed in further research.  
 
 
4.1 Narratives of political distrust 
 
We begin the analysis of popular interviews by highlighting common themes emerging in 
narratives of political distrust and presenting how distrust is expressed through the citizens’ 
own wording. This thematic analysis is a first step in tracing common patterns of expression, 
before being able to move a step away from the specific events, processes and individual 
political actors that citizens refer to in their accounts and towards the cognitive and affective 
evaluative processes distrusting attitudes entail. The analysis of interview content identified 
common themes running through interview transcripts from all three national contexts and 
participant backgrounds. Undoubtedly, there is variation in the way different citizens 
perceive and evaluate politics, and to that end this chapter also presents empirical evidence 
that shows alternative orientations and understandings of political distrust. Nevertheless, the 
prevailing similarities that emerge regarding the nature and underlying evaluations of distrust 
lead us to analyse evidence from the three national contexts together and provide insights into 
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the general meaning and attribution of political distrust in general, rather than in each specific 
cultural context. Interview extracts from multiple narratives are used throughout this chapter 
to highlight these common threads and present citizens’ perceptions and expressions of 
distrust. 
 
Firstly, we find that the electoral process is central in almost every citizen narrative and the 
act of voting comes up as the first point of reference in citizens’ relation to the political 
world, even when negatively oriented. This is not surprising, as many participants from all 
three European democracies seem to consider elections and the right to vote as a central 
feature of their democratic system and an integral part of their civic identity. Elections 
represent the opportunity for each citizen to voice their political will, to participate in the 
democracy they live in and to articulate their preferences in a meaningful way. Even for 
participants that did not explicitly ascribe any particular value to elections, the act of 
supporting a political party was used as an example of faith and of extended trust in that party 
and the political system. Political distrust emerges in the context of elections at the 
institutional level, when the electoral process is viewed as not functioning properly or failing 
to give citizens a chance to make their voices heard.  This could be because of a perceived 
faulty electoral system, such as the closed-list system in Italy, which according to some 
participants is “a scandal” (I-3105) and “un-democratic” (I-1206). A participant from Italy 
explains this in a simple way: 
 
So, I can vote for the party of, say ‘San Pellegrino’,5 and then Mr. San 
Pellegrino can send us a Mafioso into Parliament…Choosing who goes into 
Parliament is a huge power. But they [politicians] do not care about anything, 
they are completely disconnected. (I-2112) 
 
Citizens perceive the electoral process as a con, since it allows the party leadership to choose 
the names of candidate representatives and the order in which they appear on the ballot paper, 
taking away their right to decide their representatives and often promoting undeserving 
cronies and individuals who are perceived as serving ‘special’ interests. Distrust of the 
electoral system was also evident in narratives from the UK, where the first-past-the-post 
system made some participants describe voting as a waste of time, especially in the case of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ‘San Pellegrino’ is a brand of bottled water available in Italy. One such bottle was on our 
table at the time of the interview, leading the participant to use the name as a hypothetical 
political party name. 
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people living in a safe constituency, in which the seat is held by their opposing party. This 
becomes problematic, not only for voters who feel cheated out of their right to express 
electoral support for their party, but also for participants without any strong partisan 
preference who believe elections no longer give them the opportunity to “throw the rascals 
out”. A respondent trying to explain her exasperation with the elected MP and councillors in 
her constituency said: 
 
We are in a very right-wing local area and the joke is that you could put a 
turkey up for election with a blue ribbon around its neck, and it would be 
voted in. So this area has been Tory6 for a long, long time and like any area 
that doesn’t have that swing in politics, politicians get very complacent. They 
feel they can do things exactly their way and not worry about their posts, 
because they know they will be voted in next time. (UK-3213) 
 
It is somewhat surprising that citizens refer to the electoral system in terms of distrust. Earlier 
conceptual work had raised concerns about the use of the notion in relations between citizens 
and inanimate objects. However, people appear to recognise the outcome of these processes 
and to ascribe evaluative judgments. Political processes are a fundamental way in which 
citizens interact with their political systems, and some participants also tend to highlight that 
much is designed, implemented, maintained or reversed by legislators with particular power 
agendas in mind.  
 
Another aspect of the electoral process prominently associated with feelings of political 
distrust has to do with the parties competing for government and the citizens’ electoral 
support. Unlike the rules of the election process, which are different across the three national 
contexts, this sentiment was echoed in narratives across all participant groups: the inability to 
find a political party to support. Many respondents perceived all political parties to be the 
same, and the division between the left and right to be non-existent, not only in ideological 
terms, but in terms of following the same policies and serving the same big interests. A 
participant from Italy connects the two in the following way: 
 
But they [politicians] are much more likely to look after their own interests; 
this is what is happening in Italy right now. And this results in not being able 
to distinguish anymore between the political right and the political left. There 
is only a group of people, who are politicians and think more about serving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tory is a commonly used name to refer to the Conservative Party. The colour of the Conservative Party is 
blue, hence the participant referred to a ‘blue ribbon’ to suggest the affiliation with that party.  
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their own interests, having the right privileges, and who think less and less 
about the good of citizens, which is in reality what politics should be about. (I-
1109) 
 
Being able to cast your vote and show electoral support towards a political party is an act that 
indicates a certain level of faith in the political process and is perceived by most citizens as a 
validation and sign of support for the political system. It makes citizens part of the political 
process itself and allows them to formulate and express a political identity. On the contrary, 
being unable to lend support to a political group conveys distrust and frustration towards the 
entire system for not allowing your voice to be heard. This sentiment was particularly 
prominent among younger participants who felt let down by the political system and the ‘old’ 
parties. This distrust is expressed alongside phrases such as respondents “not wanting to 
vote”, “not finding anyone you would give your support to”, resentment for having to vote 
for “the lesser of all evils” or even declaring a refusal to participate and removing themselves 
completely from the process of electoral choice. Asked to elaborate on an initial comment of 
politicians being untrustworthy, a Greek participant explained:  
 
It means that… you cannot trust anyone! The simplest example: we will have 
elections next year and I do not know who to vote for. And the same last time. 
This is very bad. That is, I 'm a person who thinks voting is the ultimate right, 
and I do not like abstaining at all. (G-1205) 
 
Abstaining from the electoral process is the obvious choice for respondents who share this 
sentiment, though not before they have exhausted all possible political players participating 
in the political arena, including smaller parties or even radical and non-systemic political 
parties (if their personal values allow it). In the multi-party contexts under study,7 support for 
radical or extreme parties appears to be tied to attitudes of distrust. Investigating further what 
drives certain citizens to abstain and what drives others to vote for anti-systemic parties 
would certainly require more complex explanations, of which political distrust is only a part. 
Nevertheless, the narratives of those individuals demonstrate that the feeling that their tie to 
electoral representation has broken down is particularly distressing for people who hold 
strong democratic values and believe in the right and duty of citizens to vote. This in turn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a more comprehensive discussion on whether the UK can be classified as a multiparty system see 
Kavanagh and Cowley (2010). Given the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government after the 2010 
election and SNP’s considerable presence in Westminster following the 2015 general election and the presence 
of five political parties in Westminster, we believe it is no longer accurate to refer to the UK as a strict two-party 
system.  
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increases their distrust in the political system, which is perceived as a system that ‘steals’ or 
‘takes away’ their rights as citizens to make a choice, punish unworthy politicians and 
exercise their right to a political identity and civic participation. 
 
The failure of representation comes up repeatedly in narratives of distrust. This holds both at 
the symbolic level, such as a particular type of political class of ‘privately educated, 
Oxbridge-graduate men’ in the UK that are disconnected from the lives and problems of the 
participants, and in concrete terms of not being able to find any political group or individual 
that citizens believe will fight to promote their values and well-being. At the partisan level, 
political parties or political figures could help to provide this link between the citizen and 
politics. Yet when they fail, the result is unsettling, as this participant states:  “There is no 
one to represent you. So, neither on a lower nor on a higher level can I find anything. That’s 
why I am telling you they take away your will.” (G-1203) The perception of political agents 
as promoting citizens’ best-interest and protecting their rights is considered equally important 
in the case of political parties, as in the case of the institutions that legislate and enforce the 
rules. Otherwise the citizen-state bond is severed. When probed to elaborate what she means 
when she claims she is not represented, a young Italian explains:  
 
When I say “you represent me” it means that I give you my idea, it is as if I 
make this gift of trust in you and you ought to go, with my name and my face 
and represent me and fight for my interest and not yours. When I say, “I feel 
represented” for example from the institutions or by the political class, is when 
I know that my rights will be protected in some way. In reality, they don’t 
protect them, they don’t protect them through laws and they don’t protect them 
through the justice system... I mean, according to my view there is just general 
distrust in institutions in Italy. (I-3201)  
 
Many participants also refer to political promises and the perceived accord or disaccord 
between politicians’ words and actions, explaining their distrust in political figures. This 
mismatch is often cited in relation to the electoral process and manifesto promises, but is also 
expressed in broader discussions of manipulation and betrayal. Politicians, political parties 
and governments are held accountable for their promises, their manifesto pledges, electoral 
campaign commitments and subsequent courses of action. In the UK interviews, for example, 
the Liberal Democrats’ consent to the increase of student tuition fees was often presented as 
an example of trust betrayal. In interviews from Greece and Italy, where manifesto pledges or 
coalition programs are less concrete and political promises follow more populist models, the 
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gap between pre-election promises and subsequent political action is perceived to be 
exceptionally wide. Hence, political distrust is often expressed as the inability, or 
unwillingness, to believe what politicians say and is explained using evidence of such 
dishonesty. It denotes the belief that political promises are empty words employed to deceive 
voters, and an expectation that political actions will be in the opposite direction. 
 
This perceived discord between promises and actions or between words and facts often 
prompts a reaction of feeling ‘deceived’, ‘manipulated’, ‘lied to’ or ‘intentionally tricked’. 
Participants consistently chose this language to express their distrust of politics and specific 
politicians. For example, a participant from Greece asserted that: “I believe that they lie to 
our faces. You hear a politician, not just any politician, the Prime Minister who is the highest 
political authority in the country, and he is really lying to you. He says things that at the same 
time are proven to be untrue.” (G-1204) In the UK interviews, people expressed similar 
sentiments of ‘politicians lying to our faces’, particularly in regards to war. The Iraq war was 
mentioned in 12 of the 16 narratives, despite not being a recent event. It was mentioned as a 
particular instance where citizens felt deceived by their party (in the case of Labour 
supporters) or by the whole political system and began to feel distrust. In some cases this 
distrust was extended to the wider political system, while for others it was attributed solely to 
the Labour party and contained in those politicians involved in the decision-making process 
at the time. A British participant in his early 30s expressed the former view: 
 
When we see people lying, point blank in our faces, because they are trying to 
force on board their political agenda, it makes it very difficult to take politics 
seriously. If I think about the war in Iraq that happened in my student years 
[…] I remember thinking that they were lying at the time and it just reinforced, 
in a key time in my life why I didn’t believe or trust anything politicians 
would say anymore. And I think that caused a lot of damage to a whole 
generation. (UK-1105) 
 
In general, citizen evaluations of politicians emphasise the keeping of promises and 
performing their job, with particular attention to the specifications of their role and their 
motives. The abuse of power and political conduct that does not adhere to the requirements of 
their role feature extensively as examples of untrustworthiness, whether in the form of the 
expenses scandal in the UK, the manipulation of the legal system in Italy or corruption and 
clientelistic practices in Greece. In some of the interview extracts presented above, 
participants have expressed distrusting judgments on occasions where politicians are believed 
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to have served their own personal interests or other special interests, which are considered to 
be in stark contradiction to the priorities of the citizen and even the common good of the 
country. Expressions of distrust phrased in terms of ‘preferential treatment’ for politicians, 
‘double standards’ in the application of the law and unpunished behaviour are found in many 
citizen accounts. The concept of responsibility and the need for every political actor to face 
the consequences of their actions carry strong ethical connotations. Citizens expect that 
instances of corruption, revelations of scandals, money appropriation or any other unlawful 
behaviour should give rise to the same – if not more severe – consequences for politicians 
than for any other normal citizen. When this expectation is not met, citizen distrust can spill-
over to the institutional players and to the system in place for its failure to impose 
punishment. 
 
In this sense, some of the interviewees in the UK perceived the revelation of the MPs expense 
scandal as an example of inappropriate individuals who were nevertheless caught, rightly 
punished and removed from positions of authority. A participant from the UK explains his 
interpretation of the events in the following manner:  
 
If they [politicians] had actually done something wrong, something that was 
inherently wrong, then I would want them to be penalised in some way. I 
would expect that to happen. The expenses scandal…well, it’s just further 
blackening their name and people seeing them more as careerists and out for 
themselves. Overall it is not a positive thing, because you have less trust and 
faith in them, but it’s all turns and tides…Maybe it will mean that the next set 
that are voted in will come from a different angle and will want to fight against 
behaviour like that. (UK-1207) 
 
Of course, not all British citizens shared this point of view; not even every British participant 
in this study showed this level of faith for future political classes. But this interview extract 
demonstrates the thought process and rationalisation of a specific event in the mind of this 
participant. In his eyes, the institutional mechanism proved to function according to his 
normative expectation, and distrust was limited to those individuals who behaved in an 
untrustworthy manner. The behaviour of specific individuals has affected the trustworthiness 
of the political class, but individual MPs can be replaced with more trustworthy political 
representatives. Other narratives of inappropriate political conduct also show that the very 
absence of well-functioning mechanisms of control and punishment increase the expectation 
of further abuse of power by people in positions of authority. Citizens are unable to 
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distinguish between politicians who engage in harmful practices, further fuelling the 
generalised belief of a whole system that operates in an incompetent, unethical and 
ineffective manner. For these participants, political distrust spills-over to the institutions, 
which fail to fulfil their role requirements and reflects distrust at the systemic level.  
 
Further, political distrust towards institutions and the general political system evoke even 
stronger expectations of distrust for the future, as citizens realise that replacing inappropriate 
individual politicians will not make a difference to how the system operates. The question of 
distrust spill-overs is a complex, yet conceptually and practically important aspect of political 
distrust which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In effect, all interview 
transcripts show that participants are sensitive to the interaction between politicians and 
political processes. An interviewee from Italy notes this in an attempt to structure his 
thoughts on what might constitute a positive political change:  
 
In my opinion, what should change in the political system are the 
representatives, the politicians themselves. But in reality the political system is 
totally corrupt […] It is so corrupt that we could never have a Saint or even 
someone serious to govern with integrity. It will always be substantively 
corrupt and it will always arrange for someone substantively corrupt to 
govern. (I-1109) 
 
This approach also goes against arguments that claim citizens cannot evaluate the capacities 
and intentions of systems or institutions due to the fact that they are not natural persons. 
Although this participant’s claims reflect high levels of cynicism, they also suggest that his 
evaluations may alter when new representatives who want to improve the system are put into 
place. Most respondents evaluate representative and non-representative political institutions, 
such as the national parliament or the civil service, by looking to the trustworthy or 
untrustworthy behaviour of the people that comprise these institutions.  At a second level, 
political institutions are also perceived as entities with operations, rules and functions and 
designated outputs, as in the case of electoral processes. Citizens often refer to these rules and 
functions in order to explain their negative assessments of political institutions. Expressions 
of institutional distrust differ from distrust in politicians and political groups only in part, 
simply because they have this added layer of complexity; they reflect judgements about the 
majority of people that act in that institutional space (although not all of them), and they also 
reflect an evaluation of an institution’s operational procedures and outcomes. For example, in 
the earlier extracts where participants expressed distrust of the electoral system, this was 
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based on a perception that, in practice, that system was not fulfilling its role in making their 
voice heard and giving them the right to instigate change.  
 
Since political institutions do not make promises in the same way as a politician or political 
groups, institutional promises are the equivalent of a mandate, and therefore expressions of 
distrust focus on the procedures, rules and regulations the institution is meant to sustain. 
Perceptions of clientelism, inertia, corruption or any other practice that goes against the rules 
and role of an institution are assessed as failures and form the basis of negative evaluations. 
Many participants expressed distrust in terms of institutions ‘not functioning’, operating in a 
way that harms their best interest or the best interest of the country and a political system that 
does not respect them as citizens. Furthermore, such expressions of distrust evoke a 
breakdown in the reciprocal relationship and replace it with expectations of untrustworthy 
interaction, wish for disassociation and a hostile attitude.  
 
Voting, representation, manipulation, control, promise-breaking, rule-breaking and 
institutional failure are prominent themes emerging in expressions of political distrust, but 
this is by no means an exhaustive list. There is much more information in the material 
gathered, which is already bound to be limited due to the sample size and restricted national 
contexts studied. However, identifying common underlying themes offers interesting insights 
into the way citizens in these three European democracies – and potentially beyond – express 
political distrust. Further, it links this study with previous lines of inquiry into distrusting 
political attitudes and sets the ground for a deeper investigation into the meaning citizens 
assign to political distrust and the cognitive processes entailed in evaluations of 
untrustworthiness.  
 
 
4.2 The meaning of political distrust 	  
This chapter stresses the meaning citizens assign to expressions of distrust: whether it 
changes among different individuals and different parts of the political system. The implicit 
argument is that understanding what citizens mean when they claim to distrust their political 
system is integral to the study of distrusting attitudes and necessary for interpreting their 
implications for political behaviour. Our analysis suggests that the meaning political distrust 
assumes in citizens’ narratives is consistently tied to negative outcomes. A citizen’s 
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expression of distrust encapsulates expectations of political conduct that will be proven 
harmful to them and assessments of political conduct that has impacted them heavily. 
Therefore, distrust appears to be a dynamic evaluation with an inherent time dimension that is 
projected both in the past and into the future, denoting negative expectations. An interviewee 
in Italy thinking about the country’s politicians claims: “So, then we say ‘they will never look 
out for my own good, in fact, they will even ruin my life!’” (I-2112) The perceived 
untrustworthiness of political agents means that citizens are on the lookout and will attempt 
to protect themselves from harmful outcomes. Interviewees claiming that they “expect 
nothing good from them [politicians]” (G-2109), stressing that they “simply do not trust 
institutions” (I-3201) or that they “do not trust the voting system” (UK-3213) anticipate the 
actions of a political agent to be damaging or misleading in some way.  
 
Whereas trust in politicians or institutions is equated with an expectation of political conduct 
that falls within the scope of what a ‘good politician’ or ‘successful institution’ is, distrust 
reflects the belief that political agents have failed to uphold their roles. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the lack of political trust, distrust entails a break in the association between 
citizens and their political representatives or institution. This meaning of negative impact and 
the intention to sever the relationship between the citizen and political agents deemed to be 
untrustworthy in an attempt to protect themselves, is a first point where we distinguish 
distrust from the lack of trust empirically. 
 
An additional aspect of distrusting attitudes we note is that citizens evaluate evidence of past 
behaviour and use that to project a judgment into the future in the form of expectations. This 
dynamic element of time projection emerges from citizen narratives. Retrospective 
evaluations of previous events and behaviour of political agents and assessments of the 
likelihood for future untrustworthy behaviour are both integral parts of the decision to 
mistrust. Another interviewee from the UK, reflecting on the war in Iraq and political 
manipulation, explains how this experience caused her to lose faith in her political party and 
how it is shaping future thoughts of supporting that party:  
 
I think the war was probably the biggest issue. […] You always think, “Why 
are we doing this? What are we getting out of this? What is there to gain? Why 
are our politicians lying to us, telling us it is worthwhile?” I think that it was 
war probably, for me personally, why I lost trust in my party. If I were to vote 
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Labour again…But, no, now I can’t. I have lost trust in my party because of 
that. (UK-1204) 
 
Crucially, distrust entails a break in the political relationship and is not simply a reflection of 
the inability to make a decision to either trust or distrust. Withholding judgment, either due to 
lack of sufficient information or conflicting evidence, is often expressed in terms of being 
sceptical or uncertain, but it does not entail either positive or negative expectations. It denotes 
ambiguity. Distrust, however, is a reflection of negative evaluations and expectations from 
the operation of the political agent in question. The three states should be distinguished when 
citizens express attitudes towards specific parts of the political system, but also the political 
system as a whole. Trust denotes a belief that the system functions in the designated manner 
to produce positive outcomes for citizens. Distrust denotes the belief that the system 
functions in a way that produces negative outcomes: for example it fails to protect their rights 
as citizens, it fails to give them the opportunity to make their voice heard with their vote and 
it fails to promote the best-interest of citizens like themselves in society. Yet, it is possible to 
neither trust nor distrust, to think that the political system is not functioning satisfactorily but 
that it is not infringing upon your rights and interests either. Therefore, political distrust has a 
distinct meaning and leads to a different cognitive state and behavioural motivations than the 
lack of trust. It is this meaning and cognitive state that are often overlooked when research is 
framed solely in terms of trust. Consider the following two extracts, where two participants 
express their evaluations of the political class in their country:  
 
Yes, they do a decent job, but they [***] up from time to time. And they [***] 
up pretty badly, and when they do, it sort of rebases everyone’s trust in the 
system. So you kind of know that things are not going to go awfully wrong, 
but they are not going to go amazingly either. (UK-1105) 
 
Because the truth is that these people have destroyed us. These are not 
politicians! Neither their politics is politics! The only thing they know how to 
do is to grab money. (G-3213) 
 
 
Clearly, to equate these evaluations would be conceptually misleading and empirically 
counter-productive. It is worth noting that these two extracts refer to different political 
classes, the former to UK politicians and the latter to the Greek political class. The two 
extracts are presented as the clearest examples of non-positive orientations towards the 
political class, which nevertheless indicate the distinction between sceptical and properly 
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negative assessments of trustworthiness. Certainly, sceptical and lukewarm attitudes towards 
the political system were found in interviews from all three samples, as were positive and 
extremely negative orientations.  
 
This dynamic nature of political distrust, the evaluation of past actions and the formation of 
expectations regarding future conduct set it apart from political cynicism. Narrative 
interviews give the interviewees the space to retrace their thoughts and explain this 
retrospective and prospective process step by step. When probed to elaborate on what he 
means in particular instances of trust betrayal, a citizen explains: “If people let you down, 
then you can deal with this afterwards, don’t you? You deal with the consequences and you 
use that to form your future judgement.” (UK-2106)  
 
This interactive aspect of distrust is echoed throughout narratives and reveals a continuous 
process of action and reaction, feeling betrayed by untrustworthy behaviour and reacting by 
setting a negative baseline for future expectations. In this way, it becomes clear that citizens’ 
understanding of political distrust is relational and characterises a dynamic process between 
the citizen and state institutions or the citizen and her political representatives. Whereas 
cynicism is better understood as a deeply rooted, general belief in the inherent evilness of 
politicians and in tainted political process, political distrust is dynamic and depends on 
retrospective and prospective assessments. Without a doubt, continuous trust-betrayal and 
failure of political agents to fulfil their roles build more and more evidence to sustain 
distrusting attitudes and can also lead to political cynicism. For example, after mentioning 
continuous instances of disappointment and frustration with the political system, a participant 
explains how she ended up considering the corruptive effect of power on human nature: 
 
I’ve begun to believe that human nature craves power to such an extent that 
when it gets close to it also gets completely corrupt. So, even if someone had 
noble intentions at the start, it becomes impossible to uphold them. […] What 
I am saying implies that they are all useless. Whoever governs – it doesn’t 
matter who it is – could not govern in a trustworthy manner. (G-1204)  
 
 
This stance shows a cynical attitude towards the whole idea of democratic power. Although 
in this case it also appears to be shaped and reinforced by personal experiences, perceptions 
and interpretation of events, it is important to maintain the analytic distinction between the 
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two concepts. The following statement by an Italian participant explaining her mistrust of the 
country’s politicians captures this dynamic process of political distrust as action and reaction: 
 
I see distrust a bit in the sense that ‘you made me lose it’ and so it is your 
fault. Not trusting might be because I am a person that doesn’t trust and maybe 
I do not trust you. But in the case of politics, they made me lose my trust! I 
had it before. (I-2213) 
 
Political distrust is relational; not simply a trait of the individual citizen that expresses it, such 
as cynicism or a general distrusting character. It relies on assessments of the qualities of 
another agent. Narratives of political distrust, and especially respondents’ explanations when 
prompted to elaborate on their views, are almost tautological: You distrust someone because 
they are untrustworthy. However, it is worth investigating this cyclical aspect of political 
distrust further. In many of the narrative extracts already recited in this section, it appears that 
participants fine-tune their opinions and stance given their assessment of the trustworthiness 
of political agents and political institutions. Being fooled repeatedly by politicians makes a 
citizen believe politicians are untrustworthy. Like Aesop’s fable of the boy who cried wolf, 
that citizen will no longer believe any of the information conveyed by politicians, their 
manifesto pledges, their promises or their work appraisals, making it harder to identify the 
party that is closest to their preferences and participate in political processes giving their 
support. Trusting relations have been hailed in the existing literature as facilitators of 
cooperation, economic exchange and a requirement for tackling problems of collective 
action. Going back to Margaret Levi’s description of reciprocity, she claimed that “[f]ailures 
of government representatives to uphold policy compacts, to achieve stated ends and to treat 
potentially trustworthy citizens as trustworthy can have disastrous effects on the extent to 
which citizens trust government and trust each other.” (1998: 88) In effect, what we see in the 
narratives of participants is the establishment of negative reciprocity; believing in the 
untrustworthiness of the system leads people to become untrustworthy citizens in return. 
Evidence of citizen untrustworthiness would include a withdrawal from the political process, 
non-participation in elections or support for anti-systemic groups and candidates, as well as 
reluctance to follow policies and fulfil citizen obligations. An Italian participant gives the 
example of Berlusconi’s economic crimes and the pervasive tax-evasion among the political 
elite, which makes it impossible for a citizen to play by the rules: 
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They [politicians] simply continue to award themselves privileges at the 
expense of citizens. This is something scandalous, no? Scandalous! Then, 
there is the average citizen who evades taxes, and feels entitled to do so, 
because the political class gives a bad example. But things are, as we say, “like 
a dog chasing its own tail”. As long as this chain of dishonesty and insolence 
is not broken, we will never succeed in anything. (I-1206) 
 
This constant process of action and reaction between perceptions of untrustworthy behaviour, 
distrusting attitudes, further untrustworthiness and so forth can also explain why it has been 
extremely challenging to distinguish between the causes, the consequences and political 
distrust itself – both conceptually and empirically. This ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma can be 
overcome if we think of political distrust as a powerful reciprocal attitude that reinforces 
itself and has the possibility of forming a ‘vicious circle’. It can be understood as a repeated 
‘trust game’, where information is constantly updated and new events call for new action 
based on distrusting established relations – but crucially, where the citizen rarely has the 
option of terminating the ‘game’ and needs to continue ‘playing’ by modifying his behaviour 
and making decisions according to future expectations.  
 
This is why it is important to both study political distrust in its own right, separating it from 
trust and the lack thereof, and to consider its implications for political behaviour and 
democratic governance. Although it is extremely difficult to link attitudes to behaviour 
empirically, narrative interviews offer citizens’ own explanations for their judgments in a 
coherent pattern of cause and effect. Whether deciding to remove themselves from the 
democratic process of election altogether (removing their name from the electoral register or 
refusing to vote); not voting for the specific party that has betrayed their trust (e.g. the Labour 
Party after feeling deceived over the Iraq war or the Liberal Democrats over the university 
tuition fee hike); voting for radical parties in an effort to change the system (such as the Five 
Star Movement in Italy, Syriza and even Golden Dawn in Greece); or consciously standing 
up against the law and refusing to contribute any further to the citizen-state relationship 
(through tax evasion, the Greek ‘I won’t pay’ movement or bribery), citizens appear to link 
their retrospective experiences of being let down and their prospective evaluation of the 
likelihood of being let down in the future to their chosen course of action. In the words of one 
Greek participant summing up what an untrustworthy political system means to her: “So, in 
practical terms this is what untrustworthiness means, in the end you become untrustworthy as 
well, they pass it on to you...” (G-1204) 
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Most definitions of political distrust encountered in the literature emphasised the role of 
individual perceptions and assessments. Yet so far, it has been difficult to assess what 
constitutes perceptions of political untrustworthiness. Political attitudes, such as distrust, have 
an inbuilt evaluative aspect. The second point that emerges from this cyclical and relational 
nature of political distrust is that in order to understand the real significance of the meaning 
citizens ascribe to distrust one needs to identify the evaluative processes citizens use as 
concretely as possible. Naturally, what is deemed trustworthy and untrustworthy conduct 
must depend on the particular cognitive processes every citizen’s mind goes through. The 
outcome of evaluations is expected to vary between individuals and between national 
contexts, as we have already seen in interview extracts that may refer to the same event but 
reach different conclusions. However, following the analysis of all condensed narrative 
content according to recounted events, the interpretations provided by the interviewees and 
respective cognitive reactions, a comprehensive pattern for evaluating untrustworthiness 
emerges. Participants’ expressions of distrust are based on three evaluative dimensions: a 
technical assessment, a moral assessment and an interest-congruence assessment. 
 
 
4.3 Three evaluative dimensions of distrust: Technical, ethical and incongruent 
interests 
 
We have already commented on some of the key themes emerging in narratives of political 
distrust and have attempted to uncover the meaning citizens ascribe to their assertions of 
distrust. In the preceding section, we presented narrative extracts that indicated how political 
evaluations take place in a backdrop of largely agreed democratic requirements. Whether it is 
political representatives, political parties, the government, political processes, such as the 
legislative or electoral process, or institutions, such as the national parliament or the judicial 
system, citizens have some idea of how politics should function and what outputs they should 
produce in a democratic context. Hence, an untrustworthy political system and untrustworthy 
political agents are those that exhibit incompetence in dealing with governing functions and 
failure to fulfil democratic requirements. In line with earlier conceptual work on political 
trust that points to a strategic evaluation of the capacities and competencies of political 
agents, accounts of political distrust in the narrative interviews reveal a technical evaluative 
dimension that focuses on past evidence and future anticipation of incompetence or inability 
to perform predetermined tasks. Narratives of political distrust provide many examples of 
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institutional failures. These evaluations follow a technical dimension leading to the belief that 
institutions are not functioning according to their mandate – they are failing to produce the 
appropriate output and they create damaging inefficiencies for the entire system. The same 
line of evaluation underlines expressions of distrust in government, politicians or groups of 
political figures. For political figures, distrusting technical evaluations entail the conviction 
that politicians are not doing their job, that they are unable to perform competently in 
government and that they fail to deliver on their promises. For example, an interviewee 
thinking about the political response to the financial crisis in Greece explains his 
disappointment:   
 
Because even in the beginning of the crisis we expected a different approach, a 
little better management of things, some more actions rather than words, and 
ultimately what did we see? (G-1102) 
 
Accounts of distrust in many narratives follow this evaluative dimension. Participants 
evaluate governments on the basis of their success or failure to govern, pass laws and manage 
the economy, public services and other domains of government. Another participant 
perceives failures of public services as a political failure, which underpins her evaluations of 
parliament:  
 
When a country’s healthcare system is malfunctioning to such an extent – and 
it completely malfunctions – it all starts from politics. When inside the 
Parliament 300 people cannot vote the right laws, how can you respect them 
and hold them to high esteem? They are less than nothing. (G-3213)  
 
It was mentioned also in earlier sections that a failure of representatives to represent their 
constituents feeds a lot of negative evaluations of politicians and the political system in its 
entirety, for perpetuating this exclusionary type of democratic politics. This is often 
perceived as an unsound influence on political processes. Many respondents in the UK for 
example lament the uniform background of politicians and the impact this has on their ability 
to govern successfully. A participant describes her political institutions as follows: “It’s 
almost like an ‘all boys network’, I know there’s women, but that’s the first thing that comes 
to mind. It feels like it’s not really talking for or standing up for us. That’s my feeling.” (UK-
3212) Another elaborates on his apprehension of the political process: 
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You see the people who are in power and they all come from the same public 
schools, Eton and what’s what, the elitism. And there just seems to be a 
circularity, people go to the Parliament, they get their agendas through, 
whatever currently is going to win them more votes. It’s all so cyclical and so 
short-termist. (UK-1105) 
 
Another side of political distrust expressed by citizens entail a type of verdict, which does not 
necessarily have to do with the perceived technical failures of political agents and inability to 
provide desired results. It refers to perceptions of unethical political conduct and outcomes 
judged to be unfair or morally wrong. The second evaluative dimension of political distrust 
follows a normative assessment of political practices. While the normative aspect of trust has 
been discussed in earlier conceptual work, it has been harder to identify in empirical studies 
of political distrust. Moralistic trust, as defined by Uslaner (2002), is understood to stem from 
a shared set of fundamental moral values within a community and to be a characteristic of the 
truster that reflects their view of the world. The moral evaluative dimension of distrust that 
we see emerging through the narratives is rather different, in the sense that it is not the 
absence of shared norms or generalised moral worldview. Expressions of political distrust 
make a clear moral claim: political conduct has violated ethical norms considered to be 
objective and shared by the political community. It is this violation that triggers citizens to 
describe political agents as untrustworthy. We have already considered expressions of 
distrust phrased in terms of manipulation, betrayal and deception, such as being lied to, 
tricked or fooled by political agents. The ethical connotations of such complaints emerge 
clearly from citizen accounts. It is not only simply a matter of failure, but of reprehensible 
actions that motivate judgments of untrustworthiness. Narratives also show expressions of 
distrust in politicians for “having no shame” (I-1109), for stealing from the state, or serving 
big interests at the expense of citizens. Such behaviour is judged to be objectively wrong, 
going against notions of what is right and fair, and provides the basis for subsequent 
evaluations of the ethical standing of political agents.  
 
Although ethical assessments of political conduct lend themselves more readily to 
evaluations of individuals or groups of people, they are equally prominent in institutional and 
policy evaluations. The focus of those assessments is on shared notions of justice and 
fairness. Interviewees across all three countries explained distrust by referring to unjust laws 
that are too hard on the weakest citizens, special privileges for certain social groups, the lack 
of punishment for wrongdoings among politicians and the institutionalised abuse of power. A 
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citizen explains his loss of faith in politicians saying that: “It will be restored only if these 
people who comprise the politics of our country manage to do something that is fair at last! 
Make those who have money pay, those that need to pay, who owe billions to the state 
anyway.” (G-3213) Even with respect to specific policies, their fairness reflects an overall 
evaluation of distrust in the political class enforcing them:  
 
When taking such measures that are not always fair…for example, they 
enforce the charatsi8 and they don’t take into account that someone has only a 
primary residence, is unemployed, has no other income, you see? So this 
increases untrustworthiness, that’s for sure. (G-1201) 
 
It is important to note that perceived untrustworthiness following this evaluation is a type of 
behaviour deemed to be wrong not solely according to the speaker, in the sense of her having 
been personally disadvantaged, but unjust according to her normative understanding of the 
world. Interpretations of the Iraq invasion as “wrong in every sense” or political decisions 
that are seen to circumvent the constitution in order to maintain big business interests against 
the will of the people are all parts of expressions of distrust that make a strong moral claim. 
Normative frameworks may differ between individuals to some extent, and so do their 
individual judgments. Nevertheless, the prominence of ethical claims embedded in 
judgements of political distrust indicates that political roles, positions of authority and 
institutional functions are judged by citizens using a normative framework. Perceptions of 
untrustworthiness may also entail a moral argument about the effect political decisions have 
on society. A participant in the UK attributes responsibility for unhealthy divisions within her 
community to politicians’ political choices and rhetoric: 
 
And that’s the point I made earlier. On the left, the middle and the right – we 
don’t have a left really – so, in the middle and the right they are all coming 
from a very narrow educational and experiential background. They have not 
experienced what it’s like not to have. So then you see it makes it even more 
wrong that they go ahead and use them [the financially weakest members of 
society] as scapegoats, when you haven’t got a hope in hell in knowing what 
it’s like. And we are actually becoming a much more divided society. (UK-
3213) 
 
Finally, the third dimension of political distrust that surfaces from the interviews is the 
evaluation of diverging interests. This evaluative dimension can easily be conflated with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Charatsi” is a colloquial term for a horizontal additional tax imposed by the first Memorandum in Greece. 
The tax is an annual contribution per house that is non-progressive and is charged and collected via bills of the 
publicly owned electricity provider.    
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technical and ethical considerations, yet it appears to have a distinct meaning and provides a 
different basis for potential reversal of distrusting attitudes. The interest-based evaluative 
dimension of political distrust refers to the expectation that a political agent will fail to 
protect the citizen’s personal interests and will act against their individual political 
preferences. As mentioned before, political distrust characterises a relationship between the 
citizen and the political agent under evaluation. Consequently, it also depends on the 
perceived closeness of preferences, level of identification with and reciprocity between the 
citizen and that political agent. Such considerations are prominent in evaluations of political 
representatives, partisan political players, such as political parties and governments, but are 
also important in distrusting judgments of institutional agents, policies and political outputs. 
Central evaluations in this dimension refer to politicians not caring about the citizen or group 
of people the citizen identifies with, and a belief that their best interest will not be 
safeguarded. A participant praising the good job politicians are doing in his area expresses a 
different evaluation on the basis of whether politicians are doing a good job specifically for 
him: 
 
Well, that’s different, isn’t it? That’s about whether my politics is being 
listened to, which assumes that I know what my politics is…And I am not sure 
I know what my politics is. I know what I am not, but I don’t think that what I 
think is entirely in accord with one political group […]. And because I work in 
the arena I work [arts], I think that none of our political representatives give 
enough time, attention, money – crucially – to culture. Certainly, the financial 
investments that are being made year after year, by government after 
government are disproportionately prejudiced against culture and art. (UK-
2108) 
 
This dimension also emerges in partisan evaluations, where individuals may trust a specific 
political party or politician to protect them but distrust the motives of other parties and the 
effect their policies might have on their life. Many participants refer to clientelistic political 
practices and their place outside this ‘relationship’ to explain their negative expectations 
regarding future political outcomes, as well as particular evidence of behaviour contrary to 
their preferences, such as the Liberal Democrat support for increased tuition fees and Labour 
support for the Iraq war in the UK:  
 
I will tell you what I think. I believe that those who are close to a politician, 
those that are near, are fine. Nobody cares about those who are further away – 
the rest of us – so there is no trust. Those who are close are taken care of… 
there is a connection. […] I have nothing to do with all that, nothing at all. The 
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politician has a clientele of 100-200 people whom he can take care of, the rest 
are nothing. (G-2108) 
 
Returning to the earlier discourse on representation and the importance of feeling represented 
by at least some political player, we can see that political distrust judgments entail such 
interest-based evaluations. Distrust fuelled by perceptions of diverging interests marks a 
breakdown in the reciprocal relationship between the citizen and the political agent. If these 
evaluations take place at a specific level, referring to a political party or politician, 
participants explain that this break may lead them to search for alternative political players. 
When diverging interests are perceived at the institutional and systemic level, it is much 
harder to find such alternatives. The following quote shows that for this citizen representation 
of her interests is an important consideration in her attitude towards politics: 
 
So you see all these kinds of agendas that serve certain people, but in terms of 
what is important to me, I don’t see stuff that is relevant for me, and I don’t 
see stuff that is relevant for people who are disabled or ill. (UK-1210) 
 
It is important to note that although interview data indicates the presence of these three 
dimensions in the meaning of political distrust, they are not always clearly discernible. For 
example, interest-based evaluations can often assume a moral or even technical dimension, as 
actions that violate one’s own personal preference are also often thought to be objectively 
unfair or against the commonly agreed function of a political agent. However, recognising 
that distrust judgments can be based on any of these three evaluative processes is a significant 
step forward in our understanding of the concept of political distrust and its formation. 
Consider the following two extracts from the same narrative of a young Italian: 
 
But you shouldn’t make an old poor man pay, who might not even have 
money to put a chair in his house, just like that! Here you are, this has 
destroyed people…. 
 
That’s what I mean by the loss of my identity. Because I have to go out and 
study for five years away from home, and then I have to get work experience 
abroad, to even be accepted for a minimum consideration for a job application, 
or for someone to see me. And then comes the first – [***] in this case – who 
hasn’t studied, they bought him a degree and when they went to interview him, 
he did not even know where the degree was bought from, so he couldn’t even 
answer. And so, you give Italy to the hands of these people… It saddens me, 
and it really has been given to the hands of these people. (I-3202) 
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The first extract refers to a housing tax policy in Italy that the participant perceives to be 
deeply unjust for the weakest members of society and clearly evokes sentiments of 
unfairness. In the second extract, however, the interviewee uses the example of a politician’s 
son, who undeservedly became a parliamentarian, to express her anger and distrust in the 
whole political system. She describes a situation that goes against her interests and 
disadvantages her personally, but also against her moral view of the world, whereby people 
of merit should govern. Similarly, perceptions of corruption and scandals often evoke a 
combination of three evaluative dimensions of political distrust. Consider the following 
extract where a participant from the UK explains her personal decision to distrust the political 
system, referring to a series of perceived political failures: 
 
I have always grown up with Muslims, Asians, being portrayed as the bad 
guys in the media and I don’t see any representativeness really in the 
Parliament, and I think that we have always felt like the outsider. And then I 
have my opportunity to become an insider and I said, “that’s great, I can go 
and effect things”, but then I saw the opposite, which is just corruption or gain. 
So I haven’t seen anything, to be honest with you that really inspires me and 
makes me think this is ethical, because it doesn’t feel ethical to me. (UK-1210) 
 
Corruption in particular features prominently in many expressions of political distrust. 
Bribery, for example, is morally reproached as an act that goes against shared norms in a 
functioning political system. But pervasive bribery and corruption also force a system to 
operate inefficiently, creating waste, lack of competition and meritocracy and contributing to 
technical failures. Finally, respondents with a personal experience of bribery and corruption, 
such as having to pay for a service they should be entitled to, certainly consider this an act 
that harms their best-interest. Again, it is important to note that these evaluations are based on 
individual perceptions and individual frames of references that could differ considerably 
between different people and societies in the outcomes they produce. Although there were no 
specific examples in any of the interview accounts collected during this research, there were 
allusions to situations where engaging in such corruption could be beneficial for one’s best-
interest and could be perceived as a morally acceptable way of getting things done in a 
society. In such cases, what becomes most prominent in the decision to distrust is the 
closeness of the relationship and the belief that the citizen’s personal best-interest is in line 
with that of the political agent.  
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4.4 The ‘political’ in political distrust 
 
Throughout this thesis, and particularly throughout this chapter, we have argued in favour of 
the relational nature of distrust, based both on conceptual and empirical evidence. As in the 
case of the rational approach to trust, which is understood in the format of ‘A trusts B’, 
distrust also requires defining the two players (the one who distrusts and the one who is 
distrusted) as well as the relationship between them. We have already investigated the nature 
of this relationship and the meaning citizens ascribe to distrusting judgments following 
technical, ethical and interest-based evaluations to determine the trustworthiness of political 
actors. We have also seen that in most narratives, expressions of distrust are attached to a 
political actor or aspects of the political system deemed to be untrustworthy. Two questions 
follow the observations we have made thus far. Firstly, can we identify these political actors 
and provide a meaningful categorisation for the components of the political system citizens 
claim to distrust? Secondly, do citizens arrive at different evaluations for different parts of the 
political system, say for the political party they support, the prime minister, the national 
parliament or the political system in its entirety, and if so, how are these distrusting attitudes 
related to or influencing each other? If we are to advance our conceptual model of political 
distrust we need to address these questions and better define the ‘political’ in attitudes of 
political distrust.  
 
One of the most contested issues in the literature is whether expressions of political distrust 
towards political targets are attitudes that can be distinguished empirically or simply 
examples of a single attitude of political distrust. Such questions have preoccupied 
researchers studying attitudes of political support since the establishment of political trust 
batteries in mass surveys. As discussed earlier in this thesis, part of the scholarly debate 
surrounding the interpretation of political distrust indicators stems from diverging 
interpretations of what ‘political’ stands for, both conceptually and operationally, in the 
widely used measurement tools (Citrin, 1974; Miller, 1974a; Hooghe, 2011). Unfortunately, 
the debate is far from being resolved conclusively; however this volume of original empirical 
evidence that contains citizens’ own expressions of political distrust could provide insights 
into this issue. Revisiting existing studies on attitudes of political support, parts of the 
political system are usually ordered from the specific to the diffuse levels (Almond and 
Vebra, 1980; Norris, 1999). Following this categorisation, we also find political distrust 
throughout respondent narratives to be attributed to the following objects: (i) individual 
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politicians, groups of politicians, the entire political class; (ii) an individual political party, 
governing parties, the entire party system; (iii) representative political institutions; and 
finally, (iv) the political system, including all political and state institutions, processes, 
players and outputs.9 
 
One of the dilemmas in the existing literature has to do with distrust at the systemic level and 
whether it reflects distrust of institutional arrangements or merely distrust of incumbent 
political figures. We have already noted that expressions of distrust at the institutional level 
present an added layer of complexity, as they may be focused on the failure of the 
institutional set-up and its operation, which would require complete overhaul and 
transformation, or they may be contained in the failures of the particular individuals currently 
running those institutions. Even in the case of evaluations of national parliament, the most 
prominent institution of representative democracy in all three countries under study and most 
widely used survey indicator for political trust in European surveys, there is no consensus as 
to whether one should evaluate parliamentarians or the institutional process. The extracts 
below are taken from participant interviews in the same national context, highlighting the 
ambiguity entailed in evaluations at the institutional level, even among citizens in the same 
political system. 
 
I separate them, yes, because it is a different thing the quality of the people 
and a different thing the quality of the institution. The institution works fine. It 
is an achievement of democracy, of the metapoliteusi10 era. The institution 
works fine. Now, its members, whether everyone is competent and useful, 
that’s another thing. (G-1201) 
 
You identify the Parliament more with the people inside, at least I do. I 
understand that I should not do it, because obviously it can change and it is the 
basis of a political regime, but it is intertwined in my mind with those 
contained in it. It makes more sense and it is more personal this way. I mean, 
the logic says that the Parliament is the mechanism of governance, but the 
feeling says that the Parliament consists of some people who are not adequate. 
At this stage, I'm more with the feeling. (G-1203) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 This list does not include what is often identified in the literature as the highest diffuse level, which is ‘regime 
principles’. Whereas it is clear that regime principles and ideals feature heavily in citizens’ evaluations of their 
political world, trust and distrust are relational concepts and they require an expectation of trustworthy or 
untrustworthy behaviour. Hence, distrust cannot characterise the relationship between a citizen and a principle 
or ideal, although other notions such as support could. 
10Metapoliteusi refers to the on-going period of democratic rule in Greece following the military junta and the 
restoration of democracy in 1974. 
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The system and the politicians are so close that it is impossible to separate 
them. (G-1107) 
 
The distinction is conceptually important, because when distrusting attitudes are established 
at the diffuse level, they are much more difficult to reverse. Yet empirically, the separation 
seems to be more ambigious. When distrust is attributed to specific incumbents, as in the first 
extract, it can be contained at that level if citizens believe that potentially more trustworthy 
individuals could replace them. Consider the following quote from a narrative where despite 
the initial judgement of distrust, as new information about institutional practices is processed, 
untrustworthiness is attributed to one specific politician and not the systemic level: 
 
That was when the public system, that was when the British system was really 
let down. And I think it was Tony Blair and Alistair Campbell who were 
manipulating that because they wanted to go to war with Iraq. And I never 
ever understand why we did that. It was wrong, at every level to start invading 
Iraq. And we lost so many soldiers, just to help America do something. We 
shouldn’t ever have been doing that and I think that we were lied to about 
these weapons of mass destruction. That was terrible. It was a disgrace.... Well 
you hope that the system will prevent that from happening again. And I think 
the fact that David Cameron wasn’t able to get involved in Syria was a really 
positive thing, yes. (UK-1209) 
 
These quotes indicate that ring-fencing the institutional level from evaluations of 
untrustworthiness results in a markedly different approach to the political system. If negative 
evaluations are established at the diffuse level, they can easily spill-over to all parts of the 
political system (political players, institutions, processes and outputs) and are hard to reverse 
without systemic reform or radical action. Consider the following two extracts from 
interviews with Italian citizens, explaining political untrustworthiness spilling-over. The first 
refers to the country’s legislature and the latter argues that given the repeated failures of all 
governments – of the left and of the right – in Italy, the best way forward for the country 
would be an overhaul of elected governments in favour of external expert decision-making:  
 
And this gives a sense of impartiality, and hence, it makes people mistrust and 
it reverberates through everything. It reverberates through the institutions…we 
do not trust them! The Parliament makes laws that convenience the “usual 
suspects”, but we need laws that will help put the country back in its place. 
The only thing they know how to do is to burden citizens with taxes. (I-1104) 
 
I have a theory, that is a bit short, but obviously I don’t know how it can be 
done, maybe it can then be done a bit softer. I would annihilate completely 
what the government is today, whether it is of the right, of the left, of 
	   131	  
everything and any political faction. I would trust, how it was last year and up 
until a few months ago, what we called an external commission, I don’t know 
how to say it. (I-1207) 
 
The idea that no politician or political party can change the culture of untrustworthiness the 
citizen perceives to be widespread in the political system leads them, in this case, to support 
other alternatives to elected governance, such as external technocrats. Narratives of distrust 
show how repeated instances of trust betrayal can build up and generate distrust that spills 
over to the generic level. For example, repeated promise-breaking or outright lying from 
politicians of all political groups presented in earlier extracts has led many respondents to 
express disbelief in the entire political class and call into question the moral standing and 
competence of those in positions of authority. Trust betrayal from political actors that were 
especially regarded as protecting and representing a citizen’s best-interest are particularly 
powerful. We commented in previous sections on the importance citizens attach to the 
political system’s capacity to make them feel represented. Many citizens consider a political 
party or politician they have supported to provide this link to representation, and expect 
positive outcomes from the political conduct of such agents, reflected in their decisions, 
policy-making, processes and outputs. A relation of distrust developed at this level is also 
damaging for the citizen-state relationship, as it denotes a break in the link the citizen has 
developed with the democratic political system. In the following extract, a participant 
recounts her attempt to get involved in local initiatives with the political party she supported, 
when she was faced with inappropriate practices that led her to abandon politics and cease 
voting altogether. She claimed: 
 
Having that kind of responsibility was really good, but I have just seen so 
much negativity and I’ve seen so much corruption, and I don’t see any plans to 
make a difference. I see that Labour is the same, they are all just the same: 
Labour, Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats – those are your three choices 
really – and they are all the same. They are just corporate machines. (UK-
1210) 
 
This extract captures distrust spilling over from one local context and one political party – the 
party the participant believed in – to the entire party system. Similar reactions were also 
presented in response to the failure of the Liberal Democratic Party to block the coalition’s 
policy of university tuition fees increase and social policy, the Democratic Party (PD) in Italy 
joining a coalition government with Berlusconi’s centre-right PdL party, and the perception 
of the two main political parties in Greece as failing to protect the lower and middle classes 
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once the financial crisis set in. For participants who had supported these political parties, 
perceptions of untrustworthiness proved damaging for their overall association with the 
political system.  
 
We have seen that distrusting attitudes can be formed towards specific political agents, but at 
the same time that such attitudes can spill over to characterise a general stance towards the 
entire political system. We find expressions of distrust are often grounded in the evaluation of 
particular evidence and events, which spill over to the diffuse level, yet this is not the only 
process that is at play. We also see that many of the concrete events are brought in to support 
an initial observation citizens make regarding their distrust of politicians or political 
institutions in general, and are therefore examples used to explain an overarching attitude of 
political distrust. Political psychology suggests that perceptions about the ‘whole’ are more 
powerful in influencing perceptions about the ‘parts’, rather than the other way around. 
Citizens are in constant interaction with politics, by virtue of living, working and abiding by 
the laws of political communities, and general attitudes of political distrust, trust or lack of 
trust are formed to help them navigate their political lives. Hence, when asked to elaborate on 
a comment they have made, participants will often state, “Why do I say this? Well…” before 
continuing to provide further explanations. This indicates that many participants have an 
overall attitude that is readily available, even before the specific examples of distrust 
formation are retrieved. 
 
This observation refers to the difficulty of distinguishing between political distrust that 
functions as a relational evaluation between the citizen and each political player based on 
their perception of competencies, intentions and track record, and political distrust that 
functions as an overarching guiding principle for future interactions with political agents and 
other political behaviour. We have highlighted this puzzle in the preceding chapters, focusing 
on the conceptual framework for the study of political distrust judgments. Is it, therefore, fair 
to say that citizens distinguish between the trustworthiness of each and every actor within the 
political system? Or do they rely on an overall evaluation of political processes to guide their 
expectations of future untrustworthy conduct in their dealings with political actors?  
 
The theory of citizens as ‘cognitive misers’ suggests the latter is a more realistic depiction of 
citizen behaviour. When it comes to evaluating politics in everyday life, expecting citizens to 
form distinct judgments for each political institution and political player is too demanding. 
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Whether it is because of lack of information, laziness or even lack of time to devote to such 
evaluation processes, citizens are called on to decide whether to trust or distrust political 
agents based on a more readily available generalised attitude. We find a considerable amount 
of such overarching attitudes in expressions of distrust. A participant speaking about the 
multiple failures across his local area, lack of job prospects, lack of investment and a 
crumbling infrastructure, even the inability of keeping the constituency clean, assures me: 
“Who is to blame? Definitely not me! Now, I don’t know exactly if the mayor is to blame, if 
politicians are to blame or whoever… But in essence, those who govern are to blame, not 
me!” (G-2111) The ability to attribute blame for perceived failures is a key aspect of the 
decision to distrust, but in many cases, blame is attributed to the ‘people who govern’ in 
general. On the other hand, a more involved participant working in the area of construction 
for local public services lamented the lack of accurate identification of political players. 
Being understandably more knowledgeable about the workings of the local level and 
interested in its performance he explained:  
 
You have to think of institutions as a ladder. There are varying degrees, the 
municipality, the region, the state, the European Union. And often a lot of us 
get confused when we judge them... but that is a cultural aspect more than 
anything else. If I go to the municipality and the municipality gives me a bad 
service – I go to the clerk, the clerk is never there, I request a certificate, the 
certificate comes a month after I needed it – we say it’s the inefficiency of the 
municipality. Then, I know that it was the municipality that has bad service, 
but I always tend to pass it on to the state, although it wasn’t the state doing 
this. We have to distinguish. (I-3103) 
 
These two accounts support the deficiency model for political evaluations, as they both point 
in their own way to the cognitive burden entailed in distinguishing and formulating specific 
expectations for each political agent citizens interact.  
 
Therefore, looking at all participants’ accounts of political distrust through the narratives, it 
appears that, at least empirically, both processes are at play. Respondents are largely able to 
evaluate particular political objects, such as their preferred political party, the government, 
and the prime minister, using concrete examples and information regarding the actions of 
these actors which led them to distrust; however they also synthesise and combine it all in an 
overarching attitude, which in turn influences the way they may process new information. 
The two processes are not incompatible. The narrative interviews give citizens the 
opportunity to elaborate and retrace thought processes that led to their decisions to distrust. 
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Yet, at the same time interviews show that citizens make inferences using their trust or 
distrust in politics in general. These are built through multiple experiences and evaluations 
that have been synthesised or perceived failures that are attributed to the diffuse political 
level. 
 
Thus, we need to establish a model of distrust that reconciles the two processes. Political 
distrust is expressed as a specific attitude grounded in evaluations of incompetence, unethical 
conduct and diverging interests. At the same time, there is also a general, overall political 
distrust attitude, which is formed from all specific experiences of distrust, all information and 
evidence stored in the memory of citizens and fused together to produce a single overall 
stance towards the political system. Due to the cyclical nature inherent to the concept of 
distrust as previously explained, this overall attitude provides a cognitive screen for new 
stimuli, which colours the interpretation of new information and experiences in a negative or 
positive manner. Both are aspects of political distrust and both are integral to understanding 
how citizens express, understand and are motivated by political distrusting attitudes.  
 
This dual function of distrusting attitudes allows us to account for the powerful influence 
distrust has on other evaluations as a heuristic cognitive shortcut, and for the dynamic nature 
of distrust, which makes it responsive to political changes. It is possible for citizens that do 
not hold an overall distrusting attitude towards the political system to express distrust towards 
specific politicians, groups or time periods. We also see participants who, although they 
begin their discourse with an extremely distrusting attitude towards the whole political class 
and the political system at large, will also single out their preferred political party, which they 
perceive to be a political player willing to protect their best-interest (and often consider it to 
be more competent and to have a morally sound approach to common matters). They may 
even single out new governments and new politicians, giving them at least the benefit of the 
doubt and reserving judgment until further evidence is available. A participant asked about 
his view of politics in his country begun by saying: “I have zero trust in Italian politicians, 
zero! Less than zero! I repeat, zero! Because they do whatever they want, they enjoy 
themselves, they serve their own interests, with our money!” However even after this initial 
statement he went on to express a more positive view, or at least reserve judgment regarding 
a specific political figure and new government: “There are some cases, maybe now we can 
give a bit of space to the Letta government, hoping a bit that they will do something good for 
the country. A bit let’s say.” (I-1111)  
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Ignoring either side of political distrust would not allow us to account for all its multifaceted 
functions. Thinking of political distrust solely as an overarching evaluation of an 
untrustworthy political system would fail to account for variations of distrust in different 
parts of the political system, partisan groups, individuals, and local, regional, national and 
European levels of governance, which we observe in practice. We would also be unable to 
explain what gives rise to this attitude in the first place, how it is formed and why it would 
vary throughout someone’s lifetime. If we do not allow for specific evaluations to take place 
– for citizens to consider new events, experiences and information through their exchanges 
with politics – then political distrust would not be responsive to political changes. On the 
other hand, if we only focus on the dynamic evaluations of political distrust that are grounded 
in specific experiences and events and projected as expectations of further untrustworthy 
behaviour, we would fail to account for the cyclical nature of distrust and the way in which 
participants appear to synthesise their attitude towards politics overall to justify their own 
predisposition, reactions and behavioural intentions.  
 
 
4.5 Emotive responses and behavioural intentions 
 
A relatively unexplored aspect of political distrust is the distinct cognitive and emotional 
responses that such attitudes evoke, which was captured through popular narrative interviews. 
Expressions of political distrust are often accompanied by negative emotional reactions of 
anger, disappointment, sadness, despair and distress. All three evaluative dimensions – 
technical, ethical and especially considerations of interest congruence – can give rise to anger 
or disappointment. A Democratic Party supporter in Italy speaking in disappointment about 
the PD-PdL post-election coalition, which promised to dissolve itself once it passed reforms, 
declared “[s]o, if once more you have fooled us, I think that in the next election there will be 
a cataclysm!” (I-1206) 
 
When such views of having been repeatedly ‘deceived’, ‘manipulated’ or ‘fooled’ spread 
distrusting attitudes to the systemic level, the emotional state of citizens moves to fear, 
insecurity and even despair. One of the interviewees from Greece explains that after so much 
lying “it is absolutely clear that there is always something underneath that we do not know 
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about and that we are being played like dumb pawns.” (G-3206) While for another 
interviewee, the actions of the national parliament create even greater insecurity that stems 
from the institutional level:  
 
I don’t know what the dawn will bring for me. Today they say one thing, 
tomorrow they change it to another. They change the laws every day. Every 
day there are new laws! (G-2111) 
 
Fear and uncertainty are omnipresent in expressions of strong political distrust. This is 
another insight that emerges from our focus on political distrust compared to trust. We know 
from research in psychology that a state of trust entails expectations of stability and 
normalcy, although expressions of political trust are seldom accompanied by strong emotive 
responses. An interviewee explaining his overall attitude claims: “They [politicians] are 
people who have got their own merit, they have been trusted into those positions haven’t 
they? And if I didn’t trust them, what is the alternative really? Worrying? Panicking?” (UK-
3102) An established relationship of distrust between a citizen and a political object denotes a 
certain degree of conviction about future conduct, yet those expectations are of a negative or 
harmful nature. In the case of politics, whereby citizens cannot entirely remove themselves 
from the relationship, as it might be possible in instances of interpersonal rapports, citizens 
recognise they are still being affected in a multitude of ways by untrustworthy politicians and 
the political system despite their wish not to be. Another participant, speaking about the 
current governance of the country, states: “It brings such a terrifying sense of insecurity. I 
think they [the government] are deceiving us.” (G-2209) Even if a citizen distrusts a specific 
political party and decides not to vote for it, it is still possible that this party will be chosen to 
govern their country, city or council. More importantly, even when citizens accept that their 
legislature is malfunctioning, and that parliamentarians write laws with disregard to the 
country’s best-interest, there is still uncertainty and fear on how these operations will affect 
their lives. An Italian participant explains his view of the country’s broken political system: 
“We have great fear, because we know that politicians cannot change this situation, and 
hence they think more about their best-interest than of the welfare of the people.” (I-2112) 
 
Hence, in light of the conviction regarding harmful anticipated outcomes, expressions of 
political distrust are frequently accompanied with a behavioural intention of removing 
oneself from the citizen-state relationship by physically moving away from the country or 
refusing to abide by the rules of the rapport. This type of expression was found mostly in 
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narratives from Italy and Greece, where it is no doubt related to the dire economic situation 
that many citizens faced at the time of the interviews. But it was also found in UK narratives, 
in the form of removing oneself from voting registries or physically moving away from the 
country in times where the political programme implemented was in stark contrast with their 
principles and political preferences. When thinking about instances of profound distrust a 
participant refers to the period of Thatcher’s reforms in the 1980s, before adding the impact 
of war: 
 
The nearest it ever got for me was in the 1980s. Once Thatcher started her, 
let’s call it a “reformation”, rather than an attack. Once she started her 
“reformation” of how society worked, and I am sure that was a conscious 
thing, it became a country that I was profoundly uncomfortable about living 
in, but not quite so uncomfortable that, a) I did anything, or b) I left. Lots of 
people did leave. I didn’t. That’s the nearest I’ve got to feeling that we’ve 
done things wrong…Except every time we go to war! (UK-2103) 
 
As more and more research explores the influence of emotive states upon citizens’ political 
behaviour, it becomes evident that the emotive aspect of political attitudes is a relevant and 
important area to investigate. Attitudes of political distrust give rise to a complex set of 
emotive responses that can have a motivating or demotivating effect on future political 
action. For example, we know from advances in this strand of political behaviour research 
that anger is a negative but motivating emotion that pushes individuals towards action. Anger 
due to distrust towards a specific political output or political group can lead individuals to try 
to take action and attempt to block or alter this part of their political system. However, 
narratives of political distrust have also uncovered that when distrust expands across all 
political levels and political groups, emotive responses shift to uncertainty, fear and disgust. 
These are negative, demobilising emotive states that lead to a different set of cognitive 
responses and behavioural intentions, namely disaffection and an effort to remove oneself 
from the reach of the political processes that induce this psychological state of insecurity. 
Further investigation into these affective responses can bring new insights into how new 
radical political parties capitalise on political distrust by inducing anger towards the political 
establishment and mobilising citizen support, as well as the puzzle of the association of 
political distrust, lack of trust/distrust and trust with political disaffection.  
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4.6 Political distrust from the citizens’ perspective and conclusions 
 
Popular narrative interviews can help to conceptualise political distrust in its own right and 
disentangle it from competing notions of cynicism and lack of trust. Using empirical 
evidence, we argued that the reciprocal nature of distrust sets it apart from attitudes of 
political cynicism, which are used to describe an established view of a citizen against their 
political system, with no room for the consideration of new evidence. Therefore, while it is 
highly possible that antecedents of distrust and even political distrust itself could result in 
cynicism, it is important to maintain that they are conceptually distinct and focus on possible 
avenues to reverse distrust.  
 
Similarly, citizen accounts of distrusting judgments point to clearly negative expectations 
emerging from political processes, which contrast with sceptical attitudes and a lack of trust. 
We argued that lack of trust, or lack of distrust for that matter, is a distinct state that can 
potentially characterise the relationship between a citizen and a political object. Whether it is 
due to lack of information, inability or unwillingness to evaluate the said object, it is possible 
that a citizen might not hold convictions regarding positive or negative outcomes from 
interactions with political agents. This is evident in a series of narratives regarding little 
understood EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, or individuals who claim trust 
and distrust are not fit concepts for political analysis, since trust requires levels of 
information that can never be attained. Following the academic focus placed on the rise of 
democratic expectations and critical citizenry, it is also important to distinguish between 
those who demand further transparency and better politics and those that feel betrayed by 
their politicians and targeted by the policies and institutions that were set up to represent 
them. The latter case of political distrust marks a breakdown in the relationship between 
citizens and their representatives and leads to different expression and behavioural 
motivation.   
 
Further, narrative interviews have allowed us to pick apart expressions of distrust and explore 
the evaluative processes entailed in the decision to distrust, trust or reserve judgment. The 
three evaluative dimensions in political distrust emerging from this analysis are in line with 
theoretical understandings and existing work on political attitudes of trust and distrust. 
Considerations about technical competence, economic performance and institutional 
functions have been discussed at length in Chapter 2 and have featured as dependent 
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variables in numerous empirical micro and macro-level studies, despite having focused 
mainly on indicators of trust. The normative claims that trusting relations entail can also be 
found in existing analytical work, though they have been more difficult to capture 
empirically. Finally, the dimension of interest congruence could be traced back to the notion 
of trust as encapsulated interest, focusing on the potential benefit a citizen expects to receive 
from interactions with a political actor. Nevertheless, until now these three dimensions have 
not been placed together as conceptual parts of political distrust grounded in the analysis of 
empirical evidence.  
 
It is important to note that the three evaluative dimensions were fused together more often 
than they were found in isolation. Citizens expressing distrust often resorted to a combination 
of these judgments, and though many participants appeared to rely more on the moral 
evaluative dimension, it was rare to find evaluations of the same political actor on polar 
opposites across different dimensions. Many of the extracts presented in the earlier sections 
of this chapter show this synthesis of negative evaluations in the case of corrupt practices 
(pp.114, 126) or interest-based and technical negative orientations when evaluating political 
representatives (pp.109, 111). This finding is not surprising, in so far as the evaluations of 
political targets and the political system influence each other for reasons discussed in Chapter 
2 and earlier sections of this Chapter. Despite the tendency of these evaluations to move in 
tandem, identifying the technical, moral and interest-based judgments in distrusting attitudes 
is an important step, firstly, for establishing conceptual clarity, and secondly, because it gives 
us the opportunity to further investigate how these evaluative dimensions interact with each 
other and how they motivate political behaviour. As mentioned above, citizens appear to 
synthesise and weigh information that will lead them to trust or distrust, but it is possible that 
some dimensions are more important than others in the evaluation of trustworthiness of 
different political targets. Some respondents appear to give higher priority to certain 
evaluations than others. For example, a UK respondent evaluating political representatives 
values ethical conduct more than technical competence: 
 
If you accept that no human being is infallible, then they shouldn’t be pilloried 
for that, unless they are being dishonest either ideologically or practically. 
Well if you are saying one thing and doing another thing, then you are being 
ideologically dishonest. The sort of thing where you say “I believe in equality 
for all men, but black people should go home” that sort of thing. But if you 
make a mistake, then that should be forgiven. (UK-2108) 
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These differences are evident not only among different participants, but also among different 
groups or generations. A young participant from Italy explains that he thinks he evaluates the 
trustworthiness of the political system in a different way than his parents and the older 
generation based on these three dimensions: 
 
You can see it above all with Grillo and the M5S11, this type of translation of 
distrust…in the end the distrust is a sentiment, right? But you can also 
rationalise it. In my opinion, people like me and those below the age of 40 
tend to rationalise it in this way: it doesn’t matter whether someone is truly 
good or truly honest, what matters is that once he is exposed, whether I can 
punish him or not. It’s more a discourse of accountability, let’s say, a more 
retrospective view. Those who are older and have been socialised in the time 
of the First Republic, with big ideologies before the fall of the Berlin Wall, my 
parents or others, tend to view it, certainly in such a way because of what has 
happened in the past few years with all the scandals, but underneath it all they 
have specific expectations. They say, “I want a politician that cuts the tax on 
the first house”, “I want a politician that will protect pensions”, “I want a 
politician…” and so they have a point of view that is a bit more geared to the 
actual mandate. (I-2115) 
 
Operationalising distrust in a way that includes the different evaluative dimensions will allow 
for a more in-depth investigation of how these dimensions and time projections interact. 
Narrative interviews have shown that although citizens’ judgments of political distrust appear 
to operate in a similar manner across different people, they are highly contingent on a number 
of factors. These include the citizen’s normative framework, their understanding of the rules 
and responsibilities of a particular political role and their ability to assess success or failure. It 
is also a function of their personal preferences, identification with particular groups and 
interests, which could also include many of their personality characteristics as identified in 
earlier research on generalised trust (Uslaner, 2002).  
 
The exercise of building a conceptual model for political distrust judgments based on 
empirical qualitative evidence has led us to consider all such influences and functions of 
distrusting evaluations. It is important to note that the judgements and processes of evaluation 
are highly personal and possibly differ amongst any two individuals. Although expectations 
of distrust are formed following the same three evaluating dimensions across the sample of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 MV5 or ‘Movimento Cinque Stelle’ is the anti-systemic Five Star Movement party in Italy gained electoral 
support and approval in the 2013 elections. The party was created by comedian Beppe Grillo and attracted 
young citizens advocating change.  
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interviews, each individual citizen may reach a different judgment of political distrust based 
on his/her own past experiences, personal characteristics, views and beliefs. This has led 
many researchers to focus more on the characteristics of the ‘trusters’ and to develop an 
individual level theory of generalised trusters/general distrusters. There is good reason to 
believe that our attitudes towards life will shape our attitudes towards politics. There is also 
evidence that personal experience and character, and the general life attitudes they create, 
influence one’s ability to develop trusting relations or propensity to develop attitudes of 
distrust at the social and political levels. However, the effects of personality and general 
attitudes to life are not incompatible with the strategic evaluations of specific political targets 
or the political system in general. In fact they should be correlated to a citizen’s perceptions 
of political untrustworthiness. To speak about general trusters and general distrusters might 
have theoretical and empirical validity, but without making any reference to the reasons why 
political agents are judged to be untrustworthy, it is very limiting in developing our 
understanding of political distrust. 
 
By focusing on the relationship of distrust between citizens and political agents we have been 
able to disentangle the meaning and evaluative dimensions presented in the conceptual model 
in Chapter 2. However, at the same time we have also identified political distrust as an 
overarching attitude towards the political system that is readily available to citizens and can 
act as a heuristic mechanism, spilling over to evaluations of all other political actors and 
colouring subsequent information-processing and decision-making. The question of 
dimensionality of political distrust attitudes will be analysed and discussed extensively in the 
following chapter using quantitative data. In this chapter’s concluding remarks, it is useful to 
consider another explanation that supports the conceptualisation of political distrust as a 
single diffuse attitude towards the entire political system. This is the understanding of 
political untrustworthiness as a systemic characteristic that is part of a political culture. 
Political scientists have argued that the responsiveness and other democratic qualities of a 
political system are embedded in a particular political culture that fosters trust and 
trustworthiness, or distrust and untrustworthiness, across all political levels and interactions. 
Hence, citizens’ perceptions of untrustworthiness develop in response to this homogenous 
political culture. This view also explains the positive association between evaluations of 
specific institutional actors in a political system, which has been found in survey studies 
using trust measures for different political agents. We consider this explanation to address the 
same aspect of the phenomenon of political distrust, but from a different research angle: a 
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macro-level perspective. It is useful in comparative studies of democratic governance, but 
limiting in explaining the formation, attribution and operation of political distrust at the 
individual level.  
 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide a detailed thematic analysis of narrative interview 
data to uncover the meaning citizens assign to evaluations of political distrust, and the 
formation and operation of distrusting attitudes. In turn, these empirical insights, in 
combination with theoretical considerations, have helped to re-conceptualise political distrust 
and provide a model for further study into the structure and functions of such attitudes. Using 
qualitative empirical evidence we have been able to access the retrospective and prospective 
assessments entailed in political distrust and the three evaluative dimensions of technical 
competence, moral conduct and diverging interest that lead to distrust. Further we have 
attempted to address some of the theoretical dilemmas and empirical challenges encountered 
in the study of citizens’ political distrust by identifying and explaining the dynamic and 
relational aspects, as well as the cyclicality and heuristic properties of attitudes of distrust. 
The conceptual model developed has helped inform an operationalisation and survey measure 
of political distrust that provide quantitative data to further study these complexities. The 
following two empirical chapters of this thesis focus on the investigation of survey data based 
on the conceptual model of political distrust to provide additional evidence on this attitude 
area.  
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Chapter 5: The Internal Structure of Political Distrust: New 
Quantitative Evidence 	  
5.1 New distrust measure: Survey items and description of data 
5.2 The internal structure of political distrust I: Dimensions and scaling 
5.3 The internal structure of political distrust II: Identifying respondent groups 
5.4 Implications for the conceptual model of political distrust 
5.5 Discussing about validity and conclusion 
 
 
The exploratory qualitative empirical analysis of political distrust presented in the preceding 
chapter guided the conceptual model and survey indicator of citizen distrusting attitudes. 
These survey items were introduced in an online survey of UK respondents (N=785) 
supplying original quantitative evidence. This chapter presents and analyses survey responses 
to the political distrust items, investigates the internal structure of distrusting attitudes and 
discusses issues of reliability and validity of the new indicator. It explores the way in which 
the different evaluations of untrustworthiness associate with each other, what underlying 
response structures form and how respondents are grouped together based on their response 
patterns. It further discusses the implications of these findings for the conceptual model of 
distrusting attitudes formulated in this thesis.  
 
We find that the three dimensions of technical, ethical and interest-based evaluations 
identified through earlier qualitative work capture aspects of political distrust attitudes on a 
single dimension. Retrospective and prospective assessments of untrustworthy political 
conduct are also important aspects of distrusting attitudes, and we find that across our sample 
of respondents prospective evaluations are consistently less negative than retrospective ones, 
possibly pointing to a positive prospective bias. We also find that evaluations of 
untrustworthiness are lower for respondents’ preferred political parties than for the national 
parliament. This is more a validation of our research design than a surprising finding of 
political distrust attitudes. The survey items touching on citizens’ assessments of their 
preferred political party capture the lower boundary of political distrust. Respondents 
differentiate between evaluative assessments of their preferred parties and questions asking 
about national parliament along all evaluative dimensions. We also find that for assessments 
of national parliament extreme negative responses are more frequent than extreme positive 
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responses, especially regarding considerations of incongruent-interests, which is the easiest 
assessment for respondents to answer negatively. We believe this further highlights the 
relevance of examining negative political attitudes and investigating the underlying 
evaluations of untrustworthy political conduct.  
 
At the same time, our analysis of all evaluative items of national parliament and preferred 
political party shows they all tap into a single underlying attitude of political distrust. We 
argue that this reflects a double function of distrusting attitudes: one following a cognitive 
and affective process where citizens are aware and assess the trustworthiness of specific 
political agents along the three evaluative dimensions, and another following a heuristic 
process where overarching distrusting attitudes influence perceptions and assessments of 
political agents. We conclude this chapter with a discussion on the reliability and validity of 
the new measures as indicators of political distrust.  
 
 
5.1  New distrust measure: Survey items and description of data 	  
Employing the insights attained through the empirical work presented in the preceding 
chapter, we have conceptualised citizen political distrust as a dual process of retrospectively 
evaluating events and past behaviour, and forming expectations for events and future 
behaviour along three main lines of evaluation. The survey items focused on respondents’ 
evaluations of their national parliament and their preferred political party. We have already 
discussed that although attitudes of political distrust can encompass the entire political 
system, they are most often expressed in specific terms, with reference to particular events 
and political agents. The national parliament stands out for most citizens as the central 
institution of representative democracy that embodies the entire elected political class, 
political processes, symbols and outcomes of democratic governance.12 For this reason, 
citizen attitudes towards national parliaments are at the centre of empirical research on trust 
and distrust. In addition to the institution of national parliament, we wanted to include a 
subcomponent of the political system towards which citizens could be expected to have the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The different interpretations citizens give when expressing attitudes towards national parliament are discussed 
in more detail in Section 4 in Chapter 4 and considered again in the later sections of this chapter. We believe 
that despite the variation of what national parliament stands for, it is still regarded as one of the most visible 
political institutions (along with the national government) that citizens can evaluate and be oriented towards.   
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most positive orientations. This would serve not only as a control question for political 
distrust items, but also provide the basis for an interesting comparison between the 
evaluations of the two political targets. We therefore ask respondents to evaluate their chosen 
or preferred political party retrospectively and prospectively along lines of technical 
competence, ethical conduct and interest congruence. Citizen perceptions of untrustworthy 
behaviour on behalf of one’s preferred party were highlighted during narratives of distrust 
and appeared to be particularly central to citizens who felt betrayed by the political party they 
had been supporting. Examining the associations between perceptions of untrustworthiness, 
the evaluative dimensions for these two subcomponents of the political system and time 
projections can further help us map the internal structure of distrusting attitudes and 
supplement the conceptual model of distrust with survey-based evidence. 
We formulated three item statements, one for each evaluative process, which varied slightly 
to contextualise assessment of past events (retrospective) and future expectations 
(prospective).13 To capture evaluations of technical ability or incompetence, we asked 
respondents whether in recent years, they would say that parliament has “usually acted in a 
competent manner in the case of technically complex questions”. To prompt evaluations of 
the ethical standing of national parliament we inquired whether it has “usually acted in a 
moral manner in the case of ethically difficult questions”. Finally, in order to capture 
perceptions of diverging and incongruent interests, we asked whether parliament has “usually 
acted in accordance with my political preferences in the case of ideologically divisive 
questions”. Prospective items follow similar phrasing but prompt respondents to think about 
future actions; the six items were repeated, this time asking respondents to think of the 
political party they are most likely to vote for in the next general election. These 12 items 
guide respondents into thinking explicitly about competencies and characteristics of specified 
political agents and provide a timeframe (past/future) for each evaluation.  
We therefore have three items per time projection, six items for each political object and 12 
items in total to capture attitudes of political distrust. We tested the new measures on an 
online sample recruited by a research institute specialising in online survey research.14 Table 
5.1 below presents the exact phrasing and descriptive statistics for the new items. Each item 
is measured using a seven-point “strongly disagree”/“strongly agree” Likert scale offering a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The phrasing of the items is very similar in both retrospective and prospective items, and to avoid impressions 
of repetition and response bias the different sets of items were placed in different parts of the questionnaire. 
14 The research institute maintains an online panel of UK respondents. The survey was completed by 785 
individuals, representing a varied sample of the UK population, with average age 47.6 years and 50.4% women.	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midpoint category. We have recoded responses so that higher values capture negative 
assessments and hence, stronger distrust, while lower values capture positive assessments.  
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Table 5.1: Item phrasing and descriptive statistics 
Item Phrasing Item Mean SD 
When you think of Parliament as an institution, to what extent do you agree or disagree with 
the following statements? 
In recent years, I would say that Parliament has 
usually acted in a competent manner in the case 
of technically complex questions 
Parliament Technical 
Retrospective 
4.43 1.41 
In recent years, I would say that Parliament has 
usually acted in a moral manner in the case of 
ethically difficult questions 
Parliament Moral 
Retrospective 
4.44 1.50 
In recent years, I would say that Parliament has 
usually acted in accordance with my political 
preferences in the case of ideologically divisive 
questions 
Parliament Interest 
Retrospective 
4.69 1.44 
When the country faces a technically complex 
challenge, I believe that Parliament would be 
likely to take the competent decision 
Parliament Technical 
Prospective 
4.27 1.41 
When the country faces a morally difficult 
decision, I believe that Parliament would be 
likely to take the right decision 
Parliament Moral 
Prospective 
4.29 1.44 
When the country faces a question on which 
many people may have different opinions, I 
believe that Parliament would be likely to take a 
decision that is close to my preferences 
Parliament Interest 
Prospective 
4.45 1.36 
Now, think of the party you would be most likely to vote for in the next general election. 
Thinking of this party, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
In recent years, I would say that this party has 
usually acted in a competent manner in the case 
of technically complex questions 
Party Technical 
Retrospective 
3.76 1.35 
In recent years, I would say that this party has 
usually acted in a moral manner in the case of 
ethically difficult questions 
Party Moral 
Retrospective 
3.72 1.38 
In recent years, I would say that this party has 
usually acted in accordance with my political 
preferences in the case of ideologically divisive 
questions 
Party Interest 
Retrospective 
3.74 1.43 
When the country faces a technically complex 
challenge, I believe that this party would be 
likely to take the competent decision 
Party Technical 
Prospective 
3.63 1.33 
When the country faces a morally difficult 
decision, I believe that this party would be likely 
to take the right decision  
Party Moral 
Prospective 
3.57 1.39 
When the country faces a question on which 
many people may have different opinions, I 
believe that this party would be likely to take a 
decision that is close to my preferences 
Party Interest 
Prospective 
3.57 1.39 
Note: Items measured through a seven-point Likert scale (1=strongly agree, 7=strongly disagree), higher 
values denote higher distrust, N=785. 
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First we note that, on average, respondents appear to evaluate national parliament 
significantly more negatively than their preferred political party across all three evaluative 
dimensions and time projections. Comparing national parliament items to preferred party 
items along the same dimensions shows that respondents assess their national parliament 
between 0.64 and 0.95 points more negatively on the seven-point scale (t=12.78-18.38, 
p<.001). The differences are bigger in retrospective interest-based (0.88 points) and 
prospective interest-based (0.95 points) assessments for the two political targets. 
Furthermore, these differences are statistically significant and hold for gender groups, age 
and education groups.15 These differences provide a validation of the research model. 
Respondents’ perceived untrustworthiness of political agents is lower for subcomponents of 
the political system that citizens ‘choose’ or ‘prefer’, both in terms of technical competence 
and moral standing. The biggest differences emerge in comparisons of interest congruence, 
mainly because assessments of incongruent interests are more common for national 
parliament. In other words, respondents in our survey consider the parliament to have 
performed and to continue to perform poorer than their preferred political party in terms of its 
technical skills and competence, the morality of their decisions and the degree to which they 
act in accordance with or against the citizens’ best-interest. 
These differences are hardly surprising given the political targets evaluated. Interestingly, 
however, whereas on average, interest-based evaluations of national parliament are more 
negative than technical and ethical assessments per time projection, the same is not true for 
evaluations of preferred political party. This is also evident from the item response 
distributions. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the distributions for each individual item for national 
parliament and political party, respectively. Whereas responses are distributed differently in 
the interest-based evaluative items for national parliament (compared to technical and moral 
items per time projection), preferred party evaluations follow similar distributions. More 
respondents register distrust of national parliament on the basis that it has not acted in the 
past and will not act in the future in a manner that is close to their preferences, even if they do 
not consider parliament to perform incompetently or unethically when presented with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Both male and female respondents register significantly more negative evaluations of national parliament than 
for their preferred political party. Nevertheless, the two groups do not evaluate these political targets in the same 
way: men report slightly higher levels of distrust towards national parliament (on average 4.49) than women do 
(4.36), whereas women register higher levels of distrust towards their preferred political party (3.71) compared 
to men (3.62).  
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difficult decisions.16 On the other hand, the number of respondents who believe the political 
party they feel closest to has or has not acted in recent years in a manner that is against their 
best-interest is similar to the number of respondents evaluating their party negatively on 
technical and ethical grounds. Looking at the distribution of responses for all items in Figures 
5.1 and 5.2, we can further note that in the case of attitudes towards national parliament, 
extreme negative responses are much more frequent than extreme positive responses. Even in 
the case of attitudes towards citizens’ preferred component of the political system, about 10-
12% of our sample still registered extreme negative responses. We believe that the 
pervasiveness of negative evaluations in this context further highlights the need to focus on 
distrusting, rather than trusting attitudes, when it comes to the relationship between citizens 
and political agents. 
Another readily observable difference among the survey items, both from their mean values 
and their distributions, is the difference between prospective and retrospective assessments. 
Respondents consistently register less negative prospective assessments than retrospective 
ones per evaluative dimension.17 Although the differences are small (0.13 to 0.24 points on 
the seven-point scale) and only interest-based evaluations of national parliament show a 
significant difference (t=4.58, p<.001), the differences are consistent across demographic 
groups. For the items referring to national parliament, this change is primarily driven by an 
increase of mid-scale responses in the prospective from negative evaluations in the 
retrospective items. The responses at the lower end of the scale denoting the least negative 
evaluations on technical, normative and interest-based grounds do not alter significantly on 
average between retrospective and prospective items. For the six items referring to 
respondents’ preferred political party, the differences between retrospective and prospective 
assessments also hold. Fewer respondents are willing to register a negative prospective 
assessment for their party and more respondents are willing to formulate positive prospective 
evaluations. Although the differences are small and it is difficult at this stage to determine 
precisely why respondents approach prospective items less negatively than retrospective ones 
across both political targets and evaluative dimensions, we can provide some reasonable 
hypotheses.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In the majoritarian political system of the UK, we can expect that party support will influence perceptions of 
parliament based on which party controls a majority. In our sample potential Labour voters (current opposition) 
evaluate national parliament as much more interest-deviating than Conservative voters (current government, 
although leading a coalition majority with the Liberal Democratic party). 
17 The phrasing of the items is very similar in both retrospective and prospective items and, to avoid impressions 
of repetition and response bias the sets of items referring to retrospective and prospective perceptions were 
placed in different parts of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 5.1: Distributions of distrust items for national parliament 
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Figure 5.2: Distributions of distrust items for preferred political party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It might be the case that assessing the prospective untrustworthiness of a political agent 
specifically on dimensions of technical capacity, ethical conduct and interest congruence is 
more challenging than reviewing past events and would lead more respondents to give a 
middle-of-the-scale, more uncertain answer. Even in that case however, it does not explain 
why respondents who have evaluated previous actions of national parliament and their 
preferred party negatively are ready to give them the benefit of the doubt or even hope for 
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less untrustworthy behaviour in the future. It seems that though citizens are able to judge the 
failings of political agents when prompted to evaluate their recent performance, they are also 
able or willing to maintain overall more favourable expectations for future conduct, in spite 
of the existing track record. Although conceptually the establishment of distrusting relations 
depends on the existing evidence of untrustworthiness, this trend suggests there might be 
other processes at play when it comes to political attitudes of distrust, pushing for a positive 
prospective bias. Unfortunately, we do not have enough data at our disposal to investigate 
such processes, but examining retrospective and prospective perceptions of untrustworthy 
political conduct among different political contexts could provide more evidence and yield 
interesting results.18 
 
We have therefore already noted a number of visible patterns in the data. Respondents 
evaluate their preferred party less negatively than national parliament across all items, and 
furthermore, prospective evaluations are on average less negative than retrospective 
evaluations for both political targets. When respondents are prompted to think specifically in 
terms of technically complex problems, ethically difficult or socially divisive questions and 
the actions of political agents, a majority of them arrives at different judgments for past 
events and future expectations (56-59% for Parliament, 53-55% for preferred political party). 
These differences, in combination with the overall disparities in the evaluations of the two 
objects, suggest that respondents are able to come to distinct judgments when weighing the 
track record and forming expectations of untrustworthiness for two political targets. But how 
do these evaluations relate to one another? Table 5.2 below presents the associations between 
the 12 items, showing that they are all positively correlated although the strength of relations 
varies to a large extent. We can begin to map the structure of distrusting attitudes by taking a 
closer look at the inter-item correlations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Between 75-80% of the sampled responses give political targets less negative prospective assessments than 
retrospective assessments among the three evaluative dimensions. There appears to be no connection between 
this tendency to formulate more positive future expectations and other demographic characteristics such as age, 
gender, education or even character traits of political cynicism. We only find that when it comes to evaluations 
of one’s preferred political party this tendency for less negative prospective evaluations does not hold for 
younger respondents in our sample (aged 18-34 years old).  This may be a reflection of the different way in 
which past evidence of untrustworthiness are evaluated by younger and older citizens when it comes to their 
chosen party, or the different levels of belief in the party’s future actions forged by the longer duration of party 
support.	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Table 5.2: Inter-item correlations 
          
 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral Retro .769*           
Parliament 
Interest Retro .760* .703*          
Parliament 
Technical Prosp .613* .574* .577*         
Parliament 
Moral Prosp .599* .611* .564* .824*        
Parliament 
Interest Prosp .537* .489* .581* .756* .748*       
Party Technical 
Retro .489* .509* .453* .402* .427* .298*      
Party Moral 
Retro .467* .507* .425* .374* .387* .254* .829*     
Party Interest 
Retro .430* .455* .394* .377* .385* .256* .803* .789*    
Party Technical 
Prosp .363* .337* .315* .529* .507* .424* .579* .545* .554*   
Party Moral 
Prosp .341* .351* .287* .484* .510* .396* .588* .578* .603* .862*  
Party Interest 
Prosp .297* .286* .257* .423* .425* .354* .523* .498* .556* .826* .854* 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level.  
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From the table above we can see that, firstly, all correlations are positive and statistically 
significant, and secondly, that items correlate more strongly per time projection and object 
than per underlying evaluation.38 Evaluations of technical competence, ethical conduct and 
interest-congruence are still strongly correlated for each political target across time 
projections (r >.550). Ethical and technical evaluations also correlate strongly between 
national parliament and preferred political party per time projection (r >.500), which suggests 
that respondents are likely to assess past technical incompetence or ethical misconduct of 
national parliament and preferred party along the same lines.  
Table 5.2 shows that the three evaluative dimensions provide some common ground for 
assessing untrustworthy political conduct retrospectively and prospectively across the two 
political targets. An interesting observation arises when looking at the way interest-based 
evaluations of the two institutions relate to each other. In this case, assessments of deviating 
interests between a citizen and their preferred party are associated more strongly with 
evaluations of ethical misconduct (and to some extent technical incompetence) of national 
parliament (r=.455), rather than with interest-based evaluations of national parliament 
(r=.394). Respectively, evaluations of incongruent interests between the citizen and the 
national parliament are more strongly associated with technical evaluations of the citizen’s 
preferred party (r=.453), rather than interest-based evaluations (r=.394). This suggests that 
when a citizen perceives national parliament to be untrustworthy due to past indications of 
diverging interests and preferences, this perception is more strongly associated with the belief 
his preferred political party is incompetent; it is more a matter of the technical failures of his 
preferred party to deliver policies and outcomes in accordance to his preferences, rather than 
diverging interests between the citizen and his party per se. On the other hand, perceptions of 
incongruent interests between a citizen and their preferred party are more strongly associated 
with negative ethical evaluations of national parliament. When a citizen perceives that the 
subcomponent of the political system, which is closest to his preference and which he has 
chosen to support, fails to protect his best-interest, he is more likely to believe the entire 
political system and its leading institution is problematic and unfair. This association was 
particularly evident in interviews of participants who expressed distrust in the system both in 
terms of their party going against their political preferences, such as Labour supporters 
feeling betrayed over the Iraq war and Tony Blair’s leadership, and in terms of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Given the fact that the three evaluative items per object and time projection are part of the same question 
sequence, the higher correlations among each sequence are not too surprising. 
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parliament following policy decisions they perceived to be morally wrong. Even across the 
three national contexts studied, we found that the inability to identify a politician or political 
group that will promote and safeguard one’s best-interest as a citizen was often interpreted as 
a sign of a lacking political system that cannot fulfil accepted democratic norms.  
Nevertheless, all perceptions of untrustworthy political conduct run in a similar direction and 
hence, more negative perceptions along, say ethical considerations of one part of the political 
system, go hand in hand with negative perceptions along other evaluative lines or other parts 
of the political system. The very strong correlations between moral and technical evaluations 
for preferred political party, as well as national parliament, raise the question of whether 
respondents really distinguish between these two types of evaluative dimensions. Looking at 
all responses, 60.4% of the sample gave the same answer on the 1-7 scale for technical and 
ethical retrospective evaluations of national parliament, while 39.6% opt for different 
responses. For prospective evaluation, 67% of the sample picked the same response for the 
two evaluative items. Similar technical and ethical assessments of preferred political party 
reach 72.5 % and 74.5% of the sample for retrospective and prospective items, respectively. 
It seems therefore that for both political targets, and even more so for one’s chosen political 
party, the separation between normatively unacceptable behaviour and technical 
incompetence is hard to achieve – especially when this is thought of in abstract terms of 
future expectations, rather than grounded in past experiences citizens can recall. From 
exploratory interviews we noted that oftentimes political distrust is expressed in terms of 
perceived incompetence and unfair conduct of a political agent that are hard to disentangle. 
Many of the political tribulations that are known to generate distrust, such as corruption and 
political scandals, harm the ability of a system both to produce successful outputs and to 
function in accordance with acceptable norms of conduct. Even though the two aspects are 
analytically separate, they are often intertwined in practice and in political reality. 
Overall, we find that half of the sampled respondents opted for a combination of responses 
among the three items asked per time projection for national parliament evaluations, and 
about a third opted for a combination of evaluations of preferred political party. Also, looking 
back at the item response distributions in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 we see that certain items tend to 
have a high percentage of middle-category answers. Examining all the items together we find 
that most respondents chose a combination of responses, rather than opting for the middle 
category for all the distrust questions. For the items evaluating national parliament, only 56 
respondents chose the middle category throughout the six items (7.1% of the sample), while 
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for the items referring to one’s preferred political party 97 respondents opted for the midpoint 
(12.4% of the sample). Looking at the 12 items together, only 41 respondents opted for the 
middle category throughout (5.2% of the sample). If we take the scale mid-point as an 
indecisive state,39 it is somewhat surprising that more respondents appear to be indecisive 
about the political untrustworthiness of their preferred political party than the national 
parliament, given that information and pre-existing evaluations should be more readily 
available for the former political object rather than the more removed institutional level of 
parliament. 
This section has presented a brief overview of the new survey items and the way in which 
responses are related to each other. We already noted some obvious similarities and 
differences in the ways these 12 items were answered, such as less negative evaluations of 
the preferred subcomponent of the political system than of national parliament, especially in 
considerations of incongruent interests. We also saw that perceptions of untrustworthiness 
correlate positively among different items; some are more strongly associated than others, 
and these associations are in line with our conceptual model of distrusting attitudes and 
earlier empirical findings. In the following section, we proceed with a more systematic 
analysis of response patterns in order to determine the underlying structure of distrusting 
attitudes as captured through this data. 
 	  
5.2 The internal structure of political distrust I: Dimensions and scaling 
 
In line with the conceptual model of political distrust advanced throughout the thesis, we 
have argued that citizen perceptions of untrustworthiness entail retrospective and prospective 
assessments of technical failure, unethical political conduct and incongruent interests 
between the citizen and political agents. The focus of the next few paragraphs is to explore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Thinking of the middle category of the seven-point scale as a ‘neutral’ evaluation and a reflection of ‘neither 
trust nor distrust’ is tempting given the items are measured through a Likert scale that provides a range of 
positive to negative responses. Nevertheless, such an interpretation would assume the items measure trust and 
distrust perfectly and in complete symmetry, which is far from a claim that we can or wish to make in this study. 
There is a large body of literature on the meaning and implications of the middle response category in survey 
research (see Zaller, 1992 or Schaeffer and Presser, 2003) and we have also found through additional analysis 
that we can distinguish a respondent group that opts for the middle category throughout all distrust items on the 
basis of demographic characteristics and political variables. We discuss this point further in the concluding 
section of this chapter and the final chapter of the thesis. 
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how these evaluations relate to each other to map the internal structure of distrust and 
whether they are all measures of a single underlying latent attitude or they tap into different 
dimensions. 
This analysis offers two substantive contributions for our research of political distrust. 
Firstly, exploring how the different evaluations map out using multivariate statistical analysis 
supplements our understanding of distrusting attitudes that has so far been based on 
conceptual work and qualitative exploration. Empirically, does each evaluation capture a 
distinct attitude or do they represent integral parts of the same latent orientation towards the 
political system, as hypothesised? Similarly, are retrospective and prospective evaluations 
part of the same judgment of political untrustworthiness, or different underlying components 
that could be better described in other terms? And finally, what about assessments of distinct 
political targets, especially if one of them represents the part of the political system citizens 
are expected to be most sympathetic towards? We have already considered the bivariate 
correlations between individual items, commented on stronger and weaker associations and 
the evaluations that stand out. Given the differences between evaluative dimensions and time 
projections it is also possible that perceptions of political untrustworthiness follow a 
hierarchical pattern, with certain negative assessments capturing more or less political 
distrust of the political system than others. Further analysis can illuminate the structure of 
these associations and help interpret earlier observations.  
The second contribution concerns the researchers’ claim of measuring attitudes of political 
distrust through these survey items. The claim implies that we can add the different 
assessments of political untrustworthiness in some way and provide a reliable and one-
dimensional scale of political distrust. We leave the discussion on the validity of the new 
indicator for a later section of this chapter. For the time being, we would like to determine 
how different evaluations fit together, whether we can consider the items as manifest 
variables of a single latent attitude of political distrust, and explore the dimensionality of such 
an attitude. 
Since we are interested in the underlying structure and dimensions present in our data we 
employ an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) method. As explained in Chapter 3, our aim is 
not data reduction, but the exploration of the manifest items’ correlation structure, which can 
allow us to link them to the unobservable latent variable of interest based on a probability 
model (Bartholomew et al., 2008). EFA gives us the opportunity to investigate which and 
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how many underlying latent factors cause the items to covary. We use maximum likelihood 
estimation for the factor extraction, as this estimation procedure allows for the calculation of 
goodness of fit indicators and the exploration of the internal structure of the data in two 
dimensional space using factor rotation (Fabrigar et al., 1999). 
Model 1 in Table 5.3 below shows a one-factor solution for the 12 manifest items. A single 
factor explains almost 56% of total variance between the items, which suggests the presence 
of an underlying latent variable across all evaluations of political untrustworthiness. 
Evaluations of one’s preferred political party load higher on this single factor model than 
evaluations of national parliament. For both political targets retrospective evaluations have 
lower loadings than prospective evaluations and interest-based assessments have lower 
loadings than technical and ethical assessments. Yet the total variance explained by the one-
factor model is only a little over half of the total variance between the items, and our analysis 
suggests there is another factor worth considering in explaining the internal structure of the 
data (there are two factors with an Eigenvalue larger than 1).  
 
Table 5.3: Factor analysis of 12 political distrust items 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Factor 1 
 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Parliament Technical Retrospective 0.680 
 
0.617 0.611 
Parliament Moral Retrospective 0.676 
 
0.606 0.578 
Parliament Interest Retrospective 0.634 
 
0.564 0.617 
Parliament Technical Prospective 0.722 
 
0.690 0.369 
Parliament Moral Prospective 0.730 
 
0.697 0.365 
Parliament Interest Prospective 0.616 
 
0.587 0.381 
Party Technical Retrospective 0.770 
 
0.712 0.069 
Party Moral Retrospective 0.743 
 
0.686 0.059 
Party Interest Retrospective 0.739 
 
0.695 -0.017 
Party Technical Prospective 0.774 
 
0.866 -0.285 
Party Moral Prospective 0.778 
 
0.885 -0.335 
Party Interest Prospective 0.713 
 
0.821 -0.364 
     Eigenvalue 6.68 
 
6.68 1.93 
Variance Explained 55.68% 
 
55.68% 16.09% 
AIC 3900 
 
1870 
 BIC 3956 
 
1977 
 LR Test χ2=1809, p<.000    χ2=3848, p<.000 
Note: Entries are factor loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis using Maximum Likelihood 
estimation for factor extraction 
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Model 2 in the table above presents the results of a two-factor solution. The cumulative 
variance explained by the two factors is now 72% and while all items still load strongly on 
the first factor, the second factor distinguishes between assessments of untrustworthiness of 
national parliament (loading highly and positively) and of preferred political party (loading 
negatively or close to zero). None of the two models is statistically significant, but the AIC 
and BIC selection criteria values are reduced by more than half, denoting a much better fit for 
Model II to the data.40 The AIC and BIC criteria for model selection are not without their 
critics, and have been shown to point to the selection of more complex models as sample 
sizes increase (Kim and Cameron, 2011; Mulaik, 2001; Preacher et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
strictly following these criteria would lead us to conclude the two-factor model better fits our 
data. Using a two-factor model we can also present item loadings on two-dimensional space. 
In Figure 5.3 below we can see that the second factor splits the items based on the political 
agent they are referring to; though there are also some differences based on the time 
projection of each evaluation, prospective evaluations of the preferred party have negative 
loadings on this second factor. The plot shows that all evaluations tap strongly into one latent 
attitude, with some small variation (factor 1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The two-factor model is not statistically significant either, meaning that the covariance matrix reproduced 
based on the two factors extracted is statistically significantly different from the observed matrix in the data. To 
achieve a reproduced matrix that is not significantly different from the one observed we need to extract 6-7 
factors, although the process of interpreting these factors in a meaningful way, even when allowing for rotation, 
becomes challenging. Allowing for an oblique factor rotation, they can be loosely interpreted as (i) three items 
of prospective evaluations for parliament, (ii) three items of prospective evaluations for preferred political party, 
(iii) three items of retrospective evaluations for parliament, (iv) three items of retrospective evaluations for 
preferred political party, (v) prospective technical evaluation for parliament and preferred political party, (vi) 
prospective and retrospective evaluations of interest-congruence for parliament (as opposed to moral). The fifth 
and sixth factors with the item loadings indicate that firstly, evaluations of technical competence are similar and 
secondly, that there might be tension between evaluating a representative political object such as the national 
parliament in interest-congruence terms. 
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Figure 5.3: Factor loading plot for two-factor solution without rotation 
 
 
 
Factor rotation in EFA can help the process of visualising the distinction and interpreting 
what the two different underlying factors discovered in the data stand for. Table 5.3.1 below 
shows the results for an orthogonal and an oblique factor rotation for our data.41 The 
orthogonal rotation allows the two axes to move, but forces them to remain perpendicular to 
each other, meaning that the two factors are not allowed to correlate. In this case we can see 
that evaluations of untrustworthiness of the national parliament load highly on the first factor 
and evaluations of preferred political party on the latter, yet at the same time all evaluative 
items still load on both factors. Retrospective assessments of preferred party actually load 
considerably on both dimensions. Therefore, it would be difficult to argue for the presence of 
two distinct dimensions based on the political target being evaluated. Model IV presents the 
factor loadings following an oblique rotation, where the two factors are allowed to correlate 
freely with each other. With the two factors correlated positively r=.531, interpreting the two 
underlying dimensions based on assessments of the two political targets becomes easier. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For orthogonal factor rotation we used Varimax rotation, a method that maximises the squared variance 
within factors. It is the most widely used orthogonal rotation method in the social sciences (Fabrigar et al., 
1999). Oblique rotation was carried out using the Oblimin method. As a robustness check we tried other rotation 
methods both for orthogonal and oblique factor rotation and all yielded similar results as these presented above.  
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Figure 5.3.1 below also shows the loading plot for the rotated two-factor model, the dashed 
lines representing the two factors following an oblique rotation.  
 
 
Table 5.3.1: Two factor rotated models for 12 political distrust items 
 
Model III: 
Orthogonal Rotation 
Model IV: 
Oblique Rotation 
 
Factor 1 
Parliament 
Factor 2 
Party 
Factor 1 
Parliament 
Factor 2 
Party 
Parliament Technical Retrospective .849 .186 .907 -.077 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .815 .195 .866 -.054 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .826 .140 .896 -.121 
Parliament Technical Prospective .686 .380 .661 .198 
Parliament Moral Prospective .686 .389 .658 .208 
Parliament Interest Prospective .639 .291 .636 .113 
Party Technical Retrospective .447 .558 .333 .481 
Party Moral Retrospective .421 .546 .307 .476 
Party Interest Retrospective .377 .586 .244 .536 
Party Technical Prospective .233 .881 -.012 .918 
Party Moral Prospective .202 .924 -.062 .978 
Party Interest Prospective .143 .888 -.117 .956 
     Factor correlation coefficient - .531 
Note: Entries are rotated factor loadings, using maximum likelihood extraction method. Model III: 
Varimax method for orthogonal rotation. Model IV: Direct Oblimin method for oblique rotation. 
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Figure 5.3.1 Factor loading plot for two-factor solution with orthogonal and oblique 
rotations 
 
Note: Loadings on continuous axes calculated using Varimax orthogonal rotation. Loadings on dashed axes 
calculated using Direct Oblimin oblique rotation, factors correlate at r=.531 
 
What does this analysis suggest for the structure of political distrust attitudes? Firstly, that 
there is indeed an underlying latent factor that causes the different evaluative items to covary, 
which we claim is the respondents’ overall attitude of political distrust. All items capturing 
perceptions of untrustworthiness load highly on that factor. Carrying out the same analysis 
for the items referring to each political object separately shows that one underlying factor 
explains 70.6% of variance among evaluations of parliament and 72.2% of variance among 
evaluations of political party (Tables 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 in Appendix H). Therefore, we can 
claim that the three evaluative dimensions and two time projections are all part of a single 
underlying attitude, as conceptualised by the model of political distrust. The existence of a 
second dimension in our analysis points to an underlying factor that differentiates evaluations 
of untrustworthiness based on whether they are formed in respect to one’s preferred political 
party or to the national parliament (and to a much lesser extent regarding time projections). 
Given the conceptual difference between these two subcomponents of the political system 
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and the variation within our data, considering two underlying dimensions does not alter our 
substantive interpretation of this analysis. The two-factor model provides a better fit to the 
data, yet the place of the 12 items in two-dimensional space shows that if we claim there are 
two factors explaining perceptions of untrustworthiness according to each political object, 
these are positively and strongly correlated with one another. The differences among the 
specific types of evaluation (technical, ethical and particularly interest-based), as well as 
retrospective and prospective assessments, can also be seen through this analysis, but overall 
the 12 manifest items can be taken to capture a single underlying political attitude.  
We further test the scalability of the new items for measuring a unified concept through 
reliability analysis. A scale comprised of all 12 evaluative items appears to be highly reliable, 
scoring a reliability coefficient much higher than the accepted threshold value of .8 that 
denotes high reliability (Chronbach’s a=.927). All items are highly correlated to the single 
scale, with prospective moral assessment of national parliament showing the strongest 
association. Furthermore, all items contribute to the reliability of the scale; even removing 
interest-based assessments of parliament, which has proven to be a difficult evaluative 
dimension, would still decrease total overall reliability. We can therefore claim that putting 
all these evaluative items together in a single index provides a reliable scale measuring a 
unified variable. The same analysis conducted for two separate scales for each political 
component, distrust of national parliament and distrust of preferred party items, also results in 
highly reliable scales (Chronbach’s a=.916 and a=.923 respectively, see Tables 5.4.1 and 
5.4.2 in Appendix H). 
Table 5.4: Reliability analysis for 12 items 
Items 
Item-scale 
correlation 
Alpha, if item 
deleted 
Parliament Technical Retrospective .751 .920 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .744 .921 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .712 .922 
Parliament Technical Prospective .778 .919 
Parliament Moral Prospective .785 .919 
Parliament Interest Prospective .683 .923 
Party Technical Retrospective .770 .919 
Party Moral Retrospective .743 .920 
Party Interest Retrospective .738 .921 
Party Technical Prospective .761 .920 
Party Moral Prospective .763 .920 
Party Interest Prospective .700 .922 
Scale Chronbach's a coefficient = .927 
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Being able to create a unified scale with the 12 evaluative items is useful for subsequent 
analyses of political distrust attitudes. Nevertheless, we have seen that there are obvious 
differences among items of specific evaluative dimensions and time projections. 
Retrospective and prospective assessments of untrustworthy political conduct differ both in 
their mean values and the way they load on underlying factors. Furthermore, the items 
capturing interest-based assessments of national parliament lead to more negative perceptions 
and correlate lower with the underlying attitude of political distrust than any other evaluative 
dimension. These differences suggest that there might be an ordered structure to the 
evaluations capturing distrusting attitudes.  
We used Mokken analysis to explore the internal hierarchical structures between the 
responses to the 12 items capturing perceptions of political untrustworthiness. Mokken scale 
analysis is an Item Response Theory (IRT) based model and follows the IRT scale 
assumptions of unidimensionality, monotonicity and local independence. It provides a more 
demanding scaling test than Classic Test Theory (CTT) models, such as reliability and factor 
analysis presented above. More relevant for our purposes, Mokken analysis takes into 
account the relative ‘popularity’ or ‘unpopularity’ of items within a scale and can investigate 
hierarchies within data structures. Using Mokken analysis we can determine whether some 
items are harder to agree with than others in a consistent pattern across all respondents, which 
would denote a cumulative aspect in the way they measure political distrust. Would it make 
sense to think of the 12 evaluative items measuring political distrust similar to the way, say 
an algebra test measures the latent trait of mathematical knowledge? For example, an item 
asking for a multiplication result is ‘easier’ than an item asking for polynomial factorisation, 
and we can reasonably expect that someone who is able to answer the second question 
correctly will be able to answer the first correctly as well. We can think of mathematical 
knowledge as a latent trait that follows ‘steps’, so that being able to ‘agree with’ or ‘correctly 
answer’ the item at one step means you can also ‘agree with’ or ‘correctly answer’ the items 
on all of the steps below, since they are easier and denote a smaller amount of the latent 
variable. 
Do attitudes of political distrust measured through assessments of retrospective and 
prospective technical incompetence, unethical conduct and diverging interests follow an 
ordinal step-like structure? Perhaps a time projection or a particular evaluation could be 
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‘harder’ to agree with, and such negative evaluations would denote more of the latent 
variable of political distrust than others. In citizen narratives of political distrust it was clear 
that participants placed more emphasis on certain evaluations than on others to explain their 
decision to distrust political targets. For some, it was assessments of incongruent interests in 
the future that motivate distrust, while for others retrospective assessments of unethical and 
unjust conduct. Through Mokken analysis we can determine whether differences among the 
responses for different items are driven by a hierarchy of ‘easier’ and ‘harder’ evaluations 
(denoting ‘less’ or ‘more’ of the latent distrusting attitude), which is consistent among all 
respondents. Further, it is also possible that different evaluations are more central in 
perceptions of political untrustworthiness for different political objects. For example, looking 
at item mean scores, we have seen that although registering a negative interest-based 
evaluation of national parliament is more common among respondents, negative interest-
based evaluations of one’s preferred political party (at least prospective ones) are the least 
common. Since we have items referring to two political targets, we can also check for 
hierarchies within distrusting attitudes towards national parliament and towards one’s 
preferred political party separately and compare our findings. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.5.1 below present the results of a Mokken analysis for the items capturing 
evaluations of national parliament and evaluations of preferred political party, respectively. 
Firstly, we can see that the items can be grouped in indices measuring distrusting attitudes 
towards the two objects that show strong scalability. For the items referring to national 
parliament, the scale Loevinger’s coefficient is H=.674 and each item has a strong individual 
coefficient, between Hi=.646-.693. Similarly, distrust of preferred party items form a good 
scale, with a Loevinger’s coefficient H=.685, and Hi for each individual item between 
Hi=.666-.717. These values far exceed Mokken’s suggestions for the threshold value of a 
medium-strength scale (H=.400) and the threshold value for a strong scale (H=.500).42 
Hence, there is strong evidence that the two scales measure unidimensional latent traits 
(distrust of national parliament and distrust of preferred party) and that a higher overall score 
in the scale would denote a larger amount of distrust.43 Looking at the non-intersection 
criteria, which can provide evidence on whether respondents order their levels of 
agreement/disagreement with the items in a similar manner and hence create a hierarchical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 We use the following guidelines for interpreting scalability coefficients from Mokken (1971): H < 0.30: no 
scale; .30 < H < .40: weak scale; .40 < H < .50: medium scale; .50 < H: strong scale. 
43 To test the Monotone Homogeneity (MH) model we look at the Homogeneity criteria. Values under 40 are 
considered acceptable for the homogeneity model and in our analyses all item criteria fall below this value. 
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pattern in the data, we find some evidence in favour of an ordered item structure in the case 
of distrust of national parliament and some, although much weaker, for distrust of preferred 
political party.44 The ordering that is evident from the analysis suggests that in the case of 
parliament, items measuring interest congruence in both time projections are the ‘easiest’ 
items, which are able to capture less distrust, while prospective assessments of unjust 
practices and technical incompetence are harder to agree with. Moreover, items touching on 
retrospective evaluations are easier to answer denoting distrust than items touching on 
prospective evaluations, and this holds both for preferred party and parliament items.  
 
 
Table 5.5: Mokken scale analysis for distrust of parliament items 
 
Item Hi 
 
Homogeneity 
Criteria 
Non-intersection 
Criteria 
Parliament Technical Retrospective .682 24 71 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .655 20 52 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .674 -9 0 
Parliament Technical Prospective .693 23 38 
Parliament Moral Prospective .691 2 59 
Parliament Interest Prospective .646 0 52 
    Scale  H= .674 (.541) 
 Note: Scale Loevinger’s coefficient H (st.error in parenthesis) and item Hi calculated in R programme 
using Mokken package. N=785 
 
 
Table 5.5.1: Mokken scale analysis for distrust of preferred party items 
 
Item Hi 
 
Homogeneity 
Criteria 
Non-intersection 
Criteria 
Party Technical Retrospective .685 -8 83 
Party Moral Retrospective .666 0 91 
Party Interest Retrospective .680 0 70 
Party Technical Prospective .691 -3 85 
Party Moral Prospective .717 0 80 
Party Interest Prospective .670 26 77 
    Scale  H= .685 (.021) 
 Note: Scale Loevinger’s coefficient H (st.error in parenthesis) and item Hi calculated in R programme 
using Mokken package. N=785 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 According to Hardouin et al. (2011) strong evidence for non-intersecting item step response functions are 
provided with criteria values below 40, while values between 40 and 80 are acceptable. An investigation of the 
non-intersection criteria for the parliament scale shows it is borderline with all of the criteria values being below 
80, although the majority of items fall between 40 and 80. For distrust in preferred political party we find there 
is mixed evidence, and weaker than in the case of items referring to parliament, with three of the item criteria 
with values of 80 and below and the remaining three above 80. 
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In other words, the evaluations used to capture attitudes of political distrust in our survey 
show that perceptions of untrustworthiness for national parliament are ordered in a similar 
way among the respondents. Both retrospective and prospective assessments of diverging 
interests make it easier for respondents to express negative attitudes, while prospective moral 
and technical negative assessments capture more distrusting attitudes than other items. There 
is some evidence, although much weaker, that preferred party evaluations may also be 
ordered. Perceptions of political party untrustworthiness are ordered on the basis of 
prospective and retrospective assessments, with negative evaluations of future incompetent 
and unethical conduct capturing more distrust than retrospective negative evaluations.  
Performing the same analysis for the 12 items together, the results in Table 5.5.2 below show 
that the evaluative items can be grouped together to form a strong scale measuring attitudes 
of political distrust. The scale’s Loevinger’s coefficient H=.541 and individual item Hi 
coefficients are all strong, between Hi=.49-.58. Further, all evaluative items tap into a 
unidimensional latent trait and political distrust; respondents scoring higher values on the 
aggregate scale express higher levels of political distrust (the monotonicity assumption 
criteria are satisfied).45 However, we do not find any evidence that respondents rank the 12 
items in a similar way to justify a hierarchical structure. The assumption of non-intersecting 
item step response functions is violated, and all of the criteria are substantially above the 
conventional threshold value of 80.46 Nevertheless, there is evidence that the 12 items can be 
considered a good measure of political distrust and that the three fundamental assumptions of 
Mokken Scaling and IRT are verified. 
 
Table 5.5.2: Mokken scale analysis of 12 political distrust items 
 
Item Hi 
 
Homogeneity 
Criteria 
Non-intersection 
Criteria 
Parliament Technical Retrospective .546 8 241 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .539 80 236 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .518 13 278 
Parliament Technical Prospective .571 -2 235 
Parliament Moral Prospective .575 0 239 
Parliament Interest Prospective .492 29 255 
Party Technical Retrospective .564 15 233 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The Monotone Homogeneity (MH) model is satisfied since all items’ homogeneity criteria fall below the 
value of 40. 
46 Investigating the assumption of non-intersecting item step response functions using the P-matrix we can see 
curves intersect. This means that the order in which items are ranked by respondents is not the same across all 
respondents. 
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Party Moral Retrospective .539 15 241 
Party Interest Retrospective .532 14 238 
Party Technical Prospective .558 17 260 
Party Moral Prospective .555 13 291 
Party Interest Prospective .504 31 278 
    12 Item Scale  H= .541 (.021) 
 Note: Scale Loevinger’s coefficient H (st.error in parenthesis) and item Hi calculated in R programme 
using Mokken package. N=785 
 
Although we have commented on the differences in the average levels of negative 
evaluations registered for the two different subcomponents of the political system, there is no 
overall pattern or clear hierarchy in the way all respondents approach the 12 evaluative items. 
In the following section we will investigate the structure of the data from another viewpoint, 
that of respondents themselves, to check whether clearer patterns emerge. Until now, we have 
provided a series of analyses for the 12 questions tapping into assessments of political 
untrustworthiness. These analyses suggest the 12 items are measuring a single latent attitude, 
of political distrust, and can be used together to form a reliable and unidimensional scale. At 
the same time, the presence of a second smaller element that differentiates evaluations of 
national parliament from evaluations of one’s preferred political party indicates that the 
political target being evaluated is also an important aspect to take into consideration when 
analysing attitudes of political distrust. Speaking of two distinct attitudes, such as distrust of 
national parliament and distrust of one’s preferred party, would not be entirely correct since 
the two are highly correlated and dependent on a single latent attitude of political distrust. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of investigating distrusting attitudes further, evaluations that 
tap into perceptions of untrustworthiness for these two parts of the political system can be 
considered separately. They create reliable and strong scales and further, showed some 
evidence of hierarchical ordering in the way respondents consider each evaluative dimension 
and time projection.  
 
 
5.3    The internal structure of political distrust II: Identifying respondent groups  
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We have already investigated the perceptions of political untrustworthiness as these are 
captured through the 12 evaluative items employed in our survey. In this section, the aim is to 
explore patterns from the viewpoint of respondents; that is, how respondents choose to 
approach the items in the survey. Latent Class Analysis is a respondent-centred method and 
aims to identify and characterise classes of similar response patterns. In other words, LCA 
identifies substantively meaningful groups of respondents based on the way they answer 
different evaluative items.47 This analysis can show whether more negative evaluations along 
certain items are consistently paired with less negative evaluations along other items by a 
subgroup of respondents. We have already noted that some of the associations between 
evaluative items are weaker than others. It is possible to think of such cases: for example 
citizens who support an anti-systemic or extreme political party are likely to perceive national 
parliament as pursuing policies that go against the citizens’ best-interest and at the same time 
to perceive their preferred party as protecting their interests.   
 
We chose LCA as an exploratory tool to identify patterns of responses and we investigate all 
evaluative items together as well as separately depending on the part of the political system 
they refer to. The latent class model estimates class-conditional response probabilities and 
provides information criteria to judge which number of classes in a model provides the best 
fit to the data. Using LCA as an exploratory method requires us to start from a complete 
independence model (with one class) and then start increasing the number of classes. In the 
study of the 12 items, the LCA yields interesting and meaningful results from the three-class 
model onwards. A three-class model is presented in Figure 5.4 and identifies the following 
three groups: respondents who record high levels of distrust across all 12 items (23% of 
sample), those who have higher probability of selecting medium values across all items (49% 
of sample), and those who register the least negative evaluations (28% of sample). We can 
clearly see that the basis for the creation of groups is not a difference in item preferences, but 
on the range of evaluations recorded across all items uniformly.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: Latent class analysis using a three-class model for all items 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For a longer discussion on the usefulness and choice of Latent Class Analysis, please see Chapter 3.4. 
Examples of latent class models in political science include McCutcheon (1985), Feick (1989), Breen (2000), 
Hill (2001), Hill and Kriesi (2001), Blaydes and Linzer (2006), Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), and 
Hagenaars and McCutcheon (2002). 
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Class 1: population share = 0.235
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Class 2: population share = 0.486
ParlTR ParlMR ParlIR ParlTP ParlMP ParlIP PartyTR PartyMR PartyIR PartyTP PartyMP PartyIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2
3 4
5 6
7
Manifest variables
O
ut
co
m
es
P
r(
ou
tc
om
e)
            
         
   
   
   
   
   
      
   
  
 
      
  
  
  
            
            
Class 3: population share = 0.279
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Note: Models calculated in R using poLCA statistical package. Length of each bar denotes the probability 
members in this class will pick the specified response from the 1-7 measurement scale. The probability scale is 
situated on the left, the seven-point response scale is on the right hand-side of each figure.   
 
 
Nevertheless, these three groups show variations in the response patterns of certain items. We 
can easily see that within the group characterised by higher probability of expressing 
extremely negative assessments on a technical, ethical and interest basis, evaluations of 
national parliament are more likely to be extremely negative than evaluations of preferred 
political party. In fact, calculating a four-class model captures this difference in the way 
respondents approach the items evaluating national parliament and preferred party. 
Respondents give more favourable evaluations to their preferred political party than to 
national parliament and the probability of registering complete distrust is lower (Class 2 in 
Figure 5.4.1). A model identifying five latent classes brings out clearer differences in the 
patterns of responses. Presented in Figure 5.4.2, this model identifies the group of 
respondents who overwhelmingly opt for the scale midpoint across all 12 items (Class 1, 18% 
of sample). The second class groups together completely distrusting respondents (Class 2, 
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14% of sample), yet once more, the probability of registering complete distrust of parliament 
is higher than distrust of one’s political party. The third class identifies a group of distrusting, 
but not extremely,  respondents (17% of sample), while the fourth groups together responses 
of average and lower distrusting (35% of sample). Finally, the fifth class groups respondents 
that evaluate their political party and national parliament positively along items, although the 
probability of such evaluations for the parliament items is lower than that for one’s political 
party.  
 
Figure 5.4.1: Latent class analysis using a four-class model for all items 
Class 1: population share = 0.311
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Class 2: population share = 0.2
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Class 3: population share = 0.339
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Class 4: population share = 0.15
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Note: Models calculated in R using poLCA statistical package. Length of each bar denotes the probability 
members in this class will pick the specified response from the 1-7 measurement scale. The probability scale is 
situated on the left, the seven-point response scale is on the right hand-side of each figure. 
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Figure 5.4.2: Latent class analysis using a five-class model for all items 
Class 1: population share = 0.183
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Class 2: population share = 0.142
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Class 3: population share = 0.169
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Class 4: population share = 0.348
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Class 5: population share = 0.158
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Note: Models calculated in R using poLCA statistical package. Length of each bar denotes the probability 
members in this class will pick the specified response from the 1-7 measurement scale. The probability scale is 
situated on the left, the seven-point response scale is on the right hand-side of each figure. 
 
Even with the calculation of more latent response groups, our data still do not show response 
patterns assessing untrustworthy conduct along specific evaluative dimensions or political 
targets. Although there is some variation in the probability of a certain response category 
depending on whether the item taps into evaluations of national parliament or preferred party, 
classes of respondents are identified according to overall levels of political distrust (the range 
of negative evaluations across all items). 
 
Identifying respondent groups based on their response patterns on the latent variable under 
investigation is already an informative exercise. If we would like to decide the optimal 
number of classes to describe this data, comparing the three, four and five-class models based 
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on model fit, the information criteria and percentage change in the likelihood chi-squared 
statistic compared to the one-class model, all point to the five-class model as the most 
parsimonious. Recent simulation tests on LCM selection criteria show that the BIC performs 
better than other information criteria in determining the number of classes in latent class 
modelling and in our data the five-class model scores the lowest values of BIC (Nylund et al., 
2007). 
 
Table 5.6: Latent class analysis model selection criteria 
 
3 Class Model 4 Class Model 5 Class Model 6 Class Model 
AIC 27331 26360 25641 25405 
BIC 28349 27719 27341 27446 
Note: Models calculated in R using poLCA statistical package. 
 
 
Following the same procedure as prior methods of analysis, we also calculated latent class 
models for the six items referring to national parliament and the six items referring to 
preferred political party separately. The most informative models are the three and four-class 
models for evaluations of national parliament. The three-class model splits respondents into 
those registering high distrust, those with average and those with positive evaluations. 
Moving from three to four classes allows for a further distinction within the distrusting group, 
between those respondents who choose extreme negative evaluations (values 6-7) and those 
with milder distrusting attitudes. It also becomes apparent that perceptions of deviating 
interests are the easiest items to respond negatively. The analysis of items evaluating the 
respondents’ preferred party shows a different picture. Here the three-class model identifies 
respondents clustering away from the extreme negative end of the scale. Moving from the 
three to the four-class model, does identify a group of respondents who give distrusting 
responses (Class 2, 17% of sample) and the remaining three groups show higher probability 
of responses in the middle, middle-low and lower end of the scale. It is worth noting that 
although we can see that it is easier to formulate negative evaluations on the retrospective 
compared to the prospective items, we do not see any classes forming on the basis of this 
distinction in either analysis (Figures 5.4.3-5.4.6 in Appendix H).  
 
The purpose of this additional type of analysis is to investigate the structure of the data from 
a different perspective: that of the respondents. We consider this perspective to be important, 
as it could potentially highlight subgroups of respondents that formulate perceptions of 
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political untrustworthiness following different patterns of evaluations. Political distrust is, 
after all, an attitude held by a citizen towards the political system, and it is reasonable to 
expect that different combinations of evaluations might be at play for different people. 
Although we do not find an such evidence in our analysis, we need to note that our group of 
respondents is not a representative sample of the UK population, and therefore all patterns of 
associations and structures cannot be generalised to the wider population in any sound 
statistical way. Nevertheless, this is a first step in investigating such patterns of assessment 
and respondent subgroups.  
 
Overall, and in line with previous analyses, respondents are split into groups depending on 
the range of negative evaluations registered uniformly across all items tapping into 
perceptions of political untrustworthiness. Respondents approach evaluations of technical 
incompetence, ethical misconduct and diverging interests, retrospective and prospective, in a 
similar manner, and to a large extent evaluate their preferred party and national parliament 
along the same lines. In this sense, LCA findings add support to the results of the more 
widely used item-focused factor analysis. They confirm the view that to a certain extent 
respondents distinguish between the untrustworthiness of different political targets, the 
national parliament and political party of choice, however distrusting attitudes towards the 
two targets are strongly associated. This could be attributed to the fact that citizens perceive 
different subcomponents of the political system to share the wider culture of political 
trustworthiness – or political untrustworthiness. Even items that are meant to tap into 
perceptions regarding the political conduct of one’s preferred part of the political system are 
not completely independent from perceptions of the institution of national parliament. This 
could also be a reflection of the fact that citizen attitudes of distrust are formed and 
influenced by similar antecedents, information and events, and hence distrust or trust in 
different parts of the political system tend to move in tandem.  
 
Similarly, we do not distinguish any respondent group from the total sample based on a 
pattern of negative evaluations according to the domain being judged. Retrospective and 
prospective perceptions of technical failure, unethical conduct and incongruent interests are 
formed along similar lines. Earlier analyses showed that some negative evaluations might be 
easier to express than others across all respondents, namely, interest-based considerations of 
national parliament, yet we do not find a respondent group that is much more likely to 
differentiate itself based on this assessment. The analysis of latent classes has instead shifted 
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the focus to two groups of response patterns that have not been identified previously: 
respondents who consistently chose categories of extreme negative values and responses of 
complete distrust, and respondents who did not simply register average evaluations, but opted 
for the middle-point offered in categorical scales throughout the 12 items. This latter group 
forces us to question what this middle category stands for, while the former highlights a 
response group of particular interest: those respondents that perceive political actors 
extremely negatively across the board, without differentiating between retrospective, 
prospective evidence, evaluative dimensions or particular political agents. We will be 
investigating this group further in the following chapter of the thesis. 
 
 
5.4 Implications for the conceptual model of political distrust 	  
Following the analyses carried out in this chapter, what insights have we gained into the 
internal structure of distrusting political attitudes? Firstly, we can confirm that the three lines 
of evaluating political untrustworthiness, as identified in earlier qualitative research, do 
indeed tap into a single underlying attitude and can be considered together to form a reliable 
indicator of political distrust. Respondents differentiate to some extent between ethical, 
technical and interest-based considerations, and this is particularly evident when looking at 
perceptions of deviating interests. The evaluations correlate strongly per time projection and 
political target, but we also find strong correlations per evaluative dimension across targets 
and time projections, at least for technical and ethical considerations. Perceptions of political 
untrustworthiness based on diverging interests are associated with other evaluations in a more 
complex pattern, which highlights the many interactions between evaluations of particular 
subcomponents of the political system.  
Overall however, respondents’ evaluations are registered uniformly across these three 
dimensions. There are no discernible patterns of respondents who consistently evaluate 
political targets diametrically on two dimensions, for example technical competence and 
ethical conduct. We have already argued that it is analytically possible to hold both these 
views, and indeed some of the interviews considered in the preceding chapter made such 
claims. It has also been pointed out in earlier survey research that a citizen may consider 
political agents to be able, competent and successful in what they seek to achieve, while at 
the same time feeling that what these political agents seek to achieve is unfair and goes 
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against accepted moral norms (Seligson, 1983). Of course, in such cases one can argue that it 
is the normative evaluation that would correctly capture the attitude of distrust, since 
interacting with a politician that is perceived not to be incompetent but to function in an 
unethical manner would still increase the chances of negative outcomes for citizens. 
Nevertheless, no such patterns emerged from our sample. Citizens’ perceptions of political 
untrustworthiness along these three evaluative dimensions are distinct but run in similar 
directions.  
What the analysis did point to is that, in certain cases, there is an internal hierarchy among 
the different evaluative dimensions, as some are better able to capture attitudes of political 
distrust than others. Beliefs about future unethical and unfair political practices are a central 
component of overall attitudes of political distrust. For each political target, prospective 
ethical items load more strongly on the underlying identified factor and correlate highest with 
the overall distrust scale. Although the differences between items tapping into evaluations of 
technical competence and ethical conduct are small, there is enough evidence to suggest that 
ethical judgments play a key role in the decision to distrust and that such negative evaluations 
are able to capture more distrust than negative technical or interest-based evaluations. Once 
we consider all the items together, the evidence pointing to this hierarchy disappears; 
nevertheless, it is possible, and conceptually interesting, to think of levels in expressing 
distrust towards particular political agents in this manner: negative perceptions based on 
diverging interests between the citizen and the political institution can capture distrusting 
attitudes more ‘easily’, and hence reflect less distrust than if technical and moral evaluations 
were as negative. Subsequently, the belief that the institutional player is likely to prove 
incapable to fulfil its political role provides stronger grounds for distrust, and finally, the 
belief that this player is also likely to function in a manner that violates shared notions of 
fairness and rightness reflects even stronger political distrust. We have found some evidence 
to support a hierarchical view of perceptions of political untrustworthiness, although 
additional research would be needed to investigate this cumulative nature in more depth. 
Already, our data is complicated by the role of the retrospective and prospective projections 
of each evaluative dimension and of course by the differences between evaluations of 
national parliament and preferred political party.48  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 We also carried out Mokken scale analysis per time projections but the results where weaker and there was 
still no evidence of a Double Monotonicity model. 
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The conceptualisation and operationalisation of distrusting attitudes also entailed two time 
projections for each evaluation of political untrustworthiness. Following the analysis 
conducted in this chapter we can provide some additional comments on this aspect of 
distrusting attitudes as well. We have seen from the outset that there is a small, but in some 
cases significant, positive prospective bias that affects evaluations of both national parliament 
and preferred political party. Though we can only hypothesise about the reasons behind these 
differences at this stage, they may be driven by individuals who, despite perceiving political 
actors as having been untrustworthy in the past, are willing to give them the benefit of the 
doubt on future action or by a human need for hope that affects perceptions of future political 
trustworthiness. After all, no citizen wishes to live under a political system he considers 
untrustworthy.  
Nevertheless, despite these differences, our analyses suggest that both retrospective and 
prospective evaluations tap into a single underlying attitude. Prospective items are better 
placed to capture political distrust and, to some extent, negative assessments regarding future 
political conduct reflect more distrust than negative assessments of past conduct. This is an 
interesting point that we will consider further in the following chapters. If prospective 
evaluations regarding the type of political conduct to be expected are formulated solely on 
the basis of past indicators and experiences, the retrospective and prospective items should 
not differ. But in our survey 55-60% of respondents changed their evaluations between 
retrospective and prospective items. In narrative interviews analysed in the preceding chapter, 
we also saw that expressions of political distrust that followed retrospective assessments were 
phrased in more specific terms, using more concrete examples and events that were made 
available from the citizen’s memory. On the other hand, expectations regarding future 
untrustworthy conduct were inevitably phrased in more general terms and placed greater 
emphasis on personal beliefs about the future. Given that, strictly speaking, the future is 
always uncertain, researchers of political trust have often highlighted the important role that 
faith in the system plays for maintaining citizens’ cooperative stance despite past 
disappointing political performance. We also find that beliefs regarding future political 
conduct are important attributes of political distrust, along with retrospective evaluations of 
untrustworthiness.  
Conceptually, political distrust can be established entirely on the basis of past negative 
experiences that will prevent any further cooperation and hence the possibility to reassess the 
trustworthiness of political agents. It would be very interesting to investigate whether the 
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difference between retrospective and prospective evaluations depends on the overall levels of 
political distrust in a given country. In our sample, we could not find any different categories 
of respondents that formulated retrospective and prospective perceptions of political 
untrustworthiness following a different pattern than that described above.  
We have established therefore that the three lines of evaluating political agents and the 
retrospective and prospective nature of these assessments tap into attitudes of political 
distrust, following the conceptual model advanced in this thesis. Since we have asked 
respondents to evaluate two subcomponents of their political system, we were also able to 
look at the differences between perceptions of untrustworthiness for the national parliament 
and for the respondents’ preferred political party. As expected, respondents tend to evaluate 
their preferred party less negatively than national parliament, yet perceptions of 
untrustworthiness are still positively related. We did not find any evidence of ordering among 
items tapping into evaluations of parliament and preferred party, although, conceptually, 
there are good reasons to consider whether distrust of parliament and preferred party might 
be connected hierarchically. A citizen that perceives all political parties in the system as 
untrustworthy, even the party she considers to be closest to her preferences, is highly likely to 
perceive that the entire political system and its key representative institution are also 
untrustworthy.  
Our respondents did not all follow this pattern in evaluating the two political targets, although 
approximately 50% of our sample gave less negative evaluations to their political party 
compared to parliament per item. Taking a closer look at the respondents who registered 
extreme distrusting attitudes, that is giving the most extreme negative evaluations (values of 
six and seven on the seven-point scale) for all items tapping on attitudes towards a political 
target, we find that more respondents actively distrust their parliament than their preferred 
party. From 785 total respondents, 68 registered extreme distrust of parliament and 31 
distrusted their preferred party. Only 21 respondents claimed to have complete distrust in 
both political agents, and these are some of the respondents identified by the latent class 
model as the extreme distrusters, choosing extreme negative values for all 12 items. These 21 
respondents are part of the 31 people in our sample recording complete distrust in the 
political party they supported, while the remaining ten respondents registered distrusting 
attitudes towards parliament, but not on all six evaluations. In fact, no respondents expressed 
complete distrust in the political party of their choice and at the same time no extreme 
distrust in any of their evaluations of national parliament. On the opposite side, 32 
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respondents indicated complete distrust of national parliament and did not give any extreme 
negative evaluations to their preferred political party.49 Therefore, we can see that even on 
the extreme negative side of evaluations, the majority of respondents who completely distrust 
their party also distrust national parliament, but only a third of those who completely distrust 
Parliament also distrust their party.  
Overall, perceptions of untrustworthiness for two different parts of the political system are 
positively and strongly correlated. The differences in responses can be attributed to the fact 
that by virtue of representing the respondent’s chosen subcomponent of the political system, 
preferred party will be evaluated more sympathetically along all dimensions. It is equally 
possible that differences also arise from the distinctive practical nature of the two political 
objects. One is a partisan political agent that advances the interests and preferences of a part 
of society and is mostly identified with the people, personalities, ideology, issue preferences 
or pursued policies. National parliament, on the other hand, is a representative institution for 
the entire democratic polity and it incorporates democratic processes, functions and symbols, 
as well as the political class and party majorities currently in place. It is therefore expected 
that, although the same evaluative dimensions hold for assessing political untrustworthiness, 
there are different influences when considering the two political targets. Not simply in the 
way that citizens may prioritise one evaluative dimension over another, but through the 
events, experiences and information one uses to evaluate specific parts of the political 
system. 
Based on the conceptualisation of political distrust, it follows that citizen perceptions may 
vary across different political agents. Citizens can reach different conclusions regarding the 
technical incompetence, ethics and interests of different parts of the political system. They 
may distrust the government, but not the entire parliament, or the opposite way around. 
Similarly, they may distrust local government, but not national government, and vice versa, 
simply because different agents are involved in each evaluation, different expectations may 
be formed and different evidence may be relevant to their assessment. It is these variations 
which, although often small, allow political distrust to be based on the citizen’s cognitive 
processing and be open to change when evidence and information alter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Further analysis on that specific group of respondents shows that although it does not stand out on any 
demographic characteristics, its members have a statistically significant higher mean probability to vote for 
UKIP (the UK Independence Party, sitting at the far right of the main political parties and employing an anti-elit 
rhetoric) than the rest of the respondents. 
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At the same time, perceptions of untrustworthiness are not independent from each other. 
Even if we separate the items into two indicators of political distrust for each political target, 
these two indicators are positively and strongly correlated. The more a citizen perceives one 
part of her political system to be untrustworthy, the more likely she is to perceive that other 
parts of the system and the system in its entirety is untrustworthy. We discussed the potential 
direction of distrust spill-overs in the preceding chapter, as these emerged from citizen 
narratives of distrust. What we observe in the present analysis is that the individual evaluative 
items capture an overarching latent attitude of political distrust, along with specific elements 
relevant to the political untrustworthiness of each political agent. Multivariate analysis 
showed that all items loaded strongly on a single latent factor and that including all 
evaluations in a single indicator provides a unidimensional, homogenous and reliable scale of 
political distrust. Alternatively, we create two individual distrust indicators, one for each 
political target, with the two scales being strongly related (r=.55).  
There are three potential interpretations for this finding, which we referred to in the 
conceptual chapter of the thesis and would like to briefly revisit here. These three 
interpretations are often presented as contesting one another, but we would argue that they 
are simply explaining the same phenomenon from different viewpoints. The first views 
political distrust as a unidimensional concept, because it is taken to reflect the features of the 
political culture of the entire system. It follows a macro-level approach and focuses on the 
uniformity of political qualities in any given system (Hooghe, 2011). Alternatively, a micro-
level approach emphasises the features of the individual citizen that lead them to express 
distrust across most aspects of social and political life (Zmerli and Hooghe, 2011). Third, we 
can interpret this consistency by recalling the heuristic nature of political distrust attitudes. 
Political distrust does not simply act as a cognitive shortcut for future action and decision-
making, but also as a cognitive shortcut for itself, shaping all political evaluations and 
thought processes regarding political players.  
The three interpretations have their merits and are more likely to be functioning in 
combination, rather than exclusively, in influencing distrusting attitudes. Indeed, dramatic 
variations in the trustworthiness of political agents do not occur often in any given system, 
although some differences do exist and overlooking them may inhibit progress in 
understanding how particular judgments of distrust influence other attitudes and what can be 
done to remedy them. Similarly, it is possible that systematic ‘losers’ or ‘winners’ in society 
will evaluate political agents uniformly due to their developed predispositions. Yet, the 
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fluctuations in distrust and variation of responses along different evaluative dimensions 
suggest there are additional forces at play.  
Interpreting similarities in perceptions of political distrust using the idea of distrust as a 
heuristic mechanism is a promising avenue. In the context of our study, this view offers 
insights into the operation of distrusting attitudes that supplement the conceptual model 
advanced in the thesis. We can argue that political distrust entails both a dynamic process that 
is evaluation-specific and consideration-based, and an overarching heuristic-driven process. 
This means we can, and should, think of citizens’ expressions of political distrust both as a 
combination of assessments of the political system and its agents based on retrospective and 
prospective technical, ethical and interest-based considerations, and as an overall attitude of 
distrust that influences specific assessments and future decision-making. The distrust 
heuristic implies that no matter which component of the political system a citizen is asked to 
assess or which evaluative dimension she is asked about, the result will always be the same 
negative attitude of distrust. It is perhaps this dual function of political distrust that has 
caused confusion in interpreting citizen attitudes on top of the well-documented debate of 
specific and diffuse support. After all, continuous disappointing and untrustworthy political 
conduct, even when it is attributed to specific political agents, can spill over to more general 
evaluations regarding the political system. Equally, overarching attitudes of political distrust 
spill over and colour most evaluations of political agents in a system. Highlighting this 
double operation of distrusting attitudes can resolve some of the confusion surrounding the 
meaning and measurement of political distrust and improve our understanding of this attitude 
area.  
Turning to the survey indicator at hand, does it make more sense to speak of a single distrust 
attitude, or of a multidimensional attitude encompassing distrusting assessments of different 
parts of the political system? Our analysis suggests that the answer is, both. We believe we 
can confidently create a homogenous and reliable scale of political distrust by including all 
evaluative items. At the same time, we can also speak of distrust towards specific parts of the 
political system, in our case towards national parliament and preferred political party, and 
create two separate indicators that capture perceptions of untrustworthiness for each target – 
bearing in mind they are not entirely independent from each other. In the following chapters 
we will consider these indices, as well as the individual evaluative items, and investigate 
associations with other political attitudes and behavioural intentions relating to citizens’ 
political behaviour.  
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5.5 Discussing about validity and conclusion 	  
The final analysis presented in this chapter addresses issue of validity of our measure. 
Throughout this chapter, we have referred to the new items as tapping into attitudes of 
political distrust and of their aggregate scale as political distrust. However, as this is an 
entirely novel measure, it is necessary to justify our claim that these items provide a valid and 
reliable measurement of political distrust attitudes. In the following paragraphs we discuss 
the measure’s face and construct validity and provide remarks on the insights afforded by this 
chapter. 
 
Both reliability and Mokken analysis showed that the resultant scale (or scales, for each 
political target) are reliable and capture a single latent attitude. Are we thus justified in 
thinking of this as an attitude of political distrust? We believe we are. Based on the research 
design of the thesis and the exploratory research conducted in three European nations, 
including the country where the quantitative data originated, these survey items were 
formulated to capture citizens’ perceptions of political untrustworthiness. Perceptions of 
untrustworthiness were taken to reflect failure on technical matters and functions, unethical 
or unjust practices and outputs, and failure or unwillingness to protect the citizen’s best-
interest. These negative political orientations have also been identified by political scientists 
studying citizen attitudes since the 1960s. Although they have not been brought together in 
this manner before, analytically and conceptually we can expect that a citizen who perceives 
a political agent to have been technically incompetent, unethical and to have failed to protect 
her best-interest is expressing distrust towards that agent. The decision to include both 
retrospective and prospective assessments may have been guided by empirical findings in 
exploratory research, but the two time projections are also conceptually fundamentally 
important for the concept we are investigating. Including only prospective political 
assessments might inadvertently be tapping more strongly into underlying optimistic or 
pessimistic personal worldviews. Negative retrospective and prospective evaluations of 
political agents along these three dimensions combine past evidence available in the citizen’s 
cognitive and affective reservoir, as well as beliefs about the prospective likelihood of 
untrustworthy behaviour. 
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Certainly, a political system contains a multitude of political groups, institutions, agents and 
policy domains, and hence there are plentiful combinations of political targets we could ask 
respondents to assess. The choices of national parliament and preferred political party have 
been explained earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 3. An additional advantage of these parts 
of the political system is that they are less influenced by personal partisan affiliations than for 
example perceptions of national government. They are not completely immune from such 
influences; the parliament still includes the elected political class and partisan majorities, and 
strength of partisanship may affect technical, ethical and interest-based evaluations of one’s 
preferred party. Yet it would be hard to argue that these items tap into partisan evaluations 
instead of political distrust. In fact, we believe that the novelty of asking respondents about 
their preferred political party, as opposed to political parties in general (which regularly 
receive the lowest trust scores in European democracies) allows us to tap into the lower 
bound of political distrust with limited influence from ideology or partisanship effects.  
 
It can therefore be argued in good faith that respondents who agree with such negative 
evaluations of key political agents are expressing an attitude of distrust in politics. A further 
test that can boost our claim to a valid measure for political distrust refers to construct 
validity. In other words, if the new measure of political distrust behaves in a manner 
consistent with what existing theory about how attitudes of political distrust relate to other 
variables, this would provide evidence of a valid measure. We check construct validity using 
three sources of comparison for the new measure of political distrust. Firstly, we have 
theoretically informed expectations regarding the association between political distrust and 
external variables. Secondly, we include a traditionally phrased single item measuring trust in 
the British Parliament.50 This single trust in parliament item provides an additional source of 
comparison for associations within the same respondent sample. Finally, we use external 
associations of political trust measures available from the closest European Social Survey 
(conducted a year earlier than our survey) using a representative sample of the population in 
Great Britain to check for any discrepancies.  
 
We checked associations between our composite index of political distrust, including all 
evaluative items and a series of respondent characteristics that are related to political distrust 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The exact question read: “Please indicate how much you trust each of the following institutions to usually 
take the right decisions: The British Parliament”. 
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theoretically and empirically, through existing research. These variables are political 
cynicism, democratic satisfaction, political efficacy, political knowledge, strength of 
identification with the UK, left-right ideological position and respondent demographic 
information. A more comprehensive discussion of the different variables used in our survey 
can be found in Chapter 6. Also Chapter 2.6 elaborates on the theoretical links and 
importance of these related concepts. 
 
We expected to find a positive and strong association between attitudes of political cynicism 
and attitudes of political distrust. Although we have argued that cynicism and distrust are 
conceptually distinct the two are still strongly related. Levels of satisfaction with the 
workings of democracy capture more fluid attitudes of political support, sensitive to changes 
in government and economic performance and, hence, this variable is expected to relate to 
distrusting political attitudes in a negative way. Further, strong feelings of political efficacy 
are expected to be negatively associated with attitudes of distrust, given that those who feel 
like their actions and choices can influence political processes for the better are less likely to 
believe that those processes are malfunctioning or that politicians are behaving 
incompetently, unethically and against the citizen’s best-interest. The theoretical association 
between the two constructs is of course more nuanced, with political efficacy being also 
dependent on overall levels of political knowledge, political interest and even levels of 
education.  
 
The association between levels of political knowledge or education and political distrust is 
contested theoretically, though empirical survey evidence usually points to a negative 
association. The ‘winners hypothesis’ of political trust suggests that increased levels of 
information and knowledge, which ordinarily go hand in hand with higher levels of education 
and socioeconomic status, are negatively associated with political distrust (Zmerli and 
Newton, 2011; Uslaner 2002, Scheidegger and Staerklé, 2011). We also use respondents’ 
strength of identification with the UK as an additional measure. The association between 
identification with one’s nation and political distrust is complex and causality can be argued, 
theoretically, to run in either direction. Nevertheless, we would expect that attitudes of 
political distrust are related to a rupture in the citizen-state relationship and destroy one’s 
ability and willingness to identify with a political collective. The measure of ideological self-
placement in a left-right spectrum can also help test the validity of our distrust indicator. 
Respondents placing themselves on the right end of the scale tend to have higher trust in 
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political institutions and especially institutions of the state. Acceptance of political authority 
and endorsement of agents setting law and promoting order are both characteristics 
associated with right-wing ideology and lead to more positive evaluations of state 
institutions. Conversely, citizens who place themselves on the left end of the ideological 
spectrum tend to challenge the operations of the state more and hence express greater distrust 
of political agents and political institutions.51 Finally, there are two respondent characteristics 
to include in our investigation, which are age and gender.  
 
Table 5.7 presents correlation measures between these variables and the new political distrust 
index, as well as the single trust in parliament item. For further sources of comparison, Table 
5.7.1 presents association measures between trust indicators and a limited list of external 
variables available from a representative sample survey conducted in the UK in 2012. Both 
tables largely confirm the expected direction of association between the newly constructed 
political distrust scale and external variables, providing evidence of the measures’ validity. 
Only the association between education level and political distrust does not reach statistical 
significance, although we might have expected to see even a weak negative correlation of 
education and distrust, as seen by the single trust item and in the European Social Survey 
data.  
 
Table 5.7: Bivariate correlations between distrust measures and 
external variables  
 
Political Distrust 
Index 
Single Item Trust 
British Parliament 
Antecedents   
Political Cynicism  .450* -.519* 
UK Identification 
Strength -.270* .343* 
Political 
Knowledge -.078* .097* 
Political Efficacy  -.411* .300* 
LR Ideology  -.242* .208* 
Demographics 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 This effect should be enhanced by the fact that the current government at Westminster at the time of survey 
was headed by the Conservative Party, in a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, and hence Labour 
supporters could perceive Parliament to produce an output that is in line with Conservative policies and 
priorities. We have much less theoretical and empirical prior indication about the association between left-
leaning or right-leaning ideology and distrust of one’s preferred party of support. However, given the nature of 
the Westminster Parliament and evidence from the popular interviews conducted in the UK just a few months 
before the survey, former Labour Party supporters showed clear disappointment over the party’s past choices 
and its inability to stop Conservative policies. Hence, it is possible that again, the political party being in power 
may receive a boost in its apparent performance. 
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Age -.022 .063 
Gender (Male) -.010  .015 
Education  -.041 .087* 
Political Support 
 
 
Democratic 
Satisfaction -.586* .711* 
  
 
Traditional Trust 
British Parliament -.643* 1 
Note: Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. * Correlation is significant at 
the .05 level. 
 
 
Table 5.7.1: Correlation coefficients for trust measures, Great Britain ESS6, 2012 
 
Trust in Parliament Political Trust (Index) 
Political Interest .191* .023 
LR Ideology .184* .167* 
Age -.015 .021 
Gender (Male) .033 -.030 
Education  .147* .060* 
Democratic 
Satisfaction .567* .458* 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated using the ESS6 GB sample, n=2285. ‘Trust 
in Parliament’ is a single survey item measured on a 0-10 scale. ‘Political Trust’ is an index calculated 
using trust items for Parliament, the legal system, police, politicians and political parties (a=.871). * 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Looking at the remaining associations, political cynicism and identification with the UK are 
positively correlated with the index of political distrust. Further, political knowledge and 
political efficacy are negatively associated with our measure. The closest measure available 
in the ESS survey and fit for comparison is a measure of political interest which shows the 
expected weak, but positive relationship between trust in parliament and interest in politics. 
This relationship however is lost once a political trust index is used, highlighting the 
ambivalent association between the two concepts. Ideological placement in a left-right scale 
is also associated with our measures of political distrust as expected, and this relationship is 
confirmed by the single trust in parliament item and the ESS data. Personal characteristics of 
gender and age are not associated with political distrust levels in any significant way. Finally, 
measures of democratic satisfaction are also related to the indices of political distrust in the 
hypothesised way.  
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A final test of the new items is to explore the relationship between the distribution of 
responses to the single trust in parliament item included in the survey with the new index of 
political distrust. As the correlation coefficient in Table 5.7 show, the two measures are 
strongly associated, but the association is far from perfect. The single item asking 
respondents how much they trust national parliament is correlated at r=-.643 with the 
political distrust index. This strong association points to the additional facets of distrusting 
attitudes captured by the 12 items tapping into different aspects of political distrust, but also 
provides additional support for the validity of the new measures.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has investigated the survey items tapping into citizen attitudes of 
political distrust with the aim of revealing the internal structure of the data and adding to our 
understanding of distrusting attitudes. It has provided ample evidence to support the 
conceptual model of political distrust advanced throughout the thesis, supplementing this 
with new insights regarding the prominence of certain evaluative dimensions and the 
differences between retrospective and prospective assessments of political untrustworthiness. 
It also interpreted findings from multiple analyses regarding the structure of distrusting 
attitudes and identified two mechanisms in which these attitudes operate, which are both 
evaluation-based and heuristic-driven. Further, it addressed several measurement issues and 
justified the use of an index of political distrust as well as two separate indices for distrusting 
attitudes towards two components of the political system as valid and reliable indicators for 
subsequent analyses in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Political Distrust through Technical, Moral and 
Congruence Evaluations: What Evaluations Matter? 
 
6.1 Examining association of distrusting attitudes with related political concepts 
6.2 Examining associations of distrusting attitudes with behavioural intentions 
6.3 Investigating the distrust heuristic  
6.4 Discussion of the new measures’ contribution and conclusion 
 
 
This chapter examines how attitudes of political distrust are associated firstly, with key 
citizen characteristics and related political concepts, and secondly with behavioural intentions 
regarding citizens’ political participation. This part of the thesis seeks to explore which 
aspects of political distrust matter most for citizens’ political behaviour? Based on insights 
from earlier analyses, we investigate how different subcomponents of political distrust 
connect to related notions discussed in earlier chapters. We find that although there are no 
major variations in the way different evaluations of political untrustworthiness are associated 
with other political attitudes and citizen characteristics, assessments of preferred political 
party and national parliament show some important differences in relation to levels of 
political knowledge, efficacy and cynicism. 
 
We ask whether particular assessments of political untrustworthiness are more central than 
others in influencing behavioural intentions related to political action. An important part of 
the value in studying attitudes of political trust and distrust for political scientists is the 
behavioural manifestations such attitudes give rise to and their implications for democratic 
politics. Although in the scope of this thesis we cannot study realised behaviour, we can 
assess the role of distrust in motivating behavioural intentions. This allows us to better 
understand the structure of political distrust judgments by establishing which aspects of 
distrust are more powerful in shaping considerations for actions that contribute to democratic 
processes or distance citizens from the political system. Although the methodological 
approach is not designed to investigate causal relations, we are motivated by theoretical 
reasons and earlier research in arguing that associations between distrust and behavioural 
intentions indicate an influence of the former on the latter.52  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The exact phrasing of the behavioural intention items used in this analysis can be found in Appendix G. 
Respondents are asked to indicate whether they would consider actions such as abstaining in elections and 
participating in demonstrations, when they are unhappy with the situation in their country. These questions 
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Recalling the discussion on the association between political distrust and related attitudes in 
Chapter 2, we sought to investigate the potential motivating and demotivating influence of 
distrusting attitudes on political behavior. We find that, contrary to our expectations, distrust 
of national parliament based on considerations of diverging interests is not enough to 
motivate disruptive behaviour, such as abstaining from an election or leaving the country, 
though it can enhance a citizen’s intention to participate by demonstrating in a peaceful 
manner. In accordance with the discussion in the earlier parts of the thesis, we find that 
perceptions of untrustworthiness based on ethical judgments are stronger in motivating such 
actions that can be considered as disruptive for political processes. Further, we present some 
evidence that suggests distrust targeted at different parts of the political system can have the 
opposite influence on a citizen’s intention to participate in politics in an active manner. 
Distrusting attitudes targeted towards one’s preferred party demotivate participation through 
democratic avenues, whereas distrusting attitudes based on negative ethical and interest-
based assessments of parliament can prove motivating for such action. Though overall, the 
aggregate indicator of political distrust suggests increased distrust leads citizens to consider 
more action that weakens democratic processes and less active political participation, the 
pathways of these effects are varied. 
 
Finally, we choose to investigate in more detail the group of respondents who register active 
political distrust along all evaluative dimensions and time projections and for both national 
parliament and preferred political party. We interpret their unwillingness or inability to make 
any distinction between the evaluative items as an illustration of the distrust heuristic 
mechanism taking over. To explore this function of distrusting attitudes further, we look at 
whether this group of individuals can be distinguished from those who formulate distrusting 
judgments following a combination of evaluation. We find that this group can be 
distinguished both on the basis of their average level of political knowledge, education 
profile and their intention to consider disruptive forms of political action.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
clearly tap on intentions of political action in the case of political grievances, not actual behaviour but they 
provide a useful insight to relation between distrusting attitudes and the potential range of actions a citizen could 
envisage taking once he is displeased with politics. 
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6.1 Examining association of distrusting attitudes with related political concepts 
 
The first section of the final empirical chapter of this thesis presents further analyses of the 
associations between the new measure of political distrust and citizen characteristics, 
building on insights from the preceding chapter. We have already introduced the key political 
attitudes and respondent characteristics that are expected to be associated with political 
distrust. These were used in the preceding chapter to provide a construct validity test for the 
new political distrust indicator created. In this chapter, we take advantage of the multiple 
items included in the measure of political distrust and examine these associations for each 
evaluative dimension, time projection and different political target of distrust. Before looking 
at each individual item, we compare how distrust in national parliament and distrust in 
preferred party relate to political attitudes of political cynicism, political efficacy, political 
knowledge, strength of identification with the UK and left-right ideological position, and 
respondent demographics. This analysis provides meaningful information about the 
subcomponents of distrusting attitudes driving the associations between distrust and other 
political attitudes.  
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, we note the methodological choices made in this 
section. The relationship between political distrust and many of the political variables 
considered in this section, such as political efficacy, knowledge and even cynicism, does not 
imply a simple one-directional causal association. Theoretically, the associations are more 
complex and the direction of effects can be argued to flow both ways to and from political 
distrust. For example, feelings of political inefficacy, that is, the belief that a citizen cannot 
comprehend nor meaningfully contribute to political processes, should boost negative 
perceptions of political agents and distrust towards the political system. At the same time, 
distrusting attitudes towards the political system and perceptions of untrustworthy political 
agents can also be expected to contribute to feelings of inefficacy and the belief that one 
cannot influence political processes. Unfortunately, in the context of this research project we 
are not able to address the question of causal direction. Nevertheless, given the multiple item 
indicator of political distrust, we can investigate the subcomponents of political distrust that 
are driving the association, whether certain evaluative dimensions are related more strongly 
to feelings of efficacy and whether evaluations of national parliament or preferred party are 
influenced more strongly, which provide novel information regarding the relationship of 
efficacy and distrust.  
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Similarly, political knowledge can be thought to influence and be influenced by distrusting 
attitudes. Most often we consider the association to run from political knowledge to attitudes 
of distrust, and expect increased levels of knowledge to render political agents and 
institutions more familiar, more approachable and contribute to less negative perceptions of 
politics. However, attitudes of political distrust can also influence the amount of political 
knowledge citizens seek; a citizen that considers their political system to be untrustworthy 
may be driven to ‘switch off’ from political discussion and information. We recognise that 
both processes are possible and for this part of our analysis we cannot make any claims as to 
the direction of causality. Yet, there are good reasons to believe that all of the aforementioned 
factors to a certain extent influence levels of political distrust, and hence we can use them as 
independent variables in a regression model in order to isolate the effect of each variable on 
the subcomponent of distrust.  
 
We first present measures of bivariate associations for the three political distrust indices 
(distrust of preferred party, distrust of national parliament and the composite index of 
political distrust), as well as the single trust in parliament item included in the survey, before 
presenting the results of the regression analysis. Table 6.1 shows correlation measures for 
distrust indices and other citizen characteristics. Looking at the bivariate associations, we can 
see that political cynicism and identification with the UK positively correlate with the 
measures of political distrust. It is worth noting that these correlate more strongly with the 
single traditionally phrased trust in parliament item, which aims to capture trust by intuition, 
rather than tapping into its different aspects using different attitude statements. The 
association between distrust and cynical traits and national identification appears to be 
weaker when respondents are asked to assess political targets on their past and future actions 
along specific technical, ethical and interest-based lines.   
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Table 6.1: Bivariate correlations between distrust indicators, political attitudes 
and citizen characteristics  
 
Distrust 
Parliament 
Index 
Distrust 
Preferred 
Political Party 
Index 
Political 
Distrust 
Index 
Single Item 
Trust British 
Parliament 
Political Cynicism .478* .314* .450* -.519* 
Political Efficacy -.267* -.459* -.411* .300* 
Political 
Knowledge .020 -.160* -.078* .097* 
UK Identification 
Strength -.237* -.239* -.270* .343* 
LR Ideology -.247* -.179* -.242* .208* 
Age .050 -.091* -.022 .063 
Gender (Male) .055 -.039 .010 .015 
Education  -.044 -.027 -.041 .087* 
     
Traditional Trust 
British Parliament -.632* -.461* -.643* 1 
Note: Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
On the contrary, political efficacy, political knowledge and left-right ideological placement 
are associated more strongly with the distrust indices than the single trust item. For the 
measure of political efficacy, the negative association with distrust is driven more strongly by 
perceptions of one’s preferred political party than national parliament. Similarly, the 
association between political knowledge and distrust is driven by distrust in one’s preferred 
party. The relationship between perceptions of untrustworthiness and knowledge is negative, 
although weak. As hypothesised in the section above, increased levels of political 
information are linked to less political distrust, insofar as this is captured by the distrust in 
preferred party index. The correlation between distrust of parliament and political knowledge 
does not reach statistical significance, which is slightly surprising given that the single trust 
in parliament measure is positively, albeit very weakly, correlated to political knowledge. In 
the next few sections of this chapter, we intend to further investigate the relationship between 
political knowledge and political distrust, examining the relationship with subcomponents of 
distrusting attitudes controlling for other respondent characteristics. 
 
Ideological placement on a left-right scale is an interesting respondent characteristic that 
interacts with political distrust attitudes on two levels. Firstly, more right-wing or 
conservative ideology is associated with higher approval for and favourable perceptions of 
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political institutions, whereas left-wing ideology has traditionally been linked with more 
defiant attitudes towards political authority and negative orientations towards hierarchical 
political institutions. Although the left-right ideological spectrum varies considerably 
between national contexts and national party-systems, we expect to find a similar relationship 
in the UK population. At a second level, we cannot neglect the party effect entailed in 
ideological placement along a left-right dimension, both in the context of the UK majoritarian 
political system and of course in evaluations of one’s preferred partisan group. With a 
Conservative Party lead government and Conservative-Liberal Democrat majority in the 
House of Commons during the time of our survey, we can expect that perceptions of political 
untrustworthiness for national parliament to be boosted by partisan considerations. In 
particular, retrospective interest-based evaluations should be more negative for supporters of 
the left and left-leaning ideologues and less negative for supporters of the right.  
 
For evaluations of preferred political party, ideology should have less of an influence if we 
assume that each respondent is assessing the political party closest to their ideological 
preference on a left-right dimension. Nevertheless, we still find a weak but negative 
correlation, pointing to the fact that respondents who place themselves towards the left (lower 
end of the left-right scale) report more distrusting attitudes towards their chosen party. This 
finding is in line with evidence from citizen interviews carried out a few months prior to the 
survey, where left-leaning citizens and former Labour Party supporters often evaluated their 
party in a negative manner, referring to policy failures, dubious decisions taken while in 
government and general disappointment for the party not representing the ideological space.  
 
In terms of other respondent demographic characteristics, gender and age are not associated 
with political distrust levels in any significant way, although we do find a small association 
between age and distrust in the political party of one’s choice. Perceptions of 
untrustworthiness are more prevalent among younger respondents, while older respondents 
record more favourable evaluations of their preferred party: a finding that is in line with party 
identification theories where party attachment strengthens through time (Campbell et al., 
1960). Finally, we have included a single measure of asking respondents’ level of trust in 
their parliament, which correlates moderately to strongly, but far from perfectly with our 
political distrust index. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, using multiple items to tap 
into attitudes of political distrust through different evaluative dimensions, time projections 
and political targets helps us to capture additional aspects of distrusting attitudes that could 
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not be captured by a single trust survey question. None of the measures of association in 
Table 6.1 is so high as to suggest that our indices are inadvertently capturing some other 
latent attitude.  
 
As a second step in the analysis of associations between the new indices of political distrust 
and political variables, Table 6.2 below presents the results of multiple regression analysis for 
distrust of parliament and distrust of political party indices, as well as the aggregate political 
distrust index. We are mainly interested in what happens to the effects we have identified 
once we control for all other respondent characteristics: which associations remain, which are 
explained away by other more powerful variables and which ones are altered?  
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Table 6.2: Regression results showing partial associations of political characteristics and 
distrust indices 
Dependent Variable Model 1 
Distrust Parliament 
Index 
Model 2 
Distrust Preferred 
Political Party Index 
Model 3 
Political Distrust 
Index 
Independent Variables 
  
 
Political Cynicism .690*** .346*** .519*** 
 
(.05) (.05) (.04) 
Political Knowledge  .250** -.140 .055 
 
(.12) (.13) (.10) 
Political Efficacy -.144*** -.337*** -.241*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) 
UK Identification 
Strength -.120*** -.089*** -.105*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.02) 
L-R Ideology -.119*** -.055*** -.087*** 
 
(.02) (.02) (.01) 
2. Middle level 
Education .004 .072 .038 
 
(.11) (.12) (.10) 
3. Higher Level 
Education .054 .127 .091 
(ref.cat. Low Educ) (.12) (.12) (.10) 
Age .008*** .004 .005*** 
 
(.002) (.002) (.002) 
Male .093 .009 .05 
 
(.07) (.07) (.062) 
Constant 2.947*** (.32) 4.496***(.32) 3.722*** (.27) 
R-squared .347 .291 .374 
Note: OLS regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05. 
 
 
A few differences become readily apparent in the determinants of the two indices. Firstly 
political cynicism has twice as powerful an association with distrusting attitudes towards 
national parliament than towards one’s preferred party. Of course, evaluations of preferred 
party are not immune from one’s cynical approach to the political world, but it seems that the 
chosen subcomponent of the political system is influenced less by overall cynical 
predispositions. The direction of the effect is clearly positive for all indices, with higher 
levels of political cynicism fuelling greater distrust. Feelings of political efficacy are still 
more strongly associated with less negative evaluations of the citizens’ chosen political agent 
than evaluations of national parliament.  
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Interestingly, the effect of political knowledge alters once we control for the remaining 
respondent characteristics. On the basis of bivariate correlations we failed to find a 
significant linear association between political knowledge scores and distrusting evaluations 
of national parliament. However, in the regression analysis we find a positive and significant 
effect of political knowledge on distrust of national parliament. In other words, when it 
comes to assessing the trustworthiness of national parliament, respondents who score higher 
on the political knowledge indicator are more likely to distrust parliament than those 
respondents with a lower political knowledge score, given the same levels of political 
cynicism, efficacy and other characteristics. Here, the direction of the association goes 
against previously stated expectations. In the earlier chapters of this thesis we noted that the 
way in which political distrust is expected to relate to other concepts central to political 
behaviour has often been contested both theoretically and empirically. This has been the case 
for political action and behavioural intentions, which we will be addressing in the following 
section, but also for political knowledge and education. Indeed, increased levels of political 
knowledge and education are also expected to contribute to ‘critical’ assessments of political 
institutions and processes as they place stronger democratic demands on the system. 
Knowing more about the ways in which one’s political system functions and the people in 
key positions of authority can also make one more likely to form negative assessments of 
these functions and agents. Alternatively, taking the opposite flow of influence, perceptions 
of untrustworthy political agents may motivate citizens to seek more political information 
and increase their levels of political knowledge. 
 
Although we fail to find any effect on levels of education throughout our analysis (possibly 
as an imposed limitation of the non-representative sample), what we do find is a surprising 
discrepancy between the association of political knowledge and distrusting attitudes targeted 
at two different parts of the political system. The effect of political knowledge on evaluations 
of preferred party was found to be negative through bivariate correlations, with respondents 
that scored higher on the political knowledge measure giving less negative evaluations of 
their chosen political party. When controlling for feelings of political efficacy and other 
characteristics this effect largely disappears and is no longer significant. Therefore, in our 
sample, increased levels of political knowledge contribute to political distrust only through 
negative evaluations of parliament. The evidence is not unequivocal and the effect of political 
knowledge on the aggregate political distrust index does not reach statistical significance. In 
the case of assessments of one’s preferred political party, higher levels of political 
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information contribute to less negative evaluations of the party’s actions, in particular their 
expectations of untrustworthy future behaviour and belief that this party will not act in a way 
that goes against their personal preferences. This analysis further highlights how increased 
levels of information and knowledge can have a multifarious effect on political distrust, 
depending on other key citizen characteristics, the political object under evaluation and even 
the time projection of specific evaluations.  
 
Previous analyses of distrusting attitudes were not able to delve deeper into the ways in 
which political attitudes and citizen characteristics are associated to political distrust. Even 
when different items tapping into trust in different political institutions are available, there is 
no way of breaking down associations further to explore what aspects of trustworthiness are 
shaped by different characteristics. An additional advantage of using multiple items to tap 
into attitudes of political distrust is that we can de-aggregate the index and examine the 
associations between these variables and each individual item. We have already seen 
differences in the way respondent characteristics influence perceptions of political 
untrustworthiness for national parliament and preferred political party, as well as in the way 
certain associations alter when controlling for remaining variables.  
 
We can now explore the evaluative pathways in which levels of cynicism, political 
knowledge, efficacy and other characteristics influence distrusting attitudes. We know from 
earlier analysis that retrospective evaluations of national parliament produce distrusting 
judgements more easily than prospective ones, and that interest-based evaluative dimensions 
make it easier for respondents to formulate negative expectations. We also noted the 
prominence of moral considerations in distrusting attitudes, both towards one’s preferred 
party and distrust of national parliament.  
 
Table 6.3 below presents correlation measures for political attitudes and respondent 
characteristics for each distrust item. Although there are no sharp differences among the 
items tapping into perceptions of political untrustworthiness, we can see that associations are 
generally weaker between interest-based evaluations of national parliament than for technical 
and moral evaluations. This suggests that considerations of deviating interests capture some 
additional aspect of political distrust that refers to political preferences and interest 
representation. Indeed, even levels of political cynicism, which might have been expected to 
contribute most to perceptions of deviating interests between the citizens and political agents, 
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are associated more strongly with negative technical assessments. This effect is confirmed in 
regression analyses (Tables 6.4, 6.5), where political cynicism contributes more to 
assessments of technical incompetence, both for national parliament and preferred party.  
 
Political efficacy is negatively associated with perceptions of political untrustworthiness, but 
the strongest link is with evaluations of unethical political conduct and not with evaluations 
of incongruent interests. Increased levels of political efficacy contribute more heavily to 
normative evaluations of the political system (again supported by regression analyses in 
Tables 6.4, 6.5). Feeling capable of understanding and influencing political processes drives 
respondents to evaluate political agents more positively along all three evaluative 
dimensions, but most of all along normative lines.  
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Table 6.3: Bivariate correlations between distrust items political attitudes and citizen characteristics 
 
Political 
Cynicism 
Political 
Knowledge 
Political 
Efficacy 
UK 
Identification 
Strength 
LR 
Ideology Age 
Gender 
(Male) Education 
Distrust of National Parliament       
Parliament Technical Retrospective .455* .017 -.242* -.201* -.215* .029 .055 -.069 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .395* .022 -.260* -.216* -.225* .047 .043 -.049 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .385* .041 -.158* -.180* -.238* .076* .034 -.018 
Parliament Technical Prospective .420* -.004 -.243* -.214* -.185* .014 .046 -.048 
Parliament Moral Prospective .407* .001 -.250* -.200* -.188* .029 .051 -.022 
Parliament Interest Prospective .344* .023 -.190* -.181* -.192* .058 .046 -.018 
Distrust of Preferred Political Party       
Party Technical Retrospective .312* -.110* -.411* -.184* -.179* -.038 -.009 -.007 
Party Moral Retrospective .289* -.095* -.416* -.183* -.220* -.031 -.044 -.045 
Party Interest Retrospective .252* -.090* -.400* -.203* -.181* -.067 -.028 -.009 
Party Technical Prospective .265* -.169* -.357* -.210* -.098* -.103* -.037 -.020 
Party Moral Prospective .239* -.157* -.382* -.218* -.121* -.092* -.050 -.045 
Party Interest Prospective .244* -.196* -.373* -.219* -.110* -.134* -.028 -.029 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, N=785, *p<.05. 
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As expected, the opposite pattern is evident in the association between the national 
parliament distrust items and ideological left-right placement. Here the strongest association 
among the three evaluative dimensions is that which captures incongruent interests. Both 
retrospective and prospective evaluations of parliament are less negative among those 
respondents who place themselves on the right of the ideology scale, but retrospective items 
receive the biggest boost as a result of the Conservative-led government that had been in 
place for the past four years. Left-right ideology is associated more weakly with evaluations 
of preferred party, but the considerable coefficients between retrospective evaluations, 
especially moral, do reflect the comments of interview participants who identified themselves 
as Labour Party supporters and expressed intense feelings of disappointment with their party. 
The association with prospective expectations for the party’s conduct is much weaker, 
suggesting that party supporters from across the ideological spectrum are more likely to 
formulate positive expectations for their preferred political party, even if they have been let 
down in the past. Controlling for other respondent characteristics, the effect of ideology on 
preferred party assessments is no longer significant for prospective evaluations (Table 6.5). If 
respondents’ self-placement on the ideology scale in our sample mirrors their political party 
preference, we could claim that they are all equally confident of their party’s trustworthy 
behaviour in the coming years.53 
 
Education is still not correlated in any significant way with the individual evaluative items, 
failing to provide any more insights into this relationship. Finally, the other two demographic 
characteristics show that gender has no significant linear association with the evaluative 
items and that for age the relationship is only statistically significant for the prospective 
evaluations of preferred party behaviour. Surprisingly, distrust of national parliament and 
distrust of preferred party items are associated with age and gender in opposite directions. 
The correlation between age and evaluations of national parliament is positive, with older 
respondents being more distrustful of parliament, although the associations are very weak and 
seldom significant. These differences disappear once we control for other characteristics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Further	  tests	  indicate	  that	  Conservative,	  UKIP	  and	  BNP	  potential	  voters	  evaluate	  their	  preferred	  parties	  favourably,	  whereas	  Liberal	  Democrat	  and	  Labour	  potential	  voters	  are	  more	  sceptical	  and	  disapproving	  of	   their	   party’s	   recent	   actions.	  When	  prompted	   to	   evaluate	  prospective	   actions,	   however,	   respondents’	  expectations	  are	  more	  positive	  (for	  Liberal	  Democrat	  voters	  on	  the	  moral	  prospective	  evaluation).	  This	  is	  in	   line	   with	   the	   overall	   finding	   of	   different	   judgments	   of	   past	   and	   future	   conduct,	   future	   judgments	  capturing	   more	   hopeful	   and	   positive	   expectations	   than	   retrospective	   ones.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   prospective	  evaluations,	  one’s	  left-­‐right	  ideological	  placement	  plays	  no	  part	  in	  shaping	  towards	  the	  preferred	  political	  party.	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however, and we have some evidence that in our sample, older age contributes to more 
negative perceptions of political untrustworthiness.  
 
Taking a closer look at Tables 6.4 and 6.5, which present the results of OLS multiple 
regression analysis for each political distrust item, we can examine this irregular effect of 
political knowledge on distrust. As seen by the analysis of distrust indices, once we control 
for political efficacy and other key respondent characteristics, increased levels of political 
knowledge contribute to negative evaluations of national parliament, but these are driven 
primarily by retrospective technical and ethical assessments. None of the other coefficients 
reaches statistical significance. On the other hand, increased political information contributes 
to positive prospective evaluations of preferred party, especially interest-based prospective 
expectations. Therefore, political knowledge not only influences different political targets in 
opposite ways, but also affects retrospective and prospective perceptions of 
untrustworthiness. Having more information about political players and processes may 
motivate unfavorable evaluations of past performance and ethical conduct, but at the same 
time may draw citizens closer to the political system, foster attachments with political 
subcomponents, such as a political party, and boost their belief in more positive prospective 
actions. Essentially, we find evidence that increased levels of political sophistication and 
knowledge can both increase and lower distrust at the same time. 
 
We have pulled apart an initial weak but negative correlation between our political distrust 
index and political knowledge to uncover a fairly complex pattern of associations with 
different evaluative dimensions, projections and political targets. Although as political 
scientists we always prefer less complex models and explanations over more complicated 
ones, the purpose of this analysis has been to highlight that in the case of a social construct as 
multifaceted as political distrust, it may be beneficial to investigate complex underlying 
associations. When presented with contesting theoretical expectations, exploring each 
association and breaking down perceptions of political untrustworthiness help to produce 
meaningful explanations for the relations we are observing, which can further illuminate the 
different pathways activated by different theoretical approaches. 
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Table 6.4: Regression results showing partial associations of political characteristics and distrust in parliament items 
Dependent Variable Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
Independent Variables 
      Political Cynicism .792*** .711*** .697*** .711*** .695*** .534*** 
 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Political Knowledge  .314** .333** .230 .206 .198 .219 
 
(.15) (.16) (.16) (.15) (.16) (.16) 
Political Efficacy -.155*** -.196*** -.068 -.154*** -.176*** -.119*** 
 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
UK Identification Strength -.101*** -.140*** -.117*** -.129*** -.115*** -.113*** 
 
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
L-R Ideology -.118*** -.130*** -.158*** -.096*** -.104*** -.112*** 
 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
2. Middle level Education -.171 -.100 .106 -.0340 .169 .053 
 
(.14) (.15) (.15) (.14) (.15) (.14) 
3. Higher Level Education -.126 -.028 .157 .009 .200 .114 
(ref.cat. Low Educ) (.14) (.16) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.150) 
Age .007** .009*** .012*** .007** .008*** .010*** 
 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Male .106 .0634 .0349 .112 .134 .109 
 
(.09) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Constant 2.682*** (.38) 3.241*** (.42) 2.870*** (.41) 2.832*** (.40) 2.706*** (.41) 3.350*** (.40) 
R-squared .298 .267 .244 .255 .245 .187 
Note: OLS regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.5: Regression results showing partial associations of political characteristics and distrust in preferred party items 
Dependent Variable Party Technical 
Retrospective 
Party Moral 
Retrospective 
Party Interest 
Retrospective 
Party Technical 
Prospective 
Party Moral 
Prospective 
Party Interest 
Prospective 
Independent Variables 
      Political Cynicism .429*** .382*** .349*** .351*** .294*** .274*** 
 
(.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) 
Political Knowledge  .071 .140 .189 -.297** -.201 -.401** 
 
(.15) (.15) (.16) (.15) (.16) (.16) 
Political Efficacy -.360*** -.376*** -.369*** -.280*** -.328*** -.310*** 
 
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
UK Identification Strength -.061 -.041 -.090** -.096** -.112*** -.111*** 
 
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) 
L-R Ideology -.073*** -.107*** -.072*** -.017 -.030 -.027 
 
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) 
2. Middle level Education .193 .123 .149 -.054 -.041 .061 
 
(.14) (.14) (.15) (.14) (.15) (.15) 
3. Higher Level Education .309** .091 .197 .081 -.008 .093 
(ref.cat. Low Educ) (.14) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.15) 
Age .008*** .005 .005 .002 .003 -.000 
 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
Male .061 -.060 -.005 .018 -.039 .079 
 
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) (.09) 
Constant 3.941*** (.40) 4.435*** (.40) 4.568*** (.41) 4.289*** (.40) 4.835*** (.41) 4.911*** (.40) 
R-squared .247 .254 .215 .192 .200 .199 
Note: OLS regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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All analyses carried out in this section study linear associations. The evaluative items tapping 
into distrusting attitudes are all measured using a seven-point scale, but we are also interested 
to determine which part of the scale is driving these associations we identified. Using the 
results of the latent class analysis conducted in Chapter 5, we collapsed each item response 
scale into three categories and test for statistically significant differences among these three 
groups.54 First we compared the three groups based on their mean values of political cynicism 
and found that mean differences are statistically significant among each group in the expected 
direction. Strength of identification with the UK also shows statistically significant means 
among the three groups of responses for national parliament distrust items, with the least 
distrusting respondents scoring the highest level of identification. The differences are not 
significant only for retrospective interest-based evaluations of national parliament, where 
only the trusting group has a higher level of identification with the UK. For distrust of one’s 
preferred political party we can see the association between identification strength and 
evaluations of distrust is driven by the lower end of responses. For all six items, the mean 
level of identification with the UK is significantly higher for the group of more positive 
responses.  
 
Next we delve into the difference between the three groups of responses to parliament items 
and their average scores of political efficacy and political knowledge. The negative 
association between political efficacy and distrust in parliament is driven by the lower end of 
the distrust scale. Those with the least negative evaluations of parliament register 
significantly higher levels of political efficacy. Political knowledge, measured as a three-
question politics test, is not correlated with any of the parliament distrust items in a 
significant way. However, there is a statistically significant difference in the average level of 
political knowledge for the three groups. In every one of the six evaluative items for national 
parliament the group of respondents opting for the middle category also score the lowest 
political knowledge average. This difference is significant for four evaluative items: all three 
retrospective evaluations and prospective evaluations for technical competence. Interestingly 
the average political knowledge score for respondents at the higher and lower end of the scale 
is similar across all evaluative items. This provides further evidence in favour of the double 
role played by increased amounts of information, leading to more critical and negative as 
well as more positive evaluations of political targets. In terms of education level, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The three categories are: negative evaluations (responses ‘5 to 7’), average evaluations (scale midpoint, 
response ‘4’) and low negative evaluations (responses 1 to 3). 
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unfortunately, we still do not find any statistically significant association with the distrust 
items. We can observe that when it comes to evaluations of national parliament, the 
respondent group with very negative evaluations contains a greater portion of respondents 
with higher levels of education and a smaller portion of respondents with lower levels of 
education than the trusting group, though these differences are very small. 
 
Political knowledge and distrust of one’s preferred party are significantly correlated in a 
negative direction, although again here we can see that the group of respondents that opts for 
the middle category has the lowest average political knowledge score. The main difference in 
the associations between the two political objects is that in the case of evaluations for 
preferred party the respondent group at the lower end of negative evaluations shows higher 
levels of political knowledge than the group at the higher end, driving that overall negative 
linear association. Evaluating a partisan political agent considered closest to the respondent 
should be an easier cognitive task than evaluating a more distant and complex political 
institution. A citizen with more information about politics and more confidence in 
understanding political processes should also be able to identify at least one party in the 
political arena that best represents their interests and ethical values. 
 
In conclusion, we have seen that political cynicism is associated more strongly to negative 
evaluations of national parliament than to evaluations of one’s chosen subcomponent of the 
political system, although these perceptions are not immune. We found that political 
knowledge, as measured through a three-question index, has a manifold relationship with 
measures of political distrust. The bivariate association shows that higher scores of political 
knowledge are linked to less distrusting attitudes towards the respondent’s preferred party, 
while there was no link to attitudes towards the parliament. However, when controlling for 
other respondent characteristics, the association between political knowledge and distrust in 
preferred party disappears, and the effect of higher levels of political knowledge on distrust in 
parliament becomes positive and significant. In other words, for respondents with the same 
levels of cynicism, ideology, efficacy, national identification and demographic 
characteristics, higher levels of political knowledge result in more distrust in parliament, 
driven by negative retrospective assessments of technical competence and moral conduct. For 
assessments of preferred political party, the effect of political knowledge is explained away 
by feelings of political efficacy. Theoretically, both higher levels of political efficacy and 
higher political knowledge should be associated with the ability to identify a political agent 
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that one can support. In the case of political efficacy, feeling efficacious contributes to less 
untrustworthy perceptions of both political targets, across all evaluative dimensions. 
Interestingly, the specific evaluation for which efficacy feelings have the biggest effect is the 
one based on ethical norms and fairness. Feeling you understand and can influence political 
processes makes you less negative about the normative underpinnings of your preferred 
party, the parliament and the entire political system. 
 
 
6.2 Examining associations of distrusting attitudes with behavioural intentions 
 
From its outset, this thesis has argued that attitudes of political distrust are important to 
investigate due to their role in motivating citizens’ political behaviour. In the definition 
provided in Chapter 2, a citizen’s decision to distrust a political agent is made in “a context in 
which it affects his own action” (Gambetta, 1988: 217). Further, as we have seen from the 
empirical research conducted for this study, behavioural intentions feature prominently in 
citizen narratives of political distrust. The original formulation of civic culture entailed a 
citizenry that is both positively oriented towards the political system and its agents, as well as 
participatory in its approach to political processes. Attitudes of political distrust affect both 
aspects of citizens’ political lives. The effect of distrust on the former is straightforward; 
distrusting citizens are clearly not oriented positively towards political agents and the system 
in general. Yet the effect of political distrust on citizens’ participation habits is harder to 
trace. As discussed in Chapter 2, various theories have been formulated and many hypotheses 
have been tested regarding the effect of political distrust on citizens’ political behaviour, 
some providing more conclusive results than others.  
 
Much of the research investigating the link between distrusting attitudes and behaviour has 
focused on the specific action of electoral participation. Many empirical studies have 
provided evidence in favour of the hypothesis that trusting citizens are more likely to 
participate in politics through voting, while distrusting citizens are less likely to do so 
(Hooghe and Dassonneville, 2014; Bélanger and Nadeau, 2005). Yet despite this evidence, 
political scientists have not been able to identify which subcomponents of distrusting 
attitudes are more central in motivating such types of political behaviour. Mapping the effects 
each evaluative dimension has on behavioural intentions can provide valuable information 
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about the relationship between distrust and political action, as well as about the most 
appropriate ways to remedy or tackle these phenomena. Similarly, it is useful to know 
whether perceptions of political untrustworthiness that are specific to one political agent are 
more central in citizens’ consideration of abstaining, casting a blank vote and other political 
actions, or whether, as shown in the previous section, distrusting attitudes formulated in 
respect to different political agents motivate different types of behavioural intentions.  
 
In the following paragraphs we examine these associations between distrusting attitudes, their 
subcomponents and a series of behavioural intentions for political participation. The 
behavioural intentions we consider in our study have been identified through earlier 
exploratory research presented in Chapter 4 and are also central to some of the theoretical 
debates inherited from political behaviour research in political distrust, alienation and 
disaffection discussed in Chapter 2. As mentioned above, studies on the effects of distrust on 
political behaviour have been less conclusive when it came to investigating aspects of 
institutional and non-institutional political participation other than voting. We chose to focus 
on specific actions we expect distrusting attitudes to influence, which are central to citizens’ 
overall participant stance towards their political system. In the survey we included eight 
items referring to behavioural intentions. Respondents were asked about the likelihood of 
abstaining in an election, casting a blank vote and voting for a radical party, the likelihood of 
attending a peaceful or a violent demonstration, the likelihood of joining a political party or 
joining a pressure group, and finally the likelihood they would consider leaving the country.55 
 
These items are grouped into two separate categories of political behaviour, which can 
arguably provide more meaningful insights into the relationship between distrust and political 
participation than the traditional separation of institutionalised versus non-institutionalised 
participation. First, items referring to the likelihood of attending a peaceful demonstration, 
joining a political party and joining a pressure group or NGO are grouped together in an 
indicator of active political participation, which represents types of citizen action that operate 
within the system and its democratic principles. Items referring to electoral abstaining, blank 
voting, voting for a radical party, joining a violent demonstration and considering moving 
away from the country are grouped together in an indicator denoting political action that is 
disruptive for the citizen-state relation and the stability of the political system. Describing all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 For more information on the operationalisation, wording and selection of variables see Appendix H. 
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of these items as types of ‘participation’ may be surprising, given that in some cases they 
entail non-participation. Still, they do involve decision-making and political action that 
shapes citizens’ overall input to the political system. 
 
In addition to the two indices for active political participation and disruptive participation, we 
look more closely at election related behaviour. Abstention or non-participation in the 
electoral process erodes the effectiveness and legitimacy of the democratic system and might 
lead to political instability over time. Hence, it is particularly interesting to determine which 
evaluations of political untrustworthiness motivate such types of political behaviour. 
Similarly, we are looking for insights into the relationship between distrusting attitudes and 
the intention to support an extremist, radical or anti-systemic party, which is increasingly 
becoming a relevant outlet for citizen frustration and placing mounting pressures on political 
systems in Europe. Distrust of the political system in general and the national parliament 
should be more central in motivating considerations of voting for a radical party, whose aim 
is precisely changing political processes and challenging the current system. In this instance 
we expect retrospective negative evaluations to be a particularly prominent factor in 
motivating the choice of abstention and radical voting. Distrust of national parliament due to 
past evidence of technical incompetence, violations of shared ethical norms and political 
decisions that go against the best-interest of the citizen are expected to boost considerations 
of voting for a radical political party that advocates a change in the political direction of the 
country. Distrust of national parliament should also motivate electoral abstention, but even 
more prominent should be perceptions of untrustworthiness related to one’s preferred 
political party. Given that elections are political contests where citizens are called on to 
support their preferred political group, negative evaluations of one’s preferred party are 
expected have a strong demotivating influence on citizens.  
 
In popular interview narratives many citizens expressing intense political distrust towards 
their political system also expressed the intention of somehow removing themselves from the 
citizen-state relation and severing ties with the political collective, not only by not voting, but 
also by moving away from the country. This is certainly an extreme reaction and as such it 
provides a harder test for the reach of distrusting attitudes in influencing citizen behaviour. 
Given the gravity of such an action, distrust attitudes would need to be strong and pervasive 
to the entire political system and its central institutions in order to motivate considerations of 
leaving the country.  
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We also investigate the association between distrusting attitudes and active political 
participation, especially the intention of participating in a peaceful demonstration. 
Expectations are harder to formulate for this type of political behaviour, since theoretically 
the association might be running in either a negative or positive direction. Perceptions of 
political untrustworthiness can motivate citizens to protest and attempt to make their voice 
heard through peaceful channels, while at the same time we could argue that distrust may 
have a demotivating effect and lead citizens to shy away from any type of participation. 
Gamson’s distrusting-efficacious hypothesis posits that among the politically efficacious, 
perceptions of untrustworthiness will have a motivating effect; however, as seen in the 
previous section, feelings of efficacy diminish distrusting attitudes. We could expect different 
motivation mechanisms to be at play given negative attitudes towards different parts of the 
political system. Negative evaluations of one’s preferred party are expected to demotivate 
participation through elections, given the partisan character of the electoral contest. Similarly, 
we can expect distrust of one’s preferred party to have a demotivating effect on other aspects 
of active participation, such as demonstrating in a peaceful manner. Political parties are 
considered by many citizens as aggregators of political interests and coordinators of political 
action; hence a citizen that considers even the party closest to their preferences to be 
untrustworthy would also be less likely to participate actively in politics. On the other hand, 
we could argue that certain negative evaluations of the political system could have a 
motivating influence for citizens to demonstrate. Along this line of thinking, perceptions of 
political untrustworthiness stemming from unethical and unfair political practices can be 
expected to have a positive effect on a citizen’s consideration to participate in a 
demonstration, firstly, because moral evaluations reflect a more intense level of distrusting 
attitudes as seen in the preceding chapter, and secondly, because political action and 
demonstration is often associated with ethically charged issues (such as inequality, social 
welfare, war, human and minority rights). 
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Table 6.6: Bivariate correlations of distrust indices with behavioural intentions 
 
Distrust 
Parliament 
Index 
Distrust 
Preferred 
Political Party 
Index 
Political 
Distrust 
Index 
Single Item 
Trust British 
Parliament 
Behavioural Intention Variables    Behavioural Intention Variables 
Active 
Participation .031 -.153* -.068 .030 
Disruptive 
Participation .100* .084* .104* -.198* 
Abstain .065 .213* .156* -.154* 
Vote Radical .102* -.053* .029* -.134* 
Leave UK .121* .055 .100* -.203* 
Peaceful 
Demonstration 
.083* -.073* .007 -.076* 
Note: Entries are Pearson's correlation coefficients, N=785, *p<.05. 
 
 
Table 6.6 above shows the bivariate correlations between the distrust indices and the 
aforementioned political behaviour variables.56 We also include the single traditional trust in 
parliament item to inspect how our new distrust indices compare in their associations with 
behavioural intentions. Items capturing active political participation are associated more 
strongly with the distrust in preferred party index than the single item capturing trust, or the 
distrust in parliament index. Moreover, as expected the association is negative, denoting that 
increased distrust in one’s preferred party demotivates active participation in politics through 
peaceful demonstrations, participating in political pressure groups, NGOs or parties. The 
likelihood of participating in a peaceful demonstration, as seen by the separate item, is 
inhibited by distrust in one’s preferred political party, though distrust in parliament has a 
small (and significant) positive effect. In other words, we can see both the motivating and 
demotivating mechanisms of political distrust at play. Being able to identify with a political 
group and trust your preferred party makes you more likely to consider participating in a 
peaceful demonstration and participate in the political process to make your voice heard. In 
the case of higher level institutions such as the national parliament, attitudes of distrust act as 
a motivating factor for demonstrating within the democratic framework. The effect is no 
longer statistically significant when controlling for citizen demographic characteristics (Table 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 All bivariate associations with behavioural intentions items were also calculated using Kendall’s tau 
correlation given that these items are measured on a four-point scale. The results do not differ to the associations 
calculated using Pearson’s r correlation and we report the latter for reasons of consistency.  
	   	  	   	   213	  
6.8), yet including political efficacy in the controls yields again a positive and significant 
effect for distrusting attitudes. We believe this provides some evidence in favour of the 
motivating effect of distrusting attitudes on intentions to demonstrate.57 
The index capturing intentions of disruptive political behaviour is associated more strongly 
with the single item tapping into political trust than our distrust indices, and so does the item 
referring to considering leaving the country. It seems that when it comes to the most radical 
decision of removing oneself from the political collective, the single item asking respondents 
directly how much they trust their parliament is a better predictor of such considerations than 
asking respondents to evaluate political targets along multiple lines. There is still a positive 
association between political distrust and considering leaving the country, driven by distrust 
attitudes towards the national parliament. As expected, distrust of one’s preferred political 
party is not a strong motivator for such a ground-breaking political decision.  
Nevertheless, in the case of considerations to abstain from the electoral process, the political 
distrust index is a better predictor than the trust in parliament item. The associations are all in 
the expected direction, driven mainly by negative perceptions of one’s preferred political 
party. As expected, we see that negative perceptions of one’s preferred political party make 
citizens more likely both to refrain from expressing electoral support for that or any other 
political party and to abstain. Perceiving your political system as untrustworthy in general 
increases your likelihood to consider electoral abstention. Although we do not find a 
statistically significant association between negative evaluations of national parliament and 
the intention to abstain, regression results presented in Table 6.8 below show that both 
distrust increase the likelihood respondents will consider electoral abstention and both effects 
are statistically significant.  
The intention to vote for a radical or extreme party is also associated with political distrust in 
the hypothesised way: perceptions of national parliament and the political system as 
untrustworthy increase the likelihood that respondents will consider voting for a radical 
political party. The effect is complicated somewhat in the case of distrust towards one’s 
preferred political party, simply because supporters of radical political parties tend to 
evaluate their party in a very positive manner. Even in the limited multi-party context of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Controlling for levels of political efficacy, we can see that the positive relationship between distrust in 
national parliament and active political participation reaches statistical significance at the 5% level (also for 
attending a peaceful demonstration). The effect of distrust in preferred party remains negative and significant, 
although reduces in magnitude.  
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UK party system,58 voters can choose to support radical or anti-systemic political parties, 
such as the British National Party (BNP), the UK Independence Party (UKIP) or smaller 
single issue parties, such as RESPECT. One can also think of equivalent political parties in 
Europe, both on the extremes of the political spectrum and radical in the sense of promoting 
an anti-systemic agenda. In the popular narratives presented in Chapter 4, the extreme Lega 
Nord (LN) and radical Five Star Movement (M5S) were mentioned by various participants in 
Italy, and the extreme-right Golden Dawn (GD) and radical coalition of the left (SYRIZA) 
were brought up in citizen accounts in Greece. In our sample, distrust in one’s preferred party 
is weak, but negatively correlated to considerations of supporting a radical party; however the 
association disappears once we control for key respondent demographics and ideology (Table 
6.8).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For a discussion on the transformation of the UK party system following the 2010 election see Kavanagh and 
Cowley (2010). 
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Table 6.7: Regressions explaining behavioural intentions using political distrust indices 
Independent Variables Distrust in Parliament Index Distrust in Preferred Party Index Political Distrust Index 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Dependent Variables Active 
Participation 
Disruptive 
Participation 
Active 
Participation 
Disruptive 
Participation 
Active 
Participation 
Disruptive 
Participation 
Distrust Parliament Index .002 .015***     
(.005) (.004)     
Distrust Preferred Political 
Party Index 
  -.027*** .008   
  (.005) (.004)   
Political Distrust Index     -.017*** .015*** 
    (.006) (.005) 
Controls       
Left-Right Ideology .013*** .004 -.016*** .002 -.016*** .004 
 (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
2. Middle level Education .024 .009 .024 .009 .024 -.009 
(.019) (.015) (.018) (.016) (.018) (.015) 
3. Higher Level Education 
(ref.cat. Low Educ) 
.033 .017 .03 .017 .031* -.017 
(.02) (.016) (.019) (.016) (.019) (.016) 
Age .001 .003*** .001 .003*** -.0004 -.003*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.0003) (.0003) 
Male .023 .038*** .021 .041*** -.0155*** .004 
 (.012) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.003) (.002) 
Constant .618*** .457*** .744*** .496*** .703*** .461*** 
 (.036) (.031) (.035) (.03) (.039) (.032) 
       
R-squared .040 .144 .078 .133 .052 .140 
Note: OLS regression analysis, entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
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Table 6.8: Binary Logistic Regression for behavioural intentions using distrust of parliament and distrust of preferred party indices  
Independent Variables Distrust in Parliament Index Distrust in Preferred Party Index 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Dependent Variables Abstain Vote 
Radical 
Leave the 
UK 
Peaceful 
Demo 
Abstain Vote 
Radical 
Leave the 
UK 
Peaceful 
Demo 
Distrust Parliament 
Index 
1.203** 
(.11) 
1.210*** 
(.09) 
1.283*** 
(.10) 
1.053 
(.07) 
    
Distrust Preferred 
Political Party Index 
    1.461*** 
(.13) 
.891 
(.07) 
1.044 
(.08) 
.799*** 
(.06) 
Controls         
Left-Right Ideology 1.014 1.129*** 1.049 .857*** 1.023 1.086* 1.018 .833*** 
 (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.03) 
2. Middle level 
Education 
.771 1.275 1.26 1.377 .754 1.265 1.238 1.384 
 (.25) (.37) (.42) (.37) (.24) (.36) (.41) (.38) 
3. Higher Level 
Education 
.525* 1.138 1.339 1.621* .527* 1.093 1.289 1.586* 
(ref.cat. Low Educ) (.18) (.34) (.45) (.45) (.18) (.32) (.43) (.44) 
Age .952*** .985*** .962*** .989** .953*** .986*** .965*** .988** 
 (.007) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.007) (.005) (.006) (.005) 
Male 1.032 2.318*** 1.844*** 1.26 1.059 2.363*** 1.902*** 1.256 
 (.21) (.42) (.36) (.20) (.22) (.42) (.37) (.20) 
Constant .987 .0742*** .199*** .889 .467 .319** .546 3.08** 
 (.63) (.04) (.12) (.47) .291 .174 .323 (1.6) 
         
Pseudo R-squared .087 .049 .072 .032 .108 .043 .060 .042 
Note: Binary logistic regression analysis, entries are Odds Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.10. 
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Tables 6.7 and 6.8 above use the distrust indices to explain active and disruptive political 
participation, as well as intentions to abstain, vote for a radical party, leave the UK and attend 
a peaceful demonstration. We look at the partial associations controlling for citizen 
demographic characteristics that are associated with political behaviour (age, gender and 
level of education), in addition to ideological self-placement on a left-right spectrum.59 The 
overall picture is clear: political distrust has a demotivating effect on active participation, 
driven mainly by the effect of distrust in one’s preferred political party, while it has a 
motivating effect on disruptive political behaviour, driven mainly by attitudes of distrust 
towards national parliament. Most behavioural items are either explained by distrust in 
national parliament or by distrust of preferred party, apart from abstaining in a general 
election, where both distrust of national parliament and of one’s preferred party increase the 
likelihood of considering such an action.  
 
Not all evaluative dimensions however are equally telling. As the next step, we disaggregate 
the distrust indices and look at the effect each distrust item has on respondents’ behavioural 
intentions. Table 6.9 below presents bivariate association measures, while the following 
tables 6.10-6.13 present regression coefficients for each evaluative item explaining 
behavioural intentions, controlling for demographic characteristics and ideology. We can see 
that for evaluations of national parliament, both retrospective and prospective assessments of 
diverging interests are not enough to motivate intentions of disruptive political behaviour. In 
the preceding chapter we noted that interest-based evaluations provide the easiest evaluative 
dimension for respondents to register distrust. The belief that national parliament has acted 
and is also likely to act in a manner that is not in accordance with citizens’ best-interest is not 
sufficient to make them consider abstaining in an election, voting for a radical party or 
leaving the country.  
 
On the contrary, the belief that parliament is acting in an incompetent and immoral manner 
has a significant effect on behavioural intentions and we can see that retrospective 
perceptions of untrustworthiness have a stronger effect than prospective perceptions. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 We decided to include left-right ideology as a control given the nature of the dependent variables. Ideology is 
expected to influence considerations regarding electoral behaviour as well as types of political participation, 
such as demonstrating. The substantive results of our analysis are not changed in any significant way whether 
we include or exclude left-right ideology; nevertheless, we are interested in the effect of distrusting attitudes 
independent of political ideology and hence choose the model that includes ideological self-placement as a 
control.  
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provides a more optimistic image for analysts of citizens’ behaviour. As long as the political 
class and major representative institution does not violate shared democratic norms and does 
not show incompetence in managing technical political issues, citizens are less likely to 
consider engaging in disruptive types of political participation. Perceptions of incongruent 
interests between the citizen and the national parliament do not provide a motivation for the 
citizen to consider electoral abstention, voting for a radical party or leaving the country. 
Respondents in our sample appear to understand that when it comes to a representative 
political institution that includes all of society’s preferences, perceptions of untrustworthiness 
based on incongruent interests can be accepted more easily and would not drive them to 
disruptive types of political action. Perceptions of incongruent interests may motivate active 
participation through demonstration, along with ethical assessments, but not anti-systemic 
action.  
 
Evaluative items of preferred political party show a uniform negative association with 
intentions of participating in politics in an active way (somewhat stronger for prospective 
items). Negative attitudes towards one’s preferred political party have a demotivating effect 
on the intention to demonstrate driven by negative prospective expectations along moral and 
interest-based dimensions. Of course, it is important to note that the strength of the 
associations between attitudes of distrust and measures of behavioural intentions are rather 
weak. The challenges of linking attitudes to behaviour in social science research are 
numerous and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. In the context of this 
survey we have relied solely on the respondents’ self-declared likelihood of acting in certain 
ways, capturing only behavioural intentions and not realised behaviour. This makes the 
interpretation of our findings straightforward and methodologically less complex, but of 
course fails to provide the elusive link to the ultimate measure of interest: citizens’ actual 
behaviour. Measures of behavioural intention are the next best alternative for our purposes in 
the context of a single survey; however the associations found should not be exaggerated. 
The limited amount of behavioural intentions variance explained by the distrust items also 
serves as a reminder of the limited strength of attitudes in motivating even considerations for 
specific actions (explaining between 13-14% of variance in responses concerning disruptive 
political participation and 1-4% in active political participation).  
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Table 6.9: Bivariate correlations of distrust items with behavioural intentions 
 
Active 
Participation 
Index 
Disruptive 
Participation 
Index 
Abstaining 
in Election 
Voting for 
Radical 
Party 
Leaving the 
UK 
Attending 
Peaceful 
Demo 
Distrust of National Parliament 
    Parliament Technical Retrospective .014 .106* .051 .108* .153* .043 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .048 .125* .092* .093* .107* .076* 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .024 .030 .005 .070 .066 .057 
Parliament Technical Prospective .027 .107* .086* .078* .116* .064 
Parliament Moral Prospective .037 .094* .062 .100* .116* .100* 
Parliament Interest Prospective .006 .039 .025 .066 .048 .076* 
Distrust of Preferred Political Party  
   Party Technical Retrospective -.083* .104* .187* -.006 .048 -.023 
Party Moral Retrospective -.105* .066 .185* -.043 .030 -.042 
Party Interest Retrospective -.120* .065 .187* -.043 .025 -.065 
Party Technical Prospective -.141* .082* .178* -.050 .080* -.062 
Party Moral Prospective -.171* .050 .174* -.088* .056 -.096* 
Party Interest Prospective -.161* .062 .175* -.051 .040 -.080* 
Note: Entries are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, N=785, *p<.05. 
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Table 6.10: Regression coefficients for distrust in parliament items 
explaining active and disruptive political participation 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Active 
Participation 
Disruptive 
Participation 
Independent Variables  
 
Parliament Technical Retrospective -.0005 .012*** 
(.004) (.003) 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .001 .014*** 
(.004) (.003) 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .0003 .007 
(.004) (.003) 
Parliament Technical Prospective -.0002 .011*** 
(.004) (.003) 
Parliament Moral Prospective .002 .010*** 
(.004) (.004) 
Parliament Interest Prospective .001 .006 
(.004) (.004) 
Controls   
Left-Right Ideology   
Level of Education   
Age   
Gender   
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05. Full OLS regression models presented in Tables 6.10.1-2 in Appendix I. 
 
	  	  	  	  
221	  
 
 
Table 6.11: Regression coefficients for distrust in preferred party items 
explaining active and disruptive political participation 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Active 
Participation 
Disruptive 
Participation 
Independent Variables   
Party Technical Retrospective -.014*** .011*** 
(.004) (.003) 
Party Moral Retrospective -.017*** .008** 
(.004) (.004) 
Party Interest Retrospective -.018*** .005 
(.00405) (.003) 
Party Technical Prospective -.021*** .006 
(.004) (.004) 
Party Moral Prospective -.024*** .003 
(.004) (.003) 
Party Interest Prospective -.024*** .002 
(.004) (.004) 
Controls   
Left-Right Ideology   
Level of Education   
Age   
Gender   
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05. Full OLS regression models presented in Tables 6.11.1-2 in Appendix I. 
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Table 6.12: Odds ratios from binary logistic regression for distrust in parliament 
items explaining behavioural intentions 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Model 1 
Abstain 
Model 2 
Vote Radical 
Model 3 
Leaving UK 
Model 4 
Peaceful Demo 
Independent Variables  
  
 
Parliament Technical 
Retrospective 
1.093 1.197*** 1.300*** .992 
(.08) (.07) (.09) (.06) 
Parliament Moral 
Retrospective 
1.206*** 1.124** 1.198*** 1.015 
(.08) (.06) (.08) (.06) 
Parliament Interest 
Retrospective 
1.029 1.173*** 1.137 1.039 
(.07) (.07) (.08) (.06) 
Parliament Technical 
Prospective 
1.205** 1.128** 1.188** 1.021 
(.0) (.07) (.08) (.06) 
Parliament Moral 
Prospective 
1.166** 1.125** 1.193*** 1.090 
(.08) (.07) (.08) (.06) 
Parliament Interest 
Prospective 
1.121 1.105 1.110 1.063 
(.09) (.07) (.08) (.06) 
Controls     
Left-Right Ideology     
Level of Education     
Age     
Gender     
Note: Entries are Odds Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. Full binary 
logistic regression results presented in Tables 6.12.1-4 in Appendix I. 
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Table 6.13: Odds Ratios from binary logistic regression for distrust in preferred party 
items explaining behavioural intentions 
Dependent Variable: 
 
Model 1 
Abstain 
Model 2 
Vote Radical 
Model 3 
Leaving UK 
Model 4 
Peaceful Demo 
Independent Variables     
Party Technical 
Retrospective 
1.376*** .1.025 1.042 .883** 
(.10) (.06) (.07) (.03) 
Party Moral 
Retrospective 
1.358*** .963 1.016 .869** 
(.10) (.06) (.07) (.05) 
arty Interest 
Retrospective 
1.338*** .97 .981 .859*** 
(.10) (.06) (.06) (.05) 
Party Technical 
Prospective 
1.301*** .890 1.12 .857** 
(.10) (.06) (.08) (.05) 
Party Moral 
Prospective 
1.270*** .828*** 1.045 .814*** 
(.10) (.05) (.07) (.05) 
Party Interest 
Prospective 
1.264*** .863** .996 .830*** 
(.10) (.05) (.07) (.02) 
Controls     
Left-Right Ideology     
Level of Education     
Age     
Gender     
Note: Entries are Odds Ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. Full binary 
logistic regression results presented in Tables 6.13.1-4 in Appendix I. 
 
 
In summary, this analysis indicated there are important differences in the ways distrusting 
judgments motivate various types of behavioural intentions. Most importantly, we noted that 
distrust attitudes directed at national parliament can help explain behavioural intentions of 
disruptive political participation and that the effects are driven primarily by perceptions of 
past technical failure and past unethical conduct. Perceptions of incongruent interests, 
although an integral part of distrusting political attitudes, are not enough to push citizens to 
consider such actions. Only in the case of radical party voting did retrospective perceptions of 
incongruent interests have a significant effect, with more negative evaluations increasing the 
likelihood of considering such action.   
 
While we were not able to provide conclusive evidence on the motivating effect of distrusting 
attitudes on the intention to participate in politics in an active manner, we did find some 
significant associations between moral and interest-based negative evaluations of national 
parliament and considerations of attending a peaceful demonstration. Therefore, we can 
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tentatively argue that citizens’ intention to participate in politics in an active way by joining a 
demonstration, pressure group, NGO or political party may indeed be boosted by their 
dissatisfaction on political matters. Feeling passionate about political issues or disagreeing 
with the normative stance of the political system can motivate citizens to engage in social and 
political action. The likelihood of doing so, however, clearly decreases as citizens distrust 
their preferred political party. At least for our UK sample, we can argue that citizens still use 
the political party closest to their preference as a link to the political system and guide to 
political participation. A citizen that fails to identify a political party he can support and 
considers even the party closest to his preferences to be untrustworthy is not likely to use 
democratic processes to voice his frustration.  
 
Distrusting attitudes targeted at a citizen’s preferred party may not motivate citizens to 
consider extreme action, such as moving away from the country, but negative evaluations 
lead citizens to shy away from the electoral process and active participation. In fact, we can 
see that distrust of one’s party based on negative technical and ethical assessments of past 
conduct can motivate disruptive political behaviour and lead citizens away from democratic 
processes. In this sense, both political targets have an active role to play in motivating 
citizens to engage with politics in a constructive way. Overall, attitudes of political distrust 
motivate disruptive political participation and demotivate active political participation (Table 
6.7). Hence, though our analysis has provided an insight into the relative strength of each 
evaluative dimension in motivating predispositions for political action, as well as the 
different effect of distrusting attitudes towards separate objects within the political system, it 
is important to bear also in mind the overall links of distrust to behavioural intentions. 
 
 
6.3 Investigating the distrust heuristic  
 
So far in this chapter we have investigated whether our new measures of political distrust can 
help us advance our understanding of how distrust judgments function, by looking at the 
measures’ associations with external variables of interest. We have seen that distrusting 
evaluations of national parliament are influenced by a host of other attitudes and 
characteristics in slightly different ways than distrusting evaluations of preferred political 
party, and that these evaluations also help predict respondents’ behavioural intention with 
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different degrees of success. In addition, we have identified differences in the way each 
evaluative dimension is associated with external variables, offering more fine-grained 
explanations for the link between distrusting attitudes and political behaviour.  
 
As a final empirical analysis, we examine more closely respondents whose attitudes are 
formulated primarily via a distrust heuristic process. Given the theoretical basis and empirical 
evidence provided for political distrust acting as a heuristic mechanism, we look for 
significant differences between those respondents who invariably give completely 
untrustworthy assessments of their preferred political party and national parliament, and 
those who evaluate these political objects in a critical, but not absolutely negative manner 
along all evaluative dimensions. The latent class analysis carried out in the preceding chapter 
pointed to the existence of a smaller group of respondents who would consistently choose 
extreme distrusting evaluations. If we consider those respondents to be forming their 
assessment under a predefined predisposition of political distrust, which leaves no space for 
considering the different evaluative dimensions, time projections or political target each item 
inquires about, then this could be an indicator of people who rely more heavily on a distrust. 
It characterises an easily accessible attitude that places more emphasis on ‘gut-feeling’ rather 
than instigating cognitive processing anew (Hetherington, 1998). We can observe the 
workings on the heuristic process in the group of actively distrusting citizens for whom 
political distrust has taken over and overrides any specific assessments of political agents.  
 
Our multi-item measures of political distrust, which include not only two different political 
targets but also separate dimensions for evaluating each target, offer the possibility of 
identifying this respondent group and testing whether it is significantly different from other 
critical and distrusting respondents. We therefore keep only respondents who denote overall 
political distrust (with overall scores on the political distrust index above 4.0) and identify 
that group of respondents who opt for extremely untrustworthy assessments of parliament 
and their political party in every single manifest item. This leaves us with a small number of 
respondents, 21 people out of a group of 360. Despite the small number of respondents and 
the fact that we are comparing them to respondents who also give negative assessments to the 
two political objects, we find some very interesting differences between these two groups. 
The group of active distrusters has a significantly lower political knowledge score (mean=.49 
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compared to mean=.64 on a 0-1 scale, p<.05) and different educational composition.60 For 
the first time we find a significant effect of education level; the extremely distrusting group is 
comprised of more people from the middle education category and less from the higher 
education category than the rest of the respondents (chi2=8.2, p<.05). There are no 
significant differences in terms of age and gender, although we do find more men being part 
of the actively distrusting respondents (chi2=3.2, p<.10). Finally, we also find differences in 
the level of democratic satisfaction and consideration of disruptive political behaviour. 
Actively distrusting respondents are on average much more dissatisfied by the way 
democracy works in their country (mean=1.6 compared to mean=3.0 on a 1-7 scale, p<.05) 
and more likely to consider engaging in disruptive political behaviour (mean=.48 compared 
to mean=.41 on a 0-1 scale, although the significance of that difference disappears when 
considering the unequal variances for the two groups). Specifically, they are much more 
likely to consider abstaining from elections (chi2=12.0, p<.05) and more likely to consider 
leaving the country (chi2=3.7, p<.10). 
 
Finding any differences given the small number of respondents suggests there is truly 
something particular about those people for whom an overall distrusting attitude has taken 
over and guides all evaluations for both political objects. One might argue that this is not the 
most stringent test for the distrust heuristic, since we include distrusting attitudes towards a 
political agent that could be identified by respondents as the political group closest to their 
beliefs and most likely to promote their preferences. Surely, the people who completely 
distrust even such a group would be driven by a very powerful negative affect towards 
politics. Therefore, it would be better to repeat the test, this time using only distrust in the 
institutional level, identifying those respondents that register completely untrustworthy 
assessments of national parliament across all evaluative dimensions and time projections. We 
compare this group of 68 respondents with the 458 in our sample who still register overall 
untrustworthy evaluations of parliament but arrive at this score through a combination of 
responses. We find significant differences among the two groups in terms of their satisfaction 
with democracy (mean=1.9 compared to mean=3.3 on a 1-7 scale, p<.01) and strength of 
identification with the UK (mean=4.8 compared to mean=5.4 on a 1-7 scale, p<.01), although 
we do not find any significant differences in terms of the political knowledge scores. More 
interestingly, respondents in this group of complete distrust are significantly more likely to 	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consider engaging in disruptive behaviour (mean=4.9 compared to mean=4.0 on a 0-1 scale, 
p<.01), more likely on average to consider abstaining in an election (chi2=6.40, p<.05), to 
consider voting for a radical party (chi2=8.42=, p<.01) and to consider leaving the country 
(chi2=9.02, p<.01). These differences show how complete distrust of national parliament 
(distrust at the institutional level) is an extremely powerful motivator even compared to 
moderate distrusting and sceptical attitudes. In that respect, it seems that people who distrust 
the institutional level across both time projections and make no differentiations between 
competence, ethical standing and interest-congruence – probably guided by a distrust 
heuristic to help them make quick evaluations across the board – are also more likely to 
consider actions that do not contribute to mainstream political processes.  
 
 
6.4 Discussion of the new measures’ contribution and conclusion 
 
This was the second chapter based on the statistical analysis of the new measurement of 
political distrust tested using UK survey data and the final empirical chapter of this thesis. Its 
aim was to examine associations between attitudes of political distrust, as these are captured 
through the new evaluative items, and other citizen characteristics, attitudes and behavioural 
intentions regarding political participation. It first presented an analysis of the associations 
with other political attitudes and citizen characteristics before considering the relation 
between distrusting attitudes and citizen political behaviour, and finally taking a closer look 
at distrusting attitudes shaped through the heuristic process. Throughout this analysis, we 
used not only the aggregate political distrust index, but also distrust indices for each political 
object. In the preceding chapter, multivariate analysis of all manifest items led to the 
conclusion that distrusting attitudes towards the two political targets measured in the survey 
tapped into a single latent political distrust attitude, but that they could also be examined 
separately, as two strongly correlated individual evaluations. In order to advance our 
understanding of distrust formation and its links to other attitudes and behaviour, we have 
examined the two indicators separately and further disaggregated them into the individual 
evaluative items.  
 
Using the two separate indices for national parliament and preferred political party, we 
determined that attitudes of distrust directed towards different parts of the political system 
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can be associated with citizen characteristics in different ways and can vary in their power to 
explain certain citizen behaviours that are interesting for political scientists. Specifically we 
saw that levels of political cynicism are more strongly associated with distrust at the 
institutional level than distrust of a partisan political target perceived to be closer to the 
citizen. This suggests that, although no part of the political system is immune to an overall 
cynical worldview, evaluations of political agents that represent citizens’ preferred 
subcomponent of the political system, such as smaller groups of politicians and partisan 
groups are not influenced as much by such cynical predispositions. On the other hand, 
feelings of political efficacy contributed more to explanations of distrust in one’s preferred 
political party than in national parliament. The politically efficacious are more likely to report 
positive evaluations of national parliament and of their preferred political party. Yet not all 
association patterns were as clearly discernible and easy to interpret as the ones mentioned 
above. The trickiest, in the case of confounding traits, was political knowledge. The dual 
possible association between levels of political knowledge and distrust was explicated in the 
first section of this chapter. We found evidence for both of these processes in our analysis, 
where increased political knowledge scores were associated with trusting and distrusting 
attitudes at the same time, pointing to the possibility of a non-linear association. 
 
The nature of the associations we investigated in this chapter is not specified as a causal 
relationship. This was mentioned in earlier sections of this chapter, but it is important to 
mention again for reasons of methodological and scientific precision. In the first section of 
this chapter we considered measures of political attitudes and citizen characteristics that are 
expected to be associated with attitudes of political distrust in a theoretically interesting and 
substantive way. For many of these variables, such as cynicism, efficacy and even political 
knowledge, the direction of influence can be argued to run both to and from political distrust. 
Nevertheless, we are interested in determining the associations and partial associations 
between all these measures and the subcomponents of distrusting attitudes to advance our 
understanding of how each evaluation of untrustworthiness operates. 
 
Furthermore, in the second section of this chapter we investigated the power of distrusting 
judgments in shaping behavioural intentions. The main purpose of this chapter was not to 
determine the effects of distrusting attitudes on political behaviour. Such an endeavour, 
although important and informative, would largely sit outside the scope of this thesis. The 
main purpose of this chapter has been to provide an additional contribution to our 
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understanding of how assessments of untrustworthiness function, based on the conceptual 
model advanced by the thesis. The fact that citizen distrust at different levels of the political 
system and of different political objects can motivate distinct behavioural considerations, or 
follow different patterns given the level of political information and knowledge, explains 
some of the complexities political science research has been facing in this field. Even in the 
limited space of a non-representative sample from one Western democracy, we have 
identified both motivating and demotivating effects of distrusting attitudes and the relative 
strength of certain evaluative dimensions in motivating different types of behavioural 
intentions. Crucially, we have seen yet again that perceptions of unethical political conducts 
are a critical aspect of distrusting attitudes also in the way these motivate people’s 
considerations for future action. Our conceptual model of political distrust has not only been 
put to the test empirically through the analysis the last two chapters, but also supplemented 
with additional information regarding the role of its components in the study of citizen’s 
political behaviour.  
 
Exploratory qualitative work helped inform the conceptual model of distrust and create the 
manifest items measuring the latent distrusting attitudes. In the preceding chapter we 
provided an analysis of these evaluative items and argued that two processes appear to be at 
play in the formation of distrusting attitudes: one process of evaluating each aspect of the 
political system along distinct evaluative dimensions based on prospective and retrospective 
indications of political conduct, and a heuristic process where overall levels of distrust act as 
a cognitive shortcut for all assessments of political agents. In this chapter we attempted to 
find some evidence of this distrust heuristic, noting that respondents who give extremely 
distrusting evaluations of political agents without differentiating across dimensions and time 
projections can be separated from other distrusting respondents on the basis of characteristics, 
other attitudes and behavioural intentions. Citizen narratives highlighted how extreme distrust 
often entails a breaking point in the citizen-state relation and how perceptions of 
untrustworthiness come to colour all new information regarding political agents, making it 
very difficult to break the cycle of distrust. We have mentioned already that the cyclicality of 
political distrust attitudes is extremely difficult to capture empirically, but we believe we 
have been able to find some traces of this heuristic, by identifying respondents in our sample 
who record extreme distrust in all survey items. Further research could delve deeper to 
investigate the precise heuristic mechanism and examine the status of those actively 
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distrusting respondents, as well as the possibilities for reversing distrust and breaking the 
vicious cycle.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion of the Thesis’ Contribution and 
Concluding Remarks 
 
7.1 Discussing key findings 
7.2 Contribution of the conceptual model and survey measure of distrusting attitudes: 
Implications for future research 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
 
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to provide a brief summary of the key findings of the 
thesis and situate them in the general academic debate surrounding political distrust. We take 
this opportunity to discuss the wider implications of this thesis, both conceptually and 
empirically, and the way it relates to existing work on citizen attitudes of political distrust. 
We revisit the conceptual model of distrust advanced throughout the thesis, highlight its key 
aspects and suggest possible avenues for further fruitful research in this field. In addition, 
after considering the arguments made and evidence gathered throughout this thesis, we re-
evaluate the relationship between political trust and distrust and reaffirm the necessity of 
further social science research that focuses on distrusting political attitudes. We conclude 
with a consideration of the limitations of this doctoral research, the ways in which it 
contributes to academic knowledge, as well as its practical relevance for democratic politics 
and the health of democratic systems.  
 
 
7.1 Discussing key findings 
 
We began our investigation into distrusting political attitudes by reviewing the most 
promising analytical approaches and supplementing them with exploratory qualitative work 
aimed at unveiling the meaning citizens attribute to judgments of political distrust. Political 
distrust is defined as an individual attitude that entails perceptions of an untrustworthy 
political system and is relevant for citizens’ subsequent stance and action. The conceptual 
model of political distrust developed through this research emphasises the relational and 
dynamic aspect of distrusting attitudes. The relational aspect is derived from the fact that 
political distrust characterises a relationship between the citizen and the state or its actors 
(institutions, politicians, political processes), while the dynamic nature of distrusting attitudes 
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captures the retrospective and prospective assessments of untrustworthiness entailed in 
citizens’ expressions of distrust.  
 
We emphasise that, as an attitude, political distrust is evaluative in character. Citizens’ 
explanations of their negative evaluations are often tautological, describing distrust in terms 
of the untrustworthiness of political agents. Yet following our analysis, we identify three 
types of evaluative dimensions that underpin citizen perceptions of untrustworthiness: 
assessments of technical failure and incompetence, assessments of unethical conduct and 
unfair outcomes, and assessments of incongruent interests between the citizen and political 
agents. When citizens claim to distrust politicians, institutions and the political system as a 
whole, they express a judgment of political untrustworthiness, retrospective or prospective, 
along one or a combination of these evaluative dimensions.  
 
The meaning political distrust assumes for these citizens is one of negative and unwanted 
outcomes derived from interactions with the political system or its agents. This places distrust 
in stark contrast with trust and its absence (the lack of trust), which can only denote the belief 
in positive outcomes and the lack of such a belief. Lack of trust in a political agent, institution 
or system implies limited conviction or ambivalence about the trustworthy qualities of the 
political targets. Distrust, on the other hand, indicates some form of certainty. However, this 
certainty refers to the probability of harmful outcomes, and it gives rise to particular 
behavioural and emotional states for citizens in an effort to protect themselves from the 
negative consequences of interactions with the state. These may include disbelief, to protect 
oneself from betrayal, not interacting with political agents, severing of the political bonds 
between citizen and the system by not participating in elections, not contributing to the state 
through taxation and not adhering to laws, or completely removing oneself from the reach of 
the political system by moving out of the community. As this latter behavioural intention is 
quite extreme, and most often citizens’ lives continue to be impacted in numerous ways by 
untrustworthy political authorities, subsequent behaviour reinforces distrusting attitudes in a 
cyclical manner. This, we have argued, is an important difference between relations of 
political distrust compared to generic distrusting attitudes (interpersonal or others): in the 
latter case interaction between free agents will be abandoned and cooperation will not take 
place, while in the former, citizens may still be forced to interact with a political system they 
perceive as untrustworthy and their behaviour will most likely enhance untrustworthiness.   
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This conceptualisation of distrusting political attitudes further highlights the importance of 
the behavioural intentions they motivate and the process through which they function. We 
traced two simultaneous modes of operation of distrusting attitudes and found evidence to 
support this interpretation through qualitative and quantitative empirical analysis. On the one 
hand, political distrust is dynamic, linked to citizens’ experiences and their evaluations of 
political actors along the three dimensions mentioned above. Information can be updated and 
perceptions can change, hence political distrust (if it is not complete and has not resulted in a 
total rupture between the citizen and the state) can potentially be reversed. Yet at the same 
time, attitudes of distrust can act as cognitive shortcuts for citizens. It would be unrealistic to 
assume that for every instance a citizen needs to decide how to navigate his daily socio-
political life he engages in a detailed cognitive and affective evaluation of political actors and 
institutions of the political system. In fact, one of the reasons why distrusting attitudes are 
considered powerful and significant in the study of political behaviour is because of this ‘rule 
of thumb’ function they appear to have in shaping subsequent perceptions and actions. 
Therefore, even though distrust is evaluation-based it also influences political evaluations as 
a cognitive shortcut.  
 
We argue that this double function of distrusting political attitudes helps illuminate two 
contentious points. The first has to do with the dimensionality of political distrust and 
whether it is more appropriate to consider distrust as a multi-dimensional or uni-dimensional 
latent concept (Fisher et al., 2010; Hooghe, 2011). Empirical analysis and quantitative 
findings showed that the various evaluations tap into a single latent notion and that citizens’ 
perceptions of untrustworthiness tend to follow similar lines when forming retrospective and 
prospective assessments for different parts of the political system. Although there are some 
differences between specific evaluations, we can see that answers are to a large extent 
motivated by a single overarching attitude of political distrust. Therefore, distrusting attitudes 
can be thought of as uni-dimensional, and even if we decide to consider citizens’ distrust 
towards different parts of the political system separately (in our study, distrust of national 
parliament and distrust of preferred political party), it is important to note that these are not 
independent attitudes.  Our analysis showed that it is also possible to speak of separate 
distrusting evaluations, and that we can gain additional insights into the nature of distrust 
itself and the way it influences other attitudes and behaviour by considering its various 
components. In this way, our research is driving the debate further away from strict 
discussions of dimensionality and the impasses resulting from theoretical distinctions of 
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specific and diffuse evaluations, and more towards a discussion surrounding the operation of 
distrusting attitudes. 
 
The second point has to do with the contested relation between political distrust and 
cynicism. From its outset, this thesis has attempted to clarify the concept of political distrust 
and separate it from competing notions, such as cynicism. The aforementioned aspects 
highlighted by our conceptual model of distrusting attitudes – its relational, dynamic nature 
and dual function – set it apart more clearly from the notion of political cynicism, which is a 
deeply held belief regarding the inherent evilness of all political authorities and power 
institutions. Cynicism is not sensitive to perceptions, information and experiences in the same 
way as distrust is, it does not follow the same lines of evaluation prospectively and 
retrospectively and it does not share this dual function of political distrust. Without a doubt, 
strongly cynical citizens are likely to be highly distrusting of political institutions and 
politicians and use this attitude more often as a shortcut rather than engage in new 
assessments of political targets. However, politically distrusting citizens are not necessarily 
cynics. It is important to separate the two notions conceptually and we hope that this thesis’s 
focus on investigating distrusting attitudes has helped clarify their differences.  
 
The empirical exploratory research conducted in three European democracies helped 
formulate the conceptual model of political distrust and provided additional information to 
address questions regarding citizens’ distrust. For example, we saw that citizens felt free to 
express distrust in various parts of their political system; not just figures, politicians or 
institutions, but also processes and the system in its entirety. It was also possible to 
investigate how people perceive political institutions and trace how their perceptions of 
distrust can spill over ‘upwards’, ‘downwards’ or be ring-fenced through their evaluation of 
new evidence, although we would argue that further research would be needed to determine 
the precise point where overall political distrust sets in.  
 
An aspect of distrusting attitudes we investigate further through the new survey evidence was 
the internal structure of the evaluative dimensions that underpin distrust. In addition to the 
dimensionality and internal consistency of the novel indicator, we also explore the different 
ways in which citizens form assessments of political untrustworthiness. Our analysis points to 
the fact that perceptions of untrustworthiness based on ethical considerations appear to be 
more prevalent and better positioned to capture stronger distrust than technical and interest-
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based evaluations in the case of a system’s key political institution. The ethical dimension of 
distrusting attitudes that surfaced clearly from citizen narrative accounts of political distrust 
was further highlighted by our statistical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. In fact, examining the 
motivational effect of the different aspects of distrust for behavioural considerations, we saw 
that ethical and technical-based perceptions of untrustworthiness can motivate intentions of 
political action that are disruptive for democratic political processes, such as abstaining from 
elections, voting for radical or anti-systemic parties or leaving the country. Whereas all three 
evaluative dimensions of political targets represent integral parts of political distrust, political 
conduct that is perceived to violate shared norms of fairness and justice may very well be the 
first point governments and practitioners of institutional reforms should address, in an effort 
to reverse widespread citizen distrust.  
 
The different aspects of distrusting political judgments and citizen orientations towards two 
subcomponents of the political system shed some light on the way in which political distrust 
is associated with other political attitudes and behavioural intentions. Although we only find 
small variations in the influence of political attitudes and individual-level characteristics on 
distrusting orientations to national parliament and to one’s political party, we are able to trace 
the simultaneous motivating and demotivating effects of distrusting attitudes on behavioural 
intentions. We find that intentions of political action that can be considered damaging for 
political processes, such as abstaining, voting for radical parties, engaging in violent 
demonstrations and even removing oneself from the political community, can be motivated 
by distrust in the country’s key representative political institution. With the exception of 
electoral abstention, distrust in one’s preferred party does not appear relevant or strong 
enough to motivate such political actions. However, perceptions of untrustworthiness that are 
ascribed to one’s preferred subcomponent of the political system can help us understand the 
demotivating effects of political distrust. Negative evaluations of the political group one 
considers closest to his or her preferences and interests makes citizens less inclined to 
participate in political processes in an active manner by voting, attending a peaceful 
demonstration, or joining a pressure group, NGO or any other political group. 
 
Arguably, our findings were not very strong in magnitude and there are many ways in which 
the design and measurement of other individual-level determinants and political action can be 
improved. Nevertheless, we believe that through our study and the empirical analysis 
presented, this thesis has managed not only to provide a clear conceptualisation of political 
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distrust and a discussion about the meaning, structure and functioning of citizen distrusting 
attitudes, but also to connect this to pressing debates regarding the role of distrust in 
influencing behavioural intentions. As argued at the outset of this thesis, political distrust 
may rest primarily on citizens’ perceptions about their political systems and agents, yet these 
perceptions appear to be central in shaping citizens’ subsequent decisions and actions. 
Investigating the precise links between political attitudes and behaviour is undoubtedly an 
area of political science (and possibly other fields, such as psychology and neurobiology) 
where more research will be welcome. We hope this thesis has contributed to the scholarly 
understanding of political distrust and that it has argued convincingly that attitudes of 
distrusting political attitudes offer a promising avenue for such endeavours. 
 
 
7.2 Contribution of the conceptual model and survey measures of distrusting attitudes; 
implications for future research 
 
This thesis’s findings regarding the nature, meaning and function of distrusting political 
attitudes and its contribution of a conceptual model and novel survey instrument to scholarly 
research will hopefully trigger more extensive discussions on political distrust. In this 
section, we wish to reflect upon a number of key points made in this thesis and their 
implications for existing work, concepts and further research into political distrust, both 
conceptual and empirical.  
 
Firstly, this research emphasised that citizen attitudes of political distrust are not normatively 
neutral. Contrary to certain scholars’ claims that neither trust nor distrust should carry any 
moral associations and that they should be considered merely appropriate or inappropriate 
given the political agents and system confronting citizens, we have argued that distrusting 
attitudes entail a substantive moral claim. Political distrust refers to the belief that parts or 
even the entirety of the political system operate in a manner that violates shared norms of 
what is ‘right’ and ‘fair’; as such, this belief also motivates behavioural intentions that may 
be considered disruptive for democratic political processes, in order to protect the citizen 
from interactions with political agents. If political agents can be removed and processes can 
be altered to no longer violate normative values, distrust can serve a positive purpose for 
democratic systems. Yet more often than not, distrusting attitudes are propagated into a 
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vicious circle of political distrust and untrustworthiness that has clearly a negative societal 
impact. 
  
Secondly, it is worth mentioning that there is an additional key aspect where political distrust 
depart from the generalisable definition given for all relations distrust. We have already 
mentioned the circularity of distrust and untrustworthiness due to the repetitive nature of 
political interactions that make it harder for citizens to activate an “exit option”. Furthermore, 
in Chapter 2 the analytical definitions of trust and distrust emphasised the absence of 
controlling mechanisms for the actions of the agent that is evaluated. David Easton (1975) 
has similarly tied the presence of trust in a political community with the fact that little 
supervision or scrutiny would be needed for political authorities. However, our research 
suggests that contrary to the explicit exclusion of controlling mechanisms from the analytical 
discussion of such relations, citizens’ distrusting attitudes refer to a large part on the 
supervisory democratic mechanisms, which have been developed in modern political systems 
as part of liberal democratic processes. The technical functioning or failure of these political 
mechanisms, their ability to protect shared norms of fairness and the citizens’ best-interest 
are part of evaluations of the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of political systems. When 
such institutions are perceived to fulfil their role, distrust can be mitigated; however when 
they are perceived as non-existent, weak or biased, they allow the diffusion of political 
distrust. We believe that when we investigate citizen attitudes of trust and distrust in modern 
democracies it is important to consider the role of controls, not as external, but as part of the 
political system being evaluated.  
 
An additional novel finding of the present thesis concerns the temporal dimension of 
distrusting attitudes, and we wish to consider the implications of the retrospective and 
prospective aspect of distrust in more detail in these concluding remarks. During the 
exploratory qualitative research we identified that judgments of political distrust were 
expressed in retrospective or prospective terms (or even both). Further, our quantitative 
analysis revealed that prospective evaluations of political untrustworthiness where 
consistently slightly lower than retrospective ones. We found that although the two time 
projections tap into a single underlying latent attitude, whether taken as indicators of political 
distrust or distrust towards the specific political target, negative assessments of future 
political conduct are better set to capture stronger distrust than negative assessments of past 
political conduct, which appear to come more easily to respondents in our sample. 
	  	  	  	  
239	  
 
We have sought to interpret this finding in terms of the variant role that hope and beliefs 
about the future play in the formulation of perceptions in politics and beyond. Much of the 
research carried out in this field of citizen attitudes has focused solely on the forward-looking 
nature of political trust. Indeed, we also found evidence of the probability calculus the 
meaning of expectations assigned to distrust. Yet, this thesis has argued that distrust is both 
retrospective and prospective in the way it is expressed by citizens and in the way it is 
understood conceptually. Trust is considered a tool to mitigate uncertainty and allow citizens 
to take “a leap of faith” in cooperating, interacting with agents and exposing themselves to 
vulnerability in relations with others. Perceptions of past trustworthy behaviour contribute to 
the formulation of positive expected outcomes, but trust reflects a belief about the future. 
Distrust on the other hand is more complex. It can be fully established on the basis of past 
instances of evidence of untrustworthiness or trust betrayal. Certainly, these perceptions of 
past untrustworthy behaviour contribute to the formation of negative future expectations 
regarding interactions with political agents, and these negative future assessments also 
constitute distrusting attitudes. Yet, the idea of this “leap of faith” is no longer relevant. Once 
distrust is established it can completely prevent forward-looking thinking and can also reside 
completely in the past. If forced to consider future interactions with political agents, the 
prospective aspect may come into play, though a citizen’s orientation can also quite possibly 
remain as a retrospective judgment. It is not simply a matter of performance review, but an 
attitude of distrust understood as negative outcomes resulting both from past and from 
hypothetical future interactions. We believe that these subtle differences are important for 
understanding established relations of political distrust and providing a clear concept and 
definition of distrusting attitudes.  
 
A final question we wish to address in this concluding chapter concerns the thesis’s focus on 
political distrust and the potential criticism of whether this has been yet another study of 
political trust under a somewhat different title. We reaffirm that from the outset, we outlined 
three pressing reasons why a study focusing primarily on the concept of political distrust was 
timely and necessary. The observations of citizen attitudes towards their political systems in 
established democracies point to the prominence of negative orientations, while the 
theoretical and empirical work is almost exclusively framed in terms of political trust. 
Further, the quantitative indicators employed in mass surveys are also pointing to this trend 
of negative citizen orientations, but in their current format present limited opportunities to 
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interpret this phenomenon and understand political distrust And lastly, we argued that the 
ambivalent or unspecified relationship between the two concepts of trust and distrust poses a 
big puzzle and hindrance to advancing social scientific understanding of such citizen 
attitudes. The initial motivation and intention of this research has been clearly placed on 
investigating the nature of political distrust, in terms of its research design, methodological 
choices and the tools employed throughout, in an effort to understand the meaning and 
functioning of political distrust. However, it is also evident that this study is relevant to the 
scholarly work on political trust and hopes to have contributed to the academic debate with 
its conceptual model, novel measures and empirical findings of distrusting attitudes.  
 
Following this investigation into the nature, meaning and functioning of citizens’ attitudes of 
political distrust, how has this thesis contributed to solving the aforementioned puzzles? Do 
trust and distrust represent two different concepts? There are two ways to think about this 
relationship and provide an appropriate answer. First, we would be lead to consider trust and 
distrust as distinct concepts if they can coexist simultaneously as attitudes of a single 
individual. Indeed this is what some scholarly work outside political science has argued 
recently (Walle and Six, 2014; Lewicki et al., 1998). Following the conceptual model of 
political distrust advanced throughout this thesis it is possible to formulate different 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of political agents on the different evaluative dimensions, 
which was also encountered during exploratory research. However, these are synthesised by 
each citizen into a negative, positive or neutral orientation towards the political object 
overall.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests citizens’ perceptions of political untrustworthiness along 
technical, ethical and interest-based lines are positively associated. Similarly, we can argue 
that a citizen may simultaneously trust some parts of the political system while distrusting 
others, based on the levels of governance, on personal experience, special relationship or 
other information and stimuli. Yet again, this is not so much a case of trust and distrust co-
existing than a case of different perceptions of political untrustworthiness based on the 
qualities of different political agents. Citizens will also synthesise such perceptions, 
prioritising the judgements they consider more important and deriving an overall attitude 
towards the political system and political authorities as a whole. Therefore, an overall 
distrusting attitude towards the political system can include perceptions of trustworthy 
political agents, which however are not prominent enough to tilt the balance away from 
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beliefs of negative outcomes. A neutral attitude of neither trust nor distrust may equally be 
derived at through the synthesis and relative weight each evaluation is given by the citizen. 
Nevertheless, we have good reason to believe that a citizen’s perceptions of trustworthiness 
and untrustworthiness relating to different political agents within the same system are not 
independent, but follow the same direction. Various methods of empirical analysis supported 
this view, and our interpretation of this phenomenon in terms of the cognitive heuristic 
function of distrusting attitudes further suggests that political distrust cannot be thought of as 
coexisting with political trust. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the two notions are 
part of the same concept, only that the two are contrasting. 
 
A second step is to consider the meaning of each notion. From its outset this thesis has 
argued that distrust needs to be distinguished from lack of trust, because the two represent 
different states and have different meanings and manifestations. We have claimed that trust, 
distrust and lack of trust are three distinct states and have tried to prove both conceptually 
and empirically that the lack of one cannot be simply equated with the other. Going back to 
earlier definitions of political trust as a gradient, it was conceptualised as running from trust 
at the positive end to cynicism at the negative end (Miller, 1974a; Easton, 1975). We have 
already addressed what we consider to be the substantial difference between political 
cynicism and distrust, but the argument we wish to make here is that the choice of the term 
cynicism unavoidably presents an emphasis on the negative nature of citizens’ orientations, 
not a simple lack of trust. Two questions follow this line of thought. Firstly, does the 
differentiation between negative, neutral and positive states require that they be considered as 
different concepts? In other words, are the three states fundamentally different in their 
meaning or in the way they relate and give rise to other notions? Secondly, would we expect 
the same evaluative dimensions derived from this study of the underlying aspects of political 
distrust to be equally suited to capturing the span of all three different states? 
 
In regards to the first question, the answer lies in the description of distrust, trust and lack of 
trust: it is a matter of positivity or negativity in the outcomes a citizen believes will result 
from interactions with state agents, denoting a positive approach of ‘good-will’, a negative 
approach of ‘ill-will’ and a neutral or ambivalent approach of ‘wait-and-see’. In fact, 
Easton’s conceptual investigation of diffuse political support follows this – perhaps counter-
intuitive – description of a range between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ support (Easton, 1975). 
We believe we have satisfactorily shown that the three states are distinguishable conceptually 
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and empirically (as shown in Chapter 4) based on the psychological states they represent, the 
particular manifestations, emotive language and behavioural intentions they entail. This 
marks a contribution of the present research and knowledge acquired following the framing 
and focus of this thesis on distrust. Further research will hopefully take these insights into 
consideration in expanding and deepening the investigation on political distrust.  
 
Regarding the second question on whether the same evaluative dimensions would be present 
in perceptions of political trustworthiness and the resulting attitudes of trust, this depends on 
whether we consider trust and distrust to be symmetrical notions or asymmetrical. We have 
already noted that the meaning and manifestations attached to the state of trust and distrust 
are not symmetrical and that the absence of one does not necessitate the presence of the other. 
The three evaluative dimensions were identified through a research design focused on 
perceptions of political untrustworthiness and distrusting attitudes. Hence, it is hard to argue 
convincingly that these are not part of trusting attitudes. Though the two states oppose one 
another and many citizens in the first part of our research often contrasted the qualities and 
political conduct they judged untrustworthy with positive qualities. For example, lies and 
political dishonesty were contrasted with truth and honesty, unfairness with fairness, failure 
and incompetence with success and competence, contravening one’s best-interest with 
protecting it and many more. Yet we do not know whether these are necessarily the 
evaluative dimensions entailed in attitudes of political trust. In addition, in Chapter 6, we saw 
that a traditionally phrased trust-in-parliament item is strongly and negatively associated with 
the index of political distrust (the strongest link was with the prospective technical 
assessments of national parliament). Nevertheless, much variation remains and further 
research would undoubtedly be needed to investigate the particular underlying assessments 
entailed in trusting political attitudes.  
 
Thus, even if we decide that political distrust is not an altogether different concept from trust, 
but rather that it represents a distinct state in an attitudinal continuum with a neutral state and 
negative and positive poles, we remain convinced that as political scientists we have grasped 
– to use the colloquial term – the ‘wrong end of the stick’. Placing all the research focus, 
conceptual, measurement and empirical work on political trust, we have neglected the part of 
this attitudinal continuum that hosts the largest chunk of citizen orientations. Further, distrust 
is strongly associated with particular emotive states and behavioural intentions that have 
implications for citizens' subsequent decision-making and their relationship with the state and 
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state actors. The ‘vicious circle’ of distrust and untrustworthiness may be considered 
analogous to the ‘virtuous circle’ of trust and trustworthiness, but unless we focus on 
studying distrust we will not be able to understand and address the destructive implications 
the former has for democratic communities. As mentioned in earlier chapters, one of the 
particularities of political distrust compared to other distrusting relations is that citizens 
cannot completely remove themselves from the citizen-state relation and that if they do try, 
by abstaining from democratic processes, breaking the law or rejecting the legitimacy of 
political authority, they are still interacting with state agents and the political community in a 
multitude of ways. Going back to the initial claim by Russell Hardin that it suffices a 
government not be “generally and deeply distrusted”, we reaffirm that the focus of research 
on political attitudes should remain on better comprehending this negative part of the 
spectrum (Hardin, 2004: 158). The emphasis citizens appear to place on evaluations of 
political untrustworthiness based on the violation of shared ethical norms may present a 
promising avenue for further research. 
 
From its outset, this thesis acknowledged it could not conclusively address all the questions 
and puzzles surrounding the study of citizen attitudes of political distrust. In fact, one of its 
primary objectives has been to bring these puzzles to light and then provide a first step 
towards understanding the ontological nature, concept and empirical function of distrusting 
attitudes. We hope that with the mixed methods research design, the conceptual model of 
political distrust and new survey measures of distrusting attitudes, this thesis has made a solid 
contribution to this area of political behaviour that further research can consult, extend and 
expand upon. The new survey measures can be easily transported to research in other national 
contexts and provide useful comparative evidence as to the way various nationalities 
prioritise evaluative dimensions and differentiate between different political targets and time 
projections. Equally, more extensive qualitative research into national contexts that have not 
been included in the present project can provide additional information to support or 
supplement the conceptual model of distrusting attitudes. One of the unavoidable limitations 
of this doctoral research lies in the restricted national contexts studied in the first part of the 
design. It might be argued that conducting exploratory research in other countries, such as 
Scandinavian or Central and Eastern European nations, would have given rise to alternative 
findings of what distrust means for citizens and the cognitive and affective processes it 
involves. We have good theoretical reasons to believe that the three evaluative processes 
feature in judgments of political distrust irrespective of the democratic context studied, and 
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have justified the country case selection based on the accessibility to citizens’ distrusting 
attitudes. What we might observe instead, however, is the relative difference in the 
prominence of one evaluative dimension over another, both among different groups within a 
national context and between different political cultures. For example, previous research 
conducted in the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe has argued that due to the 
lack of long historical democratic processes, citizens place more emphasis on political 
performance and quick positive results; hence distrusting attitudes in these national contexts 
may be dominated by technical and interest-based evaluations more than ethical assessments 
of untrustworthiness (Mishler and Rose, 2001). Yet these arguments add to the usefulness of 
our conceptual model and increase its potential contribution to the study of political distrust. 
The survey measures employed opens the door for comparative research across nations and 
national political cultures, which unfortunately could not be conducted in the space of this 
thesis. The theoretical framework followed for the study of political distrust (and trust) was 
derived from earlier work focusing on established democratic systems; for this reason, this 
thesis has limited itself to the discussion and research of citizen distrust in democracies. 
Nevertheless, additional research from democratising societies and partially free nation states 
can potentially provide useful information for citizen orientations towards political agents 
and the state.  
 
Undoubtedly, there are still areas where further research will be invaluable for advancing our 
understanding of political distrust. Questions of measurement and empirical analysis are 
especially pressing if the discipline aims to monitor distrust trends across different national 
contexts and capture latent attitudes of distrust. For example, should we aim to capture 
political distrust in a continuous or discreet manner, creating measurement indicators that can 
separate the three distinct states of trust, lack of trust and distrust discussed above? Many 
aspects regarding the operationalisation and measurement of distrust are still arbitrary, but the 
choices researchers make have implications for the way we think about citizen attitudes and 
the empirical results we derive from analysis into the causes and consequences of distrust. It 
is still important to discuss where trust ends, where the lack of trust and distrust reside and 
where distrust begins. We know that one can trust or distrust to a certain extent and that 
therefore there exists a gradient of trusting and distrusting orientations. But in this analysis 
we have refrained from assuming that the indicator of political distrust created offers a 
perfect measurement of a trust-distrust continuum. Although such assumptions have been 
made before in empirical quantitative studies, as mentioned above, it is extremely doubtful 
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whether indicators capture a complete symmetry between the positive end of trust, negative 
end of distrust and a neutral midpoint of neither trust nor distrust, or indeed whether such 
symmetry exists (Cook and Gronke, 2005; Mishler and Rose, 1997; Uslaner, 2008). There are 
important measurement issues to be discussed further in the study of political trust and 
distrust which are very much part of the conceptual debate on distrusting attitudes.  
 
In terms of the methodological choices followed in this thesis, it is important to note that the 
derived survey indicator is far from the only way to measure political distrust, even given the 
exploratory part of the research. The way distrust was operationalised in this thesis served the 
purpose of including the three specific evaluative dimensions entailed in attitudes of political 
distrust, the two time projections and two parts of the political system, so as to explore their 
internal structure and supplement the conceptual model of distrust developed in the thesis 
using statistical analysis. There could potentially be countless other ways to create indicators 
of distrust, for instance using quotes from the narrative interviews as attitude statements for 
respondents to agree or disagree with, such as “most of the laws passed by parliament are 
unfair”. This thesis has proposed and tested only one potential approach to measuring 
distrusting attitudes, but hopes to be one of many studies to come that revaluates widely used 
measures and concepts as part of an extended research effort to examine attitudes of political 
distrust. 
 
 
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite the limitations confronting doctoral research we believe this thesis succeeds in 
bringing to the fore the question of citizen attitudes of political distrust and in taking a first 
step to address three key puzzles: providing a clear conceptualisation of distrusting attitudes; 
investigating the meaning of political distrust and the of role technical, ethical and interest-
based evaluative dimensions; and developing an alternative survey indicator for distrusting 
attitudes which provided further evidence as to the structure and operation of political 
distrust. As mentioned above, the identification and relative importance of these three lines of 
assessing political untrustworthiness offer a promising avenue for further research into 
citizens’ political behaviour and possible remedial action to counteract distrusting 
orientations.  Further, the novel survey indicator could be easily included in more surveys 
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and transported to other national contexts, yielding additional comparative evidence 
regarding the composition, structure and functioning of distrusting attitudes in different 
political communities.  
 
More importantly, we hope this thesis has injected a much-needed fresh perspective into the 
question of citizen attitudes towards political systems. Many of the impasses reached in the 
study of political trust and support, which we discussed in detail in the earlier chapters of this 
thesis, are owing to the mismatch between the available theories, conceptual and empirical 
tools at our disposal on the one hand, and the reality of critical, negative and often outright 
hostile citizen attitudes towards their political systems on the other. This thesis aimed to 
bridge this gap by offering a conceptual, methodological and empirical contribution to the 
study of such negative attitudes, opening up future lines of inquiry into the implications of 
political distrust and possible avenues to reverse perceptions of untrustworthy political 
systems.  
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Appendices 	  
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Most commonly used survey indicators for political trust and distrust (USA and Europe) 
 
American National Election Studies: 
"I'd like to talk about some of the different ideas about the government in Washington. These 
ideas don't refer to democrats or republicans in particular, but just to government in general. 
We want to see how you feel about these ideas.” 
Q1: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do 
what is right-- just about always, most of the time or only some of the time?"  
Q2: "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for 
themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?"  
Q3: "Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste 
some of it, or don't waste very much of it?"  
Q4: "Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are: a little crooked, 
not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked at all?"  
Source: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_5.htm 
 
Eurobarometer 
I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For 
each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. 
Trade unions, Political parties, The Civil service, The national government, The national 
Parliament, The European Union, The United Nations later questions introduced The 
European Commission, The European Central Bank, The European Parliament  
Source:http://www.gesis.org/en/eurobarometer/topics-trends-question-retrieval/eb-trends-
trend-files/list-of-trends/trust-in-institutions/ 
 
World/European Values Survey 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? The government, Political parties, Parliament, The Civil 
service, The European Union (and other institutions). 
 
European Social Survey 
Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have 
complete trust. 
[Country]’s parliament, Politicians, Political parties, The European Parliament (other 
institutions). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Information on selected countries 
 
 
UK Italy  Greece EU Average 
GDP per capita 
(in USD) 
41,776 35,477 21,966 34,300 
Unemployment  
rate 
7.5% 12.2% 27.3% 10.9% 
Inequality (Gini 
coef.) 
30.2 32.5 34.4 30.5 
Governance Score 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
1.47 0.45 0.45 n.a 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(0 to 100) 
76 43 40 n.a. 
Democratic since 1918 1946 1974  n.a. 
EU (ECC) 
member since 1973 1957 1981 n.a. 
 
 
Electoral System 
Majoritarian (First-
past-the-post) 
Closed party-list PR, 
with plurality bonus* 
Reinforced 
PR n.a. 
 
Bicammeralism  Yes Yes No n.a. 
 
 
Federalism 
No (devolution for 
certain regions) 
No (special status for 
certain regions) No n.a. 
Trust in 
Parliament 
24% 10% 12% 25% 
Trust in 
Government 
24% 10% 10% 23% 
Trust in EU 19% 23% 21% 31% 
* The Italian electoral law in effect in 2013, also known as 'porcellum' was declared 
unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court and was replaced in 2015 with an open 
party-list PR system  
Note: Data for 2013. Sources: World Bank, Eurostat, Transparency International 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Information on study participants 
 
Key demographic characteristics of interview participants 
  
Socio-economic Status of Participants 
 SES Categories Total Sample UK GREECE ITALY 
(1) Higher salariat 8.3% 12.5% 6.25% 6.25% 
(2) Lower salariat 18.8% 25.% 18.75% 12.5% 
(3) Intermediate occupations  18.8% 12.5% 12.5% 31.25% 
(4) Petit bourgeoisie or independents 16.6% 6.25% 31.25% 12.5% 
(5) Self employed occupations 
(eg.agriculture) 12.5% 18.75% 6.25% 12.5% 
(6) Higher grade blue collar workers 2.1% 0% 0% 6.25% 
(7) Lower grade white collar workers  0% 0% 0% 0% 
(8) Lower technical occupations  2.1% 0% 6.25% 0% 
(9) Routine occupations 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 
(10) Never worked and long-term 
unemployed  6.25% 12.5% 6.25% 0% 
(11)Student  8.3% 6.25% 6.25% 12.5% 
Note: SES follows the European Socio-economic Classification  
Guide available at https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/esec/guide/docs/UserGuide.pdf 
 
 
Comparison from Survey data from June 2012 
OCCUPATION SCALE  UK GREECE ITALY 
Self-employed  5.8% 18.5% 12.3% 
Managers  12.1% 5% 4.5% 
Other white collars  7.3% 12.5% 2.3% 
Manual workers  18.1% 11.2% 17.8% 
House persons  4.5% 9% 14.2% 
Unemployed  9% 11.2% 5.8% 
Retired  27.7% 22.1% 18.3% 
Students  5.6% 1.5% 6.7% 
Note: Source of data Eurobarometer 77.4 (June 2012) 
 
 
 
Age of Participants 
Sample Average age in years 
Total Sample 41.8 
UK 44.7 
Greece 44.8 
Italy  35.8 
Total Sample Age Groups 
 18-20 years 4.1% 
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21-29 years 22.9% 
30-39 years 22.9% 
40-49 years 16.6% 
50-59 years 16.6% 
60-69 years 1.4% 
70 years onwards 2% 
   
Comparison from Survey data from June 2012 
Sample Average age in years 
UK 51.9 
Greece 45.4 
Italy 48.6 
Note: Source of data Eurobarometer 77.4 (June 2012) 
 
 
 
Gender of Participants 
Sample Male Female 
Total Sample 50% 50% 
UK 50% 50% 
Greece 50% 50% 
Italy 50% 50% 
 
Comparison from Survey data from June 2012 
Sample Male Female 
UK 45.90% 54.10% 
Greece 49.90% 5.10% 
Italy 43.10% 56.90% 
Note: Source of data Eurobarometer 77.4 (June 2012) 
 
 
 
Participant and Interview Information 
Participant ID Geographical 
Location 
Gender Age Group SES* Interview Length 
I-3201 Periphery F 18-30 6 48'16'' 
I-3202 Periphery F 18-30 11 58'01' 
I-3103 Periphery M 18-30 3 46'20'' 
I-1104 Periphery M 60-70 1 55'36'' 
I-3105 Periphery M 40-50 4 60'03'' 
I-1206 Big City F 50-60 4 61'39'' 
I-1207 Big City F 18-30 3 52'57'' 
I-1108 Big City M 30-40 2 57'40'' 
I-1109 Big City M 18-30 2 68'43'' 
I-2110 Smaller City M 18-30 3 45'00'' 
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I-1111 Big City M 40-50 9 46'53'' 
I-2112 Smaller City M 18-30 5 63'15'' 
I-2213 Smaller City F 18-30 3 60'23'' 
I-2214 Smaller City F 30-40 3 47'50'' 
I-2115 Smaller City M 30-40 11 71'30'' 
I-2216 Smaller City F 30-40 5 40'48'' 
G-1201 Big City F 50-60 1 50'00'' 
G-1102 Big City M 30-40 4 64'10'' 
G-1203 Big City F 20-30 11 58'44'' 
G-1204 Big City F 20-30 3 72'16'' 
G-3105 Smaller City M 30-40 2 61'00'' 
G-3206 Smaller City F 50-60 10 46'34'' 
G-1107 Big City M 40-50 4 62'05'' 
G-2108 Periphery M 40-50 4 60'23'' 
G-2209 Periphery F 60-70 2 55'21'' 
G-2110 Periphery M 40-50 4 48'49'' 
G-2111 Periphery M 50-60 5 40'56'' 
G-1212 Big City F 60-70 2 61'00'' 
G-3213 Smaller City F 50-60 4 71'00'' 
G-3114 Smaller City M 20-30 9 74''23'' 
G-3115 Smaller City M 20-30 8 50'05'' 
G-3216 Smaller City F 50-60 3 57'21'' 
UK-2101 Smaller City M 20-30 11 65'23'' 
UK-3102 Periphery M 30-40 2 64'00'' 
UK-2103 Smaller City M 40-50 2 57'02'' 
UK-1204 Big City F 20-30 3 61'56'' 
UK-1105 Big City M 30-40 1 55'54'' 
UK-2106 Smaller City M 20-30 3 78'55'' 
UK-1207 Big City F 20-30 2 52'00'' 
UK-2108 Smaller City M 60-70 4 61'21'' 
UK-1209 Big City F 40-50 1 50'03'' 
UK-1210 Big City F 30-40 2 64'51'' 
UK-1211 Big City F 40-50 5 56'42'' 
UK-3212 Periphery F 60-70 10 59'05'' 
UK-3213 Periphery F 50-60 5 57'40'' 
UK-3214 Periphery F 50-60 10 51'09'' 
UK-3115 Periphery M 70-80 5 54'34'' 
UK-3116 Periphery M 50-60 9 58'45'' 
Note: Socio-Economic Status number corresponds to the European Socio-economic Classification, 
for further information, see https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/esec/guide/docs/UserGuide.pdf 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Invitation for an interview to potential study participants 
 
Information about Research and Participation 
 
 
Name of researcher:  Eri Bertsou 
Name of programme:  PhD candidate in Political Science 
Email:     e.e.bertsou@lse.ac.uk 
Name of institution: Department of Government, London School of 
Economics and Political Science 
Address of institution:  Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK 
www.lse.ac.uk  
Academic Supervisor:  Dr. Michael Bruter 
 
 
Information about me and my research 
I am in my third year of study for a PhD degree in Political Science in London 
focusing on the area of political behaviour. I am interested to know more about what 
citizens think about their political institutions, their politicians and their political 
system in general. Through in-depth discussions with British citizens in various 
locations, I hope to understand better what is the relationship between citizens and 
their political system. If you agree to participate in my study, I would like to have a 
discussion with you about your thoughts on politics in Britain, your experiences in 
dealing with the political system and political institutions and how you feel about the 
current system of governance. I will not be asking you about personal political 
preferences, about whom you vote for or which political party you support. The aim 
of the discussion is to talk about how you, as a citizen, relate to the political system 
and political institution that affect your everyday life. 
 
Important information about your participation -­‐ If you would like to participate in my study, I would like to arrange a discussion 
with you, which would last approximately 60 minutes. -­‐ Prior, during and after the interview, all personal information will remain 
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confidential and everything we discuss will remain anonymous. Your name will 
not appear in the thesis or any research notes. -­‐ All the information gathered during my research will be used solely for academic 
purposes. -­‐ Your participation in the research is entirely voluntary. You have the choice 
whether to participate or not and you are free to stop our discussion at any time if 
you wish so. -­‐ Participation in the research does not incur any risks.  To thank you for your time 
and attention, I have arranged for an Amazon £10 gift voucher to be given to every 
participant after the completion of the research. -­‐ I would like to use a tape recorder during our discussion to help with later 
transcription. At any time, you can ask me to stop the recording of our 
conversation. All recordings will be erased after transcription and all information 
will remain anonymous. If you would prefer not to have our conversation 
recorded, please let me know and I can arrange to take notes instead. 
 
 
If you have any questions about me, about the research or about how I will use your 
information please ask me. If you have any questions after the interview, please write 
to me: e.e.bertsou@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
Your signature below means that you voluntarily agree to participate in 
this research study. 
 
 
___________________________          ___________________________ 
Signature               Date
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APPENDIX E 	  Extract	  from	  Interview	  IT-­‐2112	   	  
Observations 
 
Retrospective 
event 
Prospective 
expectation 
 
Technical 
Evaluation 
Moral 
Evaluation 
Interest-based 
Evaluation 
Emotive 
Responses to 
distrust 
Behavioural 
Intention 
Responses to 
distrust: 
1. Bad current 
situation in the 
country 
System is not 
working/functioni
ng properly 
 
 
But cannot be 
changed 
 
System is not 
working/functionin
g properly 
 
Justice system does 
not function 
 
High taxation 
High public 
spending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scandals 
Corruption 
Politicians party 
with citizen 
money 
 
 
 
Politicians think 
about their 
personal interest 
and not the good of 
the people 
 
 
 
 
Especially for 
graduates and those 
who have seen 
other countries 
(seing other young 
people in other 
countries and their 
opportunities, 
seeing institutions 
functioning, 
processes working) 
 
 
 
Fear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anger 
Frustration 
 
 
 
No hope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whoever can 
leave, leaves,  
Whoever 
cannot, votes 
for extreme 
(unti-system 
party Grillo) 
 
2. People are 
afraid, because 
they say "What 
    Young people (us) 
cannot find work 
 
 
Uncertainty, 
Fear 
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do I do? Do I buy 
a house? Do I sell 
it? " 
 
VAT high 
Uncertainty tax 
regime, changing 
every year 
 
 
 
3. Evaluating a 
politician 
 
 
 
 
The old haven’t 
done anything in 
60 years. Looking 
at past 
actions/track 
record 
 
Berlusconi did 
well, but now 
need a new figure 
 
 
Judge the young 
and new better 
than the old 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instability 
Government 
falls or does 
nothing 
 
 
Conflict of 
interest: 
Politicians are 
there thanks to 
the system so 
they won’t 
change the 
system 
 
 
 
 
The old haven’t 
done anything in 60 
years. 
 
Berlusconi did 
well, but now need 
a new figure 
 
But the PM hasn’t 
got a lot of powers 
The system is 
wrong 
There is never one 
that has enough 
power 
 
Instability 
Government falls 
or does nothing 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflict of interest: 
Politicians are 
there thanks to the 
system so they 
won’t change the 
system 
 
  
4. Distrust and 
vote: “I think 
they all feel 
Voted for that 
which has less 
problems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I want a fast 
judiciary system 
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distrust, total 
distrust. The only 
thing is that 
people try to 
salvage what is 
unsalvageable. 
When you vote, 
you vote for the 
lesser evil, you 
don’t vote that 
which changes 
your life.” 
 
 
 
Your vote doesn’t 
count 
 
 
 
Your vote 
doesn’t count 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MP abuse of 
power. 
They live in 
another world 
Are not looking for 
people’s interest 
but their own 
 
 
 
 
No 
reliability/trust of 
political party “I 
can vote for the 
party of "san 
Pellegrino " and 
then Mr. San 
Pellegrino can 
send us a mafioso 
in Parliament” 
 
You are denied 
the decision, the 
choice 
 
Unfair system 
 
MP abuse of 
power 
 
that functions (to 
be able to do 
business) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are denied the 
decision, the choice 
 
MP abuse of 
power. 
They live in 
another world 
Are not looking for 
people’s interest 
but their own 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Optimism is 
impossible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
People want to 
break the 
system 
If there was 
trust people 
wouldn’t vote 
for a comedian 
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Extract	  from	  Interview	  UK-­‐2109:	  	  
Observations 
 
Retrospective 
event 
Prospective 
expectation 
 
Technical 
Evaluation 
Moral 
Evaluation 
Interest-based 
Evaluation 
Emotive 
Responses 
to distrust: 
Behavioural 
Intention 
Responses to 
distrust: 
1. Iraq war and 
Syria 
 
 
 
 
 
Terrible 
Disgrace 
 
   
 
 
People misled by 
Blair, deception, 
manipulation 
 
It was morally 
wrong, lost so 
many lives 
Pleased that the 
House of Commons 
voted against 
intervention in 
Syria – reflected 
public opinion” 
 
 
 
 
 
Disappointed
, let down 
over Iraq 
Angry 
 
 
 
2.  Eu influence 
 
 
 
 
Example used: 
Banking 
coordination 
directive 
implementation 
through national 
legislation - 
Wasteful, Failure 
 
 Inefficient 
Expensive 
Mismanagement 
Bad 
implementation of 
legistlation 
 
Everybody/each 
country, does what 
they want 
 
Free trade is 
excellent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brussels-
Strasburg transfer 
ridiculous 
Mad, crazy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EU identified only 
as French and 
Germans (UK 
excluded) 
View of the EU as 
a Franco-German 
Club. 
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Extract	  from	  Interview	  GR-­‐1204	  	  
Observations 
 
Retrospective 
event 
Prospective 
expectation 
 
Technical 
Evaluation 
Moral 
Evaluation 
Interest-based 
Evaluation 
Emotive 
Responses to 
distrust 
Behavioural 
Intention 
Responses to 
distrust: 
1. No 
identification 
with any political 
party 
 
 
 
No 
representation: 
From the larger 
to the smaller 
level there is no 
representation for 
me 
 
Identification 
with a person on 
the basis of what 
they say (where 
you agree on), 
But “after that, 
it’s chaos” 
 
University student 
experience: 
negative image of 
political parties, 
coercion, bullying  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unions are the 
slime of the 
employees 
 
Party support is 
fanatical 
Unbelievably 
fanatical 
 
 
 
Unions are the 
slime of the 
employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do not want to 
identify with 
fanaticism 
 
No representation: 
From the larger to 
the smaller level 
there is no 
representation for 
me 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is why 
you are 
denied your 
voice/will, it 
is being taken 
away from 
you 
 
 
2. “I won’t pay” 
movement, not 
following the law 
 
unfairness of the 
citizen-state 
relationship 
 
  
 
 unfairness of the 
citizen-state 
relationship 
 
  
 
extreme 
fanatic 
reached your 
limits 
 
justifying the 
reaction 
reaction by 
removing 
yourself from 
the relationship 
(breaking the 
law) 
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blame them 
about your 
action 
‘they have 
brought me 
to the point’ 
 
3. Voting for an 
extreme party 
 
 
 
 
Punishment of 
only a few. 
The money is still 
missing and there 
is still a problem 
It does not fix the 
problem 
 
 
 
Only some get 
punished 
Which make it 
worse for all the 
rest who remain 
unpunished 
I cannot believe it 
is just one person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The money is 
still missing and 
there is still a 
problem 
It does not fix 
the problem 
 Seeing the 
consequences of 
actions 
Want to see 
punishment of 
those who have 
done wrong 
 
Unfair system, 
preferential/ 
unequal treatment 
of politicians 
 
The promise of 
punishment 
appeals to people 
 
 
Fairness is 
powerful 
emotion: 
“I would love to 
see there are 
consequences for 
all people” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The promise of 
punishment appeals 
to people 
 
breaking 
point 
Anger 
Infuriation 
 
 
 
 
 
Fairness is 
powerful 
emotion: 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Analysis of variance of distrust items in the second half of the questionnaire. 
 
The prospective items measuring political distrust were situated in the second half of our 
online questionnaire to have as much distance as possible from the retrospective items. The 
online survey included a media focused treatment, unrelated to the present study. There 
where three news articles per treatment condition (two shorter news articles and one longer 
news article) in the issue of investment in elderly care in times of economic crisis. 
Treatments focused on emotional news coverage (positive emotions, negative fear related 
emotions and negative anger related emotions) and the location of issue (in the UK, in the EU 
and outgroup). Exposure to any of these experimental conditions does not alter the responses 
to our distrust items. This is in line with our theoretical expectations that distrust is an attitude 
that is resistant to quick manipulation, and although it is sensitive to new experiences and 
information, changes occur less abruptly than in the case of loosely held opinions.  
 
Analysis of variance of distrust items in the second half of the questionnaire	  
Independent Variable: 
Experimental condition 
All experimental 
condition 
Experimental 
condition per 
political object (UK, 
EU, Outgroup, 
Control) 
Experimental 
condition per emotion 
(Neg Mobilising, Neg 
Demobilising, 
Positive, Control) 
 
(F-ratio) (Sig.) (F-ratio) (Sig.) (F-ratio) (Sig.) 
Parliament Technical 
Prospective .928 .499 .385 .764 .782 .504 
Parliament Moral 
Prospective 1.124 .343 .073 .974 1.125 .338 
Parliament Interest 
Prospective .727 .684 .546 .651 .551 .648 
Party Technical 
Prospective .88 .543 .559 .642 .622 .601 
Party Moral Prospective .886 .537 1.165 .322 1.15 .328 
Party Interest 
Prospective .46 .901 .105 .957 .618 .603 
Distrust in parliament 
(prospective index) .882 .541 .208 .891 .64 .589 
Distrust in preferred 
party  
(prospective index) .688 .72 .6 .615 .756 .519 
Note: Entries are F-ratios and significance (p-values) calculated through different groupings of 
experimental treatment 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Operationalisation and Variable Information  
 
Political Cynicism: 
Political cynicism index is comprised by eight items measured on a 1-7 ‘strongly agree’-
‘strongly disagree’ scale. Positively phrased items were recoded so that higher values to the 
political cynicism scale correspond to stronger levels of cynicism. The scale has a 
Chronbach’s alpha coefficient of a=.572, which is low but acceptable for a multifaceted 
psychological construct. The overall scale’s alpha coefficient would increase to above .625 if 
we removed item 5, yet we decided against it as this item taps on an additional aspect of 
cynical outlook. Factor analysis of the item pool confirms that all items load strongly on a 
single factor and the presence of a single factor with an eigenvalue higher than 1.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Political cynicism scale mean=4.18, st.deviation=.759, minimum=2, maximum=7 
Item Phrasing 
We would also like to know more about your personal opinions on politics in the UK. To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
1. On the whole, democracy works quite well in the UK (Recoded) 
2. Society has improved over the past fifty years (Recoded) 
3. On the whole, UK politicians are rather good (Recoded) 
4. Ultimately, our children will probably live a happier life than our generation (Recoded) 
5. The situation of our country really depends on world finance and companies, ultimately 
government has no influence 
6. We should recognize that some large segments of society are keen on making everyone 
else’s life miserable and cannot be helped  
7. In the UK, the school system is a big failure  
8. Administrations make life worse and not better for UK citizens  
(1) strongly disagree - (7) strongly agree 
 
 
UK Identification Strength: 
UK identification strength is captured through a single item asking respondents to indicate 
how strongly they identify with the UK using a seven-point scale.  
Descriptive Statistics 
UK Identification Strength mean=5.48, st.deviation=1.43, minimum=1, maximum=.7 
Item Phrasing 
Can you please tell us how strongly you identify with the United Kingdom? 
(1) Not strongly at all - (7) Very strongly  
 
 
Political Knowledge: 
In our study we opted for a measure of political knowledge that tests respondents through a 
series of items, rather than a self-declared level of knowledge or interest in politics. We used 
three items pertaining to UK politics and provided five possible answer categories, including 
a ‘Don’t know’ category. We recoded each correct answer to give one point, while an 
incorrect or ‘Don’t know’ answer counted for zero points, and added them together into a 
political knowledge indicator scaled from 0-1. 
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Descriptive Statistics: 
Political Knowledge mean=.664, st.deviation=.329, minimum=0, maximum=1. 
Items Phrasing: 
Please try to answer the following questions as spontaneously as possible. Don’t worry if you 
are not sure about the correct answer, just try to answer as many questions as you can.   
1. Who currently holds the position of ‘Chancellor of the Exchequer’?  
1. George Osborne* 
2. Alistair Darling 
3. Kenneth Clarke 
4. William Hague 
5. I don’t know 
2. When is the next UK general election planned?  
1. 2014 
2. 2015* 
3. 2016 
4. 2017 
5. I don’t know 
3. General elections in the United Kingdom are based on which voting system? 
1. First-past-the-post* 
2. Proportional representation 
3. Relative majority 
4. Preferential voting 
5. I don’t know 
 
 
Political Efficacy: 
We measure respondents’ political efficacy using three items asking about the level of 
confidence one has their knowledge, influence and participation in political processes. All 
items are attitude statements measured using a 1-7 ‘strongly disagree’ – ‘strongly agree’ 
scale. Negative phrased items were recoded so that the higher scores on the scale denote 
stronger feelings of political efficacy. The items create a scale with a Chronbach’s alpha 
coefficient=744. 
Descriptive Statistics: 
Political Efficacy mean=4.70, st.deviation=1.24, minimum=1, maximum=7. 
Items Phrasing: 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
1. When I go to vote, I often feel that the way I vote can influence the way my country is 
governed. 
2. When I go to vote, I often feel that if many people feel and vote the way I do it can 
influence the way my country is governed. 
3. I feel that I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to know what is right or not for our country. 
(Recoded) 
(1) strongly disagree - (7) strongly agree 
 
 
Left-Right Ideological Placement: 
We follow the widely used operationalization of capturing respondents’ ideology on the left-
right political spectrum using a single item for ideological self-placement on a ten-point 
scale.  
Descriptive Statistics:   
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Left-Right Ideology mean=5.62, st.deviation=2.09, minimum=1, maximum=10. 
Item Phrasing: 
In political matters people talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place your views on 
this scale?  
(1) Left - (10) Right  
 
 
Demographic Information 
We gather demographic characteristics of respondents that pertain to their age, gender and 
level of Education. Respondents were asked to declare their age in years, gender and the 
highest level of education they have achieved. Educational level was measured using multiple 
categories of academic and vocational education completed. For ease of interpretation and 
due to the non-interval nature of the response categories, we recoded level of Education into 
three categories:  
Low level of Education = Incomplete secondary education  
Middle level of Education = Completed secondary education and some professional 
qualification attained 
High level of Education = Completed higher level education, bachelors, masters and doctoral 
degrees 
Descriptive Statistics: 
Age: Mean=47.6, st.deviation=16.8, minimum=18, maximum=90.	  	  
Gender: Proportion of male respondents=49.6%, proportion of female respondents=50.4%. 
Education Category: Percentage of respondents with low levels of education=12.3%, 
percentage of respondents with medium levels of education=48.8%, percentage of 
respondents with high levels of education=38.9%. 
Item Phrasing: 
Age: How old are you? 
Gender: Your gender? 
Female (0) 
Male (1) 
Education: What is the highest level of education (general or vocational) you have 
successfully completed (usually by obtaining a certificate or diploma)?  
1. Doctorate  
2. Tertiary education  
3. Undergraduate degree, master's degree  
4. Higher education access courses  
5. Upper secondary school  
6. Lower secondary school  
7. Other qualifications  
8. No formal education  
9. I don't want to answer this question  
Categories recoded (excluding missing values): Higher Education level=1,2,3 Medium 
Education level=4,5, Lower Education Level=6,7,8. 
 
 
 
 
Other measures of political support 
Democratic Satisfaction and Trust in British Parliament: 
	  	  	  	  
283	  
We have included a standard measure of satisfaction with democracy, using a single item 
measured on a seven-point scale. We have also included a traditionally phrased item 
capturing institutional trust (trust in British Parliament) using a seven-point scale. This 
institutional trust item follows the conventional phrasing in European research that leaves the 
notion of political trust undefined, and up for the interpretation of each respondent. Both of 
these political support measures are helpful comparisons for our new political distrust index 
and assist in determining construct and concurrent validity of the new distrust measure.  
Descriptive Statistics: 
Democratic Satisfaction mean=3.53, st.deviation=1.33, minimum=1, maximum=7. 
Trust in British Parliament mean=3.69, st.deviation=1.60, minimum=1, maximum=7. 
Items Phrasing: 
Democratic Satisfaction: To what extent are you satisfied with the way democracy works in 
the United Kingdom? 
(1) Very dissatisfied - (7) Very satisfied 
Trust in British Parliament: Please indicate how much you trust the British Parliament to 
usually take the right decisions:  
(1) Do not trust at all  - (7) Have complete trust 
 
Behavioural Intention Variables 
In our survey we have also included a number of items capturing behavioural intentions 
pertaining to political participation actions. It is worth stressing once more that these items 
tap on intentions to behave in a given way under certain circumstances and are not measures 
of actual behaviour (such as these used in comparative survey research asking respondents 
whether they have contacted a politician in last 12 months). We ask specifically about eight 
politically motivated actions: participating in a violent or peaceful demonstration, abstaining 
or casting a black vote in an election, voting for a radical or revolutionary party, leaving the 
country and joining a political party or non-governmental organization. Following the 
insights into the emotive and behavioural responses to political distrust afforded by popular 
interviews, we are especially interested in four of these behavioural intention items and their 
association to political distrust. Nevertheless, to avoid type II errors due to multiple 
comparisons we also create two indices of political behaviour following a factor analysis of 
the single items. We identify two distinct factors (eigenvalue higher than 1) and create two 
indices; the first referring to actions that represent political activism and more traditional 
form of participation (attending a a peaceful demonstration and joining a political party or 
other non-governmental organization) and the latter capturing more disruptive political 
behaviour (electoral abstention, blank vote, voting for radical parties, participating in a 
violent demonstration and leaving the UK). The index for active participation is comprised of 
three items, scores a reliability Chronbach’s alpha coefficient of .748. The index for 
disruptive participation (that includes non-participation) is comprised of five items that score 
a reliability coefficient a=.727. Both indices are measured on a 0-1 scale for to facilitate 
comparisons.  
Descriptive Statistics: 
Active Participation Index mean=.562, st.deviation=.163, minimum=.25, maximum=1. 
Disruptive Participation Index mean=.403, st.deviation=.143, minimum=.25, maximum=1. 
Items Phrasing: 
When you are unhappy with the situation in our country, would you consider the following 
reactions?  
1. Abstain in elections 
2. Vote for a radical or revolutionary party 
3. Cast a blank vote 
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4. Participate in a violent demonstration 
5. Leave the UK and move to another country 
6. Participate in a peaceful demonstration 
7. Join a political party 
8. Join a pressure group or NGO 
1 – No, certainly not 
2 – No probably not 
3 – Yes probably 
4 – Yes certainly 
Active Participation index: Items 6-8, scaled 0-1 
Disruptive Participation index: Items 1-5, scaled 0-1 
Individual behavioural intention items: 
Abstain in Election: Proportion of ‘certainly not’ and ‘probably not’=83.4%, proportion of 
‘certainly yes’ and ‘probably yes’=16.6%. 
Vote Radical: Proportion of ‘certainly not’ and ‘probably not’=76%, proportion of ‘certainly 
yes’ and ‘probably yes’=24%. 
Peaceful Demonstration: Proportion of ‘certainly not’ and ‘probably not’=68.7, proportion of 
‘certainly yes’ and ‘probably yes’=31.3%. 
Leave UK: Proportion of ‘certainly not’ and ‘probably not’=80.5%, proportion of ‘certainly 
yes’ and ‘probably yes’=19.5%. 
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APPENDIX H 	  
Additional tables not presented in Chapter 5	  
 
Table 5.4.2: One-factor model for Parliament distrust items  
 
 
Factor 1 
Parliament Technical Retrospective .766 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .740 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .743 
Parliament Technical Prospective .876 
Parliament Moral Prospective .875 
Parliament Interest Prospective .808 
Eigenvalue 4.25 
Variance Explained 7.8% 
LR Test    χ2=651, p<.000 
Note: Entries are the result of Exploratory Factor Analysis using the 
Maximum Likelihood method for factor extraction 
 
 
 
Table 5.4.3: One-factor model for Preferred Party distrust items  
 
 
Factor 1 
Party Technical Retrospective .676 
Party Moral Retrospective .659 
Party Interest Retrospective .685 
Party Technical Prospective .907 
Party Moral Prospective .938 
Party Interest Prospective .89 
Eigenvalue 4.34 
Variance Explained 72.3% 
LR Test  χ2=1126, p<.000 
Note: Entries are the result of Exploratory Factor Analysis using the Maximum 
Likelihood method for factor extraction 
 
 
Table 5.3.1: Reliability analysis for Parliament items 
Items 
Item-scale 
correlation 
Alpha, if item 
deleted 
Parliament Technical Retrospective .850 .899 
Parliament Moral Retrospective .827 .905 
Parliament Interest Retrospective .832 .903 
Parliament Technical Prospective .860 .897 
Parliament Moral Prospective .861 .897 
Parliament Interest Prospective .811 .906 
Parliament Distrust Scale Chronbach's a coefficient = .916 
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Table 5.3.2: Reliability analysis for Preferred Party items 
Items 
Item-scale 
correlation 
Alpha, if item 
deleted 
Party Technical Retrospective .848 .909 
Party Moral Retrospective .832 .912 
Party Interest Retrospective .847 .910 
Party Technical Prospective .855 .907 
Party Moral Prospective .879 .903 
Party Interest Prospective .835 .911 
Preferred Party Distrust Scale Chronbach's a coefficient = .923 
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Figure 5.4.3: Latent class analysis using three and four-class model for items referring 
to National parliament 
Class 1: population share = 0.252
ParlTR ParlMR ParlIR ParlTP ParlMP ParlIP 
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Class 2: population share = 0.228
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Class 3: population share = 0.52
ParlTR ParlMR ParlIR ParlTP ParlMP ParlIP 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Manifest variables
O
ut
co
m
es
Pr
(o
ut
co
m
e)                   
   
  
 
    
  
      
      
 
	  	  	  	  
288	  
Class 1: population share = 0.432
ParlTR ParlMR ParlIR ParlTP ParlMP ParlIP 
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Class 2: population share = 0.217
ParlTR ParlMR ParlIR ParlTP ParlMP ParlIP 
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Class 3: population share = 0.146
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Class 4: population share = 0.205
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Note: Models calculated in R using poLCA statistical package. Length of each bar denotes the probability 
members in this class will pick the specified response from the 1-7 measurement scale. The probability scale is 
situated on the left, the seven-point response scale is on the right hand-side of each figure. 
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Figure 5.4.4: Latent class analysis using three and four-class models for items referring 
to preferred political party 
Class 1: population share = 0.377
PartyTR PartyMR PartyIR PartyTP PartyMP PartyIP 
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Class 2: population share = 0.236
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Class 3: population share = 0.387
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Class 1: population share = 0.157
PartyTR PartyMR PartyIR PartyTP PartyMP PartyIP 
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Class 2: population share = 0.166
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Class 3: population share = 0.342
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Class 4: population share = 0.336
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Note: Models calculated in R using poLCA statistical package. Length of each bar denotes the probability 
members in this class will pick the specified response from the 1-7 measurement scale. The probability scale is 
situated on the left, the seven-point response scale is on the right hand-side of each figure. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Additional tables not presented in Chapter 6 
Table 6.10.1: OLS Regressions for distrust in parliament items explaining disruptive 
political participation 
Dependent Variable: Disruptive political participation  
Independent 
Variables: 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective .012*** 
     
 
(.003) 
     Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
 
.014*** 
    
  
(.003) 
    Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
  
.007* 
   
   
(.003) 
   Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
   
.011*** 
  
    
(.003) 
  Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
    
.010*** 
 
     
(.003) 
 Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
     
.006* 
Controls 
     
(.003) 
Left-Right 
Ideology .004 .004* .003 .003 .003 .003 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
2.Middle level 
Education -.007 -.007 -.009 -.008 -.010 -.009 
 (.015) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.016) 
3.Higher Level 
Education -.015 -.016 -.019 -.017 -.019 -.018 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) 
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Age -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** 
 (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) 
Male .038*** .039*** .040*** .039*** .039*** .039*** 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Constant .469*** .458*** .497*** .475*** .482*** .500*** 
 (.030) (.029) (.029) (.029) (.028) (.029) 
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R-squared .142 .150 .133 .141 .140 .133 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** 
p<.05. 
 
 
Table 6.10.2: OLS Regressions for distrust in parliament items explaining active 
political participation 
Dependent Variable: Active political participation  
Independent 
Variables: 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective -.0004 
     
 
(.004) 
     Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
 
.001 
    
  
(.004) 
    Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
  
.0002 
   
   
(.004) 
   Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
   
-.000001 
  
    
(.004) 
  Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
    
.002 
 
     
(.004) 
 Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
     
.00009 
Controls 
     
(.004) 
Left-Right 
Ideology -.014*** -.013*** -.013*** -.013*** -.013*** -.013*** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
2.Middle level 
Education .024 .024 .024 .024 .023 .024 
 (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
3.Higher Level 
Education .033* .033* .033* .033* .033* .033* 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) 
(.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Age -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 -.0004 
 (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) 
Male .023* .023* .023* .023* .022* .023* 
 (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
Constant .624*** .617*** .621*** .622*** .612*** .622*** 
 (.036) (.035) (.035) (.034) (.034) (.035) 
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R-squared .040 .040 .040 .040 .041 .040 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** 
p<.05. 
 
 
Table 6.11.1: OLS Regressions for distrust in preferred party items explaining 
disruptive political participation 
Dependent Variable: Disruptive political participation  
Independent 
Variables: 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Party 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party Technical 
Retrospective .011*** 
     
 
(.004) 
     Party Moral 
Retrospective 
 
.008** 
    
  
(.004) 
    Party Interest 
Retrospective 
  
.005 
   
   
(.003) 
   Party Technical 
Prospective 
   
.006 
  
    
(.004) 
  Party Moral 
Prospective 
    
.003 
 
     
(.003) 
 Party Interest 
Prospective 
     
.002 
Controls 
     
(.004) 
Left-Right 
Ideology .003 .003 .002 .002 .002 .002 
 (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
2.Middle level 
Education -.010 -.010 -.010 -.008 -.008 -.008 
 (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
3.Higher Level 
Education -.019 -.017 -.018 -.017 -.018 -.018 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) 
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
Age -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** -.003*** 
 (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003) 
Male .040*** .041*** .040*** .040*** .040*** .040*** 
 (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
Constant .485*** .495*** .507*** .506*** .519*** .520*** 
 (.034) (.034) (.033) (.034) (.033) (.033) 
R-squared .139 .135 .132 .132 .130 .130 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, 
** p<.05. 
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Table 6.11.2: OLS Regressions for distrust in preferred party items explaining active 
political participation 
Dependent Variable: Active political participation  
Independent 
Variables: 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Party 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party Technical 
Retrospective -.014*** 
     
 
(.004) 
     Party Moral 
Retrospective 
 
-.017*** 
    
  
(.004) 
    Party Interest 
Retrospective 
  
-.018*** 
   
   
(.004) 
   Party Technical 
Prospective 
   
-.021*** 
  
    
(.004) 
  Party Moral 
Prospective 
    
-.024*** 
 
     
(.004) 
 Party Interest 
Prospective 
     
-.024*** 
Controls 
     
(.004) 
Left-Right 
Ideology -.015*** -.016*** -.016*** -.015*** -.015*** -.015*** 
 (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) 
2.Middle level 
Education .0255 .0248 .0251 .0210 .0207 .0229 
 (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
3.Higher Level 
Education .034* .031 .033* .030 .030 .030 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) 
(.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) (.019) 
Age -.0004 -.0004 -.0005 -.0006 -.0006 -.0007* 
 (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) (.0004) 
Male .0226* .0206* .0217* .0214* .0201* .0223* 
 (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) (.011) 
Constant .683*** .702*** .704*** .715*** .727*** .728*** 
 (.034) (.034) (.033) (.034) (.033) (.033) 
R-squared .054 .061 .065 .070 .080 .080 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** 
p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Full binary logistic regression analyses for each distrust item explaining individual 
behavioural intention items  
Table 6.12.1: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in parliament items explaining 
behavioural intention to abstain in an election 
Dependent Variable: Abstain  
Independent 
Variables: 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective 1.093 
     
 
(.079) 
     Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
 
1.206*** 
    
  
(.086) 
    Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
  
1.029 
   
   
(.074) 
   Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
   
1.205** 
  
    
(.089) 
  Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
    
1.166** 
 
     
(.085) 
 Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
     
1.121 
Controls 
     
(.086) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 1.001 1.019 .994 1.008 1.007 1.002 
 (.051) (.052) (.051) (.051) (.051) (.051) 
2.Middle 
level 
Education .775 .784 .761 .773 .753 .761 
 (.247) (.251) (.241) (.247) (.240) (.242) 
3.Higher 
Level 
Education .525* .529* .511** .531* .517** .513** 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.176) (.179) (.171) (.179) (.174) (.172) 
Age .953*** .951*** .954*** .952*** .952*** .953*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Male 1.046 1.027 1.058 1.029 1.030 1.044 
 (.215) (.212) (.216) (.212) (.212) (.214) 
Constant 1.518 .944 2.053 .997 1.195 1.409 
 (.927) (.567) (1.249) (.595) (.701) (.848) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.12.2: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in parliament items explaining 
behavioural intention to vote for a radical party 
Dependent Variable: Vote Radical  
Independent 
Variables: 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective 1.197*** 
     
 
(.073) 
     Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
 
1.124** 
    
  
(.066) 
    Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
  
1.173*** 
   
   
(.072) 
   Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
   
1.128** 
  
    
(.069) 
  Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
    
1.125* 
 
     
(.068) 
 Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
     
1.105 
Controls 
     
(.071) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 1.128*** 1.121*** 1.130*** 1.115** 1.116** 1.113** 
 (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
2.Middle level 
Education 1.324 1.286 1.256 1.271 1.250 1.265 
 (.382) (.369) (.361) (.364) (.358) (.362) 
3.Higher Level 
Education 1.187 1.139 1.114 1.128 1.109 1.110 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.356) (.339) (.332) (.335) (.329) (.329) 
Age .985*** .985*** .984*** .986*** .985*** .985*** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Male 2.322*** 2.343*** 2.354*** 2.332*** 2.330*** 2.336*** 
 (.418) (.420) (.423) (.418) (.417) (.418) 
Constant .0737*** .104*** .0838*** .107*** .110*** .118*** 
 (.040) (.055) (.045) (.055) (.056) (.062) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.12.3: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in parliament items explaining 
behavioural intention to leave the country 
Dependent Variable: Leave UK 
Independent 
Variables: 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective 1.300*** 
     
 
(.088) 
     Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
 
1.198*** 
    
  
(.078) 
    Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
  
1.137* 
   
   
(.076) 
   Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
   
1.188** 
  
    
(.080) 
  Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
    
1.193*** 
 
     
(.079) 
 Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
     
1.110 
Controls 
     
(.078) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 1.051 1.045 1.037 1.033 1.036 1.026 
 (.049) (.049) (.048) (.048) (.048) (.048) 
2.Middle 
level 
Education 1.323 1.276 1.235 1.253 1.224 1.237 
 (.442) (.422) (.407) (.413) (.404) (.406) 
3.Higher 
Level 
Education 1.420 1.342 1.289 1.328 1.299 1.285 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.485) (.454) (.434) (.447) (.438) (.431) 
Age .962*** .962*** .963*** .963*** .963*** .964*** 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Male 1.846*** 1.861*** 1.889*** 1.855*** 1.847*** 1.871*** 
 (.361) (.361) (.365) (.359) (.358) (.362) 
Constant .174*** .266** .347* .295** .299** .410 
 (.102) (.152) (.201) (.167) (.167) (.234) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.12.4: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in parliament items explaining 
behavioural intention to attend a peaceful demonstration 
Dependent Variable: Peaceful Demo 
Independent 
Variables: 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retro 
Parliament 
Moral 
Retro 
Parliament 
Interest 
Retro 
Parliament 
Technical 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Moral 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Interest 
Prosp 
Parliament 
Technical 
Retrospective .992 
     
 
(.058) 
     Parliament 
Moral 
Retrospective 
 
1.015 
    
  
(.056) 
    Parliament 
Interest 
Retrospective 
  
1.039 
   
   
(.060) 
   Parliament 
Technical 
Prospective 
   
1.021 
  
    
(.059) 
  Parliament 
Moral 
Prospective 
    
1.090 
 
     
(.062) 
 Parliament 
Interest 
Prospective 
     
1.063 
Controls 
     
(.064) 
Left-Right 
Ideology .849*** .853*** .857*** .853*** .860*** .858*** 
 (.034) (.034) (.035) (.034) (.034) (.034) 
2.Middle level 
Education 1.376 1.380 1.371 1.379 1.360 1.371 
 (.373) (.374) (.371) (.373) (.369) (.371) 
3.Higher Level 
Education 1.611* 1.618* 1.611* 1.619* 1.612* 1.611* 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.445) (.447) (.444) (.447) (.445) (.445) 
Age .990** .989** .989** .989** .989** .989** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Male 1.267 1.264 1.264 1.263 1.253 1.259 
 (.204) (.203) (.203) (.203) (.202) (.203) 
Constant 1.197 1.060 .941 1.037 .768 .857 
 (.596) (.516) (.465) (.502) (.364) (.417) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.13.1: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in preferred party items explaining 
behavioural intention to abstain in an election 
Dependent Variable: Abstain 
Independent 
Variables: 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Party 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party Technical 
Retrospective 1.376*** 
     
 
(.104) 
     Party Moral 
Retrospective 
 
1.358*** 
    
  
(.102) 
    Party Interest 
Retrospective 
  
1.338*** 
   
   
(.095) 
   Party Technical 
Prospective 
   
1.301*** 
  
    
(.098) 
  Party Moral 
Prospective 
    
1.268*** 
 
     
(.091) 
 Party Interest 
Prospective 
     
1.264*** 
Controls 
     
(.092) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 1.025 1.036 1.021 .999 1.003 1.000 
 (.054) (.055) (.053) (.051) (.051) (.051) 
2.Middle level 
Education .727 .737 .729 .788 .777 .765 
 (.234) (.237) (.234) (.253) (.249) (.245) 
3.Higher Level 
Education .492** .522* .491** .540* .538* .525* 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.167) (.177) (.167) (.183) (.182) (.178) 
Age .952*** .952*** .953*** .955*** .954*** .955*** 
 (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
Male 1.052 1.075 1.044 1.056 1.073 1.040 
 (.218) (.223) (.216) (.218) (.221) (.214) 
Constant .634 .600 .693 .768 .868 .880 
 (.372) (.363) (.404) (.452) (.505) (.513) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.13.2: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in preferred party items explaining 
behavioural intention to vote for a radical party 
Dependent Variable: Vote Radical 
Independent 
Variables: 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Party 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party Technical 
Retrospective 1.025 
     
 
(.065) 
     Party Moral 
Retrospective 
 
.963 
    
  
(.062) 
    Party Interest 
Retrospective 
  
.970 
   
   
(.059) 
   Party Technical 
Prospective 
   
.890* 
  
    
(.059) 
  Party Moral 
Prospective 
    
.828*** 
 
     
(.054) 
 Party Interest 
Prospective 
     
.863** 
Controls 
     
(.055) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 1.103** 1.092** 1.095** 1.092** 1.084* 1.088** 
 (.047) (.047) (.047) (.046) (.046) (.046) 
2.Middle level 
Education 1.263 1.270 1.271 1.244 1.223 1.258 
 (.361) (.363) (.363) (.356) (.351) (.360) 
3.Higher Level 
Education 1.106 1.102 1.108 1.082 1.048 1.080 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.327) (.326) (.328) (.321) (.312) (.321) 
Age .986*** .986*** .986*** .985*** .985*** .984*** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Male 2.372*** 2.362*** 2.370*** 2.364*** 2.343*** 2.384*** 
 (.424) (.422) (.424) (.423) (.421) (.428) 
Constant .170*** .227*** .218*** .317** .441 .369* 
 (.0872) (.119) (.111) (.164) (.227) (.190) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.13.3: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in preferred party items explaining 
behavioural intention to leave the coluntry 
Dependent Variable: Leave UK 
Independent 
Variables: 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Party 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party Technical 
Retrospective 1.042 
     
 
(.072) 
     Party Moral 
Retrospective 
 
1.016 
    
  
(.070) 
    Party Interest 
Retrospective 
  
.981 
   
   
(.065) 
   Party Technical 
Prospective 
   
1.120 
  
    
(.078) 
  Party Moral 
Prospective 
    
1.045 
 
     
(.070) 
 Party Interest 
Prospective 
     
.996 
Controls 
     
(.068) 
Left-Right 
Ideology 1.019 1.016 1.012 1.020 1.017 1.014 
 (.047) (.048) (.047) (.047) (.047) (.046) 
2.Middle level 
Education 1.232 1.236 1.240 1.262 1.246 1.237 
 (.405) (.406) (.407) (.416) (.409) (.406) 
3.Higher Level 
Education 1.279 1.284 1.282 1.320 1.298 1.280 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) (.429) (.431) (.430) (.444) (.436) (.430) 
Age .965*** .965*** .965*** .965*** .965*** .965*** 
 (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
Male 1.901*** 1.902*** 1.899*** 1.908*** 1.906*** 1.899*** 
 (.366) (.367) (.366) (.368) (.368) (.366) 
Constant .553 .614 .718 .400 .543 .672 
 (.308) (.350) (.397) (.225) (.302) (.375) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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Table 6.13.4: Binary logistic regressions for distrust in preferred party items explaining 
behavioural intention to attend a peaceful demonstration 
 
Dependent Variable: Peaceful Demo 
Independent 
Variables: 
Party 
Technical 
Retro 
Party 
Moral 
Retro 
Party 
Interest 
Retro 
Party 
Technical 
Prosp 
Party 
Moral 
Prosp 
Party 
Interest 
Prosp 
Party Technical 
Retrospective 
.883**      
 
(.033)      
Party Moral 
Retrospective 
 .869**     
 
 (.053)     
Party Interest 
Retrospective 
  .859***    
 
  (.050)    
Party Technical 
Prospective 
   .857**   
 
   (.054)   
Party Moral 
Prospective 
    .814***  
 
    (.049)  
Party Interest 
Prospective 
     .830*** 
Controls      (.206) 
Left-Right 
Ideology .839*** .833*** .836*** .843*** .837*** .840*** 
 (.054) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.033) 
2.Middle level 
Education 1.406 1.400 1.402 1.349 1.342 1.370 
 (.382) (.381) (.382) (.366) (.366) (.373) 
3.Higher Level 
Education 1.630* 1.593* 1.620* 1.574 1.540 1.573 
(ref.cat. Low 
Educ) 
(.452) (.442) (.449) (.436) (.429) (.437) 
Age .989** .989** .989** .988** .988** .988** 
 (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) 
Male 1.266 1.252 1.259 1.257 1.245 1.269 
 (.050) (.050) (.050) (.050) (.050) (.050) 
Constant 1.945 2.158 2.251* 2.244* 2.861** 2.624** 
 (.925) (1.039) (1.067) (1.082) (1.376) (1.264) 
Note: Entries are odds ratios, standard errors in parentheses. Significance *** p<.01, ** p<.05. 
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APPENDIX J 
 
Full survey-questionnaire used in the analysis: 
 
Introduction: Thank you for participating in our survey. This study is conducted by 
researchers from the London School of Economics (LSE). Our study looks at different ways 
people read the news.  
 
Q6: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your use of 
the news?  
 
1. I use the news to see how politicians stand on issues 
2. I use the news to keep up with important political issues 
3. I use the news to help me make up my mind about things 
4. I often try to relate what I see on TV news or read in the newspaper to my own 
personal experiences 
5. I often try to think about how what I see on TV news or read in the newspaper relates 
to other things I know 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
 
And how well do the following statements describe your own personality?  
 
Q7: I see myself as someone who … 
1. …is reserved.  
2. …is generally trusting.  
3. …handles stress well.  
4. …is outgoing, sociable.  
5. …tends to find fault with others.  
6. …gets nervous easily.  
7. …prefers to listen than to speak. 
8. …tries to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
9. …likes to challenge my own thinking abilities. 
10. …prefers simple to complex problems. 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
Q8: And to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me 
2. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective 
4. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies (R) 
5. I listen to what my "gut" or "heart" says in many situations 
6. I try not to let feelings guide my actions * 
7. My feelings tell me a lot about how to act in a given situation 
8. Feelings are a valuable source of information 
9. Feelings only interfere with behavior * 
(1) Strongly disagree __ (7) Strongly agree 
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We would also like to know more about your personal opinions on politics in the UK and 
Europe.  
 
Q9: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
9. On the whole, democracy works quite well in the UK 
10. Society has improved over the past fifty years 
11. On the whole, UK politicians are rather good 
12. Ultimately, our children will probably live a happier life than our generation 
13. The situation of our country really depends on world finance and companies, 
ultimately government has no influence 
14. We should recognize that some large segments of society are keen on making 
everyone else’s life miserable and cannot be helped 
15. In the UK, the school system is a big failure 
16. Administrations make life worse and not better for UK citizens 
17. It is a good thing that we all have a passport that says ‘European Union – United 
Kingdom’ 
18. It is a good thing that European Union citizens who live in another European Union 
country can vote in local elections in the town where they live 
19. On the whole, it would be a good thing if we could travel from Britain to France or 
Germany without having to pass border control formalities  
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
 
Q10: Taking everything into consideration, would you say that the United Kingdom ...? 
 
(1) has on balanced benefited or ... 
(2) has not benefited from being a member of the European Union?  
 
 
Q11: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
1. When I enter a polling station, I clearly have the feeling that I have a responsibility on 
my shoulders  
2. When I decide who to vote for, I think of what is good for my country rather than 
what is good for myself 
3. I think that in an election, if everyone votes for the party who would best defend their 
interest, the final result will likely be bad for society as a whole 
4. In general, I tend to vote in all elections 
5. When I go to vote, I often feel that the way I vote can influence the way my country is 
governed 
6. When I go to vote, I often feel that if many people feel and vote the way I do it can 
influence the way my country is governed 
7. On the whole I feel that I have a rather good understanding of the key political 
choices facing my country 
8. I feel that I am not sufficiently knowledgeable to know what is right or not for our 
country 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
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Q12: When you think of Parliament as an institution, to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? 
 
1. In recent years, I would say that Parliament has usually acted in a competent manner 
in the case of technically complex questions 
2. In recent years, I would say that Parliament has usually acted in a moral manner in the 
case of ethically difficult questions 
3. In recent years, I would say that Parliament has usually acted in accordance with my 
political preferences in the case of ideologically divisive questions 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
Q13: Now, think of the party you would be most likely to vote for in the next general 
election. Thinking of this party, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
 
1. In recent years, I would say that this party has usually acted in a competent manner in 
the case of technically complex questions 
2. In recent years, I would say that this party has usually acted in a moral manner in the 
case of ethically difficult questions 
3. In recent years, I would say that this party has usually acted in accordance with my 
political preferences in the case of ideologically divisive questions 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
 
There is a lot of different ways the news is presented today. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements about the news? 
 
Q14: I like news that… 
 
1. …includes strong opinions 
2. …only describes facts 
3. …talks about people like me 
4. …shows what the ‘man on the street’ thinks 
5. …makes me think 
6. …makes me feel something 
7. …makes me learn something 
8. …gives me information about issues I am interested in. 
9. …focuses on people’s happiness. 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
 
Now a couple of questions about your personal media use. 
 
Q15: How often do you watch the following TV programs? 
 
1. BBC News 
2. Daily Politics 
3. Panorama 
4. ITV News 
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5. Channel 4 News 
6. Sky News 
7. Soap Operas (for example, ‘EastEnders’) 
8. Reality Shows (for example, ‘Come Dine with Me’) 
9. Talk Shows (for example, ‘The Jeremy Kyle Show’) 
(1) never 
(2) a few times a year 
(3) a few times a month 
(4) a few times a week 
(5) every day 
 
Q16: And how often do you read about politics on the Internet through one of the following 
sources? 
 
1. Internet news sites of newspapers or television channels 
2. Other internet news sites 
3. Blogs or discussion forums 
4. Social media (for example, Facebook or Twitter) 
5. Official party or government websites  
(1) never 
(2) a few times a year 
(3) a few times a month 
(4) a few times a week 
(5) every day 
 
Q17: How often do you talk about politics with… 
 
1. …your friends? 
2. …your family? 
3. …your co-workers and/or clients? 
(1) never 
(2) a few times a year 
(3) a few times a month 
(4) a few times a week 
(5) every day 
 
 
Q18: In political matters people talk of “left” and “right”. Where would you place your views 
on this scale?  
(1) left __ (10) right  
 
 
We have a number of parties in the United Kingdom, each of which would like to get your 
vote.  
 
Q19: How probable is it that you will ever vote for the following parties?  
 
Please specify your views on a 7-point scale where 1 means “not at all probable” and 7 means 
“very probable.” 
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1. Labour Party 
2. Conservative Party 
3. Liberal Democrat Party 
4. UK Independence Party 
5. Green Party 
6. British National Party 
7. Others (open ended) 
(1) – not at all probable – (7) – very probable 
 
 
Q20: If, for the sake of argument, you think of the election as the political equivalent of the 
Football World Cup Final between the Conservative and Labour parties, and you think of 
your own position as voter.  
 
Would you say that you were more like: 
1 Definitely a referee 
2 Mostly a referee 
4 Mostly a supporter 
5 Definitely supporter 
6 A bit of both 
7 Neither  
 
 
Please try to answer the following questions as spontaneously as possible. Don’t worry if you 
are not sure about the correct answer, just try to answer as many questions as you can.   
 
Q21: Which country is currently not part of the European Union? 
1. Ireland 
2. Austria 
3. Norway* 
4. Croatia 
5. I don’t know 
 
Q22: Who currently holds the position of ‘Chancellor of the Exchequer’? 
6. George Osborne* 
7. Alistair Darling 
8. Kenneth Clarke 
9. William Hague 
10. I don’t know 
 
Q23: When is the next UK general election planned? 
6. 2014 
7. 2015* 
8. 2016 
9. 2017 
10. I don’t know 
 
Q24: Who is the current president of the European Commission? 
1. José Manuel Barroso* 
2. Romano Prodi 
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3. Catherine Ashton 
4. Herman Van Rompuy 
5. I don’t know 
 
Q25: General elections in the United Kingdom are based on which voting system?  
6. First-past-the-post* 
7. Proportional representation 
8. Relative majority 
9. Preferential voting 
10. I don’t know 
 
Q26: When is the next European Parliament election planned? 
1. 2014* 
2. 2015 
3. 2016 
4. 2017 
5. I don’t know 
 
 
 
On the next page you will see three short news articles that have recently been published in 
the media.  
The articles will remain on the screen for a minimum of 1 minute, but you may take as much 
time as you like to read them. When you have finished, scroll down and click the arrow to 
move on.  
We will ask you to answer some questions about the news articles. 
Please note: Read the news articles carefully, as you will not be able to access them again 
later.  
Condition 1: National Actors*Negative Mobilizing 
Condition 2: National Actors*Negative Demobilizing 
Condition 3: National Actors*Positive Emotions 
Condition 4: EU Actors*Negative Mobilizing 
Condition 5: EU Actors*Negative Demobilizing 
Condition 6: EU Actors*Positive Emotions 
Condition 7: Outgroup Actors*Negative Mobilizing 
Condition 8: Outgroup  Actors*Negative Demobilizing 
Condition 9: Outgroup Actors*Positive Emotions 
Condition 10: Control Condition 
 
 
 
Q27: What are the first three words that come to your mind when you think of the three news 
articles you just read?_____ Open ended 
 
Q28: We are now interested in what you were feeling while reading the three news articles. 
Again, please put down the first three words that come to your mind._____ Open ended  
 
Q29: Imagine you had to explain the content of the news articles you just read to a friend in 
one sentence. What would you say? _____ Open ended  
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Q30: Please look at each of the following words and fill in the blanks with letters that will 
complete the word.  Please type the completed word into the corresponding text box. The 
completed word needs to be the same number of letters as is indicated in the prompt. 
 
1. Ha_ _ _   (happy / handy, hasty)  
2. Ang_ _   (anger, angry / angle, angel)  
3. Ho _ _   (hope / home, hose)  
4. Pla _ _   (plate, plane, plain) 
5. Fu _ _   (fury / fume, full)  
6. Go_ _   (good / gone, gold) 
7. Tr_ _ _  (trust / trees, train) 
8. Ba_   (bad / ban, bar, bay) 
 
 
Q31: To what extent did the news articles you read make you feel one or several of the 
following emotions?  
 
1. Disgusted 
2. Surprised 
3. Angry 
4. Fearful 
5. Outraged 
6. Anxious 
7. Enthusiastic 
8. Proud 
9. Hopeful 
10. Guilty 
11. Nervous  
12. Happy  
13. Sad 
14. Unhappy 
(1) Not at all – (7) very much 
 
 
Q32: Please also use the following pictures to rate how you felt while reading the news 
articles. Please place the slider close to the picture that describes your reaction to reading the 
news articles best.  
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Q33: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
1. The articles I just read featured people living in the United Kingdom 
2. The articles I just read featured people living in other European Union countries  
3. The articles I just read featured people living in the United States 
4. The articles I just read featured emotions such as anger and fury 
5. The articles I just read featured emotions such as sadness and fear 
6. The articles I just read featured emotions such as hope and enthusiasm 
7. The three articles I read focused on the same topic 
8. The three articles I read focused on different topics 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
  
Q34: Thinking back to the three news articles, to what extent do you agree or disagree with 
the following statements? 
1. The FamilyGo visiting scheme is a good idea  
2. The FamilyGo visiting scheme should be extended  
3. Visiting schemes, such as FamilyGo, are effective in improving conditions for elderly 
people living with their families 
4. The increasing number of elderly citizens is one of the most important issues our 
country is facing today 
5. The UK government should spend more money on care for the elderly 
6. The European Union should invest in improving care for the elderly 
7. The economic crisis in our country hit elderly people the hardest 
8. When I think of the way society treats the elderly, I tend to feel guilty 
(1) strongly disagree__ (7) strongly agree 
 
 
Thinking back to the news articles you read, how may what you have read affect your future 
behaviour?  
Q35: Do you think it makes you a lot less likely, a little bit less likely, neither more nor less 
likely, a little bit more likely or a lot more likely to … 
1. …vote in the next general elections 
2. …vote in the next European elections 
3. …volunteer in a nearby nursing home 
4. …donate money to a charity that supports older people 
5. …seek more information about how elderly people live in this country 
6. …try to save more money for your own retirement 
7. …openly voice your own opinion about the situation of the elderly in this country 
8. …be kinder to the people around you 
9. …talk to family and friends about the situation of elderly people in this country  
10. …help out an elderly neighbour, for example by going to the supermarket for them 
1 – a lot less likely 
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2 – a little bit less likely 
3 – neither more nor less likely 
4 – a little bit more likely 
5 – a lot more likely 
 
 
Q36: When you are unhappy with the situation in our country, would you consider the 
following reactions?  
9. Vote for one of the main parties which are not in power 
10. Abstain in elections 
11. Participate in a peaceful demonstration 
12. Sign a petition 
13. Vote for a radical or revolutionary party 
14. Cast a blank vote 
15. Participate in a violent demonstration 
16. Leave the UK and move to another country 
17. Join a political party 
18. Join a pressure group or NGO 
19. Create my own party 
20. Other 
1 – no, certainly not 
2 – no probably not 
3 – yes probably 
4 – yes certainly 
 
 
Q37: To what extent do you agree or disagree that the news articles you read were… 
 
1. …informative 
2. …raised important issues regarding the situation of the elderly in this country 
3. …relevant to British citizens 
4. …relevant to European Union citizens.  
 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
 
Q38: When you think of Parliament as an institution, to what extent do you agree or disagree 
with the following statements? 
 
1. When the country faces a technically complex challenge, I believe that Parliament 
would be likely to take the competent decision 
2. When the country faces a morally difficult decision, I believe that Parliament would 
be likely to take the right decision 
3. When the country faces a question on which many people may have different 
opinions, I believe that Parliament would be likely to take a decision that is close to my 
preferences 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
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Q39: Now, think of the party you would be most likely to vote for in the next general 
election. Thinking of this party, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
 
1. When the country faces a technically complex challenge, I believe that this party 
would be likely to take the competent decision 
2. When the country faces a morally difficult decision, I believe that this party would be 
likely to take the right decision  
3. When the country faces a question on which many people may have different 
opinions, I believe that this party would be likely to take a decision that is close to my 
preferences 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
 
Q40: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  
1. On the whole, I consider myself a European citizen 
2. I feel closer to fellow Europeans than, say, to people from the USA or China 
3. Europeans have certain values in common that make them closer together than they 
are to the rest of the world 
4. I could not imagine myself ever living in another European country  
Q41: Can you please tell us how strongly you identify with….:   
1. Europe 
2. The United Kingdom 
3. Your region 
4. Your town or village 
(1) – not strongly at all __ (7) very strongly  
 
 
Q42: If you think of what sometimes goes wrong in our country, to what extent do you think 
that the following are usually responsible:  
1. Our institutional system 
2. The European Union 
3. Our politicians 
4. All of us, the people 
5. Other countries 
6. Companies 
7. Bankers 
8. Foreigners 
9. Associations and pressure groups 
10. Other (open ended) 
(1) Not responsible at all 
(2) Not really responsible 
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(3) Somewhat responsible 
(4) Highly responsible 	  
 
Q43: Please indicate how much you trust each of the following institutions to usually take the 
right decisions: 
 
1. The British Government 
2. The British Parliament 
3. The European Parliament 
4. The European Commission 
(1) Do not trust at all __ (7) Have complete trust 
 
 
Q44: To what extent are you satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union?  
(1) Very dissatisfied __ (7) Very satisfied 
 
 
Q45: To what extent are you satisfied with the way democracy works in the United 
Kingdom?  
(1) Very dissatisfied __ (7) Very satisfied 
 
 
Q46: Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
 
1. Media report the news balanced and fair 
2. Media help society solving its problems  
3. Journalists care more about selling their story than being accurate in reporting the 
story 
4. The media can be trusted 
(1) strongly disagree __ (7) strongly agree 
  
 
Q47: Thinking back of the three news articles you read earlier, please write down in one 
sentence what you still remember of the articles:  
 
__ Open Ended  
 
 
**** Thank you! **** 
 
 
